I. INTRODUCTION
According to the first reactions of the economic literature—and the greatest majority of textbooks, even nowadays—An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science by Lionel Robbins is the manifesto of a concept of the economist as a mere engineer of maximization procedures (Cannan Reference Cannan1932; Souter Reference Souter1933; Knight Reference Knight1934a,Reference Knightb; Harrod Reference Harrod1938), considering economic laws in analogy with mathematical and physical ones (Daly 1940), with predictive capabilities about human behavior (Klein Reference Klein1988). Some authors have pointed at Robbins's alleged intransigent deductivism as if he had rejected inductive methods in economics (Talamona Reference Talamona1960) in the debate on the relationship between positive and normative economics (Hutschison 1964). Others have even hinted at him as a supporter of the homo oeconomicus (Fraser Reference Fraser1932, p. 563; Parsons Reference Parsons1934, p. 513; Knight Reference Knight1934b, p. 227). But the criticism that most hurt Robbins (Reference Robbins1971a, p. 147) was the accusation of having “castrated” the economic profession, placing the economist in a sort of ivory tower (Fraser Reference Fraser1932; Nabers Reference Nabers and Roy Krupp1966; Linstromberg Reference Linstromberg1969), detached from reality and from any involvement in social and political choices.
The most astonishing aspect is that Robbins's autobiography is itself a testimony of civil and political action (Robbins Reference Robbins1971a; O'Brien Reference O'Brien1988b). He was in fact a man of action, not only academically as an energetic leader of the London School of Economics. He was a member of some secret committees for the Economic Advisory Council of the British Government;Footnote 1 he was later appointed head of the Economic Section of the War Cabinet; he was among the founders of the Federal Union association, which gathered prominent intellectuals to promote the idea of a federal union of Britain and France during the Second World War (Chaning-Pearce Reference Chaning-Pearce1940; Mayne et al. Reference Mayne, Pinder and Roberts1990; Ransome Reference Ransome1991). After the war he was an outstanding figure of British institutional and political life. Also, Robbins's scientific production is a demonstration of his engagement, as an economist, in questions of political economy, economic policy, and public management.
Nevertheless, this apparent contradiction disappears if Robbins's epistemology is considered looking at the Essay as only one step in a more general discourse that occupied all his scientific and public life, showing that Robbins was not an intransigent deductivist; he rejected the idea of a rational, maximizing homo oeconomicus and was certainly against any determinism. But mainly he was not at all for an ivory tower concept of economics—far from reality and isolated from the other social sciences.
Apart from Robbins (Reference Robbins1981) himself—who in the Ely Lecture in front of the American Economic Association, just three years before his death, made a final attempt to make himself properly understood on his attitude towards economics, political economy, politics, and the role of the economist in society—some suggestions along this alternative interpretation have been already expressed. Thirty-five years ago, in the Preface to a collected volume of Essays in Honour of Lord Robbins, Maurice H. Peston and Bernard A. Corry (Reference Peston and Corry1972, p. vii) wrote, referring to the Essay, that “the purpose of that book is misunderstood as an ‘attack’ on economists indulging in political economy. Far from this being the case, as Robbins's own contributions demonstrate, it is a clarification of the conditions under which economic science relates to political economy.” After Robbins's death, an interesting debate on the same questions took place in The Economic Journal between Denis P. O'Brien (Reference O'Brien1988a, Reference O'Brien1989) and Richard Wright (Reference Wright1989). More recently, Marcia L. Balisciano and Steven G. Medema (Reference Balisciano and Medema1999) and Susan Howson (Reference Howson2005) have stressed the importance of his engagement, as a political economist, in the scientific reflection and public management of the British artistic heritage. But, apart from these and some more hints, confined to only a few lines, an attempt to assemble a coherent picture on Robbins's contribution to the role of the economist in society has not yet been made.
The aim of this paper is to systematically enquire into the relationship Robbins sets in his writings—prior to the Essay and further brought out in several subsequent works—between economic science and political economy in order to understand the role of each in the work of the economist, thus hopefully contributing to a reconsideration of the place occupied by the Essay and by Robbins himself in the history of economic thought.
The paper reflects a chronological order, from some of his early writings and the two editions of the Essay to later contributions.
