Professor Huneeus's study of The Pinochet Regime is rigorous and systematic. It stands indeed as a model for those who want to analyse the characteristics of dictatorships, especially sophisticated dictatorships such as that of Pinochet. Its closest parallel is perhaps that of Franco, with significant differences, however, to which Professor Huneeus does very interestingly refer. Paradoxically, both dictatorships were politically successful, on one key point only: they brought about unwittingly a peaceful transition to pluralist democracy and, indeed, to what turned out to be a more stable democracy than either country had ever known. What Franco wanted the Spanish monarchy to become after his death may be somewhat mysterious, but Pinochet was absolutely clear: he was attempting to bring about a regime which would be wholly different from the Western model and what he called ‘authoritarian democracy’. As a matter of fact, what resulted from his regime was a pluralist democracy, indeed one close to being wholly consensual.
As Professor Huneeus rightly emphasizes, Pinochet's purpose had indeed not been merely to stop the ‘excesses’ of the Popular Unity government and what the coup leaders viewed as the grip of Marxism over their country. Pinochet's hope was that the opportunity provided by the widespread discontent with Allende's presidency within the middle class and somewhat beyond that class would enable him to convince most Chileans that his plan for the future would avoid the repetition of the major conflicts of the early 1970s by returning to values felt by Pinochet to have prevailed and that made Chile great in the rather distant past.
This meant a three-pronged attack, which Professor Huneeus analyses with great care and great fairness, despite the passions generated by the 17-year rule of the Pinochet dictatorship. First, there had to be a rapid and brutal repression of the elements which had brought about ‘trouble’ (and indeed beyond these elements as well): the way the coup was initiated, including an air force raid on the Presidential Palace, The Moneda, showed the level at which that repression was pitched. Communists and many others were rounded up; assassinations took place, while others were sent into exile.
Second, although the military would remain the ‘guarantors’ of the system – and, as Professor Huneeus shows, its participation at various levels of the government was considerable throughout – a determined effort to ‘legitimize’ the new regime was given top priority. Pinochet was helped in a major way by the ‘Gremialista Movement’, ‘a power group’ as Professor Huneeus refers to it, not a party – Pinochet never allowed a ‘single’ party system to be established. The Gremialista Movement was a ‘movement’ present in most sectors of the elite, infiltrating its members at the top of both the public and private sectors; its leader and key ideologist, Jaime Guzman, close to Pinochet, had definite views about what an ‘authoritarian democracy’ should be like, views which he sought to see implemented in the constitution of which he was one of the framers. The new regime was to be a ‘democracy’ without parties in which the ideas of ‘traditional Catholicism’ were to play a large part (although, ironically, the Catholic hierarchy of Chile did oppose the regime consistently and effectively).
Third, and perhaps above all, there was to be a new economic order, based on liberalism, which would succeed in turning Chile into a ‘First World’ country. That new order would bring about a greater enterprise motivation among the most dynamic sectors of the society while the bulk of the population would support the new system, as they would recognize the benefits which it was bringing to them. Up to the early 1980s at least, the greatest achievement of the regime was indeed the economy; led by young economists trained in the US (the so called ‘Chicago boys’), the liberal economic medicine was a major success for several years, thus differentiating Chile from the bulk of the dictatorships that had prevailed in the region.
Professor Huneeus saw it as his task to examine in detail these three elements, repression, legitimation by a new constitution, and establishment of a new economic order. Closely researched empirical evidence shows first the extent to which, especially in the 1970s, the regime was an unquestioned success (admittedly at a price in terms of freedom and rule of law), culminating with the adoption of the Constitution by referendum in 1980 by two-thirds of the voters. Hence, what Professor Huneeus referred to at the outset as the ‘many faces of the Pinochet regime’.
Pinochet himself perhaps read too much into the success of the referendum on the Constitution, though the conditions under which the poll took place were not altogether ideal, to say the least. Yet the Constitution was in some ways more ‘constraining’ than those of other dictatorships, as it stipulated that a further plebiscite was to take place in 1988: this was to be the ‘Tarpeian Rock’ of the regime and of its leader.
As Professor Huneeus shows, difficulties began to pile up in the 1980s, economic at first – a major recession in 1982–83 led to a partial retreat from economic liberalism in order to avoid the risk of truly widespread discontent – a little ‘dirigisme’ was introduced, with the army beginning to voice their worries about the actions of the ‘Chicago Boys’. Vacillations were then noticeable on the political front; the regime oscillated between an ‘Apertura’ policy and further repression, with two consequences, one being that divisions within the Pinochet camp emerged into the open and the other that the opposition, for the first time, could really re-organize and express its voice. Yet, up to the very end, Pinochet seemed still to believe that he could and would win.
This is where Professor Huneeus's study turns to the other set of reasons why the regime collapsed – namely, the fact that the opposition united (except for the Communists and those who favoured ‘direct’ action) and, in particular, that the Christian Democrats, under Patricio Aylwin, and the Socialists came to an agreement on government, called the Concertation. Unity enabled these parties to carry out an effective campaign against Pinochet's rule up to 1988, when policies became less actively pursued and even to an extent contradictory, as well as during the period, lasting over a year, between the 1988 referendum, when Pinochet was defeated by nearly 55% of the votes, and, as the Constitution had also stipulated, the presidential and congressional elections that took place late in 1989. The Constitution had sharply limited the powers of the new democracy; Pinochet was in the Senate for life, together with a few of his friends. Professor Huneeus shows in detail the skills and the patience which the democratic leaders, and in particular President Aylwin himself, displayed in never going beyond what the Constitution allowed them to do, in a context in which elected representatives from two of the parties were composed of supporters of the fallen regime. This is perhaps the most extraordinary feature of the new Chilean democracy, a feature which Professor Huneeus rightly emphasizes after having shown major analytical qualities in uncovering the articulation and mechanics of the dictatorship.
