In Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism, author Georg Cavallar sets out to show readers just what kind of cosmopolitanism Kant is committed to. Above all, Cavallar argues, Kant’s cosmopolitanism is embedded – ‘rooted in one’s particular community’ (p. 2) rather than free-floating or uprooted, and compatible with both ‘moderate patriotism’ and ‘civic republicanism’ (p. 13). But secondly – and this particular feature is not captured in the book’s title – it is a dynamic rather than static cosmopolitanism. A cosmopolitan condition is the cornerstone of our species’s ‘final vocation (Bestimmung)’ (p. 13), but we must work slowly and collectively in order to achieve this goal. We have a genetic predisposition to eventually become cosmopolitically united as a species, but whether we will ever fully actualize this potential depends on our own free choices. A third distinct feature of Kant’s cosmopolitanism stressed by Cavallar, one that is closely linked to its dynamic quality, is its pedagogical character. For Kant, education is one of the key vehicles by means of which both human individuals and the species as a whole reach their Bestimmung. ‘Education’ here refers above all to the moral education of individuals – learning how to consistently adopt universalizable maxims through ‘moral formation (Bildung)’ (p. 118), the key topic in Kant’s works on education.

In defending this particular conception of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, Cavallar is also arguing against a number of other authors (not all of whom are named) who fall into two broad groups. First, there are the legions of contemporary cosmopolitans who invoke Kant’s name in order to add a pedigree to their own projects, but who in doing so frequently mischaracterize his legacy. This legacy, Cavallar argues,

When spelled out in detail, each of these four commitments serves to differentiate Kant from many of ‘the new cosmopolitans’ (p. 170; see also pp. 165–74).

Second, Cavallar is also arguing against certain Kantian cosmopolitans. His disagreements here may appear to amount to a merely minor family quarrel, but they are in fact substantial. The main charges are that these authors have ‘little to say about the moral and educational dimensions of Kant’s cosmopolitan theory’ and that they misrepresent Kant’s cosmopolitanism as a ‘fully secularized’ notion (p. 3). Pauline Kleingeld’s Kant and Cosmopolitanism is singled out as an example of this tendency (see p. 3), but in this particular case it is not clear to me that the criticism is entirely warranted (see e.g. Kleingeld Reference Kleingeld2012: 169–73, where she discusses the moral, educational and religious dimensions of Kant’s cosmopolitanism). However, I do agree with Cavallar’s general observation that many contemporary Kantians have downplayed the moral, educational and religious dimensions of Kant’s cosmopolitanism.

There is also some overlap in Cavallar’s criticisms of the two groups of authors. Both are deemed guilty of treating Kant’s cosmopolitanism unhistorically, whereas Cavallar aims to examine ‘the historical context of Kant’s cosmopolitanism’ (p. 2). And this points to a second sense of ‘embedded’ employed by the author: by ‘[e]mbedding Kant in his proper late eighteenth century context’ (p. 2), Cavallar joins a host of recent scholars who draw attention to the diverse historical influences on Kant’s thought in order to better situate his philosophy within the context of his predecessors.

Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism is divided into eight chapters (many of which are revised versions of earlier articles), along with a bibliography and index. Chapter 1 (‘Introduction’), from which I have already cited extensively, is essentially an overview of the project as a whole. In chapter 2 (‘Cosmopolitanisms in Kant’s Philosophy’) Cavallar begins by stressing that ‘there are different cosmopolitanisms in Kant’, and then proceeds to focus on ‘the relationship among political, legal or juridical, moral and religious cosmopolitanisms’ (p. 21). But the bulk of this chapter is actually concerned with Kant’s concept of the highest good, which Cavallar sees as a sort of linchpin that brings systematicity to Kant’s different cosmopolitanisms. He argues strongly against secularist interpretations of the highest good, concluding that when it is given a properly religious reading, the ‘overall result is a rich account of cosmopolitanism, where the threads of theological and more secularized Enlightenment conceptions are woven into a delicate synthesis’ (p. 48).

In chapter 3 (‘Kant’s Right of World Citizens: A Historical Interpretation’), Cavallar focuses on Kant’s concept of Weltbürgerrecht – cosmopolitan right, or what he translates more literally as ‘the right of world citizens’ (p. 49). Referencing recent interpretations which view Kant’s stress on Weltbürgerrecht as signalling a decisive individualistic turn in cosmopolitan theory that stresses the needs and interests of human individuals directly rather than indirectly as citizens of states, Cavallar adds a historical contextualization to these and other interpretations, showing how Kant’s concept of Weltbürgerrecht grows out of earlier discussions in international legal theory concerning the right to hospitality. He concludes by arguing – in opposition to many contemporary interpretations – that ‘Kant’s cosmopolitan right is not the blueprint of a cosmopolitan democracy or a global and democratic civil society where individuals are co-legislators building “democratic structures”. This is an anachronistic interpretation’ (p. 74).