II. POLITICS, ETHICS AND THE BOUNDARIES OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE
As it is known (Howson Reference Howson2004, p. 416), Robbins starts his studies at the London School of Economics in the early 1920s with the intention to specialize in the history of political ideas. Only a couple of years later he decides to abandon it as “it seemed so futile to go on studying it… . Economics seems more fruitful in practical results and capable of yielding greater intellectual satisfaction.”Footnote 2 Crossing the line from political science to economics, Robbins needs a deeper reflection on the different contents of both fields and a stronger consciousness supporting his choice. Thirty years later, in a letter to John Maurice Clark dated 1 March 1951, Robbins writes: “that I eventually crossed over and made Economics my chief interest was due directly to the fact that I felt it threw light on problems of politics I had been studying from the other side… . The Nature and Significance was always intended to be a sort of preliminary manifesto designed to forestall the criticism that I did not know where the borderline between the different disciplines really lay.”
But Robbins starts to struggle with the two questions of definition and demarcation of economics long before writing the Essay. When, in 1926, Ralph G. Hawtrey publishes The Economic Problem, Robbins (Reference Robbins1927) immediately takes the opportunity to write down the results of all his earlier reflections and reacts with a review article, published in Economica, where he tries to defend the classical economists from Hawtrey's critique on the very question of the boundaries of economic science. The first attack is on the mixture of economics with ethics. As he puts it: “In the past, economists have generally agreed that ethical criticism was not part of their business as economists” (in italics in the original; Robbins Reference Robbins1927, p. 14). Hawtrey (Reference Hawtrey1926, p. 184), on the contrary, pretends that “economics cannot be dissociated from ethics.” In order to cut the difference between the economic and the ethical problems, Robbins (Reference Robbins1927, p. 177) uses a humorous paradoxFootnote 3:
Shut Mr. Hawtrey into a room together with Lenin, Confucius, Mohammed, Buddha, and the designer of the Maya altar pieces… . No doubt they would agree that the good, the true, and the beautiful were everywhere desirable. But when they came to define these terms, a difference of opinion would be probable. On the other hand ask them to produce a report on the causes of change in the rate of interest, and it is possible that Mr. Hawtrey might succeed in eliciting no inconsiderable unanimity—Lenin perhaps dissenting.
The economist possesses a specific knowledge about the relationship among some variables that are founding elements of the economic system. Robbins distinguishes this specific knowledge (which he will later name economics) from the use one can make of it as a member of a wider community tackling with political questions. Some lines afterwards, he states:
This is not to say that economists should not deliver themselves on ethical or normative questions, any more than an argument that botany is not concerned with aesthetics is to say that botanists should not have views of their own on the laying-out of gardens. Whatever may be our philosophical views as to the possibility of scientific ethics, as social beings we have to assume some such conception, and there is no reason why economists alone among their fellows should deny themselves the liberty of dogmatising. On the contrary, it is highly desirable that they should not do so… . All that I am pleading for here is that we should preserve that separation of science from what at best must remain pure opinion, which has emerged so hardily from the irrationality of the pre-scientific era. By all means let us be willing to spill our opinions on the public. By all means let us try to make our categorical imperative the categorical imperative.
But for the repute of that little area of knowledge which we can fence off from the wilderness of velleity and dogma, do not let us pretend to be talking economic science. Some day perhaps we may persuade the world that we understand those phenomena we call economic. Let us beware lest we jeopardise even this title to respect by claiming the same sanctions for judgments of value
(Robbins Reference Robbins1927, pp. 177–178).Economists belong to a professional corporation that shares some tools of analysis which prove to be particularly suitable and helpful for understanding everyday processes. As “social beings,” that is as part of a wider community facing collective choices, economists have the opportunity (and possibly the duty) to use such technical knowledge when expressing value judgments. Actually, the economist must use the apparatus of economic science, with its logical implications concerning choices, when introducing value judgments to express opinions as a citizen, and this is precisely what he would later call political economy. Robbins seems to suggest that, far from weakening the role of the economist in society, these arguments set the proper framework for gaining credibility as policy advisors: when purified from opinions, economics can aspire at being a scientific and credible domain of reflection at the service of policy action.
These elements will be restated in the 1932 text, although within a wider, more ambitious but probably more ambiguous framework. In the Preface to the first edition of the Essay Robbins explicitly writes: “The purpose of this Essay is twofold. In the first place it seeks to arrive at precise notions concerning the subject-matter of Economic Science and the nature of the generalizations of which Economic Science consists. Secondly it attempts to explain the limitations and the significance of these generalizations, both as a guide to the interpretation of reality and as a basis for political practice” (1932, p. vii).
