Do not be fooled by the title of Ahmet Kuru’s book, which at first glance may seem to associate Islam with authoritarianism and underdevelopment. The painting on the cover gives the first taste of the work—the Renaissance artist Giorgione’s The Three Philosophers, depicting a Muslim philosopher in between the ancient and Renaissance philosophers. Readers can anticipate a respite from their fatigue over the long-held debate on Islam and democracy, for Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment is a refreshingly pleasant read and a far cry from the repetitive clichés of this controversy. Not only is it painstakingly well-researched, but it is also an engaging and engaged resource that outlines and challenges established theories—all while simultaneously advancing its own.
Kuru has an ambitious and admirable aim. He begins with a simple yet bold question: “Why are Muslim-majority countries less peaceful, less democratic, less developed?” (1). Much ink has been spilled on the compatibility of Islam and democracy, and the debate seems to have only been reinvigorated by the failure of this century’s Arab uprisings, not to mention the tide of authoritarianism in their wake. The enormous volume of work in this field testifies to the intellectual relevance of the question. However, the increasing politicization and polarization around the topic have greatly diminished the possibility of a vibrant and factually grounded public debate, making it difficult for readers to navigate and often pushing them deeper into their ideological cocoons. Kuru’s timely book is unsettling across these divides, pushing readers to abandon convenient assumptions and move beyond their political, ideological, and methodological comfort zones as he stirs the hornet’s nest and picks a daring fight against essentialist Orientalists and Islamists both, and against postcolonial scholars, probably leaving few content. However, Kuru’s valiant intellectual exercise is rich and nuanced, using a historical perspective to analyze contemporary violence, authoritarianism, and socioeconomic underdevelopment.
In a non-Marxist sense, Kuru’s research offers a historical class analysis of the political and economic underdevelopment in Muslim-majority countries. He traces the change in the intergroup developmental progress between religious, political, intellectual, and economic classes (3). At first glance, Kuru’s approach, with its longue durée examination of class relations, reminds the reader of Barrington Moore’s canonical comparative study of modernization in Britain, France, and Germany; Kuru even repeats his maxim “no bourgeois, no democracy” (55, quoting Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World [Boston: Beacon Press, 1966], 418). However, despite some references to social stratification and class differentials, Kuru diverges by drawing a path of development not forged by intense material class conflicts, but in reciprocity with the institutional setting. Again, he swerves from new institutionalism, focusing instead on the actors who create these institutions, identifying their ideational and material drivers as the underlying cause of change (64–65).
Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment has two main sections. In the first Kuru explores the current disproportionate association with violence, authoritarianism, and socioeconomic underdevelopment in Muslim-majority countries, dedicating a chapter for each theme. He first draws on an array of empirical surveys and global indexes to validate the initial observations on the countries under focus. He then challenges the existing explanations, culminating in two predominant yet opposite poles—the essentialist and postcolonial approaches. Whereas the essentialist approach nominates Islam as the inherent cause of these predicaments for Muslim countries, postcolonial studies attribute the blame to Western colonization and an ongoing exploitation of Muslim resources. Kuru directly targets their paradigmatic castles and aims to conquer them both.
Kuru rejects the essentialist shortcuts and postcolonial apologias at the same time. His primary objection rests on a straight historical observation. While the essentialists ignore the intellectual dynamism from the late eighth century to the late eleventh, known as Muslims’ “golden age,” postcolonial scholars neglect the fact that the underdevelopment of Muslim lands predated the advent of Western colonialism and was not determined solely by external forces. Specifically, the essentialist argument regarding the theological lack of state-religion separation in Islam does not account for the plurality of diverse—if not contradictory—interpretations and practices of this religion. Kuru posits that these essentialist studies, mired in Orientalist knowledge, also neglect the role of human agency. Western colonialism and extractive institutions, by contrast, while retaining an explanatory value, have not been a sufficient, or even a necessary, condition for the high rate of violence, authoritarianism, or underdevelopment in Muslim-majority countries (30). Kuru depicts, instead, a complex pattern with multiple causes that cannot be reduced merely to Islam’s inherent elements or Western colonialism (54). Kuru rather calls for a study of institutional configurations and human agency, one that affects both the practices of religion and colonial trajectories (64).
Avoiding a presentist approach, in the second part of the book Kuru undertakes a historical excavation of the early Muslims’ scholarly achievements and the succeeding intellectual and economic stagnation that ultimately led to the current vicious cycle of authoritarianism and socioeconomic underdevelopment. Kuru turns attention toward the ulema-state alliance that emerged in the Seljuk model of regime from the eleventh century onward; this alliance would go on to be further consolidated in the succeeding Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires around the sixteenth century, dominating Muslims’ intellectual and economic life.
