Statement by President Obama, January 21, 2009Footnote 1
On the Situation in Iraq
This afternoon, I met with our Ambassador to Iraq, the commander in Iraq, and the overall theater commander in the region in order to get a full update on the situation in Iraq. Key members of my cabinet and senior national security officials also participated in this meeting.
The meeting was productive and I very much appreciated receiving assessments from these experienced and dedicated individuals. During the discussion, I asked the military leadership to engage in additional planning necessary to execute a responsible military drawdown from Iraq.
In the coming days and weeks, I will also visit the Department of Defense to consult with the Joint Chiefs on these issues, and we will undertake a full review of the situation in Afghanistan in order to develop a comprehensive policy for the entire region.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen, January 22, 2009Footnote 2
Secretary Robert Gates and Admiral Michael Mullen delivered these remarks in Arlington, VA
Secretary Gates. Good afternoon. I have a couple of brief points I'd like to make, and then—and then take your questions.
First, I'd just like to say that the transition here at Defense has gone very smoothly, a testament I believe to the desire and strong commitment by both the outgoing and incoming administrations to ensure continuity during a time of war. I again thank those Bush appointees who have already left, as well as those who were asked and have agreed to stay on during the transition and until their replacements are appointed or nominated. Their help has been invaluable.
I'm impressed with the caliber and credentials of the individuals recommended by the president's team for positions here in Defense, and I look forward to working with them. On that note, the president and I both urge the Senate to take up the nomination of the new deputy secretary as swiftly as possible so that we can begin addressing the myriad challenges the department faces. I also hope other senior nominees will be taken up as soon as possible, once the Senate has all the necessary paperwork.
I believe the new national security team is a strong and collegial one, and off to a fast start. We had several substantive meetings during the transition, and I would say in particular Secretary Clinton and I are committed to further strengthening the collaborative relationship between the Department of State and the Department of Defense.
Q. Mr. Secretary, wonder if you could enlighten us a bit more about your discussions yesterday at the White House on Iraq. In particular, is a speedier withdrawal from Iraq more likely under this administration than it was under the last one? And is the 16-month timetable the basic plan you're working on?
Secretary Gates. I would say that yesterday's meeting was the beginning of a process of evaluating various options. There was a good give and take, a good discussion with both Ambassador Crocker and General Odierno and General Petraeus. There is some follow up in terms of additional analysis to be done, but I would say simply that we have begun a process in which a variety of options are being examined.
Q. I wanted to ask you about Guantanamo. We were told from the podium last week that 61 former Guantanamo detainees are confirmed or suspected of returning to the fight, and that is a pretty substantial increase we were told. So if Guantanamo closes, won't that threat only increase? And also, if 61 are returning to the fight, what does that say about your review process?
Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, I think you have to find out what the other part of the equation is, because I think at one point—well, you have to know—and I don't—the total number of people who have been processed through Guantanamo over the past several years. So the number 61 is a big number compared to the 250 or thereabouts that we have now. It's not as big a number if you're talking about 700 or a thousand or however many have been—have been through Guantanamo.
Clearly, the challenge that is—that faces us and that I've acknowledged before is figuring out how do we close Guantanamo and at the same time safeguard the security of the American people. And that's the challenge that we will continue to face. I believe that there are answers to those questions, but we clearly have a lot of work to do. And the executive order spells out the—I think the work that has to be done to get there.
Q. Mr. Secretary, among the executive orders signed by President Obama today is one which would—the intent appears to be to put all national security/military/intelligence interrogation processes under the Army Field Manual. There are some in the intelligence community that will say one size doesn't fit all, that there's a gray area and there may have to be exceptions made. Given your experience at both the CIA and now at DOD, do you think that all interrogations can be conducted under the rules and regulations of the Army Field Manual?
Secretary Gates. I haven't read the latest—I haven't read the version of the executive order that the president signed. But if that's what he said, that's what will be done.
Q. But given your experience in the intelligence community, would it present problems for intelligence officials in their attempts to gain actionable intelligence in a timely manner?
Secretary Gates. I think you have to weigh the—the costs of the more severe interrogation measures with, as the president talked about in his inaugural address, our values and the impact on our values. We know a lot more about al Qaeda now than we did in the early years of the administration, the early years after September 11th, 2001. And personally, I believe that the need for measures that go outside the Army Field Manual is dramatically less than it was several years ago. So based on my experience in both arenas, I've very comfortable with where the executive order placed this.
Q. Just—to clarify—the question for both of you—to clarify on the first question, did you specifically discuss the 16-month time frame during yesterday's meeting? Do you consider that effectively an order from the new president? And as people who have at one time or another been critical of outside or artificial deadlines, do you consider it wholly responsible?
Secretary Gates. We have, from really every since the election, been looking at several options, and obviously 16 months is one of them. We are very aware of what the president has said, and we have an obligation and responsibility to provide him with a range of options that include the one that he has spoken about.
Do you want add to that?
Admiral Mullen. The only thing I would add is we discussed a deliberate and yet rapid process. The secretary talked about this being the beginning, and in fact, to look at a responsible drawdown, and there's still work to be done. We've worked this very hard. We've planned an awful lot of options. But there is—I think there will need to be additional meetings and engagements to work our way through the fullness of both Iraq, Afghanistan, hear from—hear from the Joint Chiefs, which is what the president has said he would do as well. So there's still more work to be done there, and I think a lot of that will be done in the very near future.
Secretary Gates. Barbara.
Q. What should we take from the fact that the White House statement last night doesn't mention the 16-month option specifically?
Secretary Gates. I wouldn't take anything from it.
Admiral Mullen. Yeah. I think you need—ask the White House.
Secretary Gates. Barbara.
Q. Admiral Mullen, you've just said the words a more rapid withdrawal. So whether it's 16 or 17 or 18 months, certainly more rapid than till the end of 2011 is one of the things you're looking at.
Admiral Mullen. I said a responsible drawdown, but a deliberate and rapid process to get to the decisions. If I didn't say that, that's what I meant to say.
Q. Okay. Well, my question is—and also for the secretary, then—is, the notion of 16 months is certainly in the national dialogue and has been for some time. So it seems to me there's—I don't understand. There's one of two things. Either you think 16 months is it, as you said, doable, as you've said in the past, and a doable idea—in which case I'd like to ask, did you ever tell President Bush that you could bring troops homes faster, save—save troops and money and time? Did you ever tell him that you could do it faster than the Bush plan called for? And if you did not, why not?
And if 16 months or whatever, a faster one, is not a good idea, are you both absolutely committed to telling President Obama that you think the risk is too high?