Economic science is a specific subject matter to be defined in order to know how it can best serve the interpretation of reality and the design of policy prescriptions. Until this is properly done, “the reputation of Economics suffers, and full advantage is not taken of the knowledge it confers” (1932, p. vii). The motive behind the scientific effort to write the Essay is clearly expressed as the need to distinguish and define economics as an apparatus of scientific knowledge and give it the credibility it requires to participate in the public political debate. In fact, in chapter V on “Economic Generalizations and Reality,” he stresses the relationship between the theoretical content of economic science and the concrete observable phenomena: “The fruitful conduct of realistic studies can only be undertaken by those who have a firm grasp of analytical principle and some notion of what can and what cannot legitimately be expected” (1932, p. 106).
The relationship between facts and theories is bidirectional: theories are designed to interpret facts and these help modeling and changing unsuccessful theories. When tested against facts, some generalizations may prove wrong and “we may even conclude that the theory is fallacious. It is indeed well known that this has happened again and again in the course of the history of theory… . Only by continuous sifting and scrutiny of the changing body of facts can such misapprehensions be avoided” (1932, p. 107). Some pages further, he adds: “By ‘trying-out’ pure theory on concrete situations and referring back to pure theory residual difficulties, we may hope continually to improve and extend our analytical apparatus” (1932, p. 109).
Nevertheless, this does not imply that a sort of final, true theory will be achieved that will be able to perfectly understand and predict all concrete phenomena, because this would be “just pseudo-scientific bravado” (1932, p. 109). Robbins means to distinguish economics as a science from a mere techniqueFootnote 4 and from mathematics or physics. Physical sciences have no open choice: their scholars try to find the true laws able to explain the mechanical and deterministic relationship among physical variables (Robbins Reference Robbins1932, p. 83). Economics is founded on human beings, each with his or her almost infinite needs, scarce means, and different choices of satisfaction. Any accusation of determinism should melt down in front of Robbins's idea of individuals as perfectly sovereign in the process of choice: “the [economic] problem is one of adjustment to the situation that is given” (1932, p. 52), in its time evolution. The economic problem is the continuous adjustment to ever-changing conditions, not a mechanical, deterministic game.Footnote 5 In fact, Robbins's very critical attitude towards empiricism is that it pretends to extract general laws always valid irrespective of a continuously changing environment. Historical data series might be useful to understand the past but certainly not to predict the future.Footnote 6 Economic science is a theoretical reasoning indispensable to the interpretation of reality but is not capable of conducing to scientific policy prescriptions, irrespective of individual or collective value judgments that can be attached.
Another important aspect of the Essay which is worth emphasizing is the idea of society it expresses. Contrary to what most critics have argued, it does not support a social dimension where individual sovereignty degenerates, at the aggregate level, in a mere atomistic collection of preferences, where humans are impersonal maximizing agents acting on a purely rational calculus. This is not Robbins's social vision—it is only a caricature of it.
Individuals cannot be said to be rational agents in the sense of maximizing utility functions, although they should be considered rational for their capacity to adapt to changing environmental conditions: “conduct is the resultant of conflicting psychological pulls acting within an environment of given material and technical possibilities” (1932, p. 34). Economics is therefore the science that allows one to properly understand most implications of individuals confronting choices. Of course, the stress on the importance of individual sovereignty in the process of choice can be read as the result of an atomistic concept of society (“atomistic individualism,” as Harvey W. Peck (Reference Peck1936, p. 496) has put it) where, therefore, no collective action is legitimate and a social body can be conceived merely as the sum of individual pulses. The decision to use the example of Robinson Crusoe might again induce misinterpretation. As Frank H. Knight (Reference Knight1934a, p. 359) critically observed: “a society made up of such individuals is essentially an aggregation of Crusoes, each on a separate economic island.”
