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Institutions as swords and shields: multilateral counter-terrorism since 9/11

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2010

PETER ROMANIUK
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Abstract

International institutions are prominent in the ‘global War on Terror’. But there remains variation in the institutionalisation of counter-terrorism, across policy domains and over time. I argue that institutions pursue tasks of counter-terrorism when they are backed by power. Institutions function as ‘swords’ as strong states seek to influence others. Weak states, too, are sensitive to the distributional consequences of cooperation and use institutions as ‘shields’ to resist the powerful. These claims are reflected in patterns of cooperation within the UN, and in terrorist financing and maritime security. Looking forward, multilateral counter-terrorism may remain contingent upon state power.

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Type
Research Article
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Review of International Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , July 2010, pp. 591 - 613
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2010

Despite periodic claims of unilateralism, scholars now acknowledge that international institutions play a prominent role in the ‘global War on Terror.’Footnote 1 At multiple levels, and across the breadth of counter-terrorism policy,Footnote 2 states have utilised institutions as a key part of their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorism. The period since 9/11 has seen the emergence of new international norms and rules related to counter-terrorism, and cooperation now covers an increasing amount of transnational activity including aviation, transportation, maritime, financial, customs and border controls, police and judicial cooperation, as well as measures to improve the regulation of certain weapons and WMD materials. As is clear from the ‘Directory of Best Practices, Codes and Standards’ compiled by the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) of the UN Security Council,Footnote 3 or from the membership of the Secretary-General's ‘Counter-terrorism Implementation Taskforce’ (CTITF),Footnote 4 a long and growing list of international organisations have been affected by the new emphasis on counter-terrorism. As Jonathan Winer describes it, ‘Beneath the loud shout of unilateralism present from the creation of the Bush Administration's invasion of Iraq, a veritable orchestra of institutions have continued to play sotto voce to build capacity against global terrorism.’Footnote 5

The institutionalisation of counter-terrorism in this way represents a break with the past. Before 9/11, significant constraints upon international counter-terrorism cooperation prevailed. Consequently, state counter-terrorism policies were characterised by their national particularity. The development of counter-terrorism policies reflected domestic political processesFootnote 6 and different national approaches could be explained by ‘different self-conceptions and institutional practices.’Footnote 7 Where cooperation occurred, states preferred small groupings of like-minded states, often operating at the regional level only, through ad hoc mechanisms, or reacting to events.Footnote 8 Of course, states had cooperated internationally in some ways and had, for example, negotiated 12 conventions on terrorism-related offences in UN fora.Footnote 9 But the number of signatories to these conventions, and their efforts in terms of implementation, did not increase notably until after 9/11.Footnote 10 Writing prior to those attacks, Paul Pillar claimed that multilateralism was the ‘mood music’ to counter-terrorism policy.Footnote 11

These developments give rise to a range of interesting and important questions. The uptick in institutional activity across related policy domains provides a kind of natural experiment to assess competing theories about causes and consequences of international cooperation.Footnote 12 The objective of this forum is to contribute to emerging debates about multilateral counter-terrorism since 9/11.Footnote 13 In the articles that follow, Karthika Sasikumar and Beth Whitaker describe these developments as an emerging ‘counter-terrorism regime’ and analyse the interaction between national counter-terrorism policies and the new multilateral measures. The regime concept proves useful as both a dependent and an independent variable, and my colleagues illustrate how states influence the formation of regimes, just as they are influenced by them. Complementary to this, my task is to assess trends in counter-terrorism cooperation. What has driven such a sharp rise in multilateral activity? If the institutionalisation of counter-terrorism has proceeded so quickly, how stable is it and what are the prospects that it will endure? Viewed in this way, states' willingness to act through institutions is a bellwether for the vitality and longevity of the ‘global War on Terror’ more broadly.

Indeed, a closer look at the role of institutions in multilateral counter-terrorism underscores this concern. Although existing institutions have been adapted to the tasks of counter-terrorism in unprecedented ways, the role of institutions has been neither uniform nor constant and cooperation has advanced more quickly in some domains than others. For example, cooperation against terrorist financing has evolved relatively quickly, to the point where it comprises a discrete regime.Footnote 14 But a similar claim cannot be made about measures to control the movement of persons across international borders, which remain less institutionalised.Footnote 15 Similarly, there is variation in the prominence of different international fora in counter-terrorism initiatives over time. For example, the UN Security Council (SC) led the UN counter-terrorism effort in the immediate post-9/11 period when it passed path-breaking resolutions and established the CTC. But the so-called ‘CTC process’, pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), was soon in need of ‘revitalization’,Footnote 16 and measures initiated by the UN General Assembly (GA) and the Secretary-General (SG) have produced overlapping mandates and fora. This variation reflects a measure of continuity and some aspects of the pre-9/11 period remain unchanged. Even though member states in the GA – long divided by the question of how to define ‘terrorism’ – came together in 2006 to conclude a ‘Global Counter-terrorism Strategy’, the fundamental definitional question is unresolved.Footnote 17 Relatedly, the ‘comprehensive convention on international terrorism’ – under discussion in GA fora since the late 1990s – remains a work in progress.Footnote 18

If counter-terrorism is more institutionalised than ever before, why have institutions in some domains yielded more cooperation than others? Why have particular institutions been more prominent at some times than at others? Why have some of the constraints against counter-terrorism cooperation inherited from the pre-9/11 period persisted in spite of the turn to institutions after 9/11? More broadly, if these developments amount to a ‘counter-terrorism regime’, what type of order is emerging?Footnote 19

I argue that institutions play a role in counter-terrorism when they are backed by power. Strong states view institutions as a means of exercising influence over others, with the aim of binding them to certain policies. Multilateral counter-terrorism since 9/11 reflects the traditional realist insight that institutions ‘tend to promote the interests of the powerful at the expense of the weak.’Footnote 20 Several propositions follow from this general claim. First, we can anticipate that cooperation through institutions is initiated by strong states. Realist scholars often begin by asking who demands cooperation, attributing a key causal role to an ‘enacting coalition’Footnote 21 or describing institutions as a form of ‘collusion’ among powerful actors to advance their interests.Footnote 22 Second, we should observe that strong states engage multiple institutional fora, as attempts to bind others are more likely to succeed where they can be incorporated in a ‘web of institutional arrangements.’Footnote 23 Third, we should expect that strong states succeed in inducing cooperation where they are able to raise the costs of non cooperation for others.Footnote 24 In turn, this is more likely where strong states act together and, as Dan Drezner argues, ‘A great power concert is a necessary and sufficient condition for effective global governance over any transnational issue.’Footnote 25 Therefore, while strong states can be expected to seek influence through multiple fora, they will be most attracted to those bodies that enable them to translate relative power into binding rules in an unencumbered way. It is here that the structure and procedures of institutions matterFootnote 26 and strong states may prefer to act through ‘club’ organisations, where ‘Stringent membership and accession criteria permit great powers to act in concert while limiting participation in rule formation to like-minded countries.’Footnote 27 Finally, we can expect strong states will be able to raise the costs for non cooperation by imposing sanctions and offering incentives. Once more, threats relating to market access, and other forms of coercion, are more likely to be effective when powerful states club together.Footnote 28

I summarise these claims by suggesting that, when these conditions prevail, institutions function as ‘swords’ – that is, as a means to the end of great power influence. Again, while strong states may instigate action in multiple fora, institutions function as swords when they facilitate influence. This is most likely where they enable powerful states to raise the costs for non cooperation, such as when leading powers act in concert, when they accrue privileges by virtue of institutional structures and procedures (as in clubs), and when they are willing and able to levy sanctions and offer incentives for cooperation.

