The extant literature on rivalry termination is voluminous. Consequently, any new work on the subject faces a formidable task in seeking to carve out a novel approach to the subject. Thus, a host of studies on the issue of rivalry termination largely seek to tweak, modify, or affirm existing analyses. Norrin Ripsman’s book, however, constitutes an important and novel departure from this trend.

This work is innovative in a number of respects. At one level, Ripsman seeks not merely to extend existing theories of rivalry termination. Instead, he formulates a mostly original approach to the subject. He argues that neither “top-down” approaches, which emphasize the significance of statist and realist perspectives, nor “bottom-up” approaches, which highlight the importance of societal factors, adequately explain the process through which regional peace is entrenched, and so he adopts a two-stage process. The first stage does involve a top-down process, requiring political leaders to proceed toward peacemaking despite the objections of societal actors. However, he argues that for peace to be sustained, the second stage is equally important. In this phase, societal buy-in is crucial; he realizes that in the absence of such societal embrace of a new set of policies, they are unlikely to take hold.

The bottom-up pathways include democratic institutions and norms, economic incentives, institutional norms and identities, and state-to-nation convergence. The first of these stem quite directly from the theory of the “democratic peace.” The central claim here is that rival states should be able to forge peace if both of them democratize. Democratic states, as the theory holds, reject coercion as a means to resolve conflicts. Instead, they should seek more peaceable means for conflict resolution. In this, their publics, who respect fellow democracies, should exert pressure on their elected representatives to avoid bellicose strategies to settle disputes.

A second perspective can be derived from the views of economic liberals. They have long argued that high levels of trade and investment between states can foster economic interdependence. The growth of such interdependence creates significant opportunity costs associated with the use of force. Under these circumstances trade becomes a far more viable means for securing resources as opposed to resorting to force. Consequently, peace is likely to ensue among rivals if they find ways to bind themselves through economic and commercial bonds.

Another approach highlights the significance of norms and identities in promoting peace. As Ripsman argues, constructivist scholars contend that ideas and institutions help fashion identities. So if powerful regional organizations can embed long-term adversaries, their preferences can be changed over time. There are, of course, a number of variants to this proposition. However, the basic insight is that such regional organizations can move states away from Hobbesian visions of competition.

A fourth and final path to regional peace requires states to contain and suppress societal conflicts. If a state has multiple national identities, it can become embroiled in irredentist conflicts. The task of policymakers, then, is to make state borders conform to national identities, thereby reducing the possibility of conflict. Of all the four models, this is the least specified. It also seems to lack a true bottom-up quality, as it appears to depend on the existence of a strong state and even great power assistance to guarantee new territorial arrangements.

Ripsman then proceeds to delineate four top-down approaches, including the need to balance against greater threats, the role of dominant great-power influence, reassurance signaling, and state-preservation motives. The first emphasizes the role of shocks, when states may feel forced to seek peace if confronted with imminent and compelling threats. The second requires a great power to induce regional rivals to seek peace through its overweening capabilities and influence. The third draws on the literature on building trust in international politics and emphasizes the role of costly signals. The final approach focuses on the domestic politics of states and highlights the circumstances under which a regime may feel induced to change existing policies toward a rival.

The author contends that it is theoretically possible for these two models to work simultaneously to produce peacemaking. However, he argues that the two models in sequence offer a more robust explanation for the ways in which peacemaking evolves.

Ripsman demonstrates the workings of his preferred model through a series of three major case studies of peacemaking in the twentieth century: France and the Federal Republic of Germany, Egypt and Israel, and Israel and Jordan. He demonstrates the limitations of each of these approaches, as well as the promise of his two-step model. To ensure that his results are not mere artifacts of case selection, he also briefly reviews the entire universe of peace treaties between regional rivals in the twentieth century.

It is important to note that the author also forthrightly addresses an important, potential methodological objection, namely, the choice of successful cases of rivalry termination. He contends that a careful and detailed analysis of successful peacemaking efforts might reveal the common causal mechanisms that might exist across cases. On the other hand, he argues, failures could have a range of possible sources. He also deftly anticipates one possible criticism of his research strategy: his failure to examine cases where rivals came perilously close to reaching a peace agreement. His ongoing research project involves an examination of cases that could have concluded in peace but ultimately failed to do so.

What are the implications of this work for theory and policy? One of the central theoretical implications lies in Ripsman’s insistence that both state-driven and societal forces have to move in tandem to promote successful peacemaking. The state-centric process alone cannot ensure the long-term embedding of any peace process. Societal transformation, he argues, is a vital and necessary component.

The policy implications that flow from his analysis may not be appealing to all. However, he makes a cogent case why initial negotiations may require strong states and, more importantly, a level of secrecy. Secret negotiations may prove to be critical to the success of the peace process in order to prevent societal groups who have deep-seated prejudices from derailing them. Beyond the need for secrecy, he also outlines other factors, such as the importance of matching strategies to particular stages of negotiation, the importance of sanctions and incentives, and the significance of seizing particularly opportune moments.

Given its sound theoretical basis, its rich empirical detail, and its practical policy prescriptions, Peacemaking from Above, Peace from Below constitutes a useful addition to the current literature on rivalry termination. Both scholars and practitioners should find this book invaluable.