But Robinson Crusoe economics is for Robbins just a first-step “expository device,” exactly as the homo oeconomicus is “a first approximation used very cautiously at one stage in the development of arguments which, in their full development, neither employ any such assumption nor demand it in any way for the justification of the procedure” (1932, p. 90). Actually, Robbins is particularly critical towards the Crusoe economics, for it helps him to criticize Edwin Cannan's foundation of economics on wealth. Such a foundation, observes Robbins (Reference Robbins1932, p. 10), applies to “the activities of a man isolated completely from society and enquiring what conditions will determine his wealth—that is to say his material welfare” but cannot be valid when social interaction takes place.
Robbins, far from “individualistic atomism,” and anticipating the wider and deeper reflections of Economic Planning and International Order (1937a), underlines how the society needs a set of constitutional rules governing individual freedom:
it is clearly necessary to assume a social order within which the valuations based upon it may show themselves in tendencies to action… . We assume a legal framework of economic activity. This framework, as it were, limits by exclusion the area within which the valuations of the economic subject may influence their action. It prescribes a region in which one is not free to adopt all possible expedients (1932, p. 93).
The major question becomes, then, whether economists as such should contribute to the definition of such a framework. But Robbins does not neatly recognize the centrality of this problem until later.
As we have earlier suggested, among the many critiques Robbins received for the Essay, the one that most struck him was that his epistemology seemed to exclude economists from an important market: policy advice. Lindley Fraser concluded his long, critical review article titled “How Do We Want Economists to Behave?” published in The Economic Journal in December 1932, writing: “Let us hope that economists in general will not forget that in the social studies the end of knowledge is action” (Fraser Reference Fraser1932, p. 570). Robbins therefore collected all the material published on his Essay after its publication and decided he had better clarify some points.
Three years later the second edition was ready for publication. The criticism by Lindley M. Fraser had touched Robbins's sensitiveness so much that the most evident difference between the two editions (1932; 1935) is chapter V on “Economic Generalizations and Reality,”Footnote 7 where he tries to stress again the relationship between economics as a science and concrete phenomena, observable in everyday experience. Robbins opens the chapter writing:
It is a characteristic of scientific generalizations that they refer to reality. Whether they are cast in a hypothetical or categorical form, they are distinguished from the propositions of pure logic and mathematics by the fact that in some sense their reference is to that which exists, or that which may exist, rather than to purely formal relations (1935, p. 104).
And in the following page he adds: “it is a complete mistake to regard the economist, whatever his degree of purity, as concerned merely with pure deduction…. The concern of the economist is the interpretation of reality” (1935, p. 105). Robbins explicitly recognizes that he agrees with John Stuart Mill's statement that “a person is not likely to be a good economist who is nothing else” (1935, p. ix). As he would later explain, in the second edition of the Essay, “I definitely stated that it is only if one knows how the machine runs or can run that one is entitled to say how it ought to run” (Robbins Reference Robbins1971a, p. 148).
III. ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
Irrespective of the changes made to the Essay, Robbins realizes that something is still missing. In the Essay he had tried to define economics; the next step is to show what he meant for political economy, as distinguished from economics but based on its tools of analysis. He hints again at the difference between the two in the Introduction (Robbins Reference Robbins and Wicksteed1933) to The Common Sense of Political Economy by Philip H. Wicksteed, where he stresses that the content of the book “is not political economy. It is, on the contrary, the most exhaustive non-mathematical exposition of the technical and philosophical complications of the so-called marginal theory of pure Economics” (Robbins Reference Robbins and Wicksteed1933, p. xii). But such a simple statement was certainly inadequate to explain the relationship between the two.
The result of his reflections is Economic Planning and International Order. In his Autobiography, Robbins (Reference Robbins1971a, p. 150) recalls how the 1937 book (which was actually written in the summer of 1935, as it collected some lectures he gave at the Institut des Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva) was “essentially an essay in what may be called Political Economy, as distinct from Economics in the stricter sense of the word” (Robbins Reference Robbins1937a, p. vii). In that book, Robbins makes use of the “technical apparatus of analytical Economics; but it applies this apparatus to the examination of schemes for the realization of aims whose formulation lies outside Economics; and it does not abstain from appeal to the probabilities of political practice when such an appeal has seemed relevant.” (Robbins Reference Robbins1937a, pp. vii–viii).
With that contribution, he also tries to demonstrate that political economy is within the domain of the economist, although on a different level from economics. Economics is the scientific ground and founding basis of any political economy discourse; it is the shared language and knowledge required to express the intimate relationship among variables upon which political confrontation is possible with full awareness of ideological implications.
