In developed economies, owning land usually comes with paperwork such as a deed, a title, or some official proof of ownership. In many parts of Africa this paperwork is available, yet most farmers do not have it. Only about 15 percent of agricultural households hold a formal land title. Because land titles can help people protect what they own, it raises the basic question of why so few farmers hold titles even when they are available.
This question sits at the center of a recent study by political scientist Matthew Ribar. The study shows that low land titling rates are not driven by ignorance or lack of interest. Instead, they reflect local power structures and how national land systems interact with customary authorities on the ground.
Land titles increase security, encourage long-term investments such as planting permanent crops, and can raise agricultural output. For these reasons governments and donors have promoted land titling programs across Africa, but uptake varies widely. In some places, such as Ethiopia, about 79 percent of households have titles, while in others, such as Burkina Faso, fewer than 3 percent do. Ribar argues that households decide whether to title land by weighing costs against benefits, but those costs and benefits depend heavily on political context.
The study begins from the expectation that when land has high economic value, households should be more likely to secure it with a formal title. This expectation holds in many settings, but not everywhere. In some countries, valuable land leads to more titling. In others, it does not. Ribar shows that this difference depends on two factors: how land is governed at the national level, and how powerful customary authorities are at the local level. Customary institutions include traditional leaders who often control land access, resolve disputes, and influence land administration.
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The study combines several sources of data. First, it pulls together surveys from more than 170,000 rural households across 22 African countries, showing who actually has titles. It adds high-resolution geospatial data on the potential yield of 20 agricultural crops under a variety of conditions to measure how valuable land is and what returns farmers could get from investing in it. The study then groups countries as centralized or decentralized based on their land systems. Using these data together, Ribar finds that customary institutions can either impede or encourage titling, depending on the country’s system. In centralized countries, where the national government makes most land decisions, strong local leaders tend to slow things down. They resist because formal titles take away their control over land matters. In decentralized countries, where local governments and leaders have more say, strong local leaders actually push titling forward. They take over the local process, guide applications, and use titles to help their supporters or keep power in their hands.
The study then turns to a detailed case study of Côte d’Ivoire, using original survey data from 801 households and 194 customary leaders. In villages with strong local leaders, like chiefs, far more families have titles, but chiefs control the committees and favor their own people. They support titling to reduce fights and build local order, or sometimes to reward allies. When chiefs push it, titling rises; when they resist, it stays low even on good land. This helps explain why land titling varies sharply even within the same country. National laws alone do not determine outcomes as local political incentives matter just as much.
Land titling is not only a legal or technical process but a political one, shaped by local authority and long-standing relationships. Understanding these dynamics helps explain why similar land reforms produce very different outcomes across Africa. ■
