G. A. Cohen, the Canadian philosopher who spent the last 20-plus years of his life teaching at Oxford and died of a sudden stroke one year after his retirement in 2009, at age 68, was among the most original left-wing political philosophers of the twentieth century. Three volumes of his papers, some already published and some not, are to be published posthumously and edited by his former students Michael Otsuka and Jonathan Wolff. This volume is the first in the series, and it covers three areas: luck egalitarianism, freedom and property, and ideal theory and political practice.
The title essay of the book, included here as its first chapter, was Cohen's most cited paper. Here, he enters into the “equality of what” debate that began with John Rawls's Theory of Justice, and was so named by Amartya Sen in a 1980 lecture. Cohen's “Currency” was published in 1989, eight years after Ronald Dworkin's seminal articles were published in Philosophy and Public Affairs, in which he reset the Rawlsian agenda by focusing on responsibility as a constraint on equality, to wit: Inequality is unacceptable if it is due to forces beyond the individual's control (which Dworkin called resources), but acceptable if it is the outcome of voluntary choice.
Cohen, who greatly admired Dworkin's contribution, saying that he had performed a most valuable service for egalitarian political philosophy by bringing to bear the sharpest tool of the antiegalitarian Right (personal responsibility), nevertheless critiqued Dworkin's “cut” between resources and choice, because it is not necessarily true that a person should be held responsible for all aspects of his or her choices (and preferences). Dworkin's striking example is of a person with expensive tastes: It is wrong that he or she be allocated more money than others to fulfill them. But Cohen writes: “I distinguish among tastes according to whether or not their bearers can reasonably be held responsible for the fact that their tastes are expensive” (p. 88). Thus, being imbued with expensive tastes in childhood by their aristocratic parents, and as adults being unable to make do with cheaper substitutes, individuals are entitled, at Cohen's bar of justice, to subsidy. Dworkin, however, argues that persons become responsible for their expensive tastes if they come to identify with them—are glad they have them—and do not consider them a burden, an addiction. A less fanciful example is of people who grow up in poorly resourced homes and neighborhoods, and who form preferences for life achievement that are too modest, with which they nevertheless “identify.” Are we to say that these people are not unjustly suffering due to the resource deficit that induced their modest hopes? (Earlier, Sen had given the examples of the “tamed housewife and battered slave”).
Cohen advocates a currency for justice he calls “access to advantage,” and distinguishes between “access” and “opportunity,” on the one hand, and on the other, demands that “advantage” include both resources and welfare, in some unknown combination. Dworkin's example of Tiny Tim, who has a happy disposition, but who, nevertheless, should receive a wheelchair at the bar of justice, shows that justice's concern cannot be only welfare; Cohen's example of a man who can move his arms as well and efficaciously as anyone else, but experiences great pain in doing so, shows that justice's concern cannot be only resources, for this man should (justly) receive pain-relieving medicine (provided by social insurance). Thus, Cohen argues that it is not either welfare or resources with which justice should be concerned, but some amalgam of them, the proportions of which he was never to specify.
The wonderful chapter entitled “Expensive Taste Rides Again” is a segment of a debate with Dworkin, who replied to Cohen's 1989 article, and here, Cohen replies to Dworkin's response. Several other chapters in this part take up Sen's view of justice as equality of capabilities, where a “capability” is the set of vectors of “functionings” available to an individual. Cohen praises Sen for locating an essential aspect of human flourishing, what he (Cohen) calls “midfare”—that state between having resources and experiencing welfare. (This characterizes most of Sen's functionings: e.g., being well nourished is midway between having food resources and enjoying welfare.) But he criticizes Sen for “athleticism” in using the term “capability” to characterize these states. Being free from malaria is definitely a midfare state, but it is not in any normal sense of the word something of which the person is capable. Nor is it a functioning—something the person is doing. An infant may be free of malaria by virtue of being administered medicine, but this is not by virtue of anything he or she does. Cohen argues this misidentification by Sen of his important discovery engenders ambiguity in his view.
Part II of the book, on freedom and property, reprints two essays, “Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat” and “Freedom and Money.” The second one is, in my view, absolutely fundamental. Here, Cohen attacks the right-wing view summarized in these two statements: 1) Freedom is compromised by (liability to) interference (by other people), but not by lack of means; and 2) To lack money is not to suffer (liability to) interference, but to lack means.
On the contrary, Cohen argues, having money is an “inus” condition of freedom, defined as “an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition” (p. 177). Suppose I try to leave a department store with a television set that I like. I will be prevented from doing so unless I hand over the ticket that stops that interference with my liberty—money. Money is tantamount to a license to relieve the restrictions on my freedom imposed by your ownership of the television set. Conservatives are at pains to deny this view, for as champions of freedom, if they did not, they would have to agree that poverty obstructs it and must be alleviated. Indeed, Cohen attacks conservatives for their inconsistency in focusing only upon the incursion of liberty involved in taxation, but not the incursion involved in the institution of private property, which prevents all but the owner from using the thing.
The other chapter in this part addresses the response that conservatives put to Marxists when they deny that proletarians are not forced to sell their labor power, because some fraction of them succeed in exiting the working class. Cohen's analogy here is to a room holding 10 people, with a lock on the door that will permit one and only one of them to leave. Is it reasonable to contend that the 10 are collectively free to leave the room? Certainly not, although even before anyone tries to leave, each is free to leave. Because capitalism requires a proletariat, Cohen says, it is therefore true that proletarians as a class are forced to sell their labor power, a fact that is not contradicted by the truth that some small number of them will succeed in exiting that state.
