The flow of information is central to most rational choice models of war. It is supposed to facilitate the ability of parties to reach a settlement, given the clarity of the eventual outcome and the desire to avoid paying the costs of fighting. Yet, in these approaches, information flow functions more as a central assumption of what happens in conflict than as a process that is actually examined or tested. Thus, it is refreshing to read a study that examines not only the potentially multiple effects of information flow but also individual instances in several different contexts. Specifically, Dan Lindley looks at the impact of transparency—“the availability of information about potential adversaries' actions, capabilities, and intentions” (p. 17)—that comes from security regimes. The result is a very fine book that speaks to several research milieus: rational choice, security studies, regimes, and peacekeeping, to name the most prominent ones.
The expectations that regimes promote transparency and that transparency promotes cooperation and peace are straightforward and broad. Yet several elements set this study apart. First, the theoretical logics underlying the hypotheses and the derivative propositions are well developed and grounded in broad sets of literature. Second, alternative expectations are explicated; these are not merely straw-man hypotheses opposite those of the author and presented for testing purposes. Rather, Lindley explicates the logics of these competing expectations; for example, the proposition that transparency may promote conflict is buttressed by arguments in the academic literature that too much information may be exploited by one party or that negotiations are more prone to deadlock under such conditions.
The book is especially impressive in the execution of the research. Conclusions are derived from in-depth case studies of four peacekeeping operations (Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Namibia, and Cambodia), as well as the Concert of Europe. The latter may seem out of place with the other selections, but it contributes significantly to a broadening of the applicability of the arguments and findings to security arrangements in general. Especially welcome in this same direction are two appendices that apply the findings on transparency to informational components (e.g., radio broadcasts) of more recent United Nations peacekeeping operations and arms control, “open skies” proposals, and nuclear nonproliferation, respectively. The primary method of analysis is process tracing, in which the analyst considers the sequence of events in a given case and draws inferences about their causal connections. In the hands of others, process tracing is often a thin veneer for superficial historical research. Here, the author does an excellent and systematic job in linking key actions that promote transparency to observable outcomes. Each hypothesis includes a specification of observable implications, which prevents the analyst from finding only evidence that supports the expectations; for example, indicators that security regimes promote transparency include diplomatic conferences, incident reports, and buffer zones, among others. A good portion of the analysis is based on the author's fieldwork. The Cyprus case is especially well documented, relying on fieldwork and on-site interviews, whereas the other peacekeeping cases contain less in-depth and somewhat less insightful analyses.
Lindley concludes that security regimes (formal or informal arrangements by the international community to manage conflict) provide transparency, but largely only in uncertain environments; there is less value added when adversaries already have access to information. For example, peacekeeping forces can detect cease-fire violations, but these are generally obvious to all observers. Yet who is responsible for such violations is less evident, and peacekeepers can fill an information void by investigating incidents and rendering an impartial judgment about which side (if either) is the guilty party. Most information provided by regimes is accurate, and there was little indication that it had deleterious effects by reinforcing existing fears among the disputants. The remaining findings demonstrate the variable effects of transparency across the five cases, suggesting significant contextual effects. There were few uniformly strong and positive effects from transparency, and accordingly, the author lays out an informed research agenda to investigate various points further.
The finding that transparency has multiple and sometimes differing effects by context is a valuable one for scholars used to treating uncertainty reduction as a desirable outcome. Perhaps because four of the five cases involve peacekeeping operations, the findings here will be read most closely by scholars and policymakers in that subfield. The book does an exceptional job of detailing the processes that underlie the way in which peacekeepers deal with minor disputes between parties and discourage the breaking of cease-fires; this may involve mediating disagreements at an early stage or constructing buffer zones. Similarly, the book makes an extra effort to point out direct policy implications that follow from the findings, such as discrediting rumors, as was done when peacekeepers refuted rumors of atrocities in Cyprus during a 1967 crisis. Investigating allegations and reporting the results can provide credible information that replaces rumors or non-credible claims by the conflicting parties. Transparency is clearly most relevant to traditional monitoring missions that involve cease-fire and election supervision; the appendix also makes a strong case for the role of transparency in communication aspects of recent operations, such as broadcasting information to the local citizenry and educating them on election procedures or human rights through the distribution of leaflets. It is less clear what role transparency plays in a host of other and newer peace-building functions, such as quelling civil disturbances, reconstructing infrastructure, or providing local government services.
This is a book that could too easily be overlooked by various scholarly constituencies who might incorrectly perceive it to be about only one subject (peacekeeping) or concern (information) and who therefore might not even pick it up. Others may be put off by the decidedly mixed findings and therefore lack of consistent lessons across cases. That would be a mistake. There is something for many (not quite everyone), and readers will profit by learning about topics that they thought they already knew, as well as other topics that they could stand to learn more about. Transparency is most effective in promoting peace when there are few competitors to the regime providing information and just enough—but not too much—bias, uncertainty, and incomplete information among the disputants (this is what Lindley labels the “Goldilocks zone”). This bottom-line finding may not be as strong as less equivocal claims elsewhere, but the conclusions here are well-enough grounded so as to question models and studies that purport to offer clear and consistent relationships between transparency and peace.
