Cosmopolitanism, for those not familiar, is a moral and political theory that posits that all humans (and all sentient beings depending on the author) have morally equal worth that applies universally, regardless of place of birth, religion, age, nationality, race, gender, political affiliation, and other particularities associated with culture or happenstance of birth. There are various forms of cosmopolitan thought, both strong (e.g., world state) and minimal (e.g., basic needs), dating as far back as 1230 BCE. Cosmopolitanism is rich in pedigree and has included philosophers within Greek and Roman stoicism, neo-Confucian thought, the Second Scholastic era, the Enlightenment, rights-based approaches, and, more recently, globalized forms of liberal egalitarianism.

There are a number of critiques of cosmopolitanism, and it has faced particularly harsh criticism with the recent rise of nationalist, authoritarian, and far-right movements. The most popular critiques paint cosmopolitanism as an overly demanding moral and political theory that undermines meaningful communal and patriotic obligations, deprioritizes local affinities, seeks to diminish national self-determination, requires stringent allegiance to lofty universal principles, and promotes a “rootless” individualism that often sits in opposition to important social ties. As part of these critiques, it has been argued that cosmopolitan moral theory and its institutional variants are forms of imperialism, which is top-down, elitist, Western centric, Eurocentric, and, importantly for our purposes here, unbearably arrogant in the face of alternative worldviews.

It is within this context that Luis Cabrera defends what he describes as a more modest form of cosmopolitanism in The Humble Cosmopolitan: Rights, Diversity and Trans-State Democracy. Its central aim is to “meet some of the longer-standing arrogance objections” associated with contemporary cosmopolitanism by advocating a form of cosmopolitanism that can give “due emphasis to global citizenship” by focusing on “mechanisms of input, exchange/publicity, and challenge on an equal basis to all persons” (p. 9). By emphasizing the role of equal mechanisms for input, Cabrera suggests that it is possible to create processes that resist political arrogance in any political theory (not just cosmopolitanism), particularly if these mechanisms can be “systematically oriented” and grounded on “political humility” (p. 9).

Drawing on recent writings in virtue ethics, philosophy, and psychology, Cabrera defines humility as a political virtue that accepts “a recognition of the equal moral standing of others, an openness to input from them, and an intellectual modesty about the finality of one’s own judgements” (p. 9). If harnessed and institutionalized properly, a global political disposition based on humility could act as a counter to current mechanisms of political power, as well as resurgent sovereignty-based arrogance, by allowing a plurality of voices to be meaningfully constitutive of global political practice.

To illuminate the real-world potential of the virtue of humility, Cabrera examines the political life and philosophy of Bhimarao Ramji Ambedkar, chief architect of Indi a’s 1950 constitution and champion of the Dalits against India’s exclusionary caste system. Ambedkar’s life and work are argued by Cabrera to demonstrate two key elements in the defense of cosmopolitanism. First, Ambedkar’s political theory helps illustrate the theoretical potential for a virtue of political humility as an alternative to political arrogance (arrogance equaling particularism, closed-mindedness, and righteousness). Second, Ambedkar’s politics is presented as a form of political humility in practice, showing that in India, it helped recognize entrenched diversity within an extremely complex and tenuous political context without abandoning important universal orientations necessary for successful political collaboration. As Cabrera argues, Ambedkar, as a part of political history, demonstrates an important link between human rights, broader political recognition, institutional inclusion, and political humility.

There is much to admire about The Humble Cosmopolitan. First, it offers a fascinating analysis of Ambedkar’s political thought and its potential connection to global debates outside the context of Indian politics. The analysis is informative, providing an insightful methodology to explore key historical tensions involved in both the making of the Indian constitution and in debates about cosmopolitanism. Second, the book offers a glimpse at the potential role of reexamining cosmopolitan virtues, which is an area of exploration seriously neglected in contemporary cosmopolitan thought. Whereas much of contemporary cosmopolitan thought remains ensconced in the Rawlsian tradition, an exploration of cosmopolitan virtues (humility, open-mindedness, hospitality, and so on) could offer promising insights for a reinvigorated cosmopolitanism. Finally, the book offers a series of institutional arguments about how it may be possible to advance democratic mechanisms that promote inputs from those currently disenfranchised, so as to mitigate political arrogance.

That said, The Humble Cosmopolitan demonstrates that at the end of the day cosmopolitanism relies on a series of metaphysical commitments and presuppositions that ground its core. For example, despite an appeal to the virtue of humility as representing a political “good” (not assuming the finality of one’s own judgments), Cabrera’s position ultimately rests on strong deontological commitments to human equality and political inclusion. These principles are presented as necessarily non-negotiable foundations of political humility. As a result, the book offers compelling responses to many of cosmopolitanism’s wary friends, flip-floppers and fence-sitters, but not to those who remain staunchly opposed. The likelihood is that humble cosmopolitics will continue to be painted as “arrogant” by those who do not see all humans as equally valuable, who use power for control, who fetishize cultural relativism, and who advance political exclusion as a means of securing their own interests.

A more helpful way to understand The Humble Cosmopolitan is as advocating a form of transitional cosmopolitanism, which accepts that political change takes time, that change will often be nonlinear, and that a degree of deliberative ebb and flow of self-interested motives and worldviews will be involved in determining what cosmopolitan commitments require and why we should be motivated to take those commitments seriously. This departs from most cosmopolitan arguments in two ways, thus mitigating its arrogance. First, unlike many cosmopolitan arguments that begin with ideal calculations of what global justice demands, which are then applied to global relations writ large, transitional cosmopolitanism is concerned with iterative and transformative procedures, mechanisms, and moral orientations that could, over time, provide the basis for a broader cosmopolitical condition. Second, transitional cosmopolitanism does not pretend clairvoyance about the final complexion of a cosmopolitan order. Instead, transitional accounts see cosmopolitan foundations as a normative compass, not a final destination; they seek to encourage reforms that correspond with this compass in order to create a condition of greater equity between global populations and their needs. In this light, The Humble Cosmopolitan can itself be seen as practicing humility, merely highlighting virtues and mechanisms that may promote the equal status of human beings as global citizens.