In chapter 4 (‘Educating Émile: Rousseau on Embedded Cosmopolitanism’), Cavallar tries to make good on his controversial claim ‘that Rousseau offers a version of embedded cosmopolitanism’ (p. 76; cf. p. 82), a version which in turn allegedly inspires Kant’s cosmopolitanism (see pp. 2, 13). Although the author admits that Rousseau attacks certain forms of cosmopolitanism – for instance, what he calls ‘thick cultural cosmopolitanism, or rather, Europeanism . . . that is, the belief that a single thick conception of the good life should be spread all over the globe, swallowing existing cultures and traditions’ (p. 78) – he insists that in making such attacks Rousseau is actually trying to make ‘room for genuine moral and political cosmopolitanisms’ (p. 78). His argument here seems strained, in part because he cites no Rousseauian texts which explicitly advocate genuine political cosmopolitanisms. Working primarily with Rousseau’s Émile, Cavallar cites a variety of passages which illustrate three ways of preparing ‘the ground for the cosmopolitan education of the pupil: Rousseau’s criticism of Eurocentrism, his moral universalism, and his pacifism’ (p. 82). But I do not see how any of them can lend clear support to the more controversial assertion that Rousseau is trying to make room for genuine political cosmopolitanisms. Granted, the wide variety of cosmopolitanisms Cavallar employs complicates matters. For instance, it appears that anyone who is not a moral relativist could qualify as a moral cosmopolitan. And granted too, there are a few quasi-favourable references to cosmopolitanism in Rousseau’s writings (though they are far outnumbered by unfavourable references). For instance, in the second Discourse he praises those ‘few great cosmopolitan souls, who surmount the imaginary barriers that separate peoples and who, following the example of the sovereign Being who created them, include the whole human race in their benevolence’ (Rousseau Reference Rousseau1964: 160–1). Cavallar does not cite this passage in building his case, but I do not think it would have helped his cause if he did. For Rousseau is not advocating any kind of transnational political structure here, nor is he even arguing ‘that political societies should cultivate a cosmopolitan outlook in their citizens. Rousseau’s political teaching calls for the greatest possible attachment of the citizen to his own particular patrie’ (Plattner Reference Plattner1997: 187).

In chapter 5 (‘Sources of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism: Basedow, Rousseau, and Cosmopolitan Education’), Cavallar turns to the pedagogical dimension of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. I have already expressed reservations concerning the claim that Rousseau is a source of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, so here I will focus on Basedow, the other source named in the chapter title. Although Cavallar overstates his case somewhat in calling Basedow ‘a still widely unknown figure of the Enlightenment educational reform movement’ (pp. 93, 17), I agree wholeheartedly with his decision to emphasize the significance of an author whom Kant himself praised for having ‘become so important to the world, and with the institution you have founded, deserving the gratitude of all posterity’ (Kant to Basedow, 19 June 1776, 10: 194). Cavallar analyses Basedow’s cosmopolitan educational theory deftly, but it is his assessment of the key differences between Basedow and Kant that I found most illuminating. In adhering to the traditional view that morality must be grounded in religion (albeit nondenominational religion), ‘Basedow was clearly less radical than Kant in terms of the relationship between religion and morality’ (p. 100). Also, ‘unlike Basedow’s theory, Kant’s cosmopolitan education is embedded in a comprehensive political theory, a philosophy of history, and a philosophy of religion’ (p. 100). Kant was a systematic philosopher par excellence; Basedow, at best, a Popularphilosoph. Additionally, Kant’s strong emphasis on what I have called ‘species perfectionism’ (p. 101; cf. Louden Reference Louden2000: 37) presupposes ‘a practical anthropology, a moral teleology, a philosophy of history, and a philosophy of religion’ (p. 115). Each of these, except perhaps the last item, is absent in Basedow.

In chapter 6 (‘Taking a Detour: Kant’s Theory of Moral Cosmopolitan Formation’), Cavallar turns to the cosmopolitan character of Kant’s theory of moral education. The ‘detour’ referred to in the chapter title signals another key difference between Kant and many contemporary cosmopolitans:

Although Kant sometimes wavers on the issue of whether educational reform should precede political reform or vice versa – should a better political ‘state first be established, so that every single individual could be made perfect, or should every single individual first be made perfect through education …?’ (V-Anth/Fried 25: 691, cf. V-Anth/Mensch 25: 1202, Päd 9: 448) – Cavallar is absolutely correct in emphasizing the centrality of moral education in Kant’s cosmopolitanism.

Chapter 7 (‘Res Publica: Kant on Cosmopolitical Formation’), takes its cue from Kant’s ‘surprising remark’ (pp. 133, 18) in Toward Perpetual Peace that ‘it is not the case that a good state constitution is to be expected from inner morality; on the contrary, the good moral formation of a people is to be expected from a good state constitution’ (8: 366). In other words, successful moral formation is ‘facilitated’ (p. 145) – though by no means guaranteed or causally produced – by a republican constitution. Additionally, Kant’s remark serves both as a corrective to the popular misconception that he is ‘preoccupied with inner morality rather than external circumstances; that true reform has to start with our inner lives, not with politics’ (pp. 133, 18) and as a clue that he is not ‘a typical early liberal’ (pp. 133, 134) who views government efforts in moral education as an intrusion on the rights of citizens, but closer to the republican tradition which emphasized the importance of public education in promoting a virtuous citizenry. Kant ‘was a republican of sorts’ (p. 135).

Finally, in chapter 8 (‘Conclusion: From Kant to the present’), Cavallar offers readers a selective tour of post-Kantian debates within German philosophy concerning the fate of cosmopolitanism as well as a qualified endorsement of Kant’s legacy for both contemporary cosmopolitanism and educational theory.

In closing, I raise two quibbles. While I am envious of the author’s ability to write philosophy in a non-native language, the prose style of the book would have benefited from an editor who is a native English speaker. And while Cavallar’s detailed familiarity with both relevant German- and English-language secondary literature is extremely impressive, some of the works he cites in the text do not manage to make it into his Bibliography. But these are tiny blemishes in an otherwise noteworthy book. I strongly recommend Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism to all readers who wish to learn more about both the historical sources and legacy of Kant’s cosmopolitanism.