Mark Graber offers an intriguing reassessment of American constitutional politics before the Civil War. He calls the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott versus Sandford (1857) not merely “plausible” but “centrist” (85, 239), attributes the sectional crisis over slavery to mistakes in constitutional design made by the founders, and concludes that political leaders in the 1850s who exacerbated the crisis—including Abraham Lincoln—“failed the Constitution” (251). While some of Graber's historical interpretations are problematic, his revisionist account offers a valuable opportunity to explore the limits of contemporary constitutional theory.
Relying substantially on the work of Don Fehrenbacher, especially The Slaveholding Republic (Oxford University Press, 2001) and The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 1978), Graber seeks to reconsider current criticisms of the Dred Scott decision. Against institutionalists who argue that the Court usurped power from politically accountable branches, Graber demonstrates that leading elected Democrats sought a broad ruling to avoid making controversial decisions. “Whatever one thinks of Dred Scott as an example of judicial statesmanship,” Graber writes, “that alleged political miscalculation was dwarfed by legislative and executive blunders during the 1850s” (45). Historicists claim that Chief Justice Taney's majority opinion abused original intent; Graber counters that all opinions in the case relied on questionable assertions, but Taney properly found that the original intent of the Constitution presumed a national consensus on all changes to slavery policy. Aspirationalists contend Dred Scott violated original constitutional commitments to liberty and limiting slavery; Graber states that the decision's proslavery, white supremacist values had deep roots in antebellum American politics. In the end, all sides had “the evidence necessary to make plausible arguments in Dred Scott using any constitutional logic” (85).
Graber persuasively argues that the Constitution presented no solution to the dilemma of slavery. Compromises such as the three-fifths clause, equal state representation in the Senate, the Electoral College, and the composition of federal courts produced institutions that would require national consensus for any modification of slavery policy. While many founders hoped for eventual emancipation, Northerners were more concerned with commerce and union while Southerners believed that the population would grow in regions conducive to slavery. “The persons responsible for the Constitution,” Graber states, “were far more concerned that controversies over slavery be settled peacefully than that they be settled in favor of liberty” (229).
But these original assumptions turned out to be incorrect. Population flowed north and west into free states and territories, not south. This required a new bargain. The “modified Constitution” from 1820 through 1850 survived as long as the federal government “downplayed slavery issues or championed policies that had strong support in both the free and slave states” (148). This commitment to bisectionalism collapsed in the 1850s, Graber argues, when a Republican Party emerged that could win the presidency without accommodating southern interests. Graber sees this collapse as an institutional failure arising from single-member districts and politicians driven by local concerns. “By mandating rules that promoted sectional extremism and inhibited cooperation between sectional moderates,” Graber writes, “Articles I and II are as much to blame for the secession crisis as the Wilmot Proviso, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Dred Scott and Lecompton” (168).
By rejecting compromise and recasting slavery policy as a question of majority rule, Lincoln “failed to exhibit good faith” and “misperceived the fundamental principles underlying the antebellum constitutional order” (216). Stephen Douglas more closely discerned the original intent of the Constitution. But because Douglas supported war in Cuba or Latin America, Graber writes he would likely have supported Constitutional Unionist John Bell. A vote for Bell would not limit slavery, Graber admits, but it was “a vote against risking foreign or domestic war.” In turn, supporters of Lincoln must admit “virtue may not have triumphed in 1865” (241–42).
Graber's account of the 1850s emphasizes southern fears and minimizes concerns of antislavery Northerners. Graber considers Dred Scott centrist, but its unnecessary, retroactive invalidation of the Missouri Compromise prevented any future potential political compromises—including Douglas's popular sovereignty. In his effort to minimize the significance of Dred Scott, Graber never mentions the case of Lemmons versus New York (1860). In Lemmons, New York's highest court rejected a Virginian's argument that the privileges and immunities clause of the federal constitution secured her right as a temporary resident to bring slaves to a free state for an extended period of time. Northerners, such as Lincoln, feared the Taney Court would overturn Lemmons and extend Dred Scott to require free states to accept slave codes (see Fehrenbacher, Dred Scott, p. 444–45.) Graber also discounts the suppression of antislavery speech by southern states in the 1850s. In explaining these actions, Graber states only that the South “was not entirely dysfunctional” and “very few public policies in antebellum American pass contemporary republican standards” (236). In this environment, it is difficult to see how any compromise—even if offered by President Bell—could have been acceptable.
Graber's primary motivation for this book, however, is not historical but arises from present trends in constitutional theory and American politics. “The case for John Bell,” he writes, “is stronger when we move from 1860 to 2006, from domestic policy to foreign policy” (253). Graber derides aspirationalists like Ronald Dworkin, Randy Barnett, Christopher Eisgruber, and Sotirios Barber. For Graber, the Constitution is not an expression of shared moral principles but a practical document to secure “cooperation between persons who lack a common vision of the good society” (247). Graber claims that rarely do “clear, correct answers exist” to constitutional disputes; thus the search for right answers under the guise of interpretation is “legally fruitless and politically offensive.” When deep, enduring divisions exist, “what matters is that constitutional arguments persuade, not whether the arguments meet some apolitical criteria for soundness” (248). Constitutional thinkers should seek not the perfect answer but “plausible” resolutions broadly acceptable to most political actors. In times of political polarization, Graber argues, courts can reach a plausible middle ground on divisive issues more effectively than national legislatures; he claims they have done so recently in areas such as abortion and affirmative action (249).
To Graber, the search for morally principled constitutional meaning through textual interpretation is an indulgence of stable political orders. When founders make mistakes or political conditions change, “citizens in constitutional relationships must accommodate more evil than originally anticipated” (250). Rather than joining a Dworkinian quest to make the Constitution “the best it can be,” Graber proposes that “constitutional thinkers spend some energy fashioning the most broadly acceptable plausible interpretation of the Constitution” (252). This focus on peace and compromise will not only produce a more productive politics. It can also have a moral dimension, as in the long run “just causes are better realized by persuasion than by force” (253). Responding as much to current events in the United States and the Middle East as to academic theory, Graber concludes that “contemporary constitutionalists who prefer fighting to the death in the name of justice will likely rid the world of human depravity only by ridding the world of human beings” (254).
By directly confronting the reality of constitutional evil, this book provides a useful, if unlikely, companion to the First Things symposium published a decade ago (The End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation of Politics, ed. Richard Muncy and Richard John Neuhaus [Spence Publishing Company, 1997]). Graber moves beyond a focus on judicially enforceable rights to examine how the Constitution's structural provisions can affect the decisions of elected politicians. More important, he appreciates how constitutional conditions of union and domestic tranquility are essential for establishing justice and securing the blessings of liberty. Despite its limitations as a historical case study, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil succeeds in illuminating the continual choices any political order must face.
