Environmental Philosophy is a thoughtful and challenging introduction to the selfsame topic. In comparison with Sahotra Sarkar’s earlier Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), this book is more accessible to students and philosophers who do not work in the philosophy of biology or science. The topics considered are wide-ranging and include normative ethics, ecology, systematic conservation planning, restoration, sustainability, social justice, and much else besides. Sarkar’s considered position is importantly different from many who work in environmental philosophy. First, Sarkar is a tempered anthropocentrist. On his view, environmental values and obligations are human oriented. Natural entities, when they matter morally, matter to us. Second, the core of conservation biology is systematic conservation planning that is importantly different from conservation biology of the past (e.g., Michael Soulé, Conservation Biology: The Science of Scarcity and Diversity [Sunderland, MA: Sinauer, 1986]). Third, Sarkar’s account concerns the plight of the Global South and not merely the affluent North. The absence of such concern has been a source of criticism of conservation biology and environmental ethics (Ramachandra Guha, “Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation,” Environmentalism: Critical Concepts 2 [2003]: 58–70). Let me selectively consider some of the major claims in the chapters of the book.
After an introductory first chapter, Sarkar articulates his view of how humans fit into the natural world in chapter 2. Environmentalists struggle with how humans can be both part of and separate from the natural world. Sarkar, as a naturalist, claims that humans are part of nature. However, we can operationalize the difference between humans and nonhuman nature by distinguishing the effects of humans, individually and collectively, from that of nonhumans (19). The moral significance of this distinction arises from the fact that only humans hold one another responsible for their actions (19–20). Thus, the environment consists in those nonhuman parts of the world. Of course, it is an interesting question whether, and to what degree, there are parts of our planet that have not been affected by humans and their activity (Bill McKibben, The End of Nature [New York: Random House, 2006]). Additionally, Sarkar provides an account of natural values, which are those values that concern the promotion and persistence of nonhuman biological entities and their physical environments (21). These natural values include biodiversity, welfare, fidelity, service, and wild nature. After distinguishing between wildness and wilderness (29–30), he offers several criticisms of wilderness preservation—there are very few “untrammeled” areas left, and preservation of purported wilderness has lead to the unjust exploitation of the poor (33–34). One interesting implication of Sarkar’s position is that wild nature is only one natural value among several. Thus, his environmental philosophy is consistent with a great deal of human alteration and management of ecological systems. Some traditional environmentalists will find this problematic.
In chapter 3, Sarkar turns to normative ethics. The first type of value he considers is demand value in which something has demand value if, and only if, someone has a felt preference for it (41–42). Thus, if someone prefers spotted owls over barred owls, then the former has greater demand value (for him or her) than the latter. Although many aspects of the environment have demand value (insofar as this is a type of value at all), Sarkar rightly notes that many, many parts of the environment do not (45). The second type of value he considers is intrinsic value. After clarifying what “intrinsic value” might mean, he considers several defenses of the claim that the environment, or parts of it, has intrinsic value. He finds them all wanting (47–54). First, if organisms have intrinsic value only because of their sentience, then we have no moral obligations to nonsentient organisms. Second, if organisms have interests on which intrinsic value depends, then we need principles for determining when the interests of one organism are morally more important when it comes into conflict (e.g., Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011]; Gary E. Varner, In Nature’s Interests? [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002]). Third, if organisms that are sentient or have interests have intrinsic value, then this leaves species in the moral lurch, which is the fundamental concern of biodiversity conservation. The third type of value Sarkar considers is transformative power. Something has transformative power if, and only if, it changes our felt preferences. Suppose people see a bald eagle overhead as they traipse through a Pacific Northwest wetland. They find their preferences changed; they drive less, give money to the Sierra Club, eat locally, offset their emissions, and so on. The bald eagle that flew overhead—or Haliaeetus leucocephalus more generally—has transformative power. As Sarkar notes, there are two worries regarding claims of transformative power. First, there is a directionality problem since not all transformations are positive, and there is a boundary problem since it is not clear what objects have transformative power (57–58). Whether these problems can be solved is something Sarkar leaves for another day, rightfully or wrongfully.
In chapter 4, Sarkar provides an introduction to decision theory focusing on how ethical considerations like the above are relevant to policy. Decision theory provides an important tool by making environmental decision making explicit, hopefully public, and presumably “repeatable” (81). After a brief discussion, Sarkar notes several challenges to it in the environmental context. First, what are these utility functions and what normative constraints should there be on them? These are important questions since decision theorists often disagree as to what rationality is (84). Second, should we maximize expected utility? Maximizing expected utility has the implication that we should choose A if it is a less valuable sure thing over a much, much more valuable improbable B, which is counterintuitive (85). Third, group decisions provide a source of difficulty for decision theory since aggregation requires interpersonal preference comparisons. Likewise, as is well known, Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows that no social choice function satisfies four uncontroversial assumptions regarding group decisions (84–87). Sarkar also provides a sketch of multicriteria decision analysis. Suppose we have a set of criteria C 1, C 2, … , Cn and alternatives such that an alternative dominates another if there is a least one Ci such that the first alternative is better than the second and there is no Cj where the second is better than the first. If the criteria are unordered, then the rational strategy consists in the selection of all nondominated alternatives (87). However, what counts as criteria, how do we order them, and how do we prune the number of nondominated alternatives when there are many? One particularly important question Sarkar considers is, who counts as a legitimate stakeholder in environmental decision making? In making decisions about conservation of biodiversity, one might include the preferences of policy makers who include politicians and scientists, but one can argue that local residents’ preferences matter at least as much as policy makers. This opens up decision theory to interesting considerations of environmental justice (92–94). It is clear that this is an extremely important issue on which more needs to be said.
