The purpose of Joan Hoff's book is to dispel the myths that have prevented Americans from taking a hard look at the purposes and methods of the country's foreign policy. Hoff's premise is that the United States has made numerous unethical, unsavory bargains on the way to its rise to world hegemony. Hoff rejects the notion that an American empire is uniquely benign and beneficial to the world. She insists that American empire is like any empire, as prone to hubris, cruelty, and overreaching as others in history. If American empire is unique, it is in its remarkable inability to reflect on its own character. For its abiding myths deter serious consideration of what has been required to achieve the nation's rise to and maintenance of global power. In a brief review, it is not possible to touch on even a substantial share of the cases and examples the book employs to bring these points forward. Suffice it to say that Hoff has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of American foreign policy. This is a book that should be read widely, not only discussed among academics.
Although the book is historical, tracing its themes from before the nation's founding, Hoff's primary concern is with the present. George W. Bush, she writes, is an “accidental president,” in that Bush entered the White House under a cloud of controversy (182–183). Such presidents tend not to leave a commendable legacy. After September 11, Bush was especially unfortunate in falling under the sway of the neoconservatives and their project of expanding and consolidating the American empire, primarily with overwhelming military might. This has entailed a series of “Faustian bargains” with “undemocratic regimes and petty dictators” (186). Thus, Bush's foreign policy legacy will represent a continuation of the “independent internationalism” that guided American foreign policy before and during the Cold War. This means that the United States is unlikely to adopt the multilateral approaches that meeting today's challenges would warrant. What is more, Bush's tenure has added a much stronger element of religious fervor than prior presidents. Hoff fears that Bush's use of polarizing language, dividing the world into good and evil, will result in a self-fulfilling prophecy of war and violence. Hoff avers that Bush has taken a path toward a negative legacy by such steps as giving Israel a blank check, threatening to use nuclear weapons, failing to address massive corruption among contractors operating in Iraq, failing to support democratic transitions, and condoning the use of torture in the prosecution of the war on terrorism. She declares that Bush's attempt to link Iraq to the war on terror is unfounded and rejects the notion that the invasion and occupation of Iraq was about establishing democracy in the Middle East.
Rather than the Bush administration's continuation of the Faustian foreign policy of the past, Hoff presents a “more positive legacy” that could be achieved if the United States followed a different path (191). For Hoff, a more honest, practical approach to terrorism and global security would begin with a sincere effort to negotiate peace between Israel and the Palestinians. It would include greater emphasis on conservation so as to reduce the nation's dependence on foreign oil. It would develop clear guidelines for humanitarian interventions, relying on an “association of democracies” to provide appropriate military and nonmilitary means to end genocide, encourage peaceful development, and redefine sovereignty to fit today's conditions. For any of this to occur, the United States must “mature” by abandoning the myths that have blinded American leaders and citizens to the nation's actual behavior in foreign affairs. Americans must give up the belief that the United States is exceptional, and that good intentions toward others have driven its policies. The nation must learn to engage “the world cooperatively rather than unilaterally” (193). To meet the current challenge, the United States must coordinate a global intelligence and police effort to defeat terrorism by clandestine nonstate actors.
Yet, none of this is likely to happen, she concludes, because the Bush administration prefers to create a “cloud of unaccountability” (193) that allows foreign policy blunders to go uncorrected. The cloud of unaccountability is self-defeating; Bush's willingness to use objectionable methods to fight terrorism and to sustain the occupation of Iraq undermines American claims to moral righteousness and the notion that democratic capitalism is beneficial for all. In short, Hoff writes, “How a march of freedom could result from practicing torture, massive surveillance at home and abroad, restricting the civil liberties of innocent civilians as well as those designated ‘enemy combatants,’ and endless war in the name of peace makes sense only to a president completely beguiled by the neoconservative version of Orwell's Newspeak” (202). The United States must make a complete change of course, casting aside the myths of exceptionalism and moral superiority, or else the twenty-first century will be even bloodier than the dismal twentieth century.