Admiral Mullen. With—with respect to at least my role with respect to President Bush's, I was operating under very clear guidance from him, followed that guidance in terms of what we reviewed and what we recommended. Actually, in the engagement with the new president and the new administration, it will be much the same, to both receive that guidance and then execute it, and would intend to do that.
As the secretary said, we've certainly heard 16 months for a long time. We've looked at options—looked at that option and the risks that are associated that— with that. And when the time comes to have that—to have that full engagement with the president with respect to that— which, as the secretary indicated, has started—you know, I will advise him accordingly and then he'll make the decision.
Q. You certainly must, at this point, have a fair idea of what your view is about a 16-month withdrawal.
Admiral Mullen. All of us, I think, understand where we are on the possibility of various options. That's—and that's the advice, tied to the risk that's associated with that, that—that I'll—I give the secretary and I'll give to the president.
Q. On this—
Secretary Gates. Let me just—let me just say, I think our obligation is to give the president a range of options and the risks associated with each of those options and—and he will make the decision. He has said that he wants it to be a responsible drawdown. He has said that before he makes a decision he wants to talk to the military commanders and the chiefs and get their independent views. Once he has all of that, he will make the decision and we will execute it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on Guantanamo, you told us that you tried to have it closed something like a year ago and failed. The issues really haven't changed. So what's going to be different this time, particularly with regard to the two tough issues of where to send those that you'd like to transfer and what to do with those you can't put on trial but aren't ready to release?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think those are exactly some of the issues that—that are going to be investigated, as—as laid out by the executive order.
Those—we have developed some options in terms of how many we think could be returned to other countries, if we could get the other countries to take them. That diplomatic initiative has not started. That will await work on—in carrying out the executive order.
We have identified a number of possible prisons here in the United States. I've heard from members of Congress where all of those prisons are located. Their enthusiasm is limited.
The—so I think, you know, these are just issues that we will have to work through with the new administration. And some of the legal issues, which are really outside of our purview, are the things that the Justice Department and the White House counsel and so on will—will be working on.
Q. But is there some option out there that you identified before but was rejected by the Bush administration, particularly with regard to those that you can't release and can't put on trial?
Secretary Gates. I don't think so. But I think one of the things that has come with the new president, as we have heard publicly from some of the European countries, is that they were willing to consider taking these. And we've not heard from those people before. So we may have some opportunities in terms of sending some of these detainees to other countries that did not exist before January 20th.
Q. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Gates. Yeah.
Q. Where, in your opinion, did Gitmo go wrong?
Secretary Gates. I am—you know, I was busy running Texas A&M on September 11th, and—well, actually, I wasn't; I was back up peacefully in the Pacific Northwest. And I haven't read the books and I haven't looked into the details of this, and I think that's a judgment that somebody else is going to have to make.
Q. Well, let me ask this question, then: Was the intelligence garnered from the detainees at Gitmo worth the international condemnation?
Secretary Gates. That's a net assessment that I don't think I'm in a position to make.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you started about saying you'd like the prompt approval of Bill Lynn, the deputy Defense secretary nominee. About a half an hour ago, Senator Levin sent out an e-mail saying his committee needs more information from the administration about what steps Lynn could take to recuse himself from the potential Raytheon conflicts of interest.
Could you talk a little bit about what—what—when you vetted him, was that a troublesome aspect, that he was while qualified on paper, coming from the number five defense contractor?
Secretary Gates. People certainly recognized—people in the transition certainly recognized that it was an issue. And I interviewed Bill Lynn. I was very impressed with his credentials. He came with the highest recommendations of a number of people that I respect a lot. And I asked that an exception be made because I felt that he could play the role of a deputy—of the deputy—in a better manner than anybody else that I saw.
Q. Well, one follow-up, then. What steps—
Secretary Gates. And I would just say I think that we certainly—we certainly owe the Armed Services Committee whatever information they need to feel comfortable going forward.
Q. What steps, realistically, can the department take to give not only the panel, but the American public a sense that the number two guy will be impartial about Raytheon decisions?
Secretary Gates. Fair enough.
Q. You know, there's a big DDG 1000—
Secretary Gates. And I think that—I think that the White House Counsel's Office, presidential personnel and our own General Counsel's Office are in the process of working those arrangements out right now.
Q. And you'll make them public when they're done?
Secretary Gates. I assume so. Yeah.
Q. During the campaign, President Obama said that he would, when elected, send perhaps two to three additional brigades of troops to Afghanistan. Lately, actually since the election, we've heard talk about as many as 30,000 troops—significantly more than that— going to Afghanistan. Have any decisions been actually made, pending this review that the president has talked about, in terms of how many American forces might go to Afghanistan this year?
Secretary Gates. No final decision has been made. Part of—part of what the president made clear was that they intend to look at Iraq and Afghanistan holistically. And so I think part of the—one of the things that the president will expect before making decisions is what the implications are not just for Iraq, but for Afghanistan. And I expect, as I say that, to be part of those decisions to be forthcoming pretty soon.
Do you want to add anything to that?
Admiral Mullen. I—I really wouldn't add a lot except to say that these are the level of forces that the commander has asked for. So again, we've looked very carefully at how to do that. There have been some recommendations that have been made up the chain of command, but no decisions yet.
And consistent with what I said before, I think a very deliberate process now, but rapid as it can be, to both recommend and have the president make this decision— these decisions.
Q. Are there detailed plans that you've already seen for what these 30,000 troops would do—in other words, where they would be deployed specifically in terms of what provinces and cities, and what their tasks would be? Or is it just a ballpark estimate about what these—
Admiral Mullen. No. I—consistent with how the commanders on the ground have acted for years now is when they come forward, they come forward and have a very clear plan of what they want the forces to do. And that's certainly the case here as well.
Yeah.
Q. Sir, just to follow up on what Al asked, were you ever asked by the previous administration to come up with a plan to close Gitmo, and that you started on that process and then found that you had no place to send these detainees? Or were you not asked to look at that plan? And what is your best military advice as to whether these detainees should be tried in military courts here in the U.S. or in federal courts?
Secretary Gates. First of all, I was not asked. I took that action on my own. And I am one of the least-qualified people to evaluate whether people are tried under the military commissions, Article III, or the UCMJ. I think those—those decisions will be made, or recommendations will be made, by the Justice Department, perhaps with the input of the White House counsel for the president.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on Afghanistan, as you've gone through these various reviews—and, Mr. Chairman, this question's for you also—have you come to a point where you've decided that it's clear that you've got to go after the drug—narcotics trade in Afghanistan, beginning with the drug labs? Or are you going to leave that to NATO? And is it clear to you that the United States can reach its goals in Afghanistan without going after the drug problem?
Secretary Gates. No, we clearly have to go after the drug labs and the drug lords that provide support to the Taliban and to other insurgents. And to that end, the NATO defense ministers, at our meeting in December, gave new guidance to the ISAF commander, tying those together in that way. And I have signed off on a change in the rules of engagement for our own forces that essentially say the same thing. If we have evidence that the drug labs and drug lords are supporting the Taliban, then they're fair game.
Q. Is that enough, do you think, to really take them out?
Secretary Gates. Well, we'll see.
Q. You said at one time that legislation would be needed to close Guantanamo. You specifically cited the asylum rights of detainees, if they were brought to the United States, that they—that those rules need to be changed. The executive order signed today doesn't say anything about new legislation. Do you still think that that is necessary? Or in your discussions with the transition and now the new administration, do you think that that is—is that no longer a concern of yours?
Secretary Gates. What I heard the Justice Department saying in the last administration was that legislation would be required in certain areas. I think that the Justice Department, White House counsel and others in this administration will probably take a look at that and make their own determination on whether new legislation is needed.
Q. Mr. Secretary—when the previous—when you were looking at the previous goals for Afghanistan, the end state, I mean one of the questions as we—as we send additional troops into the country is, what—when do we know we've been successful? You know, what is our end state? When are we done there?
And I'm curious to know whether you see any differences between the Obama administration and the last administration in terms of, you know, what is our goal in Afghanistan? When do we know we've completed our mission there?
Secretary Gates. Well, let me make a comment and then invite the chairman to comment.
I think one of the—one of the points where I suspect both administrations come to the same conclusion is that the goals we did have for Afghanistan are too broad and too far into the future, are too future-oriented, and that we need more concrete goals that can be achieved realistically within three to five years in terms of reestablishing control in certain areas, providing security for the population, going after al Qaeda, preventing the reestablishment of terrorism, better performance in terms of delivery of services to the people, some very concrete things.
So I think that that's—that's a starting point. But you know, the president, I think, has referred—I think referred last night to the need for a comprehensive assessment on Afghanistan. And what we have—you know, I mean, we have a—we have a NATO campaign plan. We have an RC [Regional Command] South campaign plan. We have a commander's campaign plan. We have General Petraeus's study. And we have the Afghan review that was conducted in the last administration at the White House.
So I think all of these pieces will be inputs into the—into the review that this administration will take in terms of determining what those nearer-term goals should be and how we get to where we— where we can achieve them.
Admiral Mullen. I'd only say that that's clearly the message I'm getting is, what are the near-term goals going to be? And I think that will be part of this initial assessment. And then, how do we—obviously, how do we achieve them over that time frame?
And we've talked about the military side of this. Certainly, a big part of all the reviews has been the need to make sure that we have the right civilian corps there as well, numbers of PRTs; that we have the right governance development in Afghanistan, along with the economic development; because, over time, without that, all the military troops in the world aren't going to make any difference.
Q. Mr. Secretary?
Q. We've heard about the possibility that combat troops could be withdrawn from Iraq in 16 months, but we haven't heard anybody put a number to how many troops we're talking about. Could you talk about that?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think that's one of the decisions that still has to be made.
Q. Well, how many combat troops are in Iraq?
Secretary Gates. It'll depend on which option he chooses.
Q. All right. But how do you define “combat troops”? If you are told to withdraw combat troops in 16 months, how many troops would that be?
Secretary Gates. I don't know that answer.
Q. Mr. Secretary?
Q. Mr. Secretary, it's been clear for some time that obviously Iraq was a top priority for the Bush White House. And when you talk about Afghanistan being an economy-of-force mission, in your communications thus far with the transition team and now with the new president, is it clear to you that that's now changing, and that for the Obama White House Afghanistan will be the top priority, and not Iraq? And if so, beyond troops, what does it mean to have high-level presidential attention be focused on Afghanistan primarily, as opposed to on Iraq primarily?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think, clearly, whatever time frame we end up with for drawdowns in Iraq, the administration will be paying very close attention to that. But it is clear—I mean, the president has been quite clear that the mission is to responsibly draw down and end our active combat role, the role that we have been playing over the last number of years.
He wants to put more emphasis on Afghanistan and deal with the problems in Afghanistan there and the challenges that we face in Afghanistan. It is clear that— that the threat to the homeland is—to this country—is focused in the Afghan theater, on both sides of the Pakistani—the Afghan-Pakistani border.
So that—I think what you're—what I'm trying to get at is what you're seeing is, is a transition from—moving from concluding the size of role and high—highest priority that we have given to Iraq over the last number of years and moving that priority to Afghanistan.
The admiral's spoken to this quite often.
Admiral Mullen. I think, actually, they're very much linked; it is the responsible drawdown, that the conditions in Iraq clearly permit that now. So it becomes—as the secretary has said many times, it becomes an issue of pace, specifically, and that—generally availability of troops for Afghanistan are tied to that drawdown.
And we're in a time right now over the next 24 to 36 months that it's just a very delicate balance because we haven't built out the army yet, we don't have more capability, and that the focus is moving towards Afghanistan. But I—I see it as a broad focus on both as opposed to a principled focus on one or the other.
Q. Just a follow-up briefly on Iraq. There's been so much talk coming especially from the commanders in the field that the gains are fragile. At the same time, they've held. I mean, the numbers are still very good, the Iraqi government's power has grown, its army's power has grown. Are you hearing from them now more confidence that you could do a faster and more substantive drawdown, that they are more comfortable with it today than they were, say, a few months ago or six months ago, because, as you say, the conditions may now permit it?
Admiral Mullen. I think there's— there's growing confidence, but it's not— it's not in leaps and bounds. I mean, this—this really does work over time. General Odierno right now, as we all are, very focused on the elections which come up in nine days in Iraq. That's a big deal. How the provincial elections play out will, I think, be a big indicator for 2009, which is a big year. So I think there is growing confidence, but it's something that we all watch very carefully, and that General Odierno still uses the word “fragile” and “irreversible,” but more durable than it was just a little while ago.
Q. Mr. Secretary, back to Gitmo. As someone who did advocate for taking steps to close down Gitmo, can you just talk a little about what you think the impact will be, assuming that the mechanics get worked out over the coming months on how to do it—what the impact will be on the overall U.S. war on terrorism? Will it help the United States achieve its goals? If so, in what way?
Secretary Gates. One of the things that—that that I have found interesting is the very positive response around the world to the determination to close Guantanamo, to close the detention facility there. And I think that closing Guantanamo creates additional opportunities for us in terms of partnering with other countries and other countries' eagerness to work with us in dealing with violent extremists. I don't think that can be measured.
But just based on the nature of the public comments that have been made and the statements about, “Well, maybe we can help the Americans close Guantanamo by taking some of these detainees” tells me that this is going to be very positively received—has—is being positively received. And I think—as I said, I think that creates opportunities for us.
Q. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, General Odierno yesterday said that if the provincial elections in Iraq go smoothly, the security gains could become irreversible. And I wanted to ask you, how important is that, the provincial elections, in terms of determining your plans forward? How much of that is a metric in terms of determining which plans you'll go forward with, the provincial elections and that post-period?
Secretary Gates. Well, I would just basically repeat what the chairman said a couple minutes ago about we are looking to the provincial elections as a really important event. They are the first elections in—since 2005, as I recall. This is a chance for particularly the Sunnis to become engaged more in the political process, in contrast to 2005. And so I think that—I think all of us see these provincial elections as very important.
There are two more elections in Iraq this year. There will be district and sub-district elections sometime in the summer, perhaps in June, and there'll be national elections in December. So these elections— with each set of these elections that goes—that takes place and works, the roots of political reconciliation and of solving problems with words and legislation instead of with guns—the roots of that get deeper.
And so that's why I think most of us believe that 2009 is a really important year in terms of the political evolution of Iraq and away from some of the tragic problems of the not-too-distant past.
Staff. We probably have time for about one more, sir.
Q. Have there been communications with the new administration during the transition about repealing don't ask, don't tell? And can I ask both of you whether—what your attitudes are for calls to repeal don't ask, don't tell, and whether attitudes have changed within the military and DOD about—that will make the policy not necessary anymore?
Secretary Gates. Well, I'll say—I'll offer a comment and then the admiral can.
Don't ask, don't tell is law. It is a political decision. And if the law chains— changes, we will comply with the law.
Admiral Mullen. The president has been very clear in his—I mean, as he was coming in to take over as president that it was his intent to do this. So the intent clearly is there. There are no more specifics with respect to when or anything like that that have been addressed to me.
Q. Do you sense a change in attitudes within the military, within the armed forces, that would make this viable?
Admiral Mullen. Part of—part of my responsibility as a senior military officer is to go out and do that kind of assessment, should—should—we get direction or when we get direction to do that. And I certainly look forward to the opportunity to make that assessment, and give the president my best military advice with respect to this and the impact of what a potential change could be.
Statement by President Obama, January 31, 2009Footnote 3
On Iraqi Provincial Elections
I congratulate the people of Iraq on holding significant provincial elections today. Millions of Iraqi citizens from every ethnic and religious group went peacefully to the polls across the country to choose new provincial councils. It is important that the councils get seated, select new governors, and begin work on behalf of the Iraqi people who elected them.
The elections were managed and organized by the Iraqi government with vital assistance from the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq. Iraqi police and military forces helped secure the polling sites and protected voters as they cast their ballots. This important step forward should continue the process of Iraqis taking responsibility for their future.
The United States is proud to have provided technical assistance, along with the United Nations and other international organizations, to Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission—which performed professionally under difficult circumstances.
White House Statement, February 2, 2009Footnote 4
President Obama spoke today with Iraqi President Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki to congratulate them on the provincial elections held on Saturday. The elections took place with little violence and should mark an additional step toward Iraq assuming greater responsibility for its future. The President offered the best wishes of the American people as Iraq's new provincial leaders begin to assume important new responsibilities on behalf of the Iraqi people. President Obama described the review of U.S. planning on options for executing a responsible military drawdown that he directed on the first day of his administration. He reiterated his commitment to consult with the Iraqi Government as the process moves forward.
President Obama also spoke with President Lee of the Republic of Korea. In a warm and substantive talk, the President conveyed his deep commitment to the United States-Republic of Korea alliance. Both presidents expressed their intention to expand cooperation on global issues. They discussed the current financial crisis and agreed to work together, including at the G-20 Summit in London, to stabilize the global economy, to spur growth, and to get credit markets flowing. The presidents also discussed North Korea and agreed to work closely as allies and through the six-party talks to achieve the verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons and programs.
Remarks by President Obama, February 27, 2009Footnote 5
President Barack Obama delivered these remarks in Camp Lejeune, NC
President Obama. Good morning Marines. Good morning Camp Lejeune. Good morning Jacksonville. Thank you for that outstanding welcome. I want to thank Lieutenant General Hejlik for hosting me here today.
I also want to acknowledge all of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. That includes the Camp Lejeune Marines now serving with—or soon joining—the Second Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq; those with Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force in Afghanistan; and those among the 8,000 Marines who are preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. We have you in our prayers. We pay tribute to your service. We thank you and your families for all that you do for America. And I want all of you to know that there is no higher honor or greater responsibility than serving as your Commander-in-Chief.
I also want to take this opportunity to acknowledge Ryan Crocker, who recently completed his service as our Ambassador to Iraq. Throughout his career, Ryan always took on the toughest assignments. He is an example of the very best that this nation has to offer, and we owe him a great debt of gratitude. He carried on his work with an extraordinary degree of cooperation with two of our finest Generals—General David Petraeus, and General Ray Odierno—who will be critical in carrying forward the strategy that I will outline today.
Next month will mark the sixth anniversary of the war in Iraq. By any measure, this has already been a long war. For the men and women of America's armed forces—and for your families—this war has been one of the most extraordinary chapters of service in the history of our nation. You have endured tour after tour after tour of duty. You have known the dangers of combat and the lonely distance of loved ones. You have fought against tyranny and disorder. You have bled for your best friends and for unknown Iraqis. And you have borne an enormous burden for your fellow citizens, while extending a precious opportunity to the people of Iraq. Under tough circumstances, the men and women of the United States military have served with honor, and succeeded beyond any expectation.
Today, I have come to speak to you about how the war in Iraq will end.
To understand where we need to go in Iraq, it is important for the American people to understand where we now stand. Thanks in great measure to your service, the situation in Iraq has improved. Violence has been reduced substantially from the horrific sectarian killing of 2006 and 2007. Al Qaeda in Iraq has been dealt a serious blow by our troops and Iraq's Security Forces, and through our partnership with Sunni Arabs. The capacity of Iraq's Security Forces has improved, and Iraq's leaders have taken steps toward political accommodation. The relative peace and strong participation in January's provincial elections sent a powerful message to the world about how far Iraqis have come in pursuing their aspirations through a peaceful political process.
But let there be no doubt: Iraq is not yet secure, and there will be difficult days ahead. Violence will continue to be a part of life in Iraq. Too many fundamental political questions about Iraq's future remain unresolved. Too many Iraqis are still displaced or destitute. Declining oil revenues will put an added strain on a government that has had difficulty delivering basic services. Not all of Iraq's neighbors are contributing to its security. Some are working at times to undermine it. And even as Iraq's government is on a surer footing, it is not yet a full partner— politically and economically—in the region, or with the international community.
In short, today there is a renewed cause for hope in Iraq, but that hope rests upon an emerging foundation.
On my first full day in office, I directed my national security team to undertake a comprehensive review of our strategy in Iraq to determine the best way to strengthen that foundation, while strengthening American national security. I have listened to my Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanders on the ground. We have acted with careful consideration of events on the ground; with respect for the security agreements between the United States and Iraq; and with a critical recognition that the long-term solution in Iraq must be political— not military. Because the most important decisions that have to be made about Iraq's future must now be made by Iraqis.
We have also taken into account the simple reality that America can no longer afford to see Iraq in isolation from other priorities: we face the challenge of refocusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan; of relieving the burden on our military; and of rebuilding our struggling economy— and these are challenges that we will meet.
Today, I can announce that our review is complete, and that the United States will pursue a new strategy to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility.
This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant. To achieve that goal, we will work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe-haven to terrorists. We will help Iraq build new ties of trade and commerce with the world. And we will forge a partnership with the people and government of Iraq that contributes to the peace and security of the region.
What we will not do is let the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals. We cannot rid Iraq of all who oppose America or sympathize with our adversaries. We cannot police Iraq's streets until they are completely safe, nor stay until Iraq's union is perfected. We cannot sustain indefinitely a commitment that has put a strain on our military, and will cost the American people nearly a trillion dollars. America's men and women in uniform have fought block by block, province by province, year after year, to give the Iraqis this chance to choose a better future. Now, we must ask the Iraqi people to seize it.
The first part of this strategy is therefore the responsible removal of our combat brigades from Iraq.
As a candidate for President, I made clear my support for a timeline of 16 months to carry out this drawdown, while pledging to consult closely with our military commanders upon taking office to ensure that we preserve the gains we've made and protect our troops. Those consultations are now complete, and I have chosen a timeline that will remove our combat brigades over the next 18 months.
Let me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end.
As we carry out this drawdown, my highest priority will be the safety and security of our troops and civilians in Iraq. We will proceed carefully, and I will consult closely with my military commanders on the ground and with the Iraqi government. There will surely be difficult periods and tactical adjustments. But our enemies should be left with no doubt: this plan gives our military the forces and the flexibility they need to support our Iraqi partners, and to succeed.
After we remove our combat brigades, our mission will change from combat to supporting the Iraqi government and its Security Forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their country. As I have long said, we will retain a transitional force to carry out three distinct functions: training, equipping, and advising Iraqi Security Forces as long as they remain non-sectarian; conducting targeted counterterrorism missions; and protecting our ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq. Initially, this force will likely be made up of 35-50,000 U.S. troops.
Through this period of transition, we will carry out further redeployments. And under the Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government, I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. We will complete this transition to Iraqi responsibility, and we will bring our troops home with the honor that they have earned.
As we responsibly remove our combat brigades, we will pursue the second part of our strategy: sustained diplomacy on behalf of a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq.
The drawdown of our military should send a clear signal that Iraq's future is now its own responsibility. The long-term success of the Iraqi nation will depend upon decisions made by Iraq's leaders and the fortitude of the Iraqi people. Iraq is a sovereign country with legitimate institutions; America cannot—and should not— take their place. However, a strong political, diplomatic, and civilian effort on our part can advance progress and help lay a foundation for lasting peace and security.
This effort will be led by our new Ambassador to Iraq—Chris Hill. From his time in the Peace Corps, to his work in Kosovo and Korea, Ambassador Hill has been tested, and he has shown the pragmatism and skill that we need right now. He will be supported by the courageous and capable work of so many American diplomats and aid workers who are serving in Iraq.
Going forward, we can make a difference on several fronts. We will work with the United Nations to support national elections, while helping Iraqis improve local government. We can serve as an honest broker in pursuit of fair and durable agreements on issues that have divided Iraq's leaders. And just as we will support Iraq's Security Forces, we will help Iraqi institutions strengthen their capacity to protect the rule of law, confront corruption, and deliver basic services.
Diplomacy and assistance is also required to help the millions of displaced Iraqis. These men, women and children are a living consequence of this war and a challenge to stability in the region, and they must become a part of Iraq's reconciliation and recovery. America has a strategic interest—and a moral responsibility—to act. In the coming months, my administration will provide more assistance and take steps to increase international support for countries already hosting refugees; we'll cooperate with others to resettle Iraqis facing great personal risk; and we will work with the Iraqi government over time to resettle refugees and displaced Iraqis within Iraq—because there are few more powerful indicators of lasting peace than displaced citizens returning home.
Now, before I go any further, I want to take a moment to speak directly to the people of Iraq.
You are a great nation, rooted in the cradle of civilization. You are joined together by enduring accomplishments, and a history that connects you as surely as the two rivers carved into your land. In years past, you have persevered through tyranny and terror; through personal insecurity and sectarian violence. And instead of giving in to the forces of disunion, you stepped back from a descent into civil war, and showed a proud resilience that deserves respect.
Our nations have known difficult times together. But ours is a bond forged by shared bloodshed, and countless friendships among our people. We Americans have offered our most precious resource— our young men and women—to work with you to rebuild what was destroyed by despotism; to root out our common enemies; and to seek peace and prosperity for our children and grandchildren, and for yours.
There are those who will try to prevent that future for Iraq—who will insist that Iraq's differences cannot be reconciled without more killing. They represent the forces that destroy nations and lead only to despair, and they will test our will in the months and years to come. America, too, has known these forces. We endured the pain of Civil War, and bitter divisions of region and race. But hostility and hatred are no match for justice; they offer no pathway to peace; and they must not stand between the people of Iraq and a future of reconciliation and hope.
So to the Iraqi people, let me be clear about America's intentions. The United States pursues no claim on your territory or your resources. We respect your sovereignty and the tremendous sacrifices you have made for your country. We seek a full transition to Iraqi responsibility for the security of your country. And going forward, we can build a lasting relationship founded upon mutual interests and mutual respect as Iraq takes its rightful place in the community of nations.
That leads me to the third part of our strategy —comprehensive American engagement across the region.
The future of Iraq is inseparable from the future of the broader Middle East, so we must work with our friends and partners to establish a new framework that advances Iraq's security and the region's. It is time for Iraq to be a full partner in a regional dialogue, and for Iraq's neighbors to establish productive and normalized relations with Iraq. And going forward, the United States will pursue principled and sustained engagement with all of the nations in the region, and that will include Iran and Syria.
This reflects a fundamental truth: we can no longer deal with regional challenges in isolation—we need a smarter, more sustainable and comprehensive approach. That is why we are renewing our diplomacy, while relieving the burden on our military. That is why we are refocusing on al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan; developing a strategy to use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon; and actively seeking a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab world. And that is why we have named three of America's most accomplished diplomats— George Mitchell, Dennis Ross and Richard Holbrooke—to support Secretary Clinton and me as we carry forward this agenda.
Every nation and every group must know—whether you wish America good or ill—that the end of the war in Iraq will enable a new era of American leadership and engagement in the Middle East. And that era has just begun.
Finally, I want to be very clear that my strategy for ending the war in Iraq does not end with military plans or diplomatic agendas—it endures through our commitment to uphold our sacred trust with every man and woman who has served in Iraq.
You make up a fraction of the American population, but in an age when so many people and institutions have acted irresponsibly, you did the opposite—you volunteered to bear the heaviest burden. And for you and for your families, the war does not end when you come home. It lives on in memories of your fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who gave their lives. It endures in the wound that is slow to heal, the disability that isn't going away, the dream that wakes you at night, or the stiffening in your spine when a car backfires down the street.
You and your families have done your duty—now a grateful nation must do ours. That is why I am increasing the number of soldiers and Marines, so that we lessen the burden on those who are serving. And that is why I have committed to expanding our system of veterans health care to serve more patients, and to provide better care in more places. We will continue building new wounded warrior facilities across America, and invest in new ways of identifying and treating the signature wounds of this war: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury, as well as other combat injuries.
We also know that service does not end with the person wearing the uniform. In her visits with military families across the country, my wife Michelle has learned firsthand about the unique burden that your families endure every day. I want you to know this: military families are a top priority for Michelle and me, and they will be a top priority for my administration. We'll raise military pay, and continue providing quality child-care, job-training for spouses, and expanded counseling and outreach to families that have known the separation and stress of war. We will also heed the lesson of history—that those who fight in battle can form the backbone of our middle class—by implementing a 21st century GI Bill to help our veterans live their dreams. As a nation, we have had our share of debates about the war in Iraq. It has, at times, divided us as a people. To this very day, there are some Americans who want to stay in Iraq longer, and some who want to leave faster. But there should be no disagreement on what the men and women of our military have achieved.
And so I want to be very clear: We sent our troops to Iraq to do away with Saddam Hussein's regime—and you got the job done. We kept our troops in Iraq to help establish a sovereign government— and you got the job done. And we will leave the Iraqi people with a hard-earned opportunity to live a better life—that is your achievement; that is the prospect that you have made possible.
There are many lessons to be learned from what we've experienced. We have learned that America must go to war with clearly defined goals, which is why I've ordered a review of our policy in Afghanistan. We have learned that we must always weigh the costs of action, and communicate those costs candidly to the American people, which is why I've put Iraq and Afghanistan into my budget. We have learned that in the 21st century, we must use all elements of American power to achieve our objectives, which is why I am committed to building our civilian national security capacity so that the burden is not continually pushed on to our military. We have learned that our political leaders must pursue the broad and bipartisan support that our national security policies depend upon, which is why I will consult with Congress and in carrying out my plans. And we have learned the importance of working closely with friends and allies, which is why we are launching a new era of engagement in the world.
The starting point for our policies must always be the safety of the American people. I know that you—the men and women of the finest fighting force in the history of the world—can meet any challenge, and defeat any foe. And as long as I am your Commander-in-Chief, I promise you that I will only send you into harm's way when it is absolutely necessary, and provide you with the equipment and support you need to get the job done. That is the most important lesson of all—for the consequences of war are dire, the sacrifices immeasurable.
You know because you have seen those sacrifices. You have lived them. And we all honor them.
“Semper Fidelis”—it means always being faithful to Corps, and to country, and to the memory of fallen comrades like Corporal Jonathan Yale and Lance Corporal Jordan Haerter. These young men enlisted in a time of war, knowing they would face great danger. They came here, to Camp Lejeune, as they trained for their mission. And last April, they were standing guard in Anbar. In an age when suicide is a weapon, they were suddenly faced with an oncoming truck filled with explosives. These two Marines stood their ground. These two Marines opened fire. And these two Marines stopped that truck. When the thousands of pounds of explosives detonated, they had saved fifty Marines and Iraqi police who would have been in the truck's path, but Corporal Yale and Lance Corporal Haerter lost their own lives. Jonathan was 21. Jordan was 19.
In the town where Jordan Haerter was from, a bridge was dedicated in his name. One Marine who traveled to the ceremony said: “We flew here from all over the country to pay tribute to our friend Jordan, who risked his life to save us. We wouldn't be here without him.”
America's time in Iraq is filled with stories of men and women like this. Their names are written into bridges and town squares. They are etched into stones at Arlington, and in quiet places of rest across our land. They are spoken in schools and on city blocks. They live on in the memories of those who wear your uniform, in the hearts of those they loved, and in the freedom of the nation they served.
Each American who has served in Iraq has their own story. Each of you has your own story. And that story is now a part of the history of the United States of America—a nation that exists only because free men and women have bled for it from the beaches of Normandy to the deserts of Anbar; from the mountains of Korea to the streets of Kandahar. You teach us that the price of freedom is great. Your sacrifice should challenge all of us—every single American—to ask what we can do to be better citizens.
There will be more danger in the months ahead. We will face new tests and unforeseen trials. But thanks to the sacrifices of those who have served, we have forged hard-earned progress, we are leaving Iraq to its people, and we have begun the work of ending this war.
Thank you, God Bless you, and God Bless the United States of America. Semper Fi.
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Gates, February 27, 2009Footnote 6
Secretary Robert Gates delivered these remarks in Camp Lejeune, NC
Mr. Earnest. Good afternoon, everybody. It's Josh Earnest. Thank you for jumping on the call. As Rob mentioned, we'll hear some brief remarks from Secretary Gates and then we'll open it up for questions. We're running tight on time, so we'll move quickly and we won't have any follow-up questions. So you just get one bite at the apple here.
Secretary Gates, do you want to start us off?
Secretary Gates. Sure. I'll just start with a couple of comments. First of all, the atmosphere here at Camp Lejeune for the speech was very warm, very enthusiastic. And I would also say that the welcome has been pretty extraordinary. I think that the speech was very well received. There were a number of interruptions for applause, as you may have all seen.
On the substance, I obviously am very supportive of the option that the President has chosen, the decision that he has made, as is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Frankly, this is where both the Chairman and I thought this should come out and it was a very thorough, deliberative process, where a lot of different options and a lot of different analysis were examined.
So with that, why don't I just go straight to questions.
Mr. Earnest. Thank you, Secretary. Rob, why don't we go ahead and open it up to some questions now.
Q. Secretary Gates, one of the things that surprised me in the speech was his flat-out saying, all troops would be out by 2011, at the end of 2011. And I know he referenced the Status of Forces Agreement, but he seemed quite definitive about that. Can you explain what he meant and—is that what he meant, everybody is out by 2011, no matter what?
Secretary Gates. I think what he was referring to was that under the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement, which is what we are operating under now, all U.S. forces must be out by the end of 2011. It will require a new agreement—or it would require a new agreement, a new negotiation—almost certainly an Iraqi initiative— to provide for some presence beyond the end of 2011. So in the absence of that agreement, in the absence of any negotiation for such an agreement, it is in keeping with the SOFA that, to say definitively, that we will be out at the end of 2011.
Q. Hello, sir. What difference did the three months make for you, going from 16 months to 19 months? And what problems did you have with the 19— with the 16-month issue in the first place?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think that the view of the commanders in the field, particularly General Odierno, was that the real concern—I'm going to interrupt myself—the real concern has been how do we get through this year and all of the elections that will take place—beginning with the district and sub-district elections early in the summer, the national elections at the end of the year—and have a period of adjustment after those national elections, to make sure people are accepting the results and so on, and that we would have the maximum force presence during—through the end of this year, and early into next year?
And if you go along that timeline, even if there are some reductions during the course of this year, as there will be, it provides the maximum available force for General Odierno, during that sensitive period. And to try and get everybody out by May, would have—if you do that, then really would present some significant logistical and security issues. And so the extra two months or so was considered to be important, in terms of just the logistics of how you do that.
Q. Thank you.
Q. Hi, Mr. Secretary. I just wanted to follow up on the first question about the possibility of forces remaining after the end of 2011. You've said in the past that you foresee that that could happen and in fact would be useful to assist the Iraqi forces. Does that remain your view, if the Iraqis are interested in doing it, that it would also be in the interest of the United States to do it?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think we'll have to wait and see. I mean, it's a hypothetical. The Iraqis have not said anything about that at this point. So it remains to be seen whether they will take an initiative. I think that we should be—my own view would be that we should be prepared to have some very modest-sized presence for training and helping them with their new equipment and providing, perhaps, intelligence support and so on beyond that. But again, it's hypothetical, because such a— no such request has been made, and no indication that it will be at this point.
Q. Hi there, sir. I just wanted to get a little clarification on the difference between the combat and non-combat troops. Once the U.S. has pulled all combat troops out by August 31st of next year, the remaining troops will be non-combat. But they will, presumably, be combat-capable. Will there be a real significant difference in what troops are doing today and what the troops will be doing once they're officially designated non-combat?
Secretary Gates. Yes. All of the combat units will be out of Iraq by the end of August in 2010. And those that are left will have a combat capability. There will be, as the President said, targeted counterterrorism operations. There will be continued embeds with some of the Iraqi forces in a training capacity and so on. So there will be the capability, but the units will be gone. And more importantly, the mission will have changed. And so the notion of being engaged in combat in the way we have been up until now will be completely different.
Q. Secretary Gates, how flexible is this plan? And can you describe—the President has suggested often that he is partial to decision-making based on conditions on the ground. In light of that, how fluid and nimble is this timetable projection? And if it is so nimble and fluid, why set a date at all?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think that— first of all, because he said that he would, and I think that it is important to have a date in terms of the conclusion of one mission and the beginning of another mission. And I think that the date provides a way of delineating when one mission in Iraq and a completely new and different one begins.
So I think that the date is important. It's important for our troops to know. It's important for the Iraqis to know. And I think in terms of flexibility, I mean, the President has made clear that he's the Commander-in-Chief and retains the flexibility to make changes. He clearly does not anticipate having to do that; he has balanced the risks of staying longer or coming out sooner, and has come out in this direction and I think it is the expectation of all of us involved in that process and, above all, him, that we will meet these timelines.
Q. Thank you.
Q. Hi, Secretary Gates, I'd like to ask you about the shift—President Obama says twice in the speech about refocusing on al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We've got 17,000 troops going over; people are calling it a surge, but it seems like a buildup. Can you talk a little more about how you see that force, in terms of how long they're going to be—I guess it will be 55,000 troops by summer in Afghanistan—if you see that force getting larger in the coming years.
A surge tends to imply that these folks would—you know, those numbers would come down in a couple of years, as they did in Iraq. Do you see that force remaining a large force for years to come? Do you see that force getting larger than 55,000? How do you foresee that scenario in Afghanistan with the troops?
Secretary Gates. First, no one involved in the process has, to my knowledge, ever referred to the additional troops going into Iraq—I mean, into Afghanistan as a surge. I think that the question about how long the additional forces will be there is a question that will be addressed, and whether additional forces would be sent is to be determined by the review that is going on right now and the decisions the President will make once that review is over.
And I think that there won't be a real sense of the ultimate size of the force or the duration of its presence until he has made those decisions subsequent to the conclusion of the review.
Q. Thank you.
Q. Thank you, and forgive me if I'm asking a question that you already answered—I got disconnected. I wanted to go back to the issue of the 35,000 to 50,000 troops that are going to remain in Iraq after 18 months. You have said they're not going to be combat brigades, but are you going to take combat brigades that are in the United States and sort of rename them, redesignate them, or are you going to create new units for this specific mission?
And if I could as a separate question on Afghanistan, the Marines that are— that Barack, the President, spoke to today, what will their mission be when they get to Afghanistan? Will it be population security, to mentor Afghan forces, (inaudible) the Taliban? If you could talk a little bit about specifically how they'll be used.
Secretary Gates. Well, with respect to the second question, I think it's probably all of the above. My understanding is they will be deployed principally into the south, and so they will be combating the Taliban, it will be population security.
And with respect to the 35,000 to 50,000, I think that that's a question probably better directed at General Odierno. But the clear idea is to consolidate U.S. forces into a few places where both civilians and military would be. In other words our folks would provide protection for the provincial reconstruction teams and other civilians working in Iraq. And in terms of whether those are new units or whether they are re-missioned units that are already there, I think remains to be seen. But if they are our forces that are already in Iraq that remain at that point, then— then they will be re-missioned to the new much more limited mission that we've been talking about.
Q. Hi, Secretary Gates. If the situation in Iraq were to take a turn for the worse, has the President mentioned discussing how many troops he'd be willing to send back to the country, in addition to the troops that are there, as non-combat forces? And would that affect the troop levels being built up in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. I think—you know, that's pretty hypothetical. I think, you know, we are—we feel that we have—the decisions the President has made has taken into account the risks that have been identified both by Ambassador Crocker and by General Odierno surrounding the election. And one of the reasons that General Odierno wanted to maintain as many troops as he could just beyond the end of 2009 was, in fact, to be available for those kinds of—those kinds of contingencies.
I think that—you know, the truth of the matter is, the Iraqis are going to have to step up to their responsibilities in this, and I think you saw with the performance of the Iraqi security forces in the provincial elections that they really did a superb job of maintaining security.
So I think the general view is that we will proceed on this—on this timeline and the approach the President has identified. And I don't think anybody is talking about sending more troops back in there if there are problems.
Q. Thank you.
Q. Secretary Gates, I was wondering if there was—you had talked a little bit about the drawdown being sort of back-loaded to 2010, to make sure there's enough troops for the elections. I wonder if you could say, first, how many units we should expect to come out this year, just sort of roughly. And also, if you could talk a little bit about the movement of air assets, and if we should see—expect a lot of surveillance and attack aircraft moving from Iraq to Afghanistan, and when we might see that.
Secretary Gates. I think that the two theaters are clearly separate, and frankly I don't know the answer to your question about air assets and so on moving from one place to the other.
We are adding intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in Afghanistan. At this point—or up to this point, most of what we have been adding in Afghanistan are new assets; they have not been assets transferred from Iraq. But as we draw down in Iraq, some of those enabling assets may move from one theater to another. We'll just have to wait and see.
In terms of the number of troops coming out this year, I think we'll just have to wait and see what General Odierno's specific recommendations are. But again, the general approach is to try and—there will be drawdowns this year of combat brigades, but in terms of how many and when, I think we'll wait and get the specific recommendations from General Odierno.
Q. Hi, Mr. Secretary. Can you tell us what happened to the 23-months option? And you said this came out where both you and the Chairman thought it should, but at one time there were some pretty strong voices arguing for a longer timeline. How did you settle on the 19 months versus a slightly longer version?
Secretary Gates. (Inaudible) to General Odierno about his views, to General Petraeus about his views, to the Chiefs, and then obviously the Chairman and I talked to him separately, or independently. But—and I think in this whole process, there was really, with each of the options that was being examined—16 months, 19 months, and 23 months—and all of those dated from the inauguration, basically— was a weighing of the risks involved, the risks of the progress with respect to the sustaining progress in Iraq, but also issues relating to stress on the force and the need for additional capability in Afghanistan.
All these things were taken into account, and I think that the—I think that General Odierno and General Petraeus are comfortable with the option that the President has decided on. And both the Chiefs as well as the Chairman and myself are very supportive of that option, as well.
Q. Thanks very much. Mr. Secretary, in his speech, President Obama talked about a training mission for Iraqi security forces that was conditioned on them being nonsectarian. Can you talk a bit about what mechanisms you'll have in place going forward to adjudicate whether or not certain units act in a sectarian fashion that might require the withdrawal of American support?
Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, I think that we have been very pleased by the progress in Iraq and the development of the Iraqi army as a nonsectarian force, and it has operated as a nonsectarian force as illustrated by the offensive several months ago in Basra. And so I think we have a pretty good feel that this—that the army is developing along nonsectarian lines, is operating on nonsectarian lines.
And so that's—that really is the premise from which we start. We have close enough relationships with these units— both as advisors and occasionally as embeds, that I think if we saw concerns like that we would be aware of them and be able to bring them—that some unit was acting in sectarian fashion, that we would be in a position to bring that to the attention of the Iraqi leadership.
Thank you, all.
Press Release from the U.S. Agency for International Development, March 4, 2009Footnote 7
Iraqi Minister of Water Resources Dr. Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Deputy Mission Director Thomas R. Delaney today inaugurated an irrigation symposium focused on improving farm productivity through effective water management and crop selection.
Agriculture is the second largest industry in Iraq behind oil and is the single largest employer. Iraq has nearly 30 million acres of land suitable for agriculture as the acreage is surrounded by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Of the 30 million acres, about 20 million are irrigable while the remaining land relies on rainfall. However, neglect of irrigation infrastructure for more than two decades has resulted in serious deficiencies and degradation, constraining availability of water for agriculture.
Noting these challenges, USAID's Inma Agribusiness Program invited leading Iraqi agricultural researchers, economists, and policy experts to review and identify advances needed to manage farm production with limited water resources. Titled “Reviving Irrigation Districts,” the conference focused on a series of studies on crop selection in irrigated land, participative water management, and the merits of public-private partnerships. According to the studies, Iraqi farmers have opportunities to increase income from their production, particularly through diversification of higher-value crops like fruits and vegetables. In addition, with their shared responsibility and managed risk, public-private partnerships hold the promise of bringing in efficient management skills, fresh funds, and relief of government responsibility for maintenance of resources.
Mr. Delaney said that the work done by Inma in analyzing the options for how to achieve the greatest return on irrigated land is a critical step forward in helping Iraqi farmers and policy makers in their choices.
Complementing USAID's other economic growth programs, Inma works in provinces to support the development of agribusinesses and agricultural markets, improving the livelihoods of farmers. The project addresses many of the vital links required to raise, harvest, transport and market better quality, higher-value crops and to improve the health and marketability of livestock and fish through better care, feed and technology.
Press Release from the U.S. Agency for International Development, March 24, 2009Footnote 8
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), in collaboration with the Mada'in District Council, reopened Salman Pak Industrial School today. The school's mission is to improve Iraqis' skills that will enable them to find a better life through further employment and improved businesses in their communities.
The Iraqi Ministry of Education (MoE) offers technical and vocational training in the last three years of secondary education. There are about 154 industrial vocational education schools in Iraq, according to the ministry. The renovated Salman Pak school has the capacity to train up to 700 students in eight courses: sewing, generator maintenance; welding; automotive repair; plumbing; electrical installation; masonry; and carpentry.
In his remarks at the opening, USAID's country director Christopher D. Crowley said, “The reopening of the school will provide Iraqis with useful skills in a competitive job market and local employers with a qualified labor force that increases their productivity.” He also said that he hoped the Iraqis who receive training at the school will contribute to an expanding and diversified private sector and help the Iraqi government in its reconstruction efforts.
Local Iraqi officials identified the renovation of Salman Pak Industrial School as an important community priority, after insurgent-led attacks had destroyed much of the building. The MoE and the Mada'in District Council worked in partnership with the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team, the U.S. military, and the local security officials to complete the project, which created short-term jobs for unemployed laborers and long-term jobs for the staff.
USAID invested $600,000 in the project, as a part of its country-wide efforts to help create an environment for stability and establish the conditions for long-term development to take hold in violence-affected areas. The Government of Iraq contributed approximately $58,000 in labor to remove and dispose of trash and debris from the grounds, and drain the standing water that had accumulated in the garden. Moving forward, the MoE will maintain the building grounds, provide a full-time guard and hire and retain qualified teachers for the school.