The book was meant as a direct reply to those who accused him of social atomism, in the sense of lacking the idea of a collective body with its own problems of (collective) choice, and is mainly based on the explanation of a very different concept of planning from the way it was mostly used at those times. Planning is to be considered here the translation at the aggregate, social level of the idea of individual choice. Robbins writes: “To plan is to act with purpose, to choose; and choice is the essence of economic activity.” Planning also means a path towards the achievement of particular goals: “The essence of a plan is that it is an attempt to shape means to ends” (1937a, p. 224).
Each individual has its goals to pursue. But problems of coordination may arise from the fact that choice implies the use of scarce means: “as soon as there is more than one individual planning, the different plans may not harmonize … the result of our separate planning may be disorder and chaos. To avoid this, to secure that social relations involve a greater realization of individual plans rather than their mutual frustration, a co-ordinating apparatus, a social order, a social plan is necessary, … a co-ordinating apparatus with coercive power” (1937a, pp. 4–5).
This is the political economy aspect: the idea of a social order with coercive power implies a constitutional framework where market relations and individual plans are ruled. Planning is the negation of the collectivist pretension to control all relevant variables and resources; it is on the contrary a normative architecture that helps shaping and guaranteeing freedom of choice. This also implies that a social collective identity exists and must be guaranteed together with (we might even dare to say above) the individual ones. Society is not a mere aggregation of individuals. It is a complex system of interconnected and concentric groupsFootnote 8 (from single individuals to the world as a whole), each with its needs to be satisfied and collective choices to make, ruled according to a bottom-up principle for the allocation of competences that we would now call “subsidiarity” (Masini Reference Masini, Petricioli and Cherubini2007). In order to be sure that independent centers of choices may not degenerate in conflict, a precise political arrangement is necessary, thus implying that economics (based on choices) and politics (based on the co-ordination of choices plans) are interconnected (Robbins Reference Robbins1937a, p. 325).Footnote 9
Of course it might be maintained (Costabile Reference Costabile, Asso and Fiorito2007) that this is a particular architecture aiming at a political goal—maximizing the freedom of choice—and is therefore not neutral towards ends in Robbins's sense. But this is the very reason why he felt the urge to write a book of political economy, where his value judgments could be expressed upon but outside the scientific reasoning of economics. A society based on constitutional provisions leading to guarantee the maximum degree of freedom is not an economic, but a meta-economic, a political economy end.
By 1935—the time Robbins gives the lectures on which the 1937 book is based—his ideas on the relationships between economics and political economy are fully expressed. Whatever comes later can be considered interesting refinements and further reflections on other implications of it.
In 1938, for instance, urged by the increasing debate on such matters, Robbins goes back to clarify the relevance for economists to keep an eye on reality. In Live and Dead Issues in the Methodology of Economics he writes: “That the object of economics is to understand reality is not a proposition which is likely to be questioned by any economist” (Robbins Reference Robbins1938, p. 342) and he in fact quotes some passages from chapter V of the second edition of the Essay. But, some pages later, he adds: “the economist who thinks that his subject is capable of being used for policy without further appeal to social philosophy is cherishing a naïve conclusion” (1938, p. 345).
And it is quite evident that, as time went by, the need to justify the inclusion of political economy within the role of the economist in society had become more urgent. From the day Robbins arrived at the LSE to 1938, much had changed in the world situation and in the economic profession. Even from a mere academic point of view, if ten years earlier the top-priority strategy was still to make some room for chairs in an autonomous subject field called economics, now the goal was to expand it through internal specialization: “In a subject so wide as economics it is natural that there should develop some division of labour, that some should specialize on the more theoretical developments, some on description and verification” (Robbins Reference Robbins1938, p. 352). For this reason he seems to be more indulgent towards a more catholic method: “we need both induction and deduction, observation and theoretical system; and that the important thing is to suit the method to the job” (Robbins Reference Robbins1938, p. 352).
One year later, with The Economic Causes of War, he comes again to the demarcation question. In a note of the Appendix, Robbins writes: “I have dealt with this problem at some length in my Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2nd ed., chaps. i and ii… . What follows may therefore be regarded as a supplement to these chapters. The solution here offered is entirely consistent with the somewhat radical approach of the general methodology there presented” (1939b, p. 117). Although the “solution” offered there looks more ambiguous than in the Essay, in the attempt to isolate specific “economic causations” in historical processes, it is clear that Robbins's discourse is inclined to allow for a wider range of possible methods and interests. But this does not mean that they should be mixed up.
