Statement by Secretary of State Clinton, July 3, 2009Footnote 1
I would like to offer my congratulations to Yukiya Amano of Japan on his appointment as the next Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). From its founding in 1957 to the present, the IAEA has benefited from wise leadership and generous U.S. support. For the American people, our investment in the IAEA is a way to ensure that atomic power is used prudently and appropriately for peaceful purposes. For the international community, the IAEA represents the premier international institution for promoting the safe and secure application of nuclear energy in the pursuit of prosperity, and working jointly on global challenges such as nuclear terrorism and proliferation.
In selecting Ambassador Amano, the member states of the IAEA reiterate their common resolve to collaborate on these pressing issues. As Director General Mohamed ElBaradei nears the completion of his twelve-year tenure, we thank him for his leadership. The United States stands ready to assist the next Director General in ensuring that the Agency is prepared to meet the growing challenges of the 21st century and has the appropriate resources and the authorities it needs to fulfill its mandate.
White House Statement, July 6, 2009Footnote 2
Joint Statement by President Barack Obama of the United States of America and President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Cooperation
The United States of America and the Russian Federation confirm their commitment to strengthening their cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and stop acts of nuclear terrorism. We bear special responsibility for security of nuclear weapons. While we reconfirm that security at nuclear facilities in the United States and Russia meets current requirements, we stress that nuclear security requirements need continuous upgrading. We will continue cooperating on effective export controls that make it possible to prevent nuclear materials, equipment and technologies from falling into the hands of actors unauthorized by the state as well as prevent their use in any manner contrary to obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Building upon previous joint efforts, experience and achievements, and in order to fulfill our agreements reached in London on April 1, 2009, we declare an intent to broaden and deepen long-term cooperation to further increase the level of security of nuclear facilities around the world, including through minimization of the use of highly-enriched uranium in civilian applications and through consolidation and conversion of nuclear materials. We also reaffirm our commitment to dispose of existing stockpiles of weapon-grade materials that are surplus to defense needs consistent with our obligations under Article VI of the NPT.
Both sides remain committed to executing the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation to dispose of 34 metric tons each of weapons-grade plutonium in the United States and Russia. The parties recognize that successful implementation of their respective programs will be subject to future appropriation of funds.
Both sides commit themselves to the nuclear security initiatives begun in 2005, to include the repatriation of spent highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. To expand on this work, we will jointly and together with other nations work to return research reactor HEU fuel under the agreed-upon schedule, as a practical implementation of nuclear nonproliferation objectives. We will continue working with other nations to secure and to eliminate excess stocks of proliferation-sensitive nuclear materials worldwide.
We will continue cooperating on development of new types of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for possible conversion of research reactor cores in third countries and on conducting feasibility studies to explore possibilities for conversion of such individual reactors in the United States and Russia. We note the importance of HEU minimization in civilian applications and support such efforts to the maximum extent possible, where feasible.
To continue to improve the level of nuclear security and to combat existing and emerging threats, our experts will continue working to further improve physical protection systems at nuclear facilities and ensure that these improvements will be sustained in the long term. We will continuously improve physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials and radioactive substances and qualifications of professional staff.
Building on our excellent bilateral cooperation in nuclear security, and the expertise of both countries in this area, we will work together to strengthen the ability of other nations to carry out their weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation obligations under UNSCR 1540.
We express our mutual desire to expand capabilities to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive substances at the borders of our countries.
Recognizing the important role of safeguards in promoting confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and in addressing proliferation threats, we will work together to expand opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation to strengthen the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the international safeguards system.
We share a common vision of the growth of clean, safe, secure and affordable nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Our nations have a great deal to offer together with other states to the international community in this area, focusing additional efforts on:
—Development of prospective and innovative nuclear energy systems;
—Research into methods and mechanisms for the provision of reliable nuclear fuel cycle services;
—Research into international approaches for the establishment of nuclear fuel cycle services to secure the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime;
—Improvement of the international safeguards system;
As stated in London on April 1, 2009, the United States and Russia will work to bring into force the bilateral Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Energy, which will provide the basis for these and other types of cooperation.
We welcome the expansion and strengthening of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which held the fifth meeting of partner nations in The Hague on June 16-17, 2009, and we are fully determined to continue joint work to expand national and collective efforts to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. To this end, we will jointly initiate practical steps, to include conducting world-wide regional nuclear security best-practices workshops to facilitate greater international cooperation in implementing this initiative.