If institutions can be a useful tool for strong states, the variation described above illustrates that hegemons do not always get their way. For this reason, it is important to go beyond the simple claim that institutional cooperation benefits the strong.Footnote 29 Indeed, the use of institutions as swords makes clear that institutionalisation can have distributive effects and realists note that cooperation produces winners and losers, ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’.Footnote 30 As a result, we should expect that weak states, too, behave like ‘positional actors’, concerned about the distributional consequences of counter-terrorism cooperation.Footnote 31 If strong states use institutions as swords to extend influence, then we should expect weak states to resist, to preserve their relative power or to ameliorate the consequences of being bound. By virtue of their position, weak states have fewer options, but they may nonetheless find some comfort in institutions that can maintain the status quo. Therefore, weak states are more likely to prefer institutions where the structure and procedures provide an opportunity to resist the imposition of hegemonic norms and rules, such as those with a one-member-one-vote structure.Footnote 32 In this way, institutions function as ‘shields’ – that is, as a means to the end of resisting influence. Of course, hegemons intent upon binding others may meet resistance pragmatically by using sanctions and incentives, substituting swords, or even acting outside of institutions (according to the principle ‘multilateralism where possible [but] bilateralism where necessary’).Footnote 33 Whether acting alone or in concert, strong states that possess ‘go-it-alone’ powerFootnote 34 will be best placed to engage in such forum shopping and to achieve their desired outcomes.

Overall, both strong and weak states view institutions instrumentally, as tools to advance or defend their interests. This analysis suggests that institutionalised cooperation will emerge and endure when institutions function as swords. On the other hand, when institutions function as shields, their prominence is likely to wane as strong states that demand cooperation will seek alternative fora. Whereas institutions backed by power will be prominent, those not backed by power will be less relevant. Unlike structural realists, my argument acknowledges that institutions matter because they affect outcomes. In taking a self-consciously realist and rationalist approach, I am also sceptical of liberal and constructivist claims that institutions exert truly independent effects. Rather, through their functions as swords and shields, I suggest that institutions are part of the ‘dynamic character of the “who-gets-what”’ of international politicsFootnote 35 and I study multilateral counter-terrorism on this basis.

These claims are borne out in the record of institutionalisation since 9/11. In the US and its allies, the ‘global War on Terror’ has had powerful advocates that have used institutions as a way of extending influence over others. In their efforts to elaborate binding policies, they have pressed their claims in diverse fora. But they have concentrated their efforts in fora that grant structural and procedural privileges, such as the SC. In general, they have had most success when they act together, where opportunities for resistance are absent (by virtue of institutional structure and procedures) and where they can manipulate sanctions and incentives. In other words, where institutions function as swords, they have featured most prominently in the ‘global War on Terror’. In this way, counter-terrorism cooperation resembles an ‘imposed order’, that is ‘deliberately established by dominant actors who succeed in getting others to conform to the requirements of these orders through some combination of coercion, cooptation and the manipulation of incentives.’Footnote 36 In turn, weak states have exercised resistance where possible and have sought to shift cooperation to those institutions that resemble shields, such as the GA. But the use of institutions as shields has prompted efforts at substitution and forum shopping among strong states, which have sometimes been prepared to act outside of existing institutions. In sum, the role of institutions in counter-terrorism has ebbed and flowed with the interests of great powers, especially the US, as they seek influence and encounter resistance. Variation in institutionalisation reflects the use of institutions as swords and shields by strong and weak states, respectively.

In the remainder of this article, I elaborate this argument through three short cases studies. The first case shows how shields can trump swords by looking at forum shopping among UN member states. In shifting the initiative on counter-terrorism from the SC to the GA – or, at least, as the GA has acted to qualify the mandate of the SC – weak states have been able to limit the imposition of further unwelcome costs for cooperation. The second case shows how institutions can function as swords by looking at international cooperation against terrorist financing. By integrating terrorist financing into the mission of the world's peak anti-money laundering body – the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF), which was created by industrialised states in 1989 – strong states have been able to take advantage of a unique, limited-membership institution that enables them to exercise binding authority. The third case surveys the elaboration of maritime security rules through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and reveals a mixed outcome. As a UN body, the IMO has a broad membership. Nonetheless, some specific measures – such as those concerning shipping and port security – became institutionalised as the threat of enforcement action by the US loomed in the background. Other measures – such as those concerning the security of shipping containers – were initially resisted. In response, the US undertook bilateral action, in the form of Container Security Initiative, while pressing for action in the World Customs Organization (WCO). Institutionalisation occurred as a result of substitution and forum shopping. In concluding, I reflect on the travails of multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation and the place of institutions within it. If it is indeed the case that states view counter-terrorism cooperation in distributive terms, we ought to have modest expectations about whether and how institutions will feature in counter-terrorism in the future. Without the active sponsorship of powerful states, the post-9/11 flurry in institutional activity may be fleeting and multilateralism may return to being the ‘mood music’ of counter-terrorism policy.

I. Shields trump swords? Counter-terrorism at the UN

Given the long history of contestation over counter-terrorism through the UN, there is much precedent for the use of UN organs as swords and shields by states. While detailed accounts of that history are available elsewhere,Footnote 37 two points are of worth noting here. First, the main UN forum for debate about terrorism prior to 9/11 was the GA, but cooperation was constrained as member states could not agree on how to define ‘terrorism’.Footnote 38 Nonetheless, through various committees, the GA was successful in elaborating 12 terrorism-related conventions before 9/11. These conventions criminalised particular offences committed by terrorists including the seizure of aircraft, hostage taking, offences against platforms on the continental shelf, terrorist bombing and terrorist financing, among other offenses. The virtue of this ‘piecemeal’ approach was that it permitted states to act against terrorism even though they couldn't agree on a definition.Footnote 39 By definition, such an approach could only advance cooperation so far. After the end of the Cold War, strong states – and the US in particular – became more assertive in seeking action against terrorism in the SC. On three occasions in the 1990s, the US led efforts to impose targeted sanctions against state and non-state actors in response to acts of terrorism (utilising Chapter VII of the UN Charter, on the grounds that international terrorism constituted a ‘threat to international peace and security’).Footnote 40