The book argues that the tendencies toward arrogance and domination on display today are but magnified versions of trends that have long shaped American foreign policy. Hoff takes Wilson's presidency as a major turning point, at which the ideological dynamics that have brought us to this sorry state were put in motion. Prior to 1900, the United States pursued moderate policies, largely because it lacked the power and global presence to do otherwise. After 1900, matters began to change, culminating in a sharp break during Wilson's tenure in office. Wilson's policy was especially bedeviled by the question of self-determination. Wilson had made the principle of self-determination central to his plans for the postwar settlement. Yet, practical considerations resulted in uneven application, as Wilson pursued hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, and acquiesced to the colonial claims of the allies after World War I. Moreover, Wilson's racism and wider sense that some people were fit for self-rule while others were not undercut his principled claims. Indeed, Hoff suggests that the pursuit of wealth and empire were the overriding concerns, not enforcing the rights of self-determination for subjugated peoples. Particularly in regard to Latin America, Wilson was prone to imposing American hegemony while proclaiming universal values, a contradiction “the country's unselfconcious ideology did not allow it to admit to itself or to the world” (43).
After World War I, applying the principle of self-determination proved intractable, but the idea was powerful enough to generate endless conflict. A tragic example of the failure of self-determination was the Armenian massacre (51–56), in the face of which the United States was inert. Wilson's willingness to violate any reasonable understanding of a principle of self-determination manifested in his intervention in revolutionary Russia, as well as the numerous instances in the Caribbean and Latin America. Wilson's resolution of these conceptual dilemmas was to equate American ideals of democracy and capitalism with self-determination. Thus, if countries did not embrace representative institutions and capitalist markets, they were by definition not enjoying the freedom that self-determination implies. This propensity to accept self-determination only if the results conform to American values has carried on to the present in toxic forms since Wilson's presidency.
In short, Wilson's legacy was the Faustian foreign policy that we see in effect today. This entails proclamation of high-minded universal moral values, along with the willingness to violate them. It entails repudiation of dictatorships along with willingness to deal with, and even install and maintain, heinous regimes. Hoff traces this story through successive administrations. Foreign economic policy during the interwar period aimed at expanding the influence of American corporations. Franklin Roosevelt's pre-war policy was duplicitous, on one hand asserting neutrality while on the other maneuvering the nation toward war. Truman made unjustified use of atomic bombs on Japanese cities and instigated the Cold War. Successive presidents used all available means to defeat communism, although the threat from Soviet-led revolution was greatly exaggerated. Reagan violated the law by funding the contras, but faced no serious penalty. Carter and the first Bush funded the Afghan resistance to the Soviets, creating the groups that perpetrated September 11. Clinton “intervened in more countries than any president since Wilson” and failed to undertake the systematic overhaul of American foreign policy that the end of the Cold War indicated (148).
Clearly, Hoff focuses considerable attention on the role of the president in foreign policy. Of course, this is a long-standing dilemma for American constitutional government. Hoff's concern is that the rise to power has resulted in a severe imbalance of power between the legislative and executive branches. Post-Cold War presidents are “imponderable” postmodern presidents because voters have no way to assess their policies or capacities. Policies are opaque and hardly discussed, and the person is a media image. Thus, accountability is sorely lacking, while power expands. Fighting the Cold War was especially responsible for the expansion of executive power. Although the United States continued to assert the values of democracy, free trade, and international cooperation, its actual policies contradicted these values, as the country engaged further Faustian bargains to defeat communism. Rather than a legacy of freedom, then, “the Cold War transformed the executive branch into the dominant branch of government, profoundly changing the nature of the American presidency and threatening the constitutional principle of separation of powers” (111). Thus, since Truman, presidents have operated with increasing impunity, and they have relied on this impunity to implement unsavory foreign policies. The consequence has been an increasing degree of “blowback” although myths Americans hold about themselves prevent them from understanding why others harm Americans and their interests.
The story Hoff tells suggests an immense amount of momentum behind the long-term patterns of American foreign policy. Yet, Hoff rejects the notion that the broad patterns or ideological commitments of American foreign policy are immutable. No doubt, firmly held ideas and broad patterns of action are difficult to change. Yet, opportunities to mark new paths do exist. One such opportunity was the end of the Cold War. Tragically, instead of seizing the chance to establish a foreign policy that was prudent, moral, and multilateral, the project of establishing an American empire gained new force, driven in part by the influence of the neoconservatives. After September 11, neo-conservative ideas prevailed to the extent that the United States went from the usual hypocrisy attending diplomacy to “flaunting” its willingness to violate international law, cut deals with dictators, rely on military force (including nuclear weapons), deny legitimate claims of self-determination, engage in preemptive and preventive wars, denigrate the role of Congress, torture enemy combatants, and abrogate the U.S. Constitution with signing statements and violations of Americans' individual rights. Moreover, reckless deficit spending and heedless reliance on foreign borrowing exacerbate the unfortunate Faustian results of the turn the country took during Wilson's administration. Thus, long after the Cold War has ended, policy patterns remain largely the same.
