Martin Evans presents a scholarly yet very accessible history of the causes, course, and consequences of the Algerian War of Independence. This is the first major survey of the conflict in English since Alistair Horne's acclaimed A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962.
Evans weaves “three analytical threads” throughout his chronological narrative. The first thread relates to “the long hatreds” stemming from the French conquest in 1830 that disrupted and dislocated indigenous Muslim life. Dispossession and destitution stoked these hatreds. The second thread examines “modern Algerian nationalism.” Evans delineates “four strands: assimilationists, a religious clerical movement, communists and radical nationalists” (p. xii). Rivalries roiled among the nationalists, which had tragic consequences during the war. The third thread considers “third-way reformism,” inconsistent, haphazard metropolitan efforts to institute reforms meant to improve Muslim conditions but still perpetuate French Algeria, such as the Blum–Viollette Bill of 1936 and the initiatives of the socialist-led Republican Front government during the conflict. Evans does not, however, subscribe to or spin the “what if” or “lost opportunities” trope. For example, if the metropole implemented timely reforms, Muslims would not have launched a revolution. To Evans, colonialism wreaked irreparable, irreconcilable damage impelling Muslim insurgency and independence.
The book is divided into three parts. Beginning with “Origins 1830–1945,” Evans provides a detailed contextual survey of the colonial period from the conquest of Algiers to the Sétif uprising. He covers the martial resistance of ʿAbd el-Kader, Bou-Zian (who was executed in 1849 and did not harass the French in the Sahara in the 1870s [p. 39]), and El-Mokhrani. Resistance also took other forms. Evans notes: “Religion, crime, silence, ridicule, music: all reflected deep hatred of French rule” (p. 41). To Evans' distinct credit, he particularly details musical resistance, especially the role of Oranian cheikhas, women who performed songs that were subversive and taboo (the famous Cheikha Remitti [1923–2006] emerged from this tradition). He also includes Bachtarzi Mahieddine, a musician of the 1920s and 1930s, and his politically charged anticolonial sentiments.
While Evans emphasizes the roles of ʿAbd al-Hamid Ben Badis, a cultural nationalist, Ferhat Abbas, an evolving nationalist, and Messali Hadj, a political nationalist, in the formation of a fractious Algerian nationalism, he also gives considerable attention to the Algerian Communist Party, which attracted Europeans as well as Muslims. The failure of the Blum-Viollette Bill, the rejection of the Manifesto of the Algerian People of 1943, and the insufficient March Ordinance of 1944 that extended citizenship to 67,000 Muslims, galvanized a growing nationalism, culminating in the violence at Sétif and Guelma in May 1945 and the horrific colonialist retribution, which introduces the book's second part, “Undeclared War 1945–59.”
The severe suppression of the 1945 uprising, rigged elections, and a restless elite led to the formation of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the outbreak of the war in 1954. Evans perceives the FLN as “an expression of the conservative interior. There was no vision of making society anew. It was a return to Arab and Islamic values” (p. 120). He subsequently chronicles the war's events, such as the Soummam Conference and the Battle of Algiers, and especially the conflicts within the conflicts, notably the intra-elite fratricides among the nationalists and the rifting relations between French settlers and metropolitans. The concurrent policies of reformism and repression of Guy Mollet's Republican Front receive particular attention. Indeed, de Gaulle pursued a similar strategy after coming to power (e.g., the Constantine Plan and General Maurice Challe's military operations). Evans wisely avoids delving deeply into the contentious historiography regarding de Gaulle's decision to decolonize, although he credits him for having “a wider view of the future” (p. 239). De Gaulle's self-determination speech (16 September 1959) starts the book's third part, “Dénouement 1959–62.”
Evans claims that de Gaulle's tour of the French community (especially his visit to Madagascar) in the summer of 1959 convinced him that African decolonization was inevitable and that France needed to create a new kind of relationship with Algeria, preferably one that protected French interests and preserved a French political presence. During the September speech, de Gaulle offered three choices. He equated Algerian independence (“secession”) with anarchy, although his suggestion that independence was a potential choice was significant. The option of integration of Algeria with France, replete with equal political rights for the majority Muslim population, immediately placed the settlers at a disadvantage. Finally, he presented his preferable solution of self-determination featuring a federal state run by Algerians with considerable French assistance and oversight. Evans correctly regards this speech as a crucial event.
The dénouement steepened after the speech. The transfer of popular and outspoken General Jacques Massu escalated settler anxiety and contributed to “Barricades Week” in January 1960. Concurrently, metropolitan opposition to the war spread. Although premature, in June 1960 an FLN negotiating party arrived at Melun outside of Paris and briefly met with French representatives. Meanwhile, de Gaulle's visit to Algeria in December incited spontaneous Muslim demonstrations and convinced the general that independence was inevitable. De Gaulle's 11 April 1961 press conference spoke of a sovereign Algeria on the basis that maintaining the territory was too expensive. Later that month four generals led a rebellion that failed miserably. In May, negotiations opened at Évian between the FLN and the French government. Disputes over dual citizenship and the status of the Sahara suspended discussions. In February 1962 the French and Algerian negotiating teams reconvened and in March completed the Évian Agreement. Meanwhile, violence spiraled in Algeria as the intransigent colonialist Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS) mobilized and the FLN's seething rivalries escalated into a brief civil war after the signing of the Évian Agreement. Besides the enormous loss of life from the general war (estimated at 200,000 to 300,000 [p. 338], although statistics vary widely), the social consequences included the massive repatriation/expatriation of European settlers and Jews as well as the abandonment of Algerians who supported the French, notably the harkis.