White House Statement, July 8, 2009Footnote 3
The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation have decided on further reductions and limitations of their nations' strategic offensive arms and on concluding at an early date a new legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty, and directed that the new treaty contain, inter alia, the following elements:
1. A provision to the effect that each Party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, the limits will be in the range of 500-1100 for strategic delivery vehicles, and in the range of 1500-1675 for their associated warheads. The specific numbers to be recorded in the treaty for these limits will be agreed through further negotiations.
2. Provisions for calculating these limits.
3. Provisions on definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty.
4. A provision to the effect that each Party will determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.
5. A provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.
6. A provision on the impact of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration on strategic stability.
7. A provision on basing strategic offensive arms exclusively on the national territory of each Party.
8. Establishment of an implementation body to resolve questions related to treaty implementation.
9. A provision to the effect that the treaty will not apply to existing patterns of cooperation in the area of strategic offensive arms between a Party and a third state.
10. A duration of the treaty of ten years, unless it is superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The Presidents direct their negotiators to finish their work on the treaty at an early date so that they may sign and submit it for ratification in their respective countries.
Remarks by President Obama and Russian President Medvedev, September 23, 2009Footnote 4
President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev delivered these remarks in New York, NY
President Obama. Well, first of all, I want to welcome President Medvedev to the United States and New York. As you all know, I had the great pleasure of visiting him in Moscow, and he extended extraordinary hospitality to both myself and my family. More importantly, we got a lot of work done that I think will be bearing fruit in the months and years to come.
And I have to say publicly how much I appreciate the excellent working relationship that President Medvedev and I have been able to develop during our meetings, not only bilaterally but also at the various summits that we've attended.
We've had an excellent discussion that touched on a number of areas that our teams have been working on together over the last several months. In particular, we discussed the progress that's being made on the START treaty. And both of us are confident that we can meet our self-imposed deadline to get an agreement that substantially reduces our nuclear missiles and launchers by the end of the year.
So we spent the bulk of our time talking about Iran. As I said in my speech today, the United States is committed to a strong non-proliferation regime. And we are committed to upholding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that strikes a bargain with all countries. That bargain says that countries are able to pursue peaceful nuclear technology; that they commit not to pursuing nuclear weapons; and those nations that have nuclear weapons make commitments to start reducing their stockpiles.
As the two major nuclear superpowers, we have made a commitment that we will reduce our nuclear stockpiles and move forward on our part of the bargain. And many other countries are abiding by the international commitments and norms that have been established by the NPT.
Unfortunately, Iran has been violating too many of its international commitments. So what we've discussed is how we can move in a positive direction that resolves a potential crisis, not just in the Middle East but that can cause enormous problems to the non-proliferation regime worldwide.
I believe that Russia and the United States shares the strategic objective that Iran can pursue peaceful energy sources but that it should not pursue nuclear weapons. I believe we also share the view that this should be resolved diplomatically, and I am on record as being committed to negotiating with Iran in a serious fashion to resolve this issue.
Russia, as a major leader, I think believes that such an approach is possible, as well. But I think we also both agree that if Iran does not respond to serious negotiations and resolve this issue in a way that assures the international community that it's meeting its commitments, and is not developing nuclear weapons, then we will have to take additional actions and that sanctions, serious additional sanctions, remain a possibility.
We have an opportunity for a P5-plus-1 meeting with Iran in October. I hope that Iran seizes the opportunity to follow the path that both the United States and Russia would prefer in making a decision to live up to its international commitments, abandon nuclear weapons, and to fully join the international community in a way that I think will ultimately enhance the peace of the region and the prosperity of the Iranian people.
And once again, I just want to personally thank President Medvedev, but also the Russian people, for the leadership that they're showing on the world stage. I'm confident that when the United States and Russia work on critical issues like nuclear non-proliferation, that the world rallies behind us and that we will be able to bring about the kind of international peace and security that I think we all want.
President Medvedev. I'll try to make my comment briefer because, unlike my colleague, President Barack Obama, I still have to deliver my statement from the United Nations rostrum.
I agree that indeed recently we have witnessed very positive changes in our relations, with established, constructive, friendly working relations that allow us to tackle difficult issues that not only the two countries face, but also the entire world.