As he states in a lecture at the LSE in 1939, considering the economist's engagement in economic policy: “A Theory of economic policy, in the sense of a body of precepts for action, must take its ultimate criterion outside economics” (1952, p. 177). Economic policy, which Robbins (Reference Robbins1952, p. 2) defines as “the general body of principles of governmental action or inaction—the agenda or non-agenda of the state as Bentham called them—in regard to economic activity,” is the field were economists apply their scientific knowledge—economics—to the achievement of particular goals, which lie outside that knowledge but within their commitment as “social beings.” As Medema (Reference Medema2007, p. 333) writes about Robbins's (Reference Robbins1952) book on The Theory of Economic Policy in the British Classical Political Economy, he “has elegantly laid out the case for the reformist nature of the classical economists, who were critical of a number of the institutional arrangements of their time and highly optimistic that the insights of political economy could be used to point economic policy in a direction that would be beneficial to society. This new science would be an indispensable part of the policy-making process and help to arrest the more negative effects of partisan advocacy within that process.” Robbins sympathized with such an attitude.Footnote 10
IV. ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN ROBBINS'S LATER WRITINGS
As it is known, the war keeps Robbins away from academic reflection and he becomes an economic advisor of the British Government. War might seem to have represented a turning point for Robbins, as he himself suggests. In 1954 he publishes a book where he collects some previous works, among which we can find the text of Robbins's (Reference Robbins1949) oration delivered on the 53rd Anniversary of the Foundation of the LSE, where he declares he has changed his mind on the “practical utility” (p. 8) of economics. He states:
Before the war I should have been disposed to claim speculative value for the principle of economics: I should have argued, that is to say, that general economics was an almost indispensable preliminary to the higher flights of social philosophy and to general reflection on problems of policy… . But I should have been cautious in making very positive claims. The propositions of which we are certain seem so trite, the less obvious inferences are still so much a matter of dubiety, that I would not have pushed for the claim for the practical utility of economists in the day-to-day conduct of affairs.
Nevertheless, this apparent confession of conversion does not imply that he really changed his mind, as he later explains: “experience during the war has convinced me that … the trained economist has a substantial contribution to make in this sphere” (p. 8) and, a few lines later: “Nor have I very much sympathy with the view, sometimes expressed within the profession, that we should discourage interest in the remote and abstract and confine our speculations to problems which have a direct and obvious bearing on practice. That is not the way knowledge, even practical knowledge, advances” (p. 9). Far from being a demonstration of a changing opinion, it is the testimony of an increasing reinforcement of his previous convictions through personal experience. The war and his very well-known postwar activities give him the opportunity to apply his scientific knowledge to concrete public choices, as he himself had suggested in the 1930s to be the role of an economist.
The 1950s and 1960s are, for Robbins, the decades of an enormously increasing engagement in British public life and institutions (O'Brien Reference O'Brien1988b). In 1952 he becomes Trustee of the National Gallery and in 1953 of the Tate Gallery. From 1955 to 1981 he is a Director of the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden. From 23rd January 1958 he is appointed Life Peer. From 1960 to 1975 he is Director of the Economist, from 1961 to 1970 Chairman of the Financial Times and from 1961 to 1964 Chairman of the Committee on Higher Education, named after him. In 1962 he becomes President of the British Academy. In 1968 he becomes Chairman of the LSE Governors. He is also the leader of the Bentham Project at the University College London, Director of British Petroleum, Chancellor of the University of Stirling, and Director of the Economist Intelligence Unit for the British Treasury until he dies.
Irrespective of this dramatic and impressive shift in his professional life, from an academic professor to a policy advisor and public manager, Robbins's idea of the role of the economist in society and the relationship between economics, economic policy, and politics does not change at all. In a lecture delivered in France in 1961 he argues: “The focus of economics on politics, at least in the more abstract sense, has remained very intimate … it is clear that the majority of economists aspire to some influence on politics, both as a system of thought and in manifestations of practical action” (1963a, pp. 6–7). But he also stresses the fact that the proper domain for such aspirations has to be properly set: economics is what pertains to the technical implications of individual and collective choices. All what lies beyond this, is a matter of political Weltanshauung. It is a desirable aspect of the economist's role in society but not of economics as a professional science. For this reason he is so much against a normative approach to welfare economics: because it pretends it is “a body of rules concerning the relation between welfare and the production and distribution of wealth which is independent of political valuations [… whereas] any claim that its generalizations and norms of measurement are independent of politics is surely based on illusion” (1963a, p. 14).
