Crawford Young, the erudite dean of African political studies in the United States, has released a long-anticipated sequel to The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (1994). The new book is a masterful synthesis of the tumultuous trajectories of Africa's independent states in the five decades following decolonisation. Based on detailed case evidence, the author reviews a broad set of institutional, economic and cultural factors that are implicated in the continent's recent ups and downs in state construction.
As an organising theme, Young proposes three cycles of hope, often followed by disappointment. In the first independence decade (the 1960s), optimistic African expectations that a developmental state would deliver liberty and prosperity soon dissolved in the face of one-party rule and military intervention. Thereafter, in a second cycle, over-ambitious elite plans for state-directed development (in the 1970s) tended mainly to undercut economic growth (in the 1980s). Third, in response to a fiscal and political ‘crisis of the state’, internal and external actors combined to push African rulers to accept liberalised rules of democratic and market reform, with mixed results (in the 1990s and beyond).
This historical narrative is signposted throughout with thoughtful discussions of landmarks in the literature. Young offers balanced commentary about an evolving toolkit of analytic concepts such as charisma, party-state, neopatrimonialism, civil society, hybrid regimes and state failure. He takes the reader on enlightening side trips into theories of the state, the changing character of violent political conflict in Africa (which increasingly undermined state capacity), and the nested nature of African political identities, ranging from continental through national to ethnic (some of which aided the reproduction of the state). And he shows that mood swings in popular attitudes toward the state were echoed in scholarly preoccupations; activists and academics alike oscillated regularly between heights of hope and deep Afro-pessimism.
Among the many advantages of the book, I have room to mention only three. First, by including the Arab tier of North African countries within his field of vision, the author illuminates developments elsewhere. He reminds us, for example, that Algerians were the first among Africans to launch a war of national liberation and to foment urban street demonstrations against home-grown autocracy. But the existence of a strong, interventionist, security-oriented ‘integral’ state in the North African region delayed a more widespread Arab Spring for a couple of decades. By comparison, the democratic breakthroughs in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s were due in no small part to the relative weakness of the states in the region.
Second, by applying a comparative approach, the author seeks analytic leverage from national similarities and differences. In a main theme, The Postcolonial State posits that African states followed largely parallel developments in the first two cycles (the independence decade and the era of state expansion), but diverged markedly in the third cycle (the period of liberalisation after 1990). The book identifies the common factors that made for a shared early trajectory: a harsh physical environment, an underlying patrimonial culture, ‘nationalism as a decolonization driver’ and, above all, the autocratic legacy of the colonial state. Yet few would dispute that, since 1990, African states have embarked on diverse paths, anchored at either end by the liberalising arc of Botswana, Mauritius and Ghana and descent into state failure in Somalia.
Third, the book is especially keen in recognising the state as ‘idea’. People, as active political agents, help to construct the state by breathing life into an official infrastructure of formal institutions. Whether at elite or mass level, expectations of state performance are imprinted on the minds of participants. Young argues persuasively that the very survival of the African state is underpinned by a persistent sense of territorial nationalism. This thesis resonates with Pierre Englebert's observation that even rebels seek to appropriate the state, not exit from it. My own research with the Afrobarometer confirms that ordinary Africans often endow the state with an imagined majesty, pervasiveness and effectiveness that goes well beyond its empirical capacity. By this mechanism, among others, weak states persist.
Yet, for all of the book's rich insights, its framework raises questions. Are cycles of state development as clear-cut as the author proposes? True, the early 1990s were a critical juncture for regime change in Africa; but a sharp turning point in state expansion in the early 1970s seems less plausible. In leading cases like Ghana, incoming political elites moved almost immediately after independence to adopt party monopolies, economic planning, and ill-conceived prestige projects, implying considerable continuity between the 1960s and the 1970s. And is it correct to count democratisation in Africa as part of a global ‘third wave’? Samuel Huntington, the coiner of the phrase, applied it to the diffusion of negotiation and political reforms within middle income, mainly Catholic countries in Southern Europe and Latin America during the Cold War that reliably led to democracy. More appropriate to the book's thesis would be Michael McFaul's ‘fourth wave’, which had different features. Triggered by the fall of the Berlin Wall, this set of conflicted transitions occurred in countries at various levels of economic development (including in low-income countries), many with Protestant and Muslim majorities. Most importantly, these transitions spawned both democracy and dictatorship.
Finally, does the author offer an explanation for the state outcomes he so ably describes? A comparative approach should have enabled a ‘search for some of the overall factors that might explain … the wide range … in state performance … Of particular relevance is whether democratization makes a difference’ (p. 31). Yet the book is far stronger on description than explanation. For example, much of the conclusion is devoted to a summary of progress on ‘imperatives of state reproduction’, such as hegemony, security, autonomy, legitimation, revenue and accumulation. But we are left little the wiser as to why some African states managed to build capacity along some of these dimensions, whereas others did not. In a table comparing state performance in all African countries, the North African cases obscure the possible effects of democratisation because their high relative rankings owe nothing to liberalising reforms. To be sure, trace evidence of a positive democracy-performance connection can be found lower down in the table, though this result is driven by just a few positive cases, most with minimal states.
In the end, Young muses that ‘no list of overall determinants provides a full explanation of the contemporary divergence of (state) itineraries: much of the difference lies in the particular events, sequences and configurations of particular countries' (p. 366). We can thank him for reminding us that state capacity is a variable condition across African countries (not all are failing) and for invoking the African proverb that ‘no condition is permanent’. But we still await authoritative guidance about the mechanisms of state construction that are most likely to secure the developmental dreams of the continent's resilient Afro-optimists.