Today we've discussed a range of issues—Mr. President listed them. Indeed, we communicate on regular basis. We personally meet quarterly and we talk on the phone regularly. So those personal contacts are not an exotic prank, but rather a manifestation of good working relations. Indeed, we discussed new START treaty. We are satisfied with the current pace of work. The teams that were tasked to work on this matter work very successfully, we're satisfied with the work. We believe that they will be able to stick to the time schedule and that in due time we will have every (inaudible).
We talked about missile defense with my colleague, President Obama. We talked that the decision that he took was reasonable and that reflected the position of the current U.S. administration on missile defense, and also takes into consideration our concerns on the missile defense which is needed for Europe and for the world. And we are ready to continue this work with our U.S. colleagues in this direction, as well as with our European colleagues, of course.
We also discussed other issues, we have devoted lots of our time to the Iranian problem my colleague, Mr. President, rightly mentioned. Our task is to create such a system of incentives that would allow Iran to resolve its fissile nuclear program, but at the same time prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. That's why we, as responsible members of international community and, indeed, two nuclear superpowers, should send great signals in that direction.
I told His Excellency, Mr. President, that we believe we need to help Iran to take a right decision. As to also have sanctions, Russia's belief is very simple, and I stated it recently. Sanctions rarely lead to productive results. But in some cases sanctions are inevitable.
Finally, it is a matter of choice. And we're prepared to continue and to work together with the U.S. administration both on Iranian peaceful program and on other matters.
Most importantly, we've learned to listen to each other once again. And that is of great importance both to the future of relations of the two countries and the two peoples.
That is why I would like to give special thanks to you, Barack, for your cooperation on these matters.
President Obama. Thank you, everybody.
Remarks by President Obama, September 24, 2009Footnote 5
President Barack Obama delivered these remarks in New York, NY
Introductory Remarks Omitted
President Obama. I want to thank again everybody who is in attendance. I wish you all good morning. In the six-plus decades that this Security Council has been in existence, only four other meetings of this nature have been convened. I called for this one so that we may address at the highest level a fundamental threat to the security of all peoples and all nations: the spread and use of nuclear weapons.
As I said yesterday, this very institution was founded at the dawn of the atomic age, in part because man's capacity to kill had to be contained. And although we averted a nuclear nightmare during the Cold War, we now face proliferation of a scope and complexity that demands new strategies and new approaches. Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city—be it New York or Moscow; Tokyo or Beijing; London or Paris—could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And it would badly destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life.
Once more, the United Nations has a pivotal role to play in preventing this crisis. The historic resolution we just adopted enshrines our shared commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. And it brings Security Council agreement on a broad framework for action to reduce nuclear dangers as we work toward that goal. It reflects the agenda I outlined in Prague, and builds on a consensus that all nations have the right to peaceful nuclear energy; that nations with nuclear weapons have the responsibility to move toward disarmament; and those without them have the responsibility to forsake them.
Today, the Security Council endorsed a global effort to lock down all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. The United States will host a summit next April to advance this goal and help all nations achieve it. This resolution will also help strengthen the institutions and initiatives that combat the smuggling, financing, and theft of proliferation-related materials. It calls on all states to freeze any financial assets that are being used for proliferation. And it calls for stronger safeguards to reduce the likelihood that peaceful nuclear weapons programs can be diverted to a weapons program—that peaceful nuclear programs can be diverted to a weapons program.
The resolution we passed today will also strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have made it clear that the Security Council has both the authority and the responsibility to respond to violations to this treaty. We've made it clear that the Security Council has both the authority and responsibility to determine and respond as necessary when violations of this treaty threaten international peace and security.
That includes full compliance with Security Council resolutions on Iran and North Korea. Let me be clear: This is not about singling out individual nations—it is about standing up for the rights of all nations who do live up to their responsibilities. The world must stand together. And we must demonstrate that international law is not an empty promise, and that treaties will be enforced.
The next 12 months will be absolutely critical in determining whether this resolution and our overall efforts to stop the spread and use of nuclear weapons are successful. And all nations must do their part to make this work. In America, I have promised that we will pursue a new agreement with Russia to substantially reduce our strategic warheads and launchers. We will move forward with the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and open the door to deeper cuts in our own arsenal. In January, we will call upon countries to begin negotiations on a treaty to end the production of fissile material for weapons. And the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May will strengthen that agreement.