An interesting case study of his engagement as an economist in public management are his papers on the role of the State in co-financing visual and performing arts (Robbins Reference Robbins1963b; Reference Robbins1971b; Balisciano and Medema Reference Balisciano and Medema1999; Howson Reference Howson2005). Building on a similar reasoning that would in a few years become known as the path-breaking theoretical contributions by William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen (Reference Baumol and Bowen1966) on the need to publicly finance the visual and performing arts (as sectors where no substitution of labor with capital can take place in the production function, thus leading to unavoidable stagnation), Robbins argues in favor of a strong public intervention. The economic theory helps shaping the context where policy choices have to take place and public managers can act with full awareness of the given opportunities.
Also as Lord Robbins of Clare Market, he applies his idea of distinct but complementary significance of economics and political economy, offering to the parliamentary debates on many public choices his technical knowledge about the functioning of the economic system, as can be seen in his collection of interventions at the House of Lords between 1965 and 1977 (Robbins Reference Robbins1979a). In 1966, in a speech he delivered in honor of the tenth anniversary of the Institute of Economic Affairs, he in fact explained that:
a knowledge of economics does enable one to understand the world rather better than if one has no such knowledge… . An economist who is humble and takes trouble to harmonize himself with his surroundings in my judgement has a contribution to make… . If you want to generalise in a large way about physics or biology or social matters, you must simplify, you must erect models. The trouble arises if you stop there, if you think that your first approximations exhaust reality. This is why, while I think economic theory is an extraordinary good intellectual discipline for grownups, I have grave doubts about the teaching of analytical economics in schools
(Robbins Reference Robbins1966, pp. 26–27).In 1976 he publishes a book Political Economy, Past and Present: Papers in Political Economy where he uses the distinction between scientific economics and political economy, with a greater attention to the definition of the latter. Robbins (Reference Robbins1976, pp. 2–3) writes that political economy
is not scientific economics, a collection of value-free generalisations about the way in which the economic systems work. It is a discussion of the principles of public policy in the economic field: and while it makes appeal to the findings of economic science, it also involves assumptions which, in the nature of things, lie outside positive science and which are essentially normative in character. It consists of prescriptions rather than description; although, since it is concerned with practice, its recommendations make use of what aspires to be a scientific examination of the results of action rather than wishful thinking regardless the consequences… . Political Economy thus conceived is essentially a search for solutions to problems of policy.
What is particularly interesting here is the word “discussion” at the beginning, implying that political economy, as it is founded on subjective judgments of value, cannot aspire to agreed generalizations but is by nature a locus where each contributes with his opinion to a collective debate.
In 1979, in a very interestingFootnote 11 review article published in the Journal of Economic Literature on Method and Appraisal in Economics by Spiro J. Latsis, Robbins defines “Political Economy as … the application to public policy of economic generalizations claiming scientific status” (Robbins Reference Robbins1979b, pp. 998–999).
Two years later, in 1981, Robbins makes a final attempt to collect and express all his previous reflections on normative and positive economics. He first restates the question of a constitutional architecture as a matter of political economy: “the necessity of a framework of law and an apparatus of enforcement is an essential part of the conception of a free society … acts which are not free are not acts which are capable of having value in the ethical sense” (Robbins Reference Robbins1981, p. 8).