The third part of the book contains four chapters: Two are reprinted from the intellectual popular press (London Review of Books and New Left Review), one is excerpted from Cohen's book Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008), and the fourth is a wonderful lecture Cohen gave to beginning graduate students, entitled “How to Do Political Philosophy.” The first piece, “Mind the Gap,” is a review of Thomas Nagel's Equality and Partiality (1991). In that book, Nagel argues that, as concerns justice, both a personal and impersonal view are legitimate. According to the former, it is all right for parents to spend more on their children than on others' children, even if the latter are far worse-off; under the latter, justice requires equal concern for everyone. The “gap” is between how much the rich can reasonably be expected to sacrifice and how much the poor can reasonably be expected to demand. Nagel's view is that the gap is substantial, and Cohen critiques him for unacceptably privileging the status quo. Nine years later, Cohen published a book of essays entitled If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? (2001), which delved further into the skepticism he has concerning Nagel's gap. In that book, however, he never proposes a formula to set the proper size of the gap.
An afternote in this essay is important: Here, Cohen criticizes the publisher for a blurb on the cover of Nagel's book, stating, “Egalitarian communism has clearly failed.” If, Cohen says, this refers to the failure of the centrally planned economies, then it is a trivial statement with which nobody disagrees, but if it is a more general claim about the possibility of cooperative society, it is a “cheating short-cut around a crucial question of our age.” This, too, was to become the theme of Cohen's last book (not including the posthumous ones), Why Not Socialism? (2009), in which he argues that the major impediment to socialism is not a selfish human nature, but rather a knowledge of the economic design that would make it feasible.
The last chapter in this book excerpts from Cohen's second magnum opus, Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008), the first being his 1978 book, which established his reputation, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence. Rescuing is Cohen's mature critique of John Rawls, a philosopher whom he admired immensely. At the expense of oversimplifying, let me say that it makes two crucial points.
The first is that Rawls confuses principles of justice with rules of social regulation. A principle of justice captures our fundamental normative convictions, whereas the latter are rules we adopt to order our affairs in the light of what we expect the effect of adopting them to be. Examples of the former might be “equality” or “equal access to advantage,” while a rule of social regulation might be a tax policy that does not destroy the ambition of high fliers (as Cohen liked to call them) to earn a lot of money, thereby paying a substantial amount in taxes. Thus, Rawls calls the maximin allocation, which bows to the necessity of incentive pay, as “just,” while Cohen would call it a necessary evil.
One of the critical issues that Cohen focused upon is the “site” of distributive justice. Rawls writes that justice is concerned with social institutions, and not individual behavior. Thus, justice sets a tax policy that will maximize the well-being (or primary goods) of the worst-off, permitting high fliers to optimize selfishly against that policy in choosing their careers and labor supplies. Cohen believes that personal behavior should be at the site of justice as well, and so, in a just society, high fliers would be willing to accede to taxation that would make them, all things considered, no better-off than anyone else. For Cohen, justice means equality, and people are not behaving justly if they do not take those actions that engender equality (subject to the two caveats that there is some room for the personal viewpoint, and that differential responsible effort may entail unequal outcomes). What is the currency of equality? It is some amalgam of resources and welfare.
The second crucial idea in Rescuing is that what comprises justice does not depend upon facts about the world (in particular, human nature). Facts about the world surely are needed to set the right rules of social regulation, but not principles of justice. Principles of justice are of the form: If the facts about the world are A, then justice requires X; if the facts are B, then justice requires Y. This principle is independent of whether the facts are A or B. Cohen's argument is that whenever one thinks one has discovered a general principle of justice that depends upon some facts, further thought will show that it is actually derived from a more basic principle that does not depend upon the facts. There will, I expect, be substantial debate about Cohen's claim in the coming years.
Jerry Cohen, as he was universally known, evolved from having a quite conventional Marxist view of the world to being a socialist egalitarian with a set of views that were unique. Except for his first book, which was a grandiose attempt to reconstruct the theory of historical materialism using the tools of analytical philosophy, his intellectual development occurred through his acute critique of other philosophers: first Robert Nozick, and then Dworkin, Sen, and Rawls. He greatly admired these figures, including Nozick, who, he said, helped to “rous[e] me from what had been my dogmatic socialist slumber” (G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, [1995], p. 4). His left-wing upbringing imbued him with an uncompromising egalitarianism, and his intellectual life was devoted to exposing the fallacies in conservative justifications of capitalism and the weaknesses in the arguments of his fellow egalitarian travelers. Cohen was implacably a theorist who believed that having the right theory was certainly necessary and almost sufficient for building a cooperative and egalitarian society. This was why he devoted such care to correct argumentation, often subjecting his claims to critique from hypothetical opponents, and then responding to them.
In addition to displaying his acuity, expressive way of writing, and rigor, these papers illustrate another quality that is extremely valuable in a person with such persuasive powers: intellectual honesty. Cohen (and this attribute he shared with Rawls) was always willing to revise his arguments in the face of critique. He overcame vanity for the sake of devotion to the cause.
