There are the telltale signs: men with squiggly earpieces emerge from SUVs with dark-tinted windows and government license plates, and heading stoically through the corridors of the Rayburn House Office Building. This is the unmistakable advance of the executive branch, with its flashiest U.S. Defense and State Department officials, and their convergence on their legislative counterpart to appear humbly before watchdog-minded committee chairs.
Congress can claim varying degrees of success when duking it out with the executive branch on everything from the housing fiasco to the Roger Clemens steroid kerfuffle. But in the world of foreign relations, the administration has the trump card when it comes to setting policy and, depending on the president, it is often played with resounding emphasis.
High-profile officials appearing before congressional panels include general David Petraeus, ambassador Ryan Crocker, secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and others, and they partake in discussions on Status of Forces Agreements, wartime funding, refugee policies, or foreign aid reform. Hearings are one of the main tools Congress uses to wield its influence. They are public forums with clearly defined platforms, testy exchanges, and freshly excavated intelligence. But the waters of congressional power in this world become murky when looking at the impact those tools have.
Congress's influence on foreign policy is often difficult to gauge. Some tools are more effective than others; some are off the public radar. Impact varies depending on the member and the receptiveness of the audience. By nature, Congress is a fractured body, and its myriad competing interests dilute its strength. But it can fight back. Through a cursory look at its foreign policy tools and their effectiveness, we can see how.
Congress' foreign policy weapons run the gamut, starting on one end with something as small as a staffer getting on the phone with a legislative affairs contact at the U.S. State Department and urging policy change through quiet—or not so quiet—suggestion. On the other end is the weighty arsenal where legislators cut off war funding or pass the ultimate “the president shall …” wording to restrict the administration's foreign policy. The Senate can horse trade nominations and ratify treaties. However, influence is often subtler than a binding law and the big guns of compulsory language aren't often fired, leaving foreign policy to be shaped largely by the tools in the middle range.
In between there are hearings, markups, member briefings, office visits, member phone calls, investigative reports, staff briefings, and interviews with reporters. There are congressional and staff delegations to foreign countries, where participants meet privately with foreign dignitaries to hash out policy. Members can seek the help of outside groups, or issue statements, forming public platforms to criticize administration policy. There are the requisite “Dear Colleague” letters, and the pursuit to garner as many signatures as possible to demonstrate strong support.
There are nonbinding resolutions with expressions of congressional sentiment. While the administration doesn't usually take a position on the resolutions, they'll occasionally cause some pushback. In some cases, a president could regard the language as justification for use of force. Aside from the tangible instruments of foreign policy, it is argued that Congress has one very important invisible weapon: “the law of anticipated actions.” This is the notion that the executive branch will be deterred from some actions because someone will say authoritatively, “this won't fly on the Hill.” The threat of congressional oversight alone becomes a powerful block.
Hearings are great stages for public exposure and embarrassment, both of which can be used as deterrents. But these forums also can flesh out policies important to Congress and to foreign countries. With U.S. State Department or Defense Department officials, they are a chance to force the administration to report publicly on activities. The timing of a hearing can be key—and whether it coincides with the release of a report, the scheduling of an international meeting, or visit from a foreign dignitary. Other strategic decisions also have impact, such as whether a committee invites a secretary or a deputy secretary to testify, or whether a hearing includes witnesses from other government agencies.
Hearings held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, or by its full panel, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, have ranged in 2008 from energy policy and sovereign wealth funds to diplomacy in Pakistan and international coordination in Afghanistan. Some hearings have had what is referred to as the “megaphone effect.” This occurs when the panel draws interest from the foreign press corps and the discussion resonates more with the country the hearing is addressing than with the American public or other members of Congress. The effect on policy is then indirect as increased attention in a foreign country forces people stateside to take more notice of that issue. Oftentimes hearings are notable for their lack of administration witnesses. The discussion is less stilted, less tied to talking points or administration policy, and can offer a broader conversation about what policy ought to be and why.