Second, the partial roadblock at the UN had a spillover effect and smaller multilateral groupings were preferred by interested states for many years. These groupings were diverse and operated at multiple levels. Martha Crenshaw notes that the Organization of American States passed its first terrorism-related convention in 1971, followed by the Council of Europe in 1977, reflecting that consensus on terrorism was easier to achieve at the regional level than at the global level.Footnote 41 Extending this logic further, Crenshaw surveys the variety of fora – from the (then) G7, to networks of government officials, to the EC and NATO, to ‘groups of like-minded states’ and bilateral ties – that were used by states to cooperate against terrorism.Footnote 42 This variety of cooperative fora mirrored a trend towards increasing transnational cooperation in law enforcement more generally.Footnote 43

The Security Council acts …

In 9/11, powerful states, led by the US, were presented the opportunity to consolidate the SC's role in counter-terrorism and they seized it.Footnote 44 Introduced by the US, resolution 1373 (2001) led to a ‘new paradigm’ in the international response to terrorism by setting a broad and ambitious counter-terrorism agenda.Footnote 45 Passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it requires states to implement a wide range of counter-terrorism measures in such areas as financial regulation, migration and customs control, and arms transfers, while calling for cooperation in law enforcement and extradition. To facilitate the implementation of these measures, the resolution created the CTC. As with other subsidiary organs of the SC, membership of the CTC reflects that of the Council itself. In a subsequent resolution (1377 (2001)), the SC extended to the CTC a mandate to facilitate technical assistance to states, many of whom lacked the capacity to implement the range of measures covered by 1373.Footnote 46 Beyond the substantive requirements of 1373, the resolution also requires states to report on their implementation of the measures imposed. Employing a pool of experts for this purpose, it was envisioned that reports would stimulate a dialogue on implementation between the Committee and member states. Prompting much optimism, the CTC initially enjoyed a good measure of support from states. For example, the CTC attracted an unprecedented degree of compliance with the reporting requirement (all member states submitted their first report) and numerous states sought technical assistance.Footnote 47

Swift action through the SC, then, enabled strong states to set the agenda for multilateral counter-terrorism. The SC's counter-terrorism measures also included the expansion of targeted sanctions against terrorists and entities (designated by a subcommittee of the Council), initially imposed against the Taliban with resolution 1267 (1999).Footnote 48 As the SC moved to implement this framework, high compliance costs for member states became apparent. Two practices of the CTC underscored this. First, by virtue of its core tasks – reviewing state reports on implementation and brokering assistance among providers and recipients – the CTC's experts needed to identify standards against which the implementation of resolution 1373 could be measured. Such standards were conceived as ‘best practices’. In its first work programme in October 2001, the CTC undertook to ‘Begin to identify and promulgate best practice and to research ways of assisting states where appropriate.’Footnote 49 At first, these standards were integrated into the CTC's evolving ‘directory of assistance’ which was designed to put donors in touch with those states seeking technical assistance. Over time, however, the identification of ‘best practices’ became a discrete task in itself. In early 2003, with resolution 1456 (2003), the SC requested that the CTC ‘bear in mind all international best practices, codes and standards which are relevant to the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001).’Footnote 50 In 2004, the SC again referred to best practices, requesting that the CTC, ‘in consultation with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and the UN bodies to develop a set of best practices to assist States in implementing the provisions of resolution 1373 (2001) related to the financing of terrorism.’Footnote 51 Currently, the CTC maintains a digest of best practices separately from its ‘Technical Assistance Matrix’.Footnote 52

A second, complementary practice of the CTC is its outreach to specialist or functional organisations, as well as regional and subregional organisations. To date, experts from the CTC have convened large meetings of such organisations on five occasions.Footnote 53 The range of interlocutors has been remarkably vast, covering all regions of the world, all policy domains affected by resolution 1373 and reaching well beyond UN bodies alone.Footnote 54 For example, among the specialist bodies that have had dialogue with the CTC are the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Customs Organization, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, the International Maritime Organization, Interpol, the World Bank and IMF, as well other multilateral organisations such as the FATF. When CTC experts went looking for best practices, they often found that organisations were already mobilised around the counter-terrorism agenda and, in several cases, were revising existing measures or initiating new rules. The need for best practices, alongside outreach to specialist bodies, meant that the CTC effectively outsourced to sector-specific organisations the identification of the standards necessary to implement resolution 1373. But because resolution 1373 was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, its provisions are mandatory. Therefore, member states of the UN suddenly found themselves being required to implement a vast series of norms and rules. Moreover, by virtue of the reporting requirements of 1373, they would be held accountable to the permanent five members of the SC for their responses. All of this was in addition to the implementation of targeted sanctions pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and its successors. Multilateral counter-terrorism, as envisioned by the SC, was proving to be costly.

The use of the SC in this way reflects its function as a sword. While strong states engaged multiple fora and created a ‘web of institutional arrangements’, the SC offered both a limited membership and binding authority. These attributes of SC action soon elicited a critical response from commentators and member states alike. The breadth of resolution 1373 led to several charges that the SC had assumed a ‘legislative’ role.Footnote 55 Regarding the CTC, a variety of operational problems emerged as enthusiasm began to wane: observers doubted whether it was resourced adequately to fulfil its mandate (or, indeed, whether such a vast mandate could be fulfilled at all); its role as a broker of technical assistance made it ultimately reliant on donors; it focused too much on written reports; concerns about the clash between counter-terrorism measures and human rights began to be voiced and; after all, the definition question was not resolved in 1373 or any other resolution, and that dispute was prone to resurface.Footnote 56 As the use of the SC as a sword began to be questioned, an effort emerged among non-SC members to shield themselves against the further imposition of unwelcome measures.

… the General Assembly responds

With resolution 1535 (2004), the SC acknowledged that the CTC process was in need of revitalisation and created a ‘Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate’ (CTED) as part of this effort.Footnote 57 For a variety of reasons, revitalisation has proven difficult. Within the SC itself, ongoing terrorist attacks and efforts by the various P5 states to broaden the counter-terrorism agenda led to a succession of resolutions, creating additional reporting requirements and multiple subsidiary bodies alongside the CTC. These developments impede revitalisation, leading to calls to rationalise SC efforts.Footnote 58 Tellingly, other actors – non-SC members in the GA, as well as the UN Secretary-General (SG) – asserted themselves. In 2004, the SG's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recommended that he advance a comprehensive global strategy against terrorism.Footnote 59 In 2005 then SG, Kofi Annan, began articulating such a strategy,Footnote 60 while creating within his office the CTITF to better coordinate UN efforts. Late that year, the GA requested that the SG present recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy. In 2006, the SG submitted his report,Footnote 61 and the GA duly agreed upon a ‘rather anodyne’ ‘Global Counter-terrorism Strategy.’Footnote 62 In terms of substance, the Strategy is generally repetitive of pronouncements in other UN fora, but gives more prominence to ‘measures conducive to the spread of terrorism’ and human rights concerns.

