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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 May 2004
Orna Almog reassesses Anglo-Israeli relations during the turbulent years from the coming of the Sinai War through the 1958 crises in Jordan and Lebanon. Her study offers international historians of the Middle East important insights in three areas. First, she examines the connection between regional developments and the growing significance of Cold War politics. Second, she uses Israeli and British documents and interviews with former Israeli officials to understand policy-makers' motivations on both sides of the bilateral relationship. Finally, she stresses the importance of the period after the Suez crisis for bringing about closer ties between Britain and Israel. Almog's principal argument is that it was the crises of the summer of 1958, rather than the war against Egypt, that produced a “breakthrough” in Anglo-Israeli relations.
British interests in the Middle East prevented close relations with Israel and contributed to an unfavorable British view of the Jewish state throughout much of the 1950s. These interests consisted of access to Middle Eastern oil, so crucial to Britain's postwar balance-of-payments position, and maintenance of the British military presence in Jordan, Egypt (until 1954), Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and Aden. Britain therefore needed good relations with the Arab states, and British officials regarded Israel as an obstacle to securing London's economic and strategic goals. A critical, even hostile, attitude toward Israel prevailed among British diplomats, who blamed the Israelis for regional instability.
Almog also identifies Israel's “iron fist” policy of retaliation in response to fedayeen raids on its territory as a hindrance to closer Anglo-Israeli relations. Though popular with the Israeli public, this doctrine failed to enhance Israeli security and undermined Israel's perennial attempts to obtain arms. It stemmed from the belief by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan that Arabs would perceive Israeli restraint as weakness. Israeli officials felt that the British discriminated against Israel by suspending arms sales to it following retaliatory strikes while continuing to arm Arab states from whose territory the fedayeen staged attacks. Britain also refused to recognize the borders established by the Arab–Israeli armistice agreements as final, fostering Israeli concerns that London would try to impose a territorial adjustment unfavorable to Israel.
The coming of the Cold War to the Middle East and the rise of Arab nationalism under the leadership of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser initially intensified the strains in Anglo-Israeli relations. Israel opposed Britain's sponsorship of the Baghdad Pact and resisted the Alpha Plan, the British and American proposal for an Arab–Israeli settlement that was intended to check Soviet influence with the Arab states. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden's 1955 Guildhall speech confirmed the Israelis’ worst suspicions by proposing a compromise over Israel's borders. But the Czech–Egyptian arms deal, the failure of Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, and Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal set the stage for Anglo-Israeli cooperation in the Sinai War.
Collaboration between the two countries in 1956 was of a limited nature. Though Almog finds evidence that British and Israeli officials conferred about a possible attack on Egypt as early as December 1955, Ben-Gurion deeply mistrusted Britain during the planning and execution of military operations. The Israeli raid on Qalqilya and resulting clash with Arab Legion forces prompted King Hussein to try to invoke the Jordanian defensive treaty with the United Kingdom and threatened to create a crisis prior to the tripartite attack on Egypt. While the war strengthened Israel's position, Anglo-Israeli collusion “did not bring any major change in the two countries’ relationship” (p. 106).
By 1958, greater Soviet and American influence and the spread of Pan-Arab nationalism had altered politics in the Middle East. Almog credits Ben-Gurion with adapting to the new circumstances and with overcoming Israel's isolation. During the Anglo-American interventions in Lebanon and Jordan, Ben-Gurion “was determined to use the moment to the full” in aligning with the Western powers against Arab nationalism (p. 190). Despite Soviet threats, Ben-Gurion complied with American requests to provide overflight rights to British aircraft. While he sought to deter a Nasserist seizure of Jordanian territory in the event King Hussein's government collapsed, the prime minister's diary shows that he opposed Israeli occupation of the West Bank. The overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy ended Britain's traditional policy in the Middle East and removed a major obstacle to closer relations with Israel. Harold Macmillan's government repudiated Eden's Guildhall speech and provided Israel with Centurion tanks. Although Israel's relationship with Britain did not grow as close as its ties had been with France, or as strong as its “special relationship” with the United States would become after the Six-Day War, 1958 opened a new chapter in Anglo-Israeli cooperation.
Almog's reliance on published U.S. sources makes her discussion of American policy less nuanced than her analysis of bilateral Anglo-Israeli diplomacy. In addition, the series editor Peter Catterall may overstate the novelty of Almog's argument. Her book covers some of the same ground as Zach Levey's Israel and the Great Powers, 1952–1960 (1997), and a growing number of studies recognize the 1958 crises as pivotal in the Anglo-American transfer of power in the Middle East and in the forging of a closer U.S.–Israeli relationship. Nevertheless, Almog presents some significant new information from Israeli sources, and her well-written study is an example of skillful multiarchival research.