Evans adds a “Postscript” chapter that succinctly surveys fifty years of Algerian and French postcolonial history. Ahmed Ben Bella's September 1962 accession to the premiership (not the presidency, as stated on p. 339) led to an authoritarian government marked by the expanding power of the Sécurité Militaire. The austere Houari Boumedienne overthrew Ben Bella's government in June 1965 and continued to cultivate a revolutionary national image, as popularized in the writings of Frantz Fanon and dramatized in the film The Battle of Algiers. Algeria even attracted the American Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver. Nevertheless, a rapidly growing population, unemployment, and especially a vulnerable rentier economy based on hydrocarbons and susceptible to plummeting prices (such as those in the mid-1980s) threatened the increasingly corrupt FLN. The 1988 “Black October” upheaval ended the FLN's political monopoly. Indeed, the emerging Islamic Salvation Front perceived itself as representing the authentic ideals of the revolution. Algerian military and civilian elites (the pouvoir or power establishment) forced the resignation of President Chadli Benjedid in January 1992 and terminated parliamentary elections that would have ensured the Islamic Salvation Front's victory. Subsequent civil strife has resulted in 200,000 deaths (p. 358).
As for postcolonial France, de Gaulle manipulated the narrative. By successfully freeing France from Algeria, de Gaulle contended that he had expedited national renewal, which he equated with modernization and technological achievement. Colonialism represented a past that needed to be forgotten. According to Evans: “Gaullist France turned away from Algeria in an emphatic manner” (p. 348). While there is no question that France, encouraged by de Gaulle, lapsed into amnesia regarding the war, Algeria actually remained a strategic concern vital to French interests. The Évian Agreement preserved French military—including atomic—bases in Algeria, and perpetuated the colonial Petroleum Code permitting French operating control of the Saharan hydrocarbon concessions. Despite this overt neocolonial presence, a conciliatory France also offered generous financial cooperation and tens of thousands of coopérants, whose technical and educational service helped ensure the new nation's survival. The Algiers Accords of 1965 allowed France to maintain control of Algerian oil production, but also stipulated aid for Algeria's planned industrialization—a model for negotiations with other Third World hydrocarbon-producing states. The exceptional postcolonial bilateral relationship, especially during the de Gaulle years, aimed to impress the Third World and project France as a “third force,” an attractive, alternative, and willing partner operating between the superpowers. While the nationalization of French Saharan concessions in February 1971 ended privileged relations and allegedly “normalized” them, both sides still recognized the continuing and consequential commercial, industrial, and social importance of the relationship, despite recurrent bilateral controversies and crises.
Evans describes the slow restoration of the war's memory, stirred particularly by the writings of Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora and the provocative memoirs of Jacques Massu and Paul Aussaresses. Documentaries and anniversaries also evoked the past and included symbolic acts, such as the placing of a plaque in 2001 on the Pont Saint-Michel commemorating the Algerian fatalities of the 17 October 1961 emigrant worker march in Paris. Algeria has also reexamined its history by recognizing and rehabilitating formerly spurned nationalist elites and revolutionary leaders. As Evans aptly concludes, the war remains “unfinished.”
Historicism is an issue affecting bilateral relations between France and Algeria. The passage of a bill in the French National Assembly in 2005 calling for educators to deliver a positive interpretation of colonialism especially infuriated President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and intensified the Algerian demand for an official apology for colonialism.
Given Professor Evans's past publications, this reviewer anticipated an excellent book and it fulfilled expectations. Well written and researched, Evans took advantage of increasingly available archival sources. While Alistair Horne's A Savage War of Peace reads, as an esteemed colleague recently put it, as a historical novel, Evans's tone is detached and measured, engaged but impartial. Its objectivity is timely as France and Algeria contest anamnesis and amnesia. Indeed, this balanced book may be therapeutic.
The author includes a list of biographies of “key characters” and a useful chronology. Thirteen maps and forty illustrations complement the narrative. A chance sampling of the index resulted in occasional discrepancies regarding page references (e.g., “bazooka affair,” Abderrahmane Taleb, Michel Leiris), which hardly detracts from the work's overall value. This book deserves immediate inclusion in academic and public libraries.
Martin Evans convincingly argues that Algerian decolonization was “a pivotal event in the shaping of the twentieth century which was intimately connected to other key processes, namely the impact of the two world wars, the cold war, pan-Arabism, the wider anticolonial movement, and the movement towards Western European unity” (p. 317). Above all, the book is a history of an extraordinary bilateral relationship still in the process of decolonizing decades after the official transfer of political power. The “undeclared” and “unfinished” war continues to agitate, alienate, and captivate.
