Louise Nelson Dyble frames her history of the Golden Gate Bridge and Highway District (GGBHD) as an assessment of the politics of a special district. Formed in 1923 to build the Golden Gate Bridge linking San Francisco and Marin, County the GGBHD consistently generated opposition from the public, environmentalists, landowners, competitors, local politicians and even the federal government. Complaints ranged from high tolls and taxes to financial impropriety and racial discrimination. The district fought off a series of attempts by regional government advocates who called for its consolidation and elimination. Dyble spends little time narrating the actual construction of the bridge, except thoroughly to debunk Joseph Strauss’ role in the design and construction, while praising the skills of chief designer Charles A. Ellis. Dyble's analytic focus is the series of controversies that the district's toll collection and budget expenditure practices generated after construction was completed in 1937. Critics charged the district with wasting money and keeping tolls higher than the nearby San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge. Criticism of the district's insularity led to frequent investigations and threats of state takeover. The district responded with small reforms: taking bids for painting and lowering tolls.

In the 1950s, rising traffic produced toll collection surpluses that made both the Bay Bridge and Golden Gate Bridge the ‘golden cows’ of revenue generation. The bridges became a target for takeover by those seeking a regional transportation authority with sufficient revenues for improved regional transit. The GGBHD succeeded in beating back a regional transit authority, then helped defeat an effort to build a rapid transit link to Marin County. In 1971 the district added bus and ferry services subsidized by bridge tolls. By 1979, however, bus and ferry service increased both capital and operating costs and pushed the district into the red. Dyble argues that the district was defensive and ‘stubbornly resistant’ to reform. It also has a ‘legacy of disregard to safety and maintenance’. She speaks of a bridge district ‘culture’ devoted to defending the interests of the district rather than representing the interests of the public. She concludes that special districts ‘undermine democracy’ because they avoid public scrutiny and accountability. However, the extent that the GGBHD, as a special district, was more corrupt or self-interested than any other form of government is not clear. The GGBHD was not alone in defending its autonomy. Dyble shows that local political entities, who desired to defend home rule, helped the GGBHD defeat the regional transit district. The GGBHD also found allies in local officials and other special districts that favoured local control and decentralized authority over regional government. Because Dyble covers the history of the bridge district and analyses the nature of special districts more generally, political scientists and urban historians will find the book of interest. This is a fine history of the bridge district and as such it represents one example of how a special district operates. However, it is not clear how unique the GGBHD was and what its history says about special districts more generally.