For present purposes, a critical consequence of the Strategy is that it redresses the perceived imbalance between the SC and the GA on the issue of terrorism. In this way, the emergence of the Strategy is consistent with the use of institutions as a shield. Here, the broader membership of the GA has taken the opportunity to direct the evolution of counter-terrorism cooperation towards a forum where they have more of a say over outcomes. The substantive focus of the Strategy (to emphasise ‘conditions conducive’ and human rights) represents an attempt to set a counter-terrorism agenda that is less demanding (or, at least, no more demanding) than that set by the SC. Shifting among fora here is one way of redistributing the costs and benefits the counter-terrorism cooperation. Although it is too soon to tell, and despite widespread rhetorical support for the Strategy, there is an emerging sense that the US' attention to counter-terrorism cooperation through the UN has ‘dwindled significantly’.Footnote 63 My approach suggests that such disengagement may foreground the US' intention to seek alternative fora for influence.

In sum, the experience of counter-terrorism cooperation through the UN since 9/11 suggests that strong states have used the SC as a sword to exert influence. In response, non-SC members have sought to shield themselves by using the GA. As a consequence, the SC and GA currently maintain parallel efforts, with coordination attempted through the CTITF. Being grounded in realist cynicism, of course, this interpretation may invite the criticism that the Strategy is essential to enhancing the legitimacy of the broader UN effort against terrorism.Footnote 64 But I would point out here that increased legitimacy is linked to different expectations about the substance of multilateral counter-terrorism and the monitoring of state efforts. Evidently, states disagree about what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ UN response to terrorism, leading them to distributional conflict for control over the counter-terrorism agenda. In this way, perceptions of legitimacy are part of the competition regarding who wins and who loses from the institutionalisation of counter-terrorism.

II. Institutions as swords: countering terrorist financing

If strong states have been unable to hold sway in the UN, the US and its allies have had rather more success in inducing cooperation against terrorist financing. Assessments of the financial aspects of the ‘global War on Terror’ make the point that cooperation has advanced both quickly and broadly.Footnote 65 This result is not surprising, and is perhaps over-determined, by virtue of the unique attributes of existing institutions in this domain, which were crafted to enable strong states to set standards and enforce them. In other words, the institutional vehicles for counter-terrorist financing cooperation – the FATF and its extended network of bankers and bureaucrats – personify the attributes of a sword in an area where there are high costs for deploying shields.

The anti-money laundering regime of the 1990s and the FATF's ‘club standards’Footnote 66

In the years prior to 9/11, several states pursued terrorists' finances without significant efforts at coordination and cooperation. Although the SC had imposed financial sanctions three times for reasons related to terrorism, these measures were not robustly implemented by states in the pre-9/11 period.Footnote 67 Similarly, the 1999 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism attracted scant support and only four states took the opportunity to join it before 9/11. But the US began to show an interest in cooperation and introduced the topic of terrorist financing into the FATF in 2000.Footnote 68 Also in that year, the US' National Commission on Terrorism report recommended increasing counter-terrorist financing measures and the National Money Laundering Strategy signalled US intent to train foreign officials.Footnote 69

Only after 9/11 did counter-terrorist financing initiatives become institutionalised, on the back of the anti-money laundering initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s. The rise of the FATF and the anti-money laundering regime is described in greater depth elsewhere,Footnote 70 but four of its pre-9/11 features are relevant here. First, the FATF is a limited-membership body comprising mostly industrialised states. The FATF had been initiated in 1989 by the G7 and initially included 15 states. For this reason, Drezner characterises the FATF as a ‘club’, enabling it to develop rules that reflect consensus among strong states but involve high adjustment costs for weak states.Footnote 71 Although membership of the FATF grew over time – it numbered 29 governments and two regional organisations in mid-2001Footnote 72 – pre-9/11 accounts of the emergence of the anti-money laundering regime emphasise the role of powerful states.Footnote 73

Second, the FATF member states exercised hegemony by developing standards. The ‘40 Recommendations’ against money laundering were first issued in 1990 and include measures concerning customer identification, record keeping practices and suspicious transaction reporting. While the initial focus of the anti-money laundering effort was drug money, the recommendations provide scope for implementing states to legislate other so-called predicate offences (the proceeds of which would be covered by laundering laws). Moreover, despite the limited membership of the FATF, it established an active external relations effort and the recommendations urge banks to exercise special caution regarding transactions involving countries that do not conform to the standard. They call upon members to ensure that subsidiaries of home financial institutions registered aboard adhere to the recommendations. Subsequently, the G7 invited non-members to implement the recommendations.Footnote 74 In doing so, the FATF extended to itself a global mandate.

Third, the FATF disseminated its standards through a growing network of anti-money laundering officials and experts. Under the aegis of FATF member states, so-called FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) emerged in the Caribbean (in 1990), the Asia-Pacific (1997), within the Council of Europe (1997), in Eastern and Southern Africa (1999) and South America (2000).Footnote 75 Over the course of the 1990s, money laundering standards were increasingly discussed among officials from national financial intelligence units (FIUs), who initiated the Egmont Group of FIUs in 1995. In 2000, a group of private sector banks – the ‘Wolfsberg Group’ – developed a series of principles for banks to adopt in order to comply with money laundering standards. More generally, FATF influence was extended through its interactions with a host of international and regional organisations including the IMF, World Bank, regional development banks, the Commonwealth, the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, the World Customs Organisation, Interpol, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions and the UN's peak drug and crime control office (now the ‘UN Office on Drugs and Crime’).Footnote 76 As each body endorsed the ‘40 Recommendations’, rules authored by the FATF ‘club’ gained authority for all.