Hearings in 2008 were influential in changing U.S. policy toward Iraqi refugees. Congressional Democrats were instrumental in drawing attention to what they saw as a flawed refugee policy—pointing to the U.S. occupation of Iraq that gave rise to more than four million refugees and internally displaced people and the Bush administration's limited response. Ultimately, the number of visas issued by the U.S. government was increased and new facilities to review applicants were added. Congress also increased the expenditure of additional funds for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Congressional efforts to help Iraqi refugees received extra stimulus after key players on the Hill watched a 60 Minutes report on the growing refugee problem in the Middle East. Calls to the U.S. State Department were made, and the department participated in congressional staff briefings. Staffers and members began to look at options to address the problem, and scheduled hearings involving staff from the House Foreign Affairs, Judiciary and Armed Services committees. A working group was formed to help draft a legislative response. Legislation was crafted, and several bills also were advocated in a number of “Dear Colleague” letters.
According to one Democratic staffer, the major obstacle was the Bush administration, which refused to recognize its role in resolving the refugee problem and failed to commit the needed resources. In this case, compelling testimony from witnesses outside the administration played a role in turning around policy. Anders Lago, the mayor of Sodertalje, Sweden, testified on April 10, 2008, before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a panel of Senate and House members also known as the Helsinki Commission. He told of the influx of Iraqi refugees his country had seen since the start of the Iraq war—taking in more refugees than the United States and Canada combined. “We did not start the war in Iraq, however we assume a huge responsibility for those people who are affected,” he stated. “I am not a president; I am not an ambassador; but I know that we must create a new future for the children fleeing from war” (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 2008).
After changes were launched, Richard Albright, senior coordinator for refugee issues for the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, made a statement to the news media, calling the new program “a significant step toward fulfilling our obligation of providing safehaven for those brave Iraqi citizens who risked their lives in order to serve the United States and a free Iraq” (Associated Press 2008). “It is a response to the view that we have special obligations to Iraqis who have been employed by us.”
But the discussions in hearings can often reflect the disjointed and divided nature of Congress. One congressional staffer described foreign affairs hearings this way: “You have half the table saying, ‘Why aren't you doing X?’ And you have the other half of the table saying, ‘Stop doing X.’ And we have 60 members and it's a ping-pong match … So what does an administration witness walk away from that with?—‘Well, Congress is divided. Our policy is intact. You know, I had a rough afternoon.’ ”
On the other hand, when then-secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld was hauled before the Senate Armed Services Committee after the Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse scandal, he was blasted by most of the members on the panel. Congress has fought—many would argue unsuccessfully—President Bush's uncanny ability as commander-in-chief to broaden the presidential powers extraordinarily. But, in this case, the criticism was pointed and grabbed the administration's attention, and arguably helped changed the U.S. detention policy.
There are some tools Congress does not have a history of using effectively, namely declaring war, or authorizing the use of force in advance of conflict or shortly thereafter. It never authorized the war in Kosovo, for example, and has not declared war since World War II. It is here where Congress's divided and somewhat incoherent ways are perhaps most pronounced, and its split views on how to conduct foreign policy are, according to some, most paralyzing. In some cases, Congress's lack of unity is blamed—among Democrats and Republicans—on members of the president's party for giving the administration the benefit of the doubt when it comes to military operations. In other cases, the blame is placed on the executive branch for lacking respect for its co-equal. But others might say there is a myth of cooperation on foreign policy between the two branches that is not really grounded in history, even with unified governments when congressional majorities and the White House are under the same party. It is a constitutional gray area that has the executive and legislative branches at odds with each other. In any case, Congress is left with the option of cutting off funding for a military operation, a recourse it is reluctant to use as evidenced by the recent developments with the war in Iraq. Congress would need to be united to cut off funding and would require a two-thirds super majority to override a likely veto. But presidents also know they risk impeachment if they anger Congress with risky wartime decisions. For example, the proposed articles of impeachment against President Nixon mentioned his secret approval of U.S. bombing in Cambodia.
