In the late 1960s, Saudi elites were not only wary of political unrest and of the spread of Arab socialism; they were also deeply unhappy about the state of Saudi historiography. Education Minister Hasan Al al-Shaikh thought it “hadn't been written as it should be” (p. 105), and King Faisal wished an “academic book” would center on the kingdom's founder, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Saʿud. Hoping a bureaucratic body would correct this unfortunate situation, Faisal created the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives in 1972. The story of how the Foundation (known as al-Dara in Arabic) invented national history is probably the most compelling chapter of Matthias Determann's pioneering book.
The creation of al-Dara changed the rules of the historiographic game. First, foreign-born amateurs such as Harry St. John Philby or Hafiz Wahba, who until then had had a monopoly on the writing of Saudi history, now faced competition from a new generation of Saudi professional historians. Second, local historians could access an extensive collection of documents because al-Dara copied foreign archives—particularly the Ottoman and British—and made them available inside Saudi Arabia. Third, religious exclusivism gave way to narratives of unification, development, and exceptionalism. Until the establishment of al-Dara, most historians had told the history of Najd as a religious epic whereby, since the mid-18th century, “true Muslims” were reclaiming the Arabian Peninsula from “unbelievers.” Even anti-Saudi writers used this narrative to frame their rejection of what they dubbed “Wahhabism.” Going forward, the lingo of development and an almost orientalist discourse about Saudi exceptionalism would shape the writing of Saudi history. The Al Saʿud were no longer a “tribe with a flag,” the latter being the banner of Islam; they were fulfilling a manifest destiny, unifying warring tribes and regions under the motto of progress.
Al-Dara soon became a potent tool of intellectual repression. Nicknamed “big brother” by several Saudi historians (p. 10), it was to academia what the Ministry of Information was to the press. In 1999, for instance, it “bought up and banned” a ten-volume collection of 19th- and 20th-century histories of Najd published in Beirut. Fahd al-Semmari, al-Dara's secretary general, pointed to “problems” with the “method” of the collection as well as to typos and mistakes (p. 37). In reality, the books had been banned because their authors proposed a political analysis of the Saudi regime and were not awed by the Al Saʿud religious mission. Their narratives, nourished by travels outside Najd and a vast literary culture, were probably deemed too complex by al-Dara, which was given the task in 2001 to “examine publications about the kingdom” and contact their authors to “correct any errors” (p. 10).
Determann claims that, “no university-based historian [in Saudi Arabia] has ever been imprisoned for his or her writings” (p. 11). Other historians have been. Muhammad al-Muslim, a bank employee who authored a history of the oil province entitled The Black Gold Coast, was jailed between 1964 and 1974 for his pro-Shiʿi perspective (p. 94). Hamad al-Jasser, a renowned publicist and historian, was sentenced to jail in absentia in 1962 for allegedly attacking Islam (p. 97). Although Determann does not say it, his narrative lends itself to a Foucauldian reading: just as 19th-century reformists substituted spectacular torture for the prison's meticulous surveillance, al-Dara replaced haphazard punishments in the 1960s with fastidious control, turning history writing into a state discipline.
The creation of al-Dara limited the Saudi general public's exposure to complex and nuanced history writing. Yet it did not lead to an impoverishment of historical research in the country, a point Determann illustrates through his reading of an impressive range of sources. His book is actually best read as a guide to the complex Saudi historiographical scene. Its general argument is that pro-Al Saʿud historians wrote histories of the Saudi state with the Wahhabi mission as its backbone. According to their narrative, the Al Saʿud were spreading religion in an Arabian Peninsula that was experiencing a second age of ignorance (jāhiliyya). In another version of this narrative, which al-Dara helped to propagate, the Saudi state was a force for progress and development in the region thanks to its religious guidance and God-given wealth. Determann contrasts these “dynastic” historians with “local,” “particularistic” historians, who focused on a region, a town, a tribe, or a religious sect to challenge the Najd-centric narrative of the state. Yet the history of Mecca, the Hijaz, or the Shiʿa can hardly be described as “local.” Determann here unwittingly adopts a Najd-centric perspective on historical counternarratives, even though state-sponsored books of Najdi history actually look much more provincial than works that explore transregional, and sometimes global, connections.
The book's final chapter analyzes the emergence of Saudi social and economic history. Several academics who were educated in Saudi Arabia and abroad began to challenge core tenets of the state ideology: Mohamed al-Freih showed that the Wahhabi mission was indebted to 18th-century Muslim revivalism in the Hijaz; Uwaidah al-Juhany demonstrated that Wahhabism was less a religious than a social movement, and was preceded not by irreligion but rather by the development of Islamic scholarship in Arabia; Abdullah al-Subaiy's main protagonist was no longer the royal family and its leadership, but rather the country's oil industry; Mishary al-Nuaim, who was exposed to Marxism at King Saʿud University in Riyadh, showed that the Saudi state was not based on a politicoreligious alliance, but rather on a strong connection between the princes and the commercial elites; and finally, Khalid al-Dakhil presented the Wahhabi mission as “the culmination of processes of settlement and urbanization,” refuting both dynastic historians and the Princeton-based historian Michael Cook, who argued in 1989 that the creation of the Saudi state was “an act of God” (pp. 211–12).
At the heart of the book is a hypothesis about academic freedom that deserves to be taken seriously. Determann tries to explain why such a plurality of historical narratives emerged in an authoritarian environment. He argues that state building and economic growth provided the financial means for both professional and amateur historians to pursue research that only incidentally fed into official narratives. This observation is correct, but Determann ultimately attributes the progress of historiography in the Middle East to what he calls “globalization,” which actually looks more like Westernization. According to him, “modern” history writing in the region began only when Western-inspired institutions of higher education started to implement Western academic standards (pp. 225–26). By focusing on historical plurality more than historical contestation (p. 8), Determann privileged consensual narratives, which explains the odd exclusion of such critical historians as Madawi Al-Rasheed from the scope of the book. This also explains Determann's stance on what, despite increased internal repression, he calls the post-9/11 “Saudi opening” and the “pluralization of Saudi politics” (pp. 228–29). These flaws aside, Determann's book will serve as the go-to reference on Saudi historiography, and deserves to be read and studied by scholars and students alike.
