Increasingly, political and opinion leaders in Western societies are becoming suspicious of otherness and have questioned the need to accommodate cultural groups within their polities. In past years, for example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and French President François Sarkozy all denounced “multiculturalist” policies that had allegedly paved the way for extremism, especially within the Muslim community. To students of multiculturalism, these declarations may sound not only embarrassingly superficial but also paradoxical, given the very different approaches to cultural diversity adopted in the respective countries. Yet such statements often have a considerable impact on public opinion. Any serious piece of scholarship addressing issues of cultural diversity, I believe, ought to take them into account and clarify the terms of the dispute.
Supported by excellent theoretical insights and the finest analytical methods, such a clarification can be found in Michel Rosenfeld's new book. It is a significant contribution to our understanding of the struggles over accommodation of cultural diversity in the contemporary world. Written by a legal, moral, and political philosopher, this book will be particularly useful to political scientists interested in questions relating to culture, identity, tolerance, and democracy.
The core theme of the book is Rosenfeld's passionate defense of “comprehensive pluralism” (CP), a normative theory on which he has been working for years (e.g., see Just Interpretations, 1998). Rosenfeld develops his argument by discussing a variety of key authors, including Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, John Rawls, Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, and Ronald Dworkin. He claims that in polities that are “pluralistic-in fact,” because they comprise various competing conceptions of the good, CP offers “the best available alternative for settling questions of justice, morals, ethics, and legitimacy” (p. 11). Indeed, Rosenfeld considers CP a better alternative to the main monistic theories (such as liberalism, republicanism, and communitarianism), as well as to postmodern relativism. But he also considers it superior to competing pluralist accounts, such as Isaiah Berlin's “value pluralism” (pp. 37–42). Its ultimate goal is to provide equal accommodation to all competing conceptions of the good.
CP is a teleological, rather than a deontological, theory, which—in contrast to Rawls's Political Liberalism (1993)—does not exclude fundamentalist religions, “as it commands that efforts be made to ‘feel’ and understand such religion[s] from ‘within’” (p. 65). For many readers, this aspect of CP may be particularly disturbing. Does CP posit that we should tolerate the intolerants and run the risk, as Karl Popper warned us, that eventually the latter take over and put an end to tolerance? Rosenfeld's answer is a qualified “no.” Indeed, he states that CP fully justifies imposing its conception of the good “on everyone, including proponents of religious fundamentalism” (p. 65). This position is embodied in the so-called second-order norms, a key feature of CP, meant to allow peaceful coexistence of different and competing conceptions of the good. As a consequence, CP “prescribes intolerance, in whole or in part, of crusading religions and of non-religious ideologies bent on eradicating competing conceptions of the good” (p. 146). However, even the holders of such views might be tolerated for strategic reasons (i.e., if combating them brings more harm than good), provided they are numerically small and spatially isolated, and their actions are not likely to produce a dissolution of the established democratic pluralist order. A telling example would be the neo-Nazis in the United States (p. 240).
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Rosenfeld does not condemn per se cultural practices such as female circumcision, provided the women are fully adult and embrace it voluntarily (p. 118). Nevertheless, he welcomes the bans that originate from within a given community. For instance, he states openly that we should applaud the Senegalese women who persuaded their national parliament to outlaw female circumcision (pp. 118, 120).
It is a positive feature of this book that it constantly illustrates the possible implications of its normative theory for real-world politics. Yet politicians involved in drafting a law or political scientists focused on constitutional design might find it difficult to use the precepts of CP in their work. Rosenfeld's normative framework, as I see it, is too vague in this respect because the answers to many difficult issues typically “depend on the circumstances” (p. 217). Should we tolerate hate speech and antidemocratic political parties (pp. 239–43)? It depends. In “ordinary times” we should tolerate them for strategic reasons, but in “times of stress” they should be outlawed, for “tolerance of the intolerant may pave the way to times of crisis” (e.g., war). Should we discourage ethnic parties (pp. 235–36)? Probably yes, if ethnic differences are “sharp and intense,” probably not if we want to ensure representation of a small ethnic minority.
The main difficulty of this approach, I think, is that it is not easy to decide whether the times are ordinary or stressful, whether the ethnic divisions are sharp or blurred, and so on. Ultimately, it seems to me that the crucial judgment concerning the tolerability of given ideologies depends on future developments, which are difficult or impossible to predict. This is exemplified by the case of the Islamic party Refah, banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court. Rosenfeld claims that the dissolution of this party would be justified only if it were “genuinely likely eventually to culminate in dissolution of the Turkish polity” (p. 243). Now, what is “genuinely likely” to happen is a matter of dispute on which it is hard to reach a consensus.
Finally, I found myself puzzled by the question concerning how CP should treat declared preferences of various actors (e.g., religious leaders, ethnic entrepreneurs, etc.) who claim to speak in the name of a given conception of the good. As I read it, CP presupposes a good degree of sincerity here. Such actors ought to openly disclose their internal values (i.e., “first-order norms”), so that CP can analyze them and see if their implementation is compatible with its own second-order norms. Yet it is well known that social actors, especially politicians, tend to disguise their real motives. Some believe that it is even a core imperative for any politician to be “a great pretender and dissembler [gran simulatore e dissimulatore],” for he will always find someone “who will allow himself to be deceived” (Machiavelli, The Prince, Chap. 18). So how should we treat ethnic entrepreneurs who, in departure, speak of peace and harmony but, once in power, engage in ethnic cleansing? In other words, it seems to me that CP is well suited to judge ex post whether a particular conception of the good should have been fought because it proved to be intolerant (e.g., Nazism), but it risks being too benign ex ante. Indeed, it is a tragic feature of recent human history that Hitler was quite successful in disguising his real intentions, with the result that the leaders of democratic countries kept accommodating and tolerating his murderous “conception of the good” until the very outbreak of the war.