Fourth, the FATF utilised several mechanisms to enforce the recommendations, including a graduated series of self-assessments and peer review evaluations, with the possibility of sanctions for non-compliance against both members and non-members. Most prominently, the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) initiative, launched in 2000, provided a mechanism to ‘name and shame’ non-compliant states, requiring that members subject transactions to additional scrutiny. While considered discriminatory and overtly political by some,Footnote 77 it succeeded in inducing compliance.Footnote 78

From anti-money laundering to countering terrorist financing

There are important differences between money laundering and terrorist financing. Whereas the former seeks to cleanse monies gained through past criminal activity, the latter includes the detection and apprehension of resources that may be used for future terrorist acts. Despite these differences, the FATF has been adapted to the ‘global War on Terror’, as counter-terrorist financing measures have been framed by the US and others as complementary to the nascent anti-money laundering regime.Footnote 79 In October 2001, FATF members convened an extraordinary session to consider ‘necessary steps for preventing and combating terrorist financing activity’.Footnote 80 At this meeting the mandate of the FATF was formally extended and ‘8 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing’ (SRs) were elaborated. A ninth SR was added in October 2004. The 9 SRs include recommendations to criminalise terrorist financing (that is, the provision of funds for the purpose of terrorism, or for the benefit of terrorists), to require suspicious transactions reports related to terrorism, and to better regulate charities and wire transfer services.Footnote 81 They are widely acknowledged to set the global standard for counter-terrorist financing and have been adopted as such by the global anti-money laundering network. That network continues to grow. FSRBs now cover each continent and the Egmont Group has added more than forty new FIUs as members since 9/11.Footnote 82 Importantly, in mid-2002 the boards of both the World Bank and IMF recognised the (then) ‘40+8 Recommendations’ as the relevant international standard in the area, as they developed action plans to enhance their efforts to counter money laundering and terrorist financing. On the ground, this meant that the Bank and Fund collaborated with the FATF and FSRBs in developing a common methodology to assess state compliance with the recommendations. Following a successful pilot programme, the Bank and Fund made anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing activities part of their permanent reporting activities in March 2004.

The 9 SRs now also have the explicit endorsement of the SC, following the passage of resolution 1617 (2005). As a result, FATF rules have the force of international law by fiat. A wide range of regional organisations have also endorsed the SRs. In some cases, such as APEC's Counter-Terrorism Action Plan process, formal mechanisms were established for member countries to report on their implementation of FATF recommendations and related UN measures. Other international organisations have acted to institutionalise the 9 SRs. Notable here is the G8's Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG), established in 2003, which provides counter-terrorism assistance donors with a ‘forum to identify priority areas of need to implement 1373 and to coordinate capacity building efforts to maximize impact’.Footnote 83 CTAG works closely with the FATF, the CTC and regional organisations to coordinate counter-terrorist financing assistance, identifying regional priorities as Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.Footnote 84 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime has taken measures to integrate its ongoing work – including that on money laundering – with the effort to suppress terrorist financing. Specifically, that Office has provided bilateral assistance to some states in fulfilling their reporting and substantive obligations under resolution 1373, as well as developing technical assistance guides and convening workshops in cooperation with a wide range of regional and subregional bodies.Footnote 85

Finally, professional organisations, other than those concerned with money laundering alone, have also certified FATF and UN counter-terrorist financing measures as key global standards. For example, each of the peak organisations for regulators in the banking, insurance and securities sectors has taken steps in this direction.Footnote 86 In the offshore financial sector, FATF recommendations have been ‘welcomed’ by the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, with a renewed commitment to implementing global standards.Footnote 87 Among private sector banks, the Wolfsberg Group adopted a statement supporting FATF recommendations and elaborating principles for their implementation by the financial sector.Footnote 88 Once again, rules developed within a ‘club’ have achieved global prominence.

The 9 SRs are enforced in a number of ways, principally using self-assessment questionnaires, and peer and external reviews in line with the FATF/World Bank/IMF common methodology. Unlike in the pre-9/11 period, the means for encouraging convergence with the 9 SRs is more likely to involve carrots – in the form of technical assistance from the sources recounted above – than sticks.Footnote 89 In fact, in announcing the collaboration between the FATF and the Bank and Fund, the FATF also indicated that it would not add any new jurisdictions to the NCCT list, effectively removing the ‘name and shame’ mechanism as a means for coercing compliance for states not already on that list.Footnote 90 As a consequence, symbolic sanctions only can be imposed for failure to implement the 9 SRs. This may occur through interactions with and among the FATF, FSRBs, and the various UN organs, which sometimes identify laggards in their public statements. Material sanctions for non-compliance are more likely to be imposed bilaterally. For example, under section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the US has imposed ‘special measures’ against banks and jurisdictions of primary money laundering concern.Footnote 91

Overall, the institutionalisation of terrorist financing is an archetypical example of institutions functioning as swords. Cooperation was initiated by powerful states acting through a ‘club’ and creating a ‘web of institutional arrangements’. The costs for non cooperation are high in light of both compelling incentives to cooperate (to ensure access to the world's leading economies and to public and private creditors) and the threat of bilateral sanctions. In turn, this explains why other institutions, such as regional organisations, have not been used as shields, but have actually endorsed FATF measures and supported the creation of FSRBs. Backed by powerful states, institutions have featured prominently in the effort to suppress terrorist financing.

III. Maritime security after 9/11: competing swords and shields

To date, I have shown that variation in the role of institutions in counter-terrorism reflects their use by states as either swords or shields. Sometimes the same institution can manifest both functions and resistance can prompt strong states to seek influence through other means. These mixed outcomes are apparent from the role of institutions in the various aspects of maritime security since 9/11. Here, I discuss ship and port security, and container security. While the outcomes vary, institutionalisation was prompted by US action in both instances.

If past US efforts to secure maritime industries were ‘isolated, scattered and uncoordinated’, 9/11 brought to light the fact that they provide ‘many opportunities for terrorists’.Footnote 92 This imperative gave rise to a new organisational approach (as key agencies – Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard – were brought under the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS)), new resources, and new legislation, in the form of the Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002 (MTSA), passed in November of that year. The MTSA manifests a ‘layered’ approach to security, outlining standards to secure ports, the ships that pass through them, the cargo they carry and the seafarers and port workers employed along the way. Among other measures, the Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct safety audits of local and foreign ports, to assess their anti-terrorism measures and, where necessary, prescribe sanctions. The Act ‘pushes our zone of security outward’Footnote 93 by requiring ‘standards and procedures for screening and evaluating cargo prior to loading in a foreign port for shipment to the US either directly or via a foreign port’, as well as ‘standards and procedures for allowing the US government to ensure and validate compliance with this program’.Footnote 94 Further, the MTSA requires the use of biometric technologies in the issuance of identification to transport workers and notes the relevance of such technologies for establishing the identity of all others with access to secure areas. To implement these measures, the US approached the IMO in the first instance.

Exporting homeland security through the IMO: the ISPS Code

Prior to 9/11, maritime security was not central to the IMO's mission and multilateral action had evolved in only response to events. For example, after the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985, the IMO took several steps to secure ships and ports. These measures included adopting the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the ‘SUA Convention’, which entered into force in 1992) and developing a circular on the adoption of security plans for ships and ports.Footnote 95 But the response to 9/11 would bring more far-reaching change. In November 2001 the IMO's highest governing body, the Assembly,Footnote 96 passed a resolution to review existing measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, and increase funding for technical cooperation.Footnote 97 Responding to a petition by the US, the resolution also decided that an inter-sessional working group (ISWG) should be established to undertake the review, in order to prepare recommendations for the next round of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) the following year.