Now, we harbor no illusions about the difficulty of bringing about a world without nuclear weapons. We know there are plenty of cynics, and that there will be setbacks to prove their point. But there will also be days like today that push us forward—days that tell a different story. It is the story of a world that understands that no difference or division is worth destroying all that we have built and all that we love. It is a recognition that can bring people of different nationalities and ethnicities and ideologies together. In my own country, it has brought Democrats and Republican leaders together—leaders like George Shultz, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, who are with us here today. And it was a Republican President, Ronald Reagan, who once articulated the goal we now seek in the starkest of terms. I quote:
“A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. And no matter how great the obstacles may seem, we must never stop our efforts to reduce the weapons of war. We must never stop until all—we must never stop at all until we see the day when nuclear arms have been banished from the face of the Earth.”
That is our task. That can be our destiny. And we will leave this meeting with a renewed determination to achieve this shared goal. Thank you.
In accordance with the understanding reached among Council members, I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable the Council to carry on its work expeditiously. Delegations with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate the text in writing and to deliver a condensed version when speaking in the chamber.
I shall now invite the distinguished Secretary General, His Excellency Ban Ki-moon, to take the floor.
Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton, September 24, 2009Footnote 6
Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered these remarks in New York, NY
Secretary Clinton. Thank you for your warm welcome. I am delighted to be here on behalf of the United States. It has been a long time since our government was represented at this conference. We are glad to be back.
Earlier today, President Obama chaired a special session of the Security Council to adopt a resolution outlining comprehensive steps to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This is part of a deliberative, ongoing effort by the Obama Administration to enhance our common security while moving us closer to the vision the President outlined in Prague: a world without nuclear weapons.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is an integral part of our non-proliferation and arms control agenda, and we will work in the months ahead both to seek the advice and consent of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty, and to secure ratification by others so that the treaty can enter into force.
We believe that the CTBT contributes to our global nonproliferation and disarmament strategy as well as the President's long-range vision. It does so without jeopardizing the safety, security, or credibility of our nuclear arsenal. By pursuing these goals and supporting the CTBT, we are working in the interest of all nations committed to non-proliferation and to reducing the threat of nuclear attack.
The Obama Administration has already begun the work necessary to support U.S. ratification of the Treaty. We know this task will not be quick or easy. But as long as we are confronted with the prospect of nuclear testing by others, we will face the potential threat of newer, more powerful, and more sophisticated weapons that could cause damage beyond our imagination. A test ban treaty that has entered into force will permit the United States and others to challenge states engaged in suspicious testing activities—including the option of calling on-site inspections to be sure that no testing occurs on land, underground, underwater, or in space. CTBT ratification would also encourage the international community to move forward with other essential nonproliferation steps.
To put it plainly, we support this treaty because it strengthens the prospect of a peaceful, stable, and secure world and would enhance the security of the American people.
As we work with the Senate to ratify the CTBT, we will encourage other countries to play their part—including the eight remaining Annex 2 countries. Those who haven't signed should sign. Those, like us, who haven't ratified, should ratify. And the 149 countries that have already progressed to ratification can use this opportunity to continue preparations for CTBT implementation.
Even in these times of strained budgets, we are prepared to pay our share of the Preparatory Commission budget so that the global verification regime will be fully operational when the CTBT enters into force.
More than eighty percent of the monitoring stations that will constitute the International Monitoring System have already been installed and we urge all host countries to ensure that the data from these installations are reported to the International Data Center. In the coming months, we will look for new ways to support the monitoring system —including upgrades to the system and other verification capabilities of the CTBT—with the help of all nations, including those who have yet to ratify.
President Obama and I applaud Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda's recent pledge that his country will move forward with ratification once we have done so. We look forward to similar statements from the remaining Annex 2 nations, while recognizing that today's Article XIV Conference provides an opportunity for all of us to pledge our support for the Treaty, reaffirm our commitment to the verification regime, and demonstrate the importance of this treaty to reducing the threat and role of nuclear weapons.
It will take our collective effort to develop a comprehensive, diplomatic strategy that lays the groundwork for eventual entry into force. I am pleased that Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher will hold consultations with her many counterparts at this conference to discuss diplomatic efforts to move the process forward.
Mr. Chairman, after a 10-year absence from this conference, America stands ready to renew its leadership role in the non-proliferation regime. As President Obama said yesterday, we have a shared responsibility for a global response to global challenges. We come to this conference with an optimistic spirit that all parties can make a contribution towards a world without nuclear weapons. That is the promise of the CTBT, and it is why we are rededicating ourselves to this effort. Thank you.