Most recently, Congress has been criticized for its inability to help strengthen the world's fragile states, with obstacles in legal, structural, and perceptual areas, or the tensions that result from long-practiced routines between the two branches, according to A Steep Hill, Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States, a March 2008 publication of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The failing? According to CSIS, it is the inability of Congress and the executive branch to work together as partners. “The current legislative-executive relationship is fraught with suspicion and distrust,” the report says. “Congress needs to play a more active role in driving policy on this important national security priority; and the executive branch must change the way it engages Congress” (Chollet, Irvine, and, Larson Reference Chollet, Irvine and Larson2008).
The report goes on to say that Congress, however, has some mechanics that limit its abilities. “Congressional shortcomings in dealing with stabilization and reconstruction operations are representative of the broader, and somewhat deliberately designed, limitations in how the legislative branch of government shapes U.S. foreign policy. The constitutional powers of Congress are often too blunt, reactive, and slow for the complicated trade-offs of diplomacy, trade, and security,” (Chollet, Irvine, and Larson Reference Chollet, Irvine and Larson2008).And, the reports adds, while Congress has been accused of going soft on oversight during the Bush administration, especially in the area of foreign and national security policy, the body is not irrelevant as some of its stabilization and reconstruction efforts have forced the executive branch to act.
In the world of policy through authorizations, Congress has not been a model student, largely because the role of authorizing committees has been historically upstaged by their appropriating brethren. It has been years since Congress passed a U.S. State Department authorization bill. It also has not successfully re-authorized the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act since 1985. By some calculations, this is a the result of a sort of triage, as leadership on both sides conclude that the appropriations vote for foreign assistance is the only one the public can tolerate as aid to foreign countries is not always a popular cause. Foreign policy legislation in the past has been a target for “poison pill” amendments, whose toxins can kill an entire bill. This tactic has been used by Democrats trying to pass an American troop withdrawal date in an Iraq spending bill.
The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act is a rather generic authority that does not expire and gives the president pretty much all the authority he needs to spend money in the different foreign aid accounts. So the act itself does not need to be changed every year, but the fact that it has not been substantively changed in more than two decades becomes more and more relevant as the United States takes on new stabilization and reconstruction projects around the world. This is one reason U.S. Rep. Howard Berman, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has made foreign aid reform the signature initiative of his new leadership role. A reconfiguration of the bureaucratic powers could make Congress relevant again in the area of foreign aid. The legislation could serve to enhance the role of authorizing committees as policy vehicles for Congress if it gives the body more of a say in where the money goes.
Authorizing legislation has, however, been effective, particularly with the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, which gave the administration some direction in Afghanistan. And recent changes to the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, an administration initiative on global HIV/AIDS that the House Foreign Affairs Committee was instrumental in expanding, are also viewed as congressional victories.
As for recommendations for the future, A Steep Hill suggests three reforms to fundamentally alter the relationship between the two branches: “Committee organizations, budgets, and authorities should be reengineered and streamlined,” and communication between the branches should be improved (Chollet, Irvine, and Larson Reference Chollet, Irvine and Larson2008). The report also says that the government should stop approaching stabilization and reconstruction operations in an ad hoc manner.
Recent years have shown that a tension that exists between the legislative and the executive branches, and an inevitable game of boundary pushing, is always at play—a game that the courts have traditional avoided. Some say that an atmosphere of fear in the wake of the September 11 attacks empowered the administration, and contributed to Congress's hesitancy. The future balance of power between the branches and its impact on foreign policy will depend on how much Congress can preserve its institutional integrity. Of course, its success also will depend on the dynamics of a new unified government, and whether access to senior administration officials in the U.S. State Department and Defense Department improves. But even then, a Democratic Congress, reacting to years of profound partisanship, could become recalcitrant under an Obama administration and reject any semblance of a lapdog role. The dynamics, forever in flux, are ones that promise to keep us intensely engaged. ■