By virtue of the sequencing of meetings, the first opportunity for the US to set out its agenda was in the IMO's Technical Committee. That agenda was expansive and included implementing security plans for ships, port facilities and offshore terminals, raising standards for the identification of seafarers and conducting background checks on them, and ensuring a secure chain of custody for containers from their port of origin to their destination. Moreover, the US requested that these measures be implemented through amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), which attracted high levels of compliance. In response to the US, other members of the committee doubted whether such a broad range of measures could be included in SOLAS. Any changes to SOLAS, the committee noted, would require the consent of contracting states and such a meeting could not take place until December 2002, when the MSC would meet again. Nonetheless, the Technical Committee set the date for the first meetings of the ISWG, which was to be held at IMO HQ in London in February 2002, with the US offering to foot the bill.Footnote 98

Once meetings of the ISWG commenced, other states emphasised the ways in which pre-9/11 IMO maritime security measures could be amended, expanded and affixed to SOLAS.Footnote 99 However, the US pressed its broad agenda, this time including ship and port facility security plans, improved mechanisms for seafarer's identification (utilising biometrics and background checks), requirements that shipping companies and ships designate security officers, port vulnerability assessments, measures to raise standards for long range tracking devices, port-of-origin container examinations and cooperation with the WCO to ensure the security of all cargo.Footnote 100 As the longest, most thorough document submitted to the ISWG, the US' submission was used as a working document by the group.

The US' proposals received a mixed reception from other group members.Footnote 101 Some proposals were rejected outright, such as the idea of requiring background checks for seafarers. Other proposals were deferred for further consideration by the working group or delegated in part. For example, the idea of port facility security plans attracted hesitation from group members for being beyond the remit of SOLAS, which does not cover the entirety of a port area but is limited to the ship-port interface. Group members noted that the International Labour Organization (ILO) would need to be consulted on this point, as port workers would be affected. Further, the working group encouraged other states to make submissions on the issue of containers, given the need to balance commerce and security. Regarding standards for long range tracking devices, resistance from group members resulted in the matters being partly put off and partly delegated to other IMO committees. Still other proposals were delegated in their entirety, such as the matter of seafarer identification documents, which had been the subject of an ILO convention since 1958.Footnote 102

But some issues – specifically, port vulnerability plans, ship security plans and ship and company security officers – were accepted by the ISWG. Following the introduction of the term ‘port facility’ to ensure the applicability of SOLAS,Footnote 103 the group added port security plans to this bundle of measures. Together, these measures went on to comprise the International Shipping and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) which was passed as a new chapter to SOLAS in December 2002. The Code commits SOLAS-contracting governments to a range of risk-assessment, inspection and certification measures pertaining to ships and ports, and the deadline for implementing the Code was set for 1 July 2004.Footnote 104 Regarding the enforcement of the Code, port authorities have the right to exercise control and compliance measures regarding visiting ships. Additional control measures concerning cargo, passengers and crew may also be undertaken by contracting port states. Importantly, where a port state perceives that the security of the port facility may be compromised, ships may be denied entry. Entry may also be denied on the grounds that ports visited earlier in a ship's journey, or other ships with which it has interfaced, represent a breach of security standards. Given the costs of implementation (acknowledged by IMO to be especially taxing on developing world states), and the high costs for failing to comply with the Code, IMO established a dedicated trust fund to support technical cooperation assistance activities. Maritime security issues were also folded into ongoing IMO technical assistance programmes and a ‘global technical cooperation program on maritime security’ was launched as early as January 2002.Footnote 105 In 2004, more than US $3.2 million was spent on training more than 3,800 people to aid implementation of the Code.Footnote 106

The ISPS Code was welcomed by the US as a ‘companion’ to the MTSA.Footnote 107 Pursuant to the act, the US Coast Guard took on the role of policing compliance with the Code. Under the US' International Port Security Program (IPSP), Coast Guard officials began to collaborate with foreign port officials to assess their compliance. Through its ‘Port Facility Security Compliance Advisories’, the Coast Guard commenced publishing the names of non-compliant states. (Similarly, influential states in Europe and Asia used institutions – in the form of ‘port state control’ authorities – as swords by issuing warnings to visiting ships, undertaking inspections and publishing ISPS compliance data).Footnote 108 These actions sent a strong signal to prospective shirkers. Given the US' share of world maritime trade, enforcement actions entail the threat that market access may be denied, thereby raising the costs of non cooperation.Footnote 109 Still, in the lead up to the deadline, industry critics expressed concern that compliance levels would be low and that ship and port operators would incur high costs.Footnote 110 As it turned out, levels of compliance were soon above 90 per cent for ports and ships.Footnote 111

Forum shopping for container security

In the negotiations over the ISPS Code, the IMO functioned as both a sword (for the US to advance its interests) and shield (for other states to resist aspects of the US' agenda). By virtue of the MTSA and the IPSP, the US could demonstrate its determination to enforce the Code, thereby raising the costs for non cooperation. But the ISWG also provided the opportunity for resistance to US proposals. Here, we would expect the hegemon to engage in forum shopping, to seek a substitute mechanism through which influence could be exerted. Indeed, on the issue of container security, the US responded in an entirely pragmatic way conforming to the general rule: ‘multilateralism where possible, bilateralism where necessary’.Footnote 112

At the same time that its expansive agenda before the IMO was being disaggregated, US officials began talking about a ‘Container Security Initiative’ (CSI). Such an initiative would establish a series of bilateral agreements with foreign ports to identify and pre-screen high-risk containers, expanding the use of scanning technology. By the end of March 2002, three Canadian ports (in Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver) had signed on to the measures and, reciprocally, Canadian customs officials were stationed in certain US ports. Since that time, more than 50 ports on all continents have concluded bilateral agreement with the US' CBP, including the world's 20 largest ports, which were targeted for membership first.Footnote 113

Under these agreements, CBP officers are posted in foreign ports to undertake risk assessments of US-bound cargo. Only containers deemed risky are actually screened, using ‘non-intrusive inspectional’ (NII) equipment. Host countries are responsible for the acquisition and operation of NII equipment and CBP describes associated costs as a kind of ‘insurance policy’ against terrorism.Footnote 114 Formally, the US offers no sanctions or incentives to states for joining, or failing to join, CSI. Rather, the benefits are indirect as CSI sends a positive signal about security standards at a port. And in the event of a terrorist attack on world shipping, CBP points out, CSI ports will be the first to recover as they already possess a developed security infrastructure.Footnote 115