Economists can therefore devote themselves to this constitutional level of reflections, as freedom requires institutions enforcing rules: “one of the main practical functions of economic science was to enable us to detect inconsistencies in plans.” Plans are intended again as the ways to move along a changing environment, where no “persistence” is possible: “In natural science, once causal connections have been established, the quantitative relationships can usually be assumed to persist … this is not so in economics… . The same absence of persistence applies also on the side of obstacles. The human beings … are capable of learning” (Robbins Reference Robbins1981, p. 3). But an inevitable judgment of value is implicit: “in the application of Economic Science to problems of policy, I urge that we must acknowledge the introduction of assumptions of value essentially incapable of scientific proof.” That is why Robbins concludes: “I recommend what I call Political Economy which, at each relevant point, declares all relevant non-scientific assumptions…. I venture to suggest that, as teachers of the subject, our instructions will be more fruitful if, side by side, they run parallel with suitable courses in Politics and History” because “excessive specialization in the first-degree stage, productive of one-eyed monsters, is too frequently the order of the day” (1981, p. 9). The three life-long beloveds of Robbins—economics, politics, and history—are finally supposed to be walking hand in hand.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the Preface to his Politics and Economics, written in 1961, Robbins confesses: “[on these matters] I have written a certain amount in the past, but … I have never succeeded in making my views immune from misunderstanding” (Robbins Reference Robbins1963a, p. vii).
Much of this misunderstanding came from his 1932 Essay: most of the criticism he received after its publication was directed to an epistemological construction where economics seems to be a pure mechanical science completely detached from reality and from policy action. The economist appears, accordingly, to be a mere discoverer of logical implications who has nothing to say to those who are responsible for collective choices, an intellectual closed in his ivory tower of pure formal relationships; economics seems to get further and further away from political economy and from economic policy.
Some of these critiques were not misdirected, as Robbins's discourse is often rude, sometimes ambiguous, and apparently self-contradicting. In some passages of the Essay, he gives the impression of considering given ends and given means as if they were stable, immobile, not undergoing profound changes in time and environment. Some sentences, if taken outside their wider context, sound as cutting definitions implying a pure logical economics with no reference to real problems, where policy considerations remain outside the economist's interest.
But this was clearly not his intention, as his long record of writings on this topic reminds us. For Robbins, the economist builds on its scientific apparatus, which interacts with his own value judgments, therefore acting as a political economist. In order to better explain this, after the two editions of the Essay he wrote Economic Planning and International Order, where he added important reflections on economics and political economy and tried to better clarify the relationship between the economist and policy choices, as he later recognized in his Autobiography. In that book, he tried to show a way to deal both with single individuals and collective bodies, each of them facing ever-changing choices and needing a coordinating constitutional framework. The economist emerges as a privileged advisor to design a constitutional architecture impacting on economic relations—that is, the rules governing the process of choice within the social body. His later writings restated and further enquired on this, trying to better define political economy and (later) economic policy as distinct from scientific economics but both within the role of the economists as “social beings.”
In synthesis, Robbins's scientific production shows an interesting evolution on the definition and use of the terms economics and political economy. But we cannot agree with Talamona's idea (1960, pp. 83 ff) of a complete reversal of opinion which he attributes to Robbins's hostility towards the increasing abstractness of economic theory in fields of research as “game theory.” Robbins, in his opinion, would have abandoned the deductivist credo of his youth, together with any concept of economic science as a purely formal system of thought, upon seeing the results it later produced in the form of a self-referential, formalist economic theory, excessively detached from reality and distinct from economic policy considerations.
Reading the original writings by Robbins and searching for his definitions of both economics and political economy, we have found a common thread which cannot be said to have interruptions and which, although with some differences in language, shows an important evolution but only in terms of enrichment and clarification, and therefore a convincing continuity in time. Robbins has always shown the same attitude towards the question of the relationship between economics, political economy, economic policy, and politics, although the weights of the different arguments change according to the audience and historical period in which he expressed them.
Tactical reasons may explain sharp, crude expressions, leading to misunderstandings:Footnote 12 as Marshall had to fight against Cunningham and his Political Economy as a Moral Science, and was therefore forced to stress the detachment of economics from ethics, although rescuing it in several ways (and giving rise to accusations of ambiguity), similarly the young Robbins had to clear the ground from Hawtrey and his renewed melting pot of economics and ethics, although convinced of the importance of value judgments to be assumed in political economy.
For Lionel Robbins, economics is the tool box of economic policy and of political action. As an economic advisor himself, he felt that it was necessary to set the proper expectations of government and public opinion on what economists’ contributions could be helpful for. Individuals choose for themselves, politicians choose for collective groups; and in order to have such choices made with full awareness of their implications, the economist—a scientist used to work in and on settings characterized by changing choices—is the indispensable advisor.
Far from undermining the role of the economic advisor, Robbins's Essay was actually the necessary manifesto of the profession. It attempted to define exactly what might be asked of economists when required to give policy advice, a professional market that was just opening in those years.
