In analysing China's approach to peace and development at the United Nations during the decade-long tenure of Hu Jintao, Oertel's work joins a small but growing body of literature studying China's changing behaviour at the forum. Oertel asks two primary research questions: how do domestic and international determinants shape China's UN policy-making? Which preferences are Chinese leaders taking into account with regards to the areas of peace and development at the United Nations? These questions are framed with the goal of improving our understanding of authoritarian actors in multilateral institutions more generally. What separates Oertel's analysis from earlier works is her ambitious effort to disaggregate the Chinese state into the sub-actors and forces that shape its activities at the UN. Oertel situates her text at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations, emphasizing liberal and constructivist traditions in her work.
Oertel's central argument is that it is the interplay between the preferences of domestic social groups and the intervening variable of international players that shape China's policy in peace and development at the United Nations. Social groups are termed broadly as “any group of actors that significantly contributes to or limits the debate in the realm of foreign policy-making” (p. 33), including the Chinese leadership, various bureaucratic agencies, the People's Liberation Army and think tanks at the state level; and public intellectuals, media outlets and non-governmental groups at the society level. Conversely, international players are detailed as the United States, the Russian Federation and developing countries via the G77. Though of limited effect, the ability of international players to affect China's behaviour is determined via linkage (“the density of ties in the economic, political, diplomatic, social and organizational realm, as well as through cross-border flows of trade, investment, people and communication,” p. 119) and leverage (“China's vulnerability to pressure within the UN,” p. 120). With this conceptual framework at hand, Oertel gives a succinct historical overview of China's tenure at the United Nations, before using a qualitative research approach to address four within-case comparisons along practical and ideational lines: China's engagement with UN peacekeeping and its corresponding positioning regarding the responsibility to protect, and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the corresponding discourse regarding human development and sustainability.
The first four chapters – setting up the theoretical framework, historical overview and details of the domestic and international determinants – demonstrate Oertel's ability to work with a wide array of resources to craft her argument. The text mainly draws from Chinese- and English-language secondary and primary documents, with additional insights garnered from interviews of Chinese foreign policy elites.
China and the United Nations leaves the reader with three central questions, however. First, it is unclear why Oertel focuses on the four studies, as opposed to other sub-areas within the universe of peace and development cases. For example, China's activities in nuclear politics and the contingent discourse on the nuclear peace, or environmental protection and its contingent discourse on green development are also worthy areas of analysis. These two areas potentially draw upon a different set of social groups, to include the technical experts and scientists that offer policy advice and negotiating guidance, for example. Studies note that experts can form epistemic communities, constructing China's preferences towards cooperation or conflict with other powers (for instance, see Alanna Krolikowski's chapter in Tai Ming Cheung and Kevin Pollpeter's 2015 edited volume The Human Dimension of China's Defense Science, Technology, and Innovation System [La Jolla: California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation]). These cases could challenge the text's central assumption that domestic social groups are separate from their international peers.
Second, Oertel hints at a theoretical framework, but shies away from a clear causal mechanism for how these different actors affect China's policy-making. Which combination of social groups may triumph in affecting decision-making, and under what conditions, remains under-explored in the cases. This is a shame since Oertel's careful empirical investigation leads to some surprising findings. For example, regarding peacekeeping, Oertel notes that Chinese deployment to peacekeeping missions is affected by whether the host state maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan – noting that “Taiwan unites the various social groups in mainland China in their rejection of international interference” (p. 150). Yet, Oertel details three peacekeeping cases that show, in practice at least, that the Taiwan factor is not always an impediment to Chinese deployment. How actors rationalize and overcome the “Taiwan barrier” in China's decision-making reveals much about their preferences in regards to United Nations policy.
Third, Oertel's work raises the broader question about the future of China's participation at the United Nations. She conservatively concludes that the Chinese leadership “strategically makes use of UN policy to contribute to the legitimation and stabilization of its rule” (p. 239), but avoids a detailed discussion addressing the extent to which China can be socialized into a foreign policy role beyond its current position – or, conversely, to what extent China can socialize other states.
These questions aside, Oertel provides a thorough entry-level text regarding China's role in multilateral activities at the United Nations, and for those interested in the mechanics of China's foreign policy decision-making.