As CSI gained signatories, the US worked to ‘internationalize’ the initiative.Footnote 116 Through the G8, the US won support for CSI principles.Footnote 117 More importantly, the US framed CSI as consistent with existing WCO measuresFootnote 118 and has worked through that forum to establish a multilateral ‘Framework of Standards to Facilitate and Secure Global Trade’. Similar to the ISPS Code, the development of the Framework occurred through a special working group – this time a High-Level Strategic Group – in which CBP was ‘in the thick of the process’.Footnote 119 Adopted by the WCO's Council in June 2005, the Framework bears a strong resemblance to the US' CSI. It implements four principles: harmonisation of electronic advance cargo information requirements, a consistent risk-management approach to assess threats to cargo security, offshore screening using NII equipment and partnerships with business to provide incentives for improved security.Footnote 120 The Framework has attracted criticism from some in the industry that US-derived standards will impose undue costs for other states and the private sector.Footnote 121 But implementation of the Framework remains a decision for member states. The US has underscored the importance of technical assistance, endorsing the creation of a Capacity Building Directorate with the WCO Secretariat and establishing a Capacity Building Division within CBP itself. Further, CBP indicated that it would solicit a ‘serious commitment’ for technical assistance funding from other US government agencies and from international lending institutions. Other developed states have similarly supported capacity building initiatives related to the Framework, drawing attention to the many positive spillovers that the Framework gives rise to (including efficiency gains, greater transparency, facilitation of economic development, improved ability to collect customs duties and the apprehension of criminals).Footnote 122 By September 2007, 149 countries had expressed their intention to implement the Framework.Footnote 123

Overall, the shift of fora from the IMO, to the CSI and bilateralism, to the WCO, reflects that great powers have the capacity to substitute governance mechanisms.Footnote 124 While the US was prepared to exercise ‘go-it-alone’ power,Footnote 125 it showed a preference for acting through institutions where possible. US leverage – by virtue of its central role in maritime trade – meant that it could raise the costs for non cooperation. Under these circumstances, opportunities for resistance were exhausted and the IMO and WCO have been prominent in multilateral counter-terrorism.

Conclusion

Since 9/11, international institutions have played a prominent role in counter-terrorism. Despite this break with the past, there remains variation in the institutionalisation of counter-terrorism, both across domains and over time. I explain these developments by taking a realist and rationalist approach, wherein institutions resemble swords (enabling influence by the powerful) or shields (enabling resistance). Where institutions function as swords – as in terrorist financing – they are prominent; although it is too soon to tell, some evidence – as in the UN case here – suggests that institutions used as shields may play a lesser role over time. Mixed outcomes – across different aspects of maritime security – show how states compete by using institutions as swords and shields. But ultimately, as that case also reveals, institutions matter most where they are backed by power. As all three cases demonstrate, attempts at influence through institutions are often initiated by strong states, which act through multiple fora but prefer those that can translate relative power into binding rules. Although my cases provide evidence for the claim that hegemony is exercised through club organisations, they also underscore ‘go-it-alone’ power, suggesting that great power consensus is more important in some areas (for example, among the permanent five members of the SC) than others (for example, on container security, where the US acted bilaterally).Footnote 126 In sum, multilateral counter-terrorism since 9/11 conforms to the traditional realist insight that institutions ‘tend to promote the interests of the powerful at the expense of the weak.’Footnote 127 This argument has three implications, relevant to scholars and practitioners.

First, as noted earlier, the puzzle described here (an uptick in the institutionalisation of counter-terrorism since 9/11, but with variation) provides a natural experiment for theories of cooperation. My discussion attests to the relevance of realist arguments in debates about institutions and I contend that an ‘imposed order’ has emerged. I leave open the question of whether that order now comprises a ‘regime’,Footnote 128 but suggest that future studies may find the concept of ‘regime complexes’ useful. Kal Raustiala and David Victor define a ‘regime complex’ as ‘an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area […] marked by the existence of several legal agreements that are created and maintained in distinct fora with participation of different sets of actors.’Footnote 129 This concept is particularly relevant given that, after 9/11, states did not have a ‘clean institutional slate’Footnote 130 on which to develop multilateral responses. Consistent with Raustiala and Victor's preliminary conjectures, I demonstrate that the emerging ‘regime complex for counter-terrorism’ is very much characterised by competitive forum shopping among states.

Second, my realist interpretation has implications for alternative approaches, which would yield different expectations about the institutionalisation of counter-terrorism. Liberals would expect that institutions offer opportunities for mutual benefits and absolute gains from cooperation. But the facts here do not reflect such liberal assumptions. If counter-terrorism cooperation were driven by consensus, the pattern of influence and resistance would be less stark and, for example, efforts to rationalise the UN's role would proceed with less conflict. Constructivist arguments about the role of norms would expect that institutionalisation results from shared understandings, socialisation or epistemic communities. It is undoubtedly the case that norms related to counter-terrorism are emerging through institutions, including a broad norm against terrorism per se. But the effects of such norms are far from uniform and my analysis demonstrates that there is disagreement about how broad, emerging norms should be implemented in practice.

Of course, these comments on alternative explanations are speculative as I have not undertaken a systematic and robust comparison. A study of further policy domains may yield different resultsFootnote 131 and my findings may be subject to revision over time. However, the empirical record reveals an important a point of continuity from the pre-9/11 period – that different states continue to accord a different priority to terrorism. The independent effects of institutions are difficult to demonstrate here. For this reason, Pillar foresees that, while ‘no foreign government will declare that it now supports the terrorists’, they may ‘be a little slower to act, a little less forthcoming with information, or slightly more apt to cite domestic impediments to cooperation.’Footnote 132

Third, my argument suggests that we should have modest expectations about what can be accomplished through multilateral counter-terrorism. The early optimism concerning the CTC appears misplaced in hindsight. Indeed, one stark lesson from this analysis for policymakers is that pursuing counter-terrorism through institutions can quickly descend into politics as usual. As in other policy domains, the absence of a harmony of interests among states means that conflicts of interest must be negotiated. But viewing institutions as fora for distributive bargaining may also help identify solutions to such dilemmas. By linking other issues to counter-terrorism, by providing incentives (such as through technical assistance) and by emphasising the positive spillover effects of cooperation,Footnote 133 states may yet strike bargains that are more beneficial for the strong and the weak.

In closing, my explanation of the exercise of power through institutions should not be read as a normative endorsement of it. Rather, I am sympathetic to the view that even powerful states have much to gain from institutional cooperation and that they are prudent to define their interests in this way.Footnote 134 But it is telling that such arguments use the language of ‘interest’. To test the claim that multilateralism is in the interest of hegemons would require a study of the effectiveness of institutions in responding to terrorism. That difficult but important study remains to be done. In the meantime, although multilateralism is more than merely the ‘mood music’ to counter-terrorism today, it is contingent upon the exercise of power by strong states.

References

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87 Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, ‘OGBS welcomes Eight Special Recommendations on terrorist financing’, Press release (14 November 2001); Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, ‘OGBS welcomes revised FATF Recommendations’, Press release (July 2003).

88 Wolfsberg Group, ‘Wolfsberg Statement on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism’ (January 2002).

89 For an overview and criticism of US counter-terrorist financing assistance initiatives, see GAO, Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate US Efforts to Deliver Counter-terrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad, GAO-06–19, Washington DC (October 2005).