Still, here lies the lesson. World War I, World War II, the end of the Cold War, and September 11 all ushered in significant change in American foreign policy. But the direction the country took was not written in stone. The nation could have chosen differently. That it did not do so is in large part due to the inability of the American people to see beyond the myths that have forestalled serious reflection on the means and ends of American foreign policy. Hoff reviews history from the colonial era to present to shatter these myths of exceptionalism, high moral purpose, and the efficacy of force in changing other societies, thus opening the way to fundamental change. Although it is difficult to term American foreign policy a failure, in that the goal of global power has in fact been achieved, it has certainly fallen well short of its ideals. The George W. Bush administration's propensity to add an evangelical gloss to the pursuit of global power did little to change this judgment.
What drives American foreign policy, then? Although Hoff is unwilling to resort to economic determinism, the book strongly suggests that the final cause of American foreign policy is the expansive dynamic of capitalism. The growing trend toward interventionism, from the Monroe Doctrine on, was fueled by the demands of corporate capital. Yet, the subtext of Hoff's book is that the ideas of policymakers and the public channel and shape economic imperatives. For instance, Wilson's contradictory ideas on democracy and self-determination, manifested throughout American history since, gave direction to the pursuit of economic interests. Interests matter, but ideas are an independent causal factor. Institutional characteristics are also important, as the capture of the policymaking apparatus was critical to the rise of neoconservatives, leaving Bush with few alternatives. Thus, a combination of influences leads policymakers to make Faustian bargains that are morally questionable and often lack the support of the American people.
Does Hoff succeed? Does the reader finish the book believing the myths have been shattered, the Faustian bargains unmasked, the self-destructive nature of the country's imprudent policies explained, and the possibilities for the future revealed? For many readers already familiar with the themes, arguments and evidence in this book, the answer will depend on prior convictions. Readers on the political left will likely nod in assent to Hoff's accounts of the American assertion of raw power. They will embrace the book's main theme, that American foreign policy is not the unmitigated force for good in the world it is portrayed to be, because in large part they already have come to this conclusion. They might consider Hoff's proposed remedies a bit tepid and even objectionable, in particular the notion that an association of democracies should decide which countries require humanitarian intervention. After all, permission to do that has been an open invitation to all manner of abuse in the past. Nonetheless, the themes will resonate, the arguments will make sense, and the evidence will confirm what they have learned from many other sources. By contrast, readers on the political right will continue to believe that American hegemony has been and will be a force for good and progress in human affairs. While recognizing that defeating evil requires the use of brutal tactics, they will reject the proposition that doing so has sullied the nation's reputation beyond repair. Meanwhile, “realists” will accept the gist of Hoff's argument but ask, what did you expect? Great powers do as they will and the weak suffer as they must. Mythology about national purposes is fine for stirring up patriotism and willingness to pay taxes and fight in wars, but any sophisticated observer will know that such stories are meant for the masses. It was not necessary to write another book to make the obvious point. In sum, Hoff's book is bound to stir controversy, the more so because of her status and reputation as a historian.
Readers are led to the question, What should be the purpose of American foreign policy? Hoff suggests that pursuing empire has resulted in failed policy, in that American constitutional government and the ideals the nation stands for have suffered as a result. But, as she notes, many observers are quite enthusiastic about the pursuit of empire, some because of the presumed beneficial results of American empire, others because gaining and holding power is what diplomacy and statecraft are all about. It is not enough to assert that blunders and failures mark American foreign policy. For some readers, instances that Hoff deems failures (for instance, using the atomic bomb, or defeating the Soviet Union with extensive use of military power) are untrammeled success stories, in that they were necessary steps on the road to American global preeminence. Engaging whether empire is desirable in itself more directly and more extensively is a task the author should consider in future work. No doubt, many readers will be looking forward to her next effort.