Until the late eleventh century, Muslim societies had characteristics similar to those of the West’s later Renaissance. Creative intellectuals and influential merchants held prominence, enjoying more independence from state authorities, especially in comparison to subsequent centuries. Muslims, however, began to lose their progressive momentum. Due to diminishing agricultural revenues in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the mercantile system was replaced by a new economic regime based on revenue assignments to military personnel, known as iqta (tax farming). Alongside this militarization of the economy, a Sunni orthodoxy was taking shape, with the nizamiyya madrasas crystallizing the alliance between the ulema and state (116–17). The devastating invasions by the Crusaders, Mongols, and Timurids from the twelfth to the fourteenth century only reinforced the ulema-state alliance, cementing the hierarchical stratification of society. Hence two concomitant developments—the militarization of economy and the rise of state-sanctioned Sunni orthodoxy—discouraged free thinking, prevented the emergence of independent scholars, and marginalized the merchants (203). With the following Muslim empires going on to adopt the same model, the ulema-state alliance became dominant in the Muslim world, which had by now lost its once considerable lead over Europe. Kuru’s historical institutional approach here first challenges essentialist Orientalism by arguing that this alliance was not an inherent extension of Islam, but that it instead resulted much later, born of the conditions and complexities of the time. He also refutes the essentialist Islamist accounts that diminish the “golden age” to the implementation of “true Islam” and neglect the transformation of class relations in Muslim societies. At this point, Kuru reminds the readers that the core discourse of political Islamists—the unity of state and religion (din wa dawla)—was not prophetic, but was of Sasanian origin, developed in the eleventh century (9–10). Finally, against postcolonial studies, this approach compellingly demonstrates the deeper institutional roots of the Muslim predicament before the advent of Western imperialism.
When pursuing these monumental questions, Kuru manages to weave together a compelling narrative from a wide range of events, trends, and ideas spanning over thirteen centuries. He not only meticulously draws connections between the past and the present, but also transcends the limitations posed by localized area studies. The study of the predicament in Muslim-majority countries requires a capacious interdisciplinary approach, and Kuru, like a present-day polymath, engages in diverse disciplinary debates. While fleshing out the main argument about the state-ulema alliance with a thorough historical examination, he also raises a flurry of interesting subsidiary questions that deserve notice. The discussion of Imam Ghazali’s role in Muslim intellectual life (103–12), for instance, is quite illuminating for interested readers. Another particular highlight, notwithstanding its theoretical ambitions, bounteous supply of information, copious referencing, and meticulous endnotes, is that Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment is written in plainly accessible language.
The book’s forte is, however, Kuru’s broad, unpretentious theory that is applicable to both Western and non-Western contexts, providing a firm ground for comparison. In early Islamic history, Muslims were running a scientifically and economically superior civilization mainly due to the elevated and independent status of scholars and merchants, whereas the Western Christians were under the domination of clergy and the military elite. Later, Western Europe would struggle to institutionalize the separation of church and state, while the Muslim empires moved in quite the opposite direction (69). The same class dynamics can explain the course of development in both regions.
In addressing a big question and a large time span, Kuru knowingly invites criticism from multiple fronts. Firstly, despite a claim for comprehensive, global comparison, the cases under study are mainly derived from the Middle East, not giving its due to African or Southeast Asian Islam—not to mention those of non-Muslim regions like Latin America. Similarly, after investing so much in showing how the essentialist and postcolonial approaches miss the complexity and multidimensionality of the research problematique, Kuru explains several issues such as violence, authoritarianism, and development all by a single variable—the state-ulema alliance—yet his explanation behind specific cases and episodes throughout the book occasionally shifts between institutional, ideational, and material drivers. Secondly, the vast historical analysis eventually brings the readers to the same old recipe for Muslim societies, in which secularism emerges as a condition for modernization. Everything boils down to the separation of church and state as it was in the Western experience. While using notions embedded in the Enlightenment and traditions of modernization, Kuru depicts the Western trajectory as inherently universal. This seems a backward step from the contributions of the revisionist school in modernization studies in the 1990s. Finally, framing the root cause as the state-ulema alliance gives too much credit to the ulema, for it was the state that dominated and redefined both the economic and religious spheres in Muslim societies. As Kuru notes, the introduction of secularism in the region did not change how the state viewed the rise of religion and the bourgeois class as potential threats to its political power, ultimately continuing to penetrate these spheres (233). Then, religion is only one of the fields that the state dominates. This requires a reorientation of research, primarily to problematize the role of the state in Muslim societies.
Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment has already found its way onto the syllabi of undergraduate and graduate seminars, but it should be of interest to a much broader audience of all readers interested in Islam and politics. Very few books can so beautifully weave diverse disciplinary insights together in such an accessible way. Kuru’s work will go on to be one of the key references in the fields of Middle East studies and Islamic studies, as well as those of politics and religion in general.