In chapter 5, Sarkar turns to the question of what is biodiversity and the transformation of conservation biology into systematic conservation planning (i.e., the design of reserve networks). The stages of systematic conservation planning are (a) choose and delimit the planning region, (b) identify all stakeholders, (c) compile and assess all data, (d) treat data and construct models as necessary, (e) identify and evaluate biodiversity constituents and surrogates, (f) set explicit biodiversity goals and targets, (g) review existing conservation areas for performance with respect to targets, (h) prioritize additional areas for conservation management, (i) assess biodiversity constituent and selected area vulnerabilities, (j) refine the network of selected areas, (k) carry out multicriteria analysis, (l) implement conservation plan, and (m) monitor network performance (100–103). Systematic conservation planning presupposes we have a handle on the concept biodiversity. The customary definition of “biodiversity” is that either it refers to the variety of life at every structural, taxonomic, and functional level of organization or it refers to the diversity of genes, species, and ecosystems (113). Clearly, both definitions are overly inclusive and thus are not terribly useful (114). Nevertheless, conservation biologists must articulate what biodiversity constituents and surrogates are and what their diversity and persistence consists in, while avoiding the above overly inclusive definitions. Likewise, given the scarcity of conservation resources, systematic conservation planning requires that we deal with the minimum area and maximum representation problems. What is the minimal area needed to represent our biodiversity constituents adequately? What is the maximal number of constituents that can be represented in a given area? Sarkar’s account of conservation biology is striking in part because it appears that traditional questions in the philosophy of science do not find a home here. For example, traditionally readers of Philosophy of Science are concerned with questions like, What is a scientific theory? What is confirmation? What is an explanation? However, Sarkar writes, “Thus, in conservation biology, like computer science and unlike most of ecology, theoretical research consists of devising algorithms rather than formulating models and theories. In fact, because a variety of algorithms can be used to solve these problems, a lot of theoretical debate in conservation biology has been about the choice of algorithms” (124). Thus, the philosophical foundations of conservation biology seemingly concern the choice of constituents and the developing of algorithms for explicitly sociopolitical or ethical purposes. This looks very different from traditional philosophical discussions of science, although all the more exciting. Thus, are traditional philosophies simply inadequate for analyzing conservation biology? If so, what is their successor? If not, should we embrace a form of instrumentalism or pragmatism given the centrality of values and computational technologies?
Chapter 6 deals with environmental restoration. Often we find ourselves with anthropogenically altered habitats where our aim is restoring “historical fidelity” and ecological integrity (132). There are two features that constitute ecological restoration, namely, a reference state and a reference dynamic. The reference state is some state that we aim to bring about through some “authentic” process that if the latter will lead to the former we have a reference trajectory (133). One important rationale for ecological restoration as opposed to mere “reconstruction” is caprice since unless the reference state and dynamic are specified, one could reconstruct a habitat however one likes. However, there are two worries regarding ecological restoration. First, there are many different past states from which to pick. Suppose we have some area A. Do we restore it as it was 10, 100, 1,000, 10,000, 100,000, and so on, years ago? Second, do we reconstruct A to what it was or what it would be if humans had not altered it (144)? Sarkar argues that, given the problems associated with historical fidelity, we should reconstruct human-affected landscapes in light of the full gamut of natural values discussed above (145). Restoration ecology leads to re-creation ecology and the possibility that human agency can generate natural value (154). However, one worry is that this opens the door for designing novel ecosystems, which many environmentalists find problematic (Richard J. Hobbs, Eric Higgs, and James A. Harris, “Novel Ecosystems: Implications for Conservation and Restoration,” Trends in Ecology and Evolution 24, no. 11 (2009): 599–605).
Chapter 7 concerns sustainability. As we noted, Sarkar is a weak anthropocentrist (sensu Bryan G. Norton, Why Preserve Natural Variety? [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987]). Sustainability concerns the welfare of human beings past, present, and future. Following Robert Solow (“Sustainability: An Economist’s Perspective,” in Economics of the Environment: Selected Readings, ed. Robert Dorfman and Nancy S. Dorfman [New York: Norton, 1993), weak sustainability concerns our obligation to leave future humans the option or capacity to be as well off as we are now (Sarkar, 162). There is a further assumption that natural resources are fully fungible (i.e., intersubstitutable). However, how can we know what humans will want and need in the indefinite future? Likewise, insofar as we are to leave them “well off,” then sustainability is a normative concept. Knowing their preferences, even if we could now, would not tell them what is good for them then (164). Strong sustainability then concerns the obligation to leave future humans with specific natural resources. This, however, is subject to worries about the tremendous uncertainty mentioned above. Sarkar argues that that endorses weak sustainability but also adds the promotion of various natural values as well (166). Although he does address climate change in passing, the book would have been stronger if he could have discussed the science and ethics of climate change at greater length.
In chapter 8, Sarkar turns to environmental justice—specifically issues of distributional and procedure justice. Therein he articulates three positions: environmental fundamentalism, socially responsible environmentalism, and integrative biocultural environmentalism. According to environmental fundamentalism, natural values trump human cultural values (175). According to socially responsible environmentalism, natural values must be negotiated with human cultural values. Finally, integrative biocultural environmentalism claims that natural values cannot be pursued without pursuing human cultural values and vice versa. Sarkar argues for the latter since natural values are always “culturally embedded” and thus are endorsed in virtue of cultural norms. Likewise, cultural values can only be pursued absent the endorsement of natural values (176–77). The chapter concludes with a discussion of political ecology and ecofeminism. As I noted in the beginning, Environmental Philosophy is an accessible and important book for those interested in philosophical foundations of environmental ethics, conservation biology, and environmental decision making that is at once humane and scrupulous.