90 ‘Blacklist of “dirty money” havens put on temporary hold’, Financial Times (26 September 2002).

91 A summary of section 311 activity is available at: {http://www.fincen.gov/reg_section311.html} accessed 20 January 2008.

92 Tom Ridge, ‘Remarks by Secretary Tom Ridge at Port of Los Angeles’, Long Beach (21 June 2004).

93 US Customs and Border Protection, ‘Fact Sheet: US Customs and Border Protection – Protecting Our Borders Against Terrorism’ (22 July 2004).

94 MTSA 2002 §70116(b) (1) and (4).

95 For an overview of IMO activity on maritime security prior to 9/11, see, Hesse, Hartmut G., ‘Maritime Security in a Multilateral Context: IMO Activities to Enhance Maritime Security’, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 18 (2003), pp. 327–340CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Hartmut G. Hesse and Nicolaos L Charalambous, ‘New Security Measures for the International Shipping Community’, Information Paper, Maritime Safety Division, International Maritime Organization (2004); and IMO, ‘IMO 2004: Focus on Maritime Security’, Background Paper, World Maritime Day (2004).

96 The Assembly comprises all member states and also has power over the organization's work plan and budget.

97 ‘Review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships’, IMO Doc. A.224 (22) (November 2001).

98 ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/17, 14 (December 2001).

99 For example, ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/ISWG/3 (11 January 2002); ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/ISWG/5 (10 January 2002) (submitted by France).

100 ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/ISWG/5/7 (15 January 2002) (submitted by the USA).

101 Summarised in ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/17/1 (25 February 2002) (note by the Secretariat).

102 A new Seafarer's ID Convention was subsequently adopted in June 2003. The convention incorporates biometric technology into the identity document. Reaction to the Convention has been mixed. Concerned about the technical specifications of the ID, the US is unwilling to exempt seafarers from visa requirements – as is contemplated by the Convention – and is unlikely to sign: Rajesh Joshi, ‘“Hopeful sign” on seafarer shore leave in US’, Lloyd's List (2 February 2006).

103 ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/17/12, 12 (April 2002) (submitted by Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden).

104 For a summary of the specific substantive provisions of the Code see Hesse, ‘Maritime Security in a Multilateral Context’; Hesse and Charalambous, ‘New Security Measures for the International Shipping Community’; and IMO, ‘IMO 2004: Focus on Maritime Security’.

105 IMO, ‘IMO 2004: Focus on Maritime Security’, pp. 7–10.

106 ‘Helping hand for developing countries vital in compliance’, Lloyd's List (25 April 2005).

107 Adm. T. H. Collins, ‘Address to Houston Maritime Association’ (22 January 2004). Downloaded from: {www.uscg.mil/ha/g-m/mp/pdf/0122_Houston_Mtme.pdf} accessed 22 May 2004.

108 Regarding Europe, note the influence of the ‘Paris MOU’: B. Reyes, ‘Europe starts getting tough with ISPS reminders as deadline looms’, Lloyd's List (3 February 2004); The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, Port State Control: Steady She Goes (Annual Report) (2006), p. 24. In Asia, the ‘Tokyo MOU’ undertook a ‘concentrated inspection campaign’: Tokyo MOU, ‘Concentrated inspection campaign on the implementation of the ISPS Code’, Press release (15 December 2004). On the concept of ‘port state control’ generally, see Vorbach, Joseph E., ‘The Vital Role of Non-Flag State Actors in the Pursuit of Safer Shipping’, Ocean Development and International Law, 32 (2001), pp. 27–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

109 At end 2003, the US led the world with 13 per cent of maritime trade measured by value: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2004, Geneva (2004), p. 52.

110 J. Porter and J. Stares, ‘Ports at risk of missing ISPS Code deadline’, Lloyd's List (11 March 2004).

111 ‘Maritime security on agenda as USCG visits IMO’, IMO Briefing 12/2005 (17 February 2005); S. Speares, ‘ISPS starts well but survey shows port official problems remain’, Lloyd's List (2 November 2004); ‘Security compliance shows continued improvement’, IMO Press Briefing 28/2004 (6 August 2004).

112 Mastanduno, ‘US foreign policy’, p. 324.

113 For an overview of CSI, see: {http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/}.

114 US Customs and Border Protection, ‘Fact Sheet: Container Security Initiative’ (July 2005).

115 US Customs and Border Protection, ‘Fact Sheet’.

116 Customs Commissioner Bonner used this term frequently in his public statements, for example, R. C. Bonner, ‘Remarks to Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House’, London (20 September 2004).

117 G8, ‘Cooperative G8 Action on Transport Security’, Kananaskis Summit (2002).

118 For example, R. C. Bonner, ‘Remarks to World Customs Organization’, Brussels (28 June 2002).

119 Edmonson, R. G., ‘Taking shape: WCO fleshes out plan to balance security and trade facilitation’, Journal of Commerce (28 February 2005)Google Scholar ; ‘WCO endorses framework annexes for security, facilitation’, Journal of Commerce Online (29 April 2005).

120 WCO, ‘Framework of Standards to Secure Global Trade’ (June 2005).

121 Speares, S., ‘IMO nations bury differences to pass update anti-terror treaties’, Lloyd's List (17 October 2005)Google Scholar .

122 ‘Safer Global Trade Boosted by Commitment to Build Capacity’, Press release, World Customs Organization (23 June 2005).

123 ‘Members who have expressed their intention to implement the WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade’, WCO (27 September 2007).

124 Drezner, All Politics is Global, pp. 63–4.

125 Gruber, Ruling the World.

126 If borne out in future research, this observation may qualify Drezner's claim that ‘A great power concert is a necessary and sufficient condition for effective global governance’. All Politics is Local, p. 5, emphasis added.

127 Schweller and Priess, ‘A Tale of Two Realisms’, p. 12.

128 Krasner, Stephen K., ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Organization, 36 (1982), pp. 185–205CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

129 Raustiala, Kal and Victor, David G., ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’, International Organization, 58 (2004), p. 279CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

130 Raustiala and Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’, p. 280.

131 For example, several studies of intelligence cooperation after 9/11 have noted the importance of trusted links among intelligence services as well as the ‘dynamics of comparative advantage’: Rudner, Martin, ‘Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17 (2004), pp. 193–230CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Lefebvre, Stephane, ‘The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 16 (2003), pp. 527–542CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

132 Pillar, Paul R., ‘Counterterrorism after al Qaeda’, Washington Quarterly, 27 (2004), p. 107CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

133 A similar series of recommendations, specific to terrorist financing, are set out in Biersteker, Eckert and Romaniuk, ‘International Initiatives to Suppress Terrorist Financing’.

134 Millar and Rosand, ‘Building Global Alliances’; Boulden, Jane and Weiss, Thomas G., ‘Tactical Multilateralism: Coaxing America Back to the UN’, Survival, 46 (2004), pp. 103–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar .