In Canada, laws and policies consistently reject the commodification of human organs and tissues, and Canadian practice is consistent with international standards in this regard.1
See for instance the World Health Assembly's Resolution on Organ and Tissue Donation, May 22, 2004, WHA 57.18. Available at: http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA57/A57_R18-en.pdf. In the United States, blood plasma is collected through for-profit centers that pay for donation, but whole blood is collected by volunteer donation. The permissibility of payment for gametes in the largely unregulated in vitro fertilization market varies from state to state. Apart from this, trade in human organs and tissues is illegal in virtually all jurisdictions. Precise jurisdictional comparisons are hard to come by: Iran and Pakistan are reported to be the only two jurisdictions in which such trade is legal; in other jurisdictions, lax enforcement creates a functioning black market. Calandrillo SP. Cash for kidneys? Utilizing incentives to end America's organ shortage. George Mason Law Review 2004;13:69–133.
Gamete donation is solicited primarily to make gametes available to infertility patients who cannot have children using their own gametes. The use of donor gametes allows some infertile women to experience pregnancy and childbearing (gestational motherhood) even in the absence of suitable oocytes of their own, and allows pregnancy in the absence of a male partner or in the case of infertility on the part of the male partner. As a secondary function, gamete donation can make gametes available to researchers for study on gametes—for example, for research on oocyte freezing, meiotic cell division, and aneuploidy in older individuals. In this era of embryonic stem cell research and hopes for stem-cell-based therapies, many think ahead to the day when gamete donation may be “needed” and allowed for such activities,2
Lanzendorf SE, Boyd CA, Wright DL, Muasher S, Oehninger S, Hodgen GD. Use of human gametes obtained from anonymous donors for the production of human embryonic stem cell lines. Fertility and Sterility 2001;76(1):132–7.
Gamete donation has been alternately (and depending on the gamete in question) the butt of jokes and the subject of much talk about altruism. Ethicists typically do not venture far beyond humor in their analysis of sperm donation; perhaps it is difficult to motivate any ethical concern that a payment for masturbation may be exploitative. However, with only two Canadian provinces protecting sperm donors from future child support claims,3
British Columbia and Quebec have statutes protecting gamete donors from claims for child support. Sokoloff H. Canadian donors remain in the shadows. National Post Oct 1, 2004:A7.
Sher Institute for Reproductive Medicine. Gonadotropins: How they work and the risks and side effects associated with their administration. 2005. Available at: http://www.haveababy.com/infert/gonadotrp.asp.
Risks and side effects of drug treatment and surgery associated with assisted reproductive technology (ART). 2001. Available at: http://www.pregnancymd.org/risks-and-side-effects-of-drugs-surgery-art-reproductive.htm.
The prohibition of payments for gametes introduced with the AHR Act places medical donation for IVF on a par with all other organ and tissue donation for a wide range of medical conditions. Because of the previous anomaly, however, the change has interrupted expectations: Patients who were able to pay the market rate (around $5,000)6
Jimenez M. Eggs shouldn't go to the highest bidder. Globe & Mail June 4, 2005:F6.
See note 3, Sokoloff 2004:A7.
Jury Duty as Public Service
The idea that serving on a jury is a public service or a public duty rests on a complex set of assumptions regarding the jury as an important site of public engagement with the administration of justice, an engagement that has benefits for the justice system, parties in the courts, and jurors themselves. To call something a public service or a public duty involves far more than the mere idea that such service is altruistic: Indeed, one might well argue that if it were not in the (widely extended) self-interest of citizens to participate in juries, jury duty would not be a public service at all.
The Law Commission of Canada has suggested that juries in modern criminal trials fulfill at least five functions.8
For a discussion of the similar rationales that support the use of juries in civil cases, see Ontario Law Reform Commission. Report on the Use of Jury Trials in Civil Cases. Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission; 1996:19–26.
Law Commission of Canada. The Jury in Canada, Working Paper 27. Ottawa; 1980:5–6. Also see Findlay M, Duff P. The Jury under Attack. Sydney: Butterworths; 1988:163–5.
Granger C, Granger C. The Criminal Jury Trial in Canada. 2nd ed. Scarborough, Ont: Carswell; 1996:7–8.
Second, jurors act as the conscience of the community. By considering local beliefs and assumptions, jurors often try to reach equitable results. General rules of law must be applied to a variety of situations. A rigid application of legal rules could lead to inequitable results. Jurors, however, can avoid the strict application of the law by dispensing equity.11
See note 9, Law Commission of Canada 1980:8–11.
Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Latimer 1 S.C.R. 3.
As Patrick Devlin suggests, “Each jury is a little Parliament.” Devlin P. Trial by Jury. London: Stevens; 1956:164. Also see Cornish WR. The Jury. London: Allen Lane; 1968:138–62; see note 9, Law Commission of Canada 1980:11–3. The Supreme Court of Canada has limited the right of juries to nullify the law. In R. v. Morgentaler, the Court referred to a jury's power to nullify as “the citizen's ultimate protection against oppressive laws and the oppressive enforcement of the law,” that can serve as a “safety valve” in exceptional cases. However, C.J. Dickson also warned that recognizing jury nullification “is a far cry from suggesting that counsel may encourage a jury to ignore a law they do not support or tell a jury that it has a right to do so.” Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Morgentaler 1 S.C.R. 30, pp. 78–9.
The Law Commission's fourth rationale for juries is that jury service is educative, as it allows members of the public to participate in, and thus understand, the legal system. Citizens gain knowledge about the aims of the penal system and the value of due process, to choose two examples.14
See note 9, Law Commission of Canada 1980:13–5.
See note 9, Law Commission of Canada 1980:15–6.
In many senses, then, serving on a jury is a public service. Juries act on behalf of the community in a context in which it plays an important protective and legitimating role to give voice to the community in addition to and in distinction from the voice of the state as the prosecutor in a criminal trial. In a broad “social contract” sense, those who serve on juries are not only compensated financially, but also enjoy the benefit of living in a society with fair and open procedures of criminal justice, ruled by systems of laws, moderated by the participation of a body of peers, in the context of a society in which they have a stake as citizens. Beyond being a public service in all these senses, service on juries has historically evolved into a public duty: Participation is not voluntary but is compelled. As we shall see below, this compulsory nature of jury duty has played a significant role in the development of its financial compensation.
Gamete Donation: Public Service? Public Duty?
In comparison to this, is there any sense in which gamete donation is a public service, much less a public duty? It is clear that someone donating gametes to another is doing a favor for that other party: Their act is altruistic in this sense. Not all altruistic acts, however, are public services, and fewer still are public duties.
Gamete donation is an act that lies within or that constitutes a relationship between two parties: gamete donors and gamete recipients. Often there is a third party and sometimes a fourth, in the form of an IVF provider and/or a sperm bank or egg broker, but the essential exchange is between donors and recipients. The relationship between these two parties operates in the private sphere, particularly in Canada, where assisted human reproduction is not funded by the national health system. The pursuit of IVF treatment represents the most private of decisions—a decision about reproduction. Reproduction, including means of reproduction, remains an intensely private act; procedures surrounding the use of donor gametes have been carefully crafted to preserve that privacy. Gamete recipients often keep their use of donor gametes private, and gamete donors may and frequently do keep their donor status secret as well. Arrangements with gamete donors are specifically structured to prevent the donor from having any stake in the resulting social unit of the family. Legal requirements regarding donor anonymity contribute to the secrecy surrounding this practice. Unlike in jury duty, there is no sense in which the state is a party in gamete donation, and furthermore no sense in which the interests of the community (in addition to the state) are served by IVF treatment, as the interests of the community are served by jury duty. An altruistic act to benefit other individuals is not ipso facto an altruistic act to benefit society. Indeed, arguably, society might benefit more if these individuals did not have children, because the costs or benefits of the additional births could be debated, or if these individuals adopted children or offered their services in foster care. We are long past the era when reproduction as such was considered either a public service or a duty. Casting gamete donation as a public service disregards central features of what actually constitutes public service, and calling it a public duty is dangerous.
Lessons about Payment from Jury Duty: Guinea Pigs and Guinea Pigs
Jurors in Canada receive pay for their service, but understanding why they are paid requires some appreciation for how jurors have traditionally experienced serving on juries. The provision of payment is intimately tied to the fact that it is more than a public service: It is historically tied to the obligatory nature of jury duty. The reasoning evident in the Law Commission's review suggests that enlightened self-interest may provide strong motive to serve; nonetheless, jurors themselves have typically found jury duty to be time-consuming and expensive. Jurors are asked to leave their employment to attend court, sometimes for lengthy periods of time. As a result, jurors have often expressed reservations about fulfilling their civic duty to serve as jurors. In the 19th century, for example, farmers in Nova Scotia and Ontario appealed for jury remuneration to help defray their losses when they were called for jury duty during planting and harvesting.16
Brown RB. The Jury, Politics, and the State in British North America: Reforms to Jury Systems in Nova Scotia and Upper Canada, 1825–1867. Ph.D. dissertation. Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University; 2005.
Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia. Juries in Nova Scotia: A Discussion Paper. Halifax: Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia; 1993:1.
Although some forms of jury service once possessed social prestige,18
Grand jury service was once considered an honor that was reserved for the leading members of the community. Beattie JM. Crime and the Courts in England, 1660–1800. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 1986:322–3.
For example, Nova Scotia jurors who fail to show up for court may be arrested and fined up to $1000. The Courts of Nova Scotia. Jury Information. 2005. Available at: http://www.courts.ns.ca/General/jury.htm.
Some employers continue to pay jurors during their time away from work, though the law in most provinces does not require this. On juror pay in the United States, see Seamone ER. A refreshing jury cola: Fulfilling the duty to compensate jurors adequately. New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 2002;5:289–417.
See note 19, Courts 2005.
Juries Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.J.3, s.35; Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, Court Services, Jury Duty. Available at: http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/jury/juryduty.asp. British Columbia provides jurors with traveling expenses, as well as $20 a day for each of the first 10 days of a trial, $60 a day for the 11th to 49th days of a trial, and $100 a day for the 50th and each succeeding day of a trial. Jury Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.242, ss.24, 34; B.C. Reg. 282/95. Alberta is less generous; it provides jurors $10 per day for the first 5 days of jury duty, and then $40 per day for each subsequent day, plus traveling expenses. Alberta Courts; Court Services; Juror Information; Fees and Expenses. Available at: http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/go.aspx?tabid=515. For rates in Saskatchewan see Jury Act, 1998, S.S. 1998, c.J-4.2, s.14; Courts of Saskatchewan; Court of Queen's Bench, Jury Information. Available at: http://www.sasklawcourts.ca/default.asp?pg=qb_jury_info.
Legal scholars have written very little about paying jurors, probably in part because the practice has developed in an ad hoc fashion over several centuries. However, the Law Commission of Canada has outlined two broad considerations that should shape the level of compensation provided to jurors. First, if jury pay is too low, many jurors will face undue economic hardships. This may make it difficult to assemble a jury. In addition, it is possible that if jurors feel their pay inadequate, they may be less willing to carry out their duties conscientiously. Second, if the fees are too high, then jurors will receive an economic windfall.23
Particularly those jurors whose employers continue to pay them during the sittings of the courts.
Special juries were usually composed of jurors of a higher social rank than petit juries, and in England were often formed in commercial disputes, libel cases, and marital cases involving infidelity. Oldham JC. The origins of the special jury. University of Chicago Law Review 1983;50:137–221.
See Bentham J. The Elements of the Art of Packing, as Applied to Special Juries Particularly in Cases of Libel Law. London: E. Wilson; 1821.
Oldham JC. Special juries in England: Nineteenth-century usage and reform. Journal of Legal History 1987;8:148–66, at p. 157.
For other discussions of appropriate juror fees, see note 17, Law Reform Commission 1993:16–7; note 8, Ontario Law Reform Commission 1996.
The concern to avoid the formation of a professional class of jurors (the 18th and 19th-century sense of “guinea pig”) relates to the civic and political functions of trial by peers: A professional class of jurors would not offer fresh minds for each dispute, would fail to spread knowledge about the justice system, and would not play the same role in legitimating the legal system. The concern to avoid the formation of a “professional” class of organ and tissue donors is a different one, though it is also based in democratic and egalitarian values. The 20th-century sense of “guinea pig” expresses the concern that the burdens of participation in scientific research should not be borne disproportionately by the poor and disadvantaged. The analogy of pay for jury duty with pay for gamete donation alerts us to the danger of giving ourselves the worst of both worlds: any pay that would be high enough to compensate the medical “guinea pigs” for medical harms and risks would be high enough to give incentive to a new class of “guinea” pigs, to the advantage of their pocketbooks, but (for oocyte donors) to the detriment of their health and (for sperm donors) to the potential detriment of their future interests. Indeed, if it didn't provide such an incentive, that is, operate as a free market payment rather than compensation necessary and reasonable to avoid a potential widespread shirking of a civic duty, no one would have thought of offering such compensation.
The Source of the Jury Duty Analogy
A disinterested comparison of jury duty and gamete donation would hardly lead anyone to propose these practices as analogous. How, then, did this analogy arise? The analogy between jury duty and gamete donation first arose in the United Kingdom and only with reference to sperm donation. When the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFE Act) came into effect, payments for gametes were effectively prohibited, except where permitted by regulations established by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). The language of the HFE Act expressed clear disapproval of the creation of a market for gametes. However, in the absence of payments for gametes, sperm donations were expected to fall sharply, as sperm banks and IVF providers are now claiming will occur in Canada. Noticing that payments for jury duty were remarkably similar in amount to free market valuations for sperm, HFEA regulations permitted payments for sperm in the amount paid for a day of jury duty. The purported grounds for the analogy were that both jury duty and sperm donation fulfill public services; hence sperm donors, like jurors, should be compensated for their time and inconvenience. The real analogy at work, as acknowledged by some Canadian proponents of the jury duty analogy for payment for gamete donations, was an analogy of numbers alone: Established compensation for a day's jury duty and the free market payments for sperm donation happen to be roughly the same in the United Kingdom. As one Canadian IVF provider described it, we have to “look around for models that are socially acceptable” (Art Leader, personal communication, 2004). In other words, describing what would otherwise be free market payments for sperm donations as compensation on the model of jury duty lends the exchange of money a socially acceptable veneer, without constituting a defensible analogy in any other sense.
Even this minimal similarity in payment amounts falls apart when jury duty payments are extended to egg donation. For reasons of nondiscrimination, if jury duty payments are to be paid to sperm donors, similar payments must be made to egg donors. However, as egg donation is much more involved, risky, painful, and time-consuming, free market rates for egg donations are substantially higher than those for sperm donations. In this case, not only are the natures of jury duty and egg donation radically different, so too are their established pay rates, and the grounds for any analogy, already very slim, are lost. If the jury duty analogy for gamete donation fails on so many counts, what analogies might guide practice in this area?
Analogies and More Analogies
Donation of gametes is donation of human tissue; as such, laws and policies in this area should be consistent with those for organ and tissue donation more generally, while taking into account unique concerns relating to reproduction. With the development of IVF technology and, in the same era, techniques for postmortem tissue transplantation and, more recently, living organ transplantation, ethicists and legislators have faced the question of just systems for tissue and organ procurement and distribution. With the development of industrial and research applications for “harvested” tissues, these issues are revisited in the context of research governance and ethics.28
Harrison CH. Neither Moore nor the market: Alternative models for compensating contributors of human tissue. American Journal of Law and Medicine 2002;28:77–105; Nelkin D, Andrews L. Commercialization of body tissue in the age of biotechnology. Hastings Center Report 1998;28(5):30–9.
Trotter JF, Talamantes M, McClure M, Wachs M, Bak T, Trouillot T, et al. Right hepatic lobe donation for living donor liver transplantation: Impact on donor quality of life. Liver Transplantation 2001;7(6):485–93.
Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act, 2004. Available at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ216.108.
Directive 2004/23/EC: On setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells. Mar 31 2004:Chapter 3 Article 12 Section 1. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_102/l_10220040407en00480058.pdf.
See, for instance, Beavers KL, Sandler RS, Shrestha R. Donor morbidity associated with right lobectomy for living donor liver transplantation to adult recipients: A systematic review. Liver Transplantation 2002;8(2):110–7.
Information on donor compensation practices derived from The Bone Marrow Foundation; 2005. Available at: www.bonemarrow.org.
The near-universal rejection of payment for tissues and organs is under pressure in some jurisdictions in response to organ shortages. In addition, IVF practices in the United States, where IVF is a relatively unregulated form of medicine, “push the envelope” in this area, allowing for payment in some states for oocytes and for surrogacy arrangements. Arguments in favor of payment for tissues and organs rest heavily on the claim that “commodification” is a vague and unspecified term, and that exploitation of human beings for other's ends, with financial compensation as an incentive, is a familiar feature of human life in all spheres and furthermore is a situation to be improved by raising levels of compensation rather than by refusing outright to offer compensation.34
See, for instance, de Castro LD. Commodification and exploitation: Arguments in favor of compensated organ donation. Journal of Medical Ethics 2003;29(3):142–6; Engelhardt Jr HT. Giving, selling, and having taken: Conflicting views of organ transfer. Indiana Health Law Review 2004;1:29–49; Jensen TR. Organ procurement: Various legal systems and their effectiveness. Houston Journal of International Law 2000;22(3):555–84; Jefferies DE. The body as commodity: The use of markets to cure the organ deficit. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 1998;5:621–58. Recent books advancing arguments for an open market in organs include Cherry MJ. Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; 2005; Taylor JS. Stakes and Kidneys: Why Markets in Human Body Parts Are Morally Imperative. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate Publishers; 2005.
For a description of what a global market for human organs means in a world without reasonable guarantees of human rights and living wages for most of its inhabitants, see Scheper-Hughes N. The global traffic in human organs. Current Anthropology 2000;41(2):191–224.
Where does the new status quo of Canada's AHR Act leave those in need of egg donation for IVF? People who need organ transplants to save their lives mobilize patient organizations and public health bodies to advocate their case and ask from the general public the “gift of life” and look to close relatives for living organ donations. Supply does not meet demand, and in this case, supply not meeting demand means that people die who do not need to die. Nonetheless we hold it a sufficiently important value that persons not be pressured or enticed or motivated by financial gain to undergo medical procedures detrimental to themselves in order to benefit others that we maintain a firm boundary against payment for tissue donation. Is there any reason that those undergoing IVF treatment should have an easier route to imposing medical burdens on others for their own benefit than those who need blood donations or bone marrow or kidneys for transplant? Whether or not IVF patients are successful in finding donations will depend on how well they fare in recruiting those close to them and the public to value what they value and to identify with the plight of infertility to the point of being willing to undergo gamete donation procedures. The evidence from other areas of medicine suggests this will be a challenge for them—but comparison with these other areas does not suggest a reason for creating an exception for IVF.
