This book treats perennial themes of Christian philosophy: the relation of faith and reason (chaps. 3, 4, and 7), the nature of religion and faith (chaps. 4, 5, 7, 8), arguments for the existence of God and their significance (chaps. 5, 7, and 8), and questions of how we ought to live (chaps. 9 and 10). Posthumously compiled and published by Michael J. Crowe and Nicholas Ayo, CSC, this collection of essays by Frederick Crosson opens with a tribute by long-time colleague Mary Katherine Tillman and an introduction by Mark Moes. Tillman deftly tunes the reader's attention to the important themes of rhetoric and argument that unify many of the essays, while Moes provides an excellent introduction to the individual chapters. All but one has been published previously, but their quality and the relative obscurity of some of their original publication venues make this a valuable volume that will be of interest to scholars and advanced students of the history of philosophy, philosophy of religion, religious studies, and philosophical theology. It will be of special interest to Augustine scholars as five of the ten essays deal substantively with the writings of Augustine.
The opening essay, “Esoteric versus Latent Teaching,” immediately orients the reader to Crosson's persistent preoccupation with rhetoric, audience, and the ways an author can convey multiple levels of meaning through compositional structure. At least in the West, Crosson argues that the ancient Christian practice of teaching on two levels is entirely distinct from the ancient (pagan) philosophical practice of teaching both esoteric and exoteric doctrines because these practices originate from different sources, have distinct purposes, and, consequently, carry distinctive moral imports.
Chapters 2–4 are exegetical, devoted to Augustine's Confessions, De magistro, and De utilitate credendi, respectively. While the final essay widens the intellectual scope by placing Augustine's view of the relationship of faith and reason into conversation with a diverse array of voices (such as Kierkegaard, Hobbes, William James, Norman Kretzmann, and Pope John Paul II), the central preoccupation of these essays is with uncovering the latent meanings of the texts. In each case, Crosson finds a latent meaning that can only be uncovered with adequate attention to the text's compositional structure.
Religious experience, in the sense discussed by William James, receives little attention in this volume, but “Augustine and Newman” treats these men's conversion narratives and the way they elected to communicate their experience of conversion. Even so, Crosson's focus is the text. He argues that identifying the structural elements of these texts and their parallels can point to a more adequate understanding of these narratives and of the significance of the events they recount.
“Cicero and the Philosophy of Religion” (the only essay previously unpublished) wades into the complex question of Cicero's own convictions on the reasonableness of religious belief and practice. Crosson's Cicero holds that even if we lack positive arguments supporting belief in the gods presupposed by Roman religious practice, significant aspects of religion and religious practice are reasonable to maintain for their practical benefits to the community. Thus, for Cicero, religion is not exclusively an intellectual affair; it is also a system of communal practices and a support for social order and justice.
In contrast to Cicero, “Hume's Unnatural Religion” argues that for Hume the reasonableness of religion can be undermined significantly by the failure of arguments for the existence of God. Hume’s precursors regarded arguments from natural theology and revealed religion as mutually supporting religion, but Crosson argues that Hume separates these two kinds of arguments. Once separated, Hume is able to argue that neither argument stands very securely, and thus, they do not support religion.
Aquinas is offered as an antithesis to Hume on this point. In “Proof and Presence” (chap. 7), Crosson argues—against the rationalist interpretation—that for Aquinas the act of faith can be reasonable with or without prior rational arguments for the existence of God (151). According to Crosson, rational arguments for the existence of God are neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate the reasonableness of faith. For Crosson's Aquinas, faith is reasonable on other grounds, and “what faith affirms is the presence of a living God, and no proof can establish that” (157, emphasis original).
The collection concludes with essays on ethics and politics. Contrary to those who situate the origins of natural law thinking in the Stoics, in “Religion and Natural Law” Crosson finds deeper origins in the biblical tradition of the Hebrew scriptures and traces the consistent use of the concept of a “natural law” back to Philo. For Crosson, the defining features of the natural law doctrine, particularly its independent intelligibility and its accessibility to unaided human reason, are inseparable from the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation. Finally, “American Reflections on a Century of Catholic Social Teaching” brings the collection into the twentieth century by engaging with Catholic social teaching (beginning with Rerum Novarum) on two central issues: state-church relations and economic justice. Crosson perceptively draws attention to the tensions that have arisen in regards to these two issues as Catholic thinking and papal teaching about the proper role of the state in bringing about the common good for society have shifted in the last hundred years.
In developing and critiquing the concepts of religion and faith in Augustine, Cicero, Aquinas, Hume, and Newman (among others), Crosson provides not only a distinctive account of religion, but a distinctive conception of what it is to be human, to be the kind of thing for whom religion and faith are important. Following Aquinas, Crosson locates the origin of religion in an “innate inclination of human beings to realize their need for help in achieving their good” (175). Religion and the search for God spring from the recognition of our own lack of self-sufficiency in pursuit of the human good. “Religion is as natural as that aspiration and that realization are” (175). While religion is both reasonable and (in a sense) natural, it is only through faith that we attain, or draw near to, that God for whom our hearts are restless. Following Augustine, Crosson conceptualizes faith as an assent to revealed truths which are beyond the capacity of reason to demonstrate, and hence beyond the capacity of the human intellect to certify (84, 94). This aspect of faith makes it “unsatisfying” even if faith can lead to its own kind of understanding (96). In his conception of human nature we find the crux of the tension between faith and reason. We have been made to know, and yet the articles of faith are beyond our capacity to certify intellectually. So when we ask, “Is faith the fulfillment of fundamental human aspirations or the frustration of them?” Crosson's answer appears to be yes.
