I

On 11 September 2001, two aircraft demolished the World Trade Centre buildings in New York City; a third aircraft subsequently hit the United States Department of Defence building in Washington DC, while a fourth aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania. Soon thereafter, a little-known organization called al-Qa'ida (the base) was named responsible for these attacks. Al-Qa'ida's origins can be traced to the 1979 Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan. Thousands of Muslims travelled to Afghanistan during the 1980s to help fight against Soviet occupation of Muslim land. Usama bin Laden, a member of one of Saudi Arabia's wealthiest families, quickly established himself as a patron of this ‘Afghan jihad’ (holy war) and together with Abdullah Azzam founded the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) or ‘Office of Services’. MAK functioned as a recruiting office and way station for non-Afghan Muslims who fought against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Usama bin Laden relocated to Sudan, bringing a number of these fighters with him. Many of the fighters would eventually form the nucleus of al-Qa'ida, responsible for attacks not only in the United States, but also in Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Yemen.

Although the broad outlines of this story are well known, less attention has been paid in academic and popular literatures to the early development and evolution of al-Qa'ida – that is, the twelve years between 1984 and 1996. How and why did al-Qa'ida leaders latch on to the United States as a primary adversary? What motivated Usama bin Laden to form al-Qa'ida in the first place? How did this motivation change over time? This absence of attention to the early history of al-Qa'ida perhaps is due to a lack of original source material on the subject. Indeed, until recently, most documents produced by al-Qa'ida were unavailable to academe and only a select few journalists had access to al-Qa'ida. That situation changed in 2006, when the United States military released numerous al-Qa'ida documents that had been captured in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (2001 and 2002).Footnote ¹ This collection of captured documents included, among others, internal memos, letters written to and from al-Qa'ida leadership, employment forms, as well as publicly disseminated statements by al-Qa'ida's ‘Advisory and Reformation Committee’. These materials provide researchers with insight into the early history of al-Qa'ida, including strategic decisions made by al-Qa'ida leadership, events considered to be catastrophic or at least significant by al-Qa'ida leaders, requirements for membership and new recruits, as well as dissent between operatives and al-Qa'ida leadership.

Other original source materials on al-Qa'ida have also been discovered in recent years. Specifically, a collection of underground articles, entitled al-Jihad and distributed by MAK throughout the Muslim world in the mid-1980s, was discovered by journalist Peter Bergen in a research institute in Pakistan. Al-Jihad magazine was funded by Usama bin Laden and, thus, reveals key issues of concern to individuals who would become al-Qa'ida leaders. Similarly, individuals associated with the early development of al-Qa'ida have recently released pamphlets and books telling their own autobiographical accounts. Taken together, these new materials – captured documents, al-Jihad articles, and autobiographical accounts – provide the opportunity for unprecedented insight into a clandestine organization that has caused havoc for the past two decades.

The present article utilizes these original source documents to examine the birth of a clandestine organization, now known as al-Qa'ida. In doing so, it attempts to identify key shifts in the evolutionary trajectory of al-Qa'ida from the creation of MAK in 1984 until Usama bin Laden issued his ‘Declaration of jihad’ in 1996. Additionally, the article identifies exogenous events, or events that occurred outside the al-Qa'ida organization, that appear to have affected the shifts in al-Qa'ida's trajectory as well as debates that occurred between al-Qa'ida leadership and its members during the period under examination. By examining both internal debates and external events that affected al-Qa'ida's trajectory, this article provides insight into the various factors that al-Qa'ida leadership prioritized and how they made decisions, which in many ways are some of the most difficult insights to gain in the study of terrorist groups.

II

Clandestine organizations present a difficult challenge to researchers interested in exploring original source materials. Most clandestine, non-state, organizations do not keep meticulous records; after all, they exist and operate in secrecy. Security forces may raid the homes and meeting places of clandestine organizations. Thus, even if one was to receive access to an organization's own archives, these documents are likely to evidence chronological gaps. Academic researchers do have some limited experience with the archives of clandestine organizations. For a period in the 1990s, for example, the Orient House in East Jerusalem housed documents from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Yezid Sayigh used these documents in his well-regarded book on the Palestinian resistance, Armed struggle and the search for the state.Footnote ² Similarly, the UK government has released documents on the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in its National Archives. Unfortunately, the well-maintained archives of the PLO and PIRA tend to be the exception rather than the rule when dealing with clandestine groups. Some of the al-Qa'ida documents used in this article, specifically al-Qa'ida letters and internal records, were obtained in 2001 and 2002 by the US military in Afghanistan and, thus, not archived in chronological order or according to author (if the author was even known). Other documents, such as al-Jihad, were produced somewhat more systematically, but they were written for a public audience, rather than specifically for al-Qa'ida leaders and operatives. Nonetheless, these limitations notwithstanding, the entire collection of materials taken together shed light on the early history of al-Qa'ida.

Letters written by and between al-Qa'ida members, of course, provide unique insight into this clandestine organization, as do minutes documenting various meetings. This article also utilizes pamphlets written and publicly distributed by individuals associated with al-Qa'ida. While not internal al-Qa'ida documents, these sources expose changes in how leaders justified their activities to the wider Muslim world. The provenance of these pamphlets is somewhat more reliable than the letters, in the sense that they are dated and are known to have been released by al-Qa'ida. These documents include, for example, al-Jihad magazine written by Abdullah Azzam in Afghanistan and distributed by MAK, as well as letters issued by Usama bin Laden via the Advisory and Reformation Committee in London, which essentially functioned as al-Qa'ida's public relations office during much of the 1990s. Importantly, because these pamphlets are written as propaganda, disagreements revealed by the aforementioned letters are likely a more accurate reflection of organizational dynamics inside al-Qa'ida than the impression of unity provided by these pamphlets. Al-Qa'ida leaders did not, of course, divulge their own internal debates publicly in the pamphlets, but rather wanted to present a unified front to the Muslim world.

The article also draws on ‘reflections’ written by individuals associated with al-Qa'ida. Some examples include Knights under the Prophet's banner,Footnote ³Chats from the top of the world,Footnote ⁴Birth of the Afghani Arabs,Footnote ⁵ and The road to al-Qaeda.Footnote ⁶ These documents essentially represent first-hand accounts told of the Afghan jihad and al-Qa'ida, but they were written several years or even decades later. Although this article attempts to point out any discrepancies, the discussion fundamentally places more confidence in letters and pamphlets than these first-hand accounts. That is, Usama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, may testify in Knights (written in 2000 or 2001) that the United States was a priority target for al-Qa'ida attacks ten years previously, but if pamphlets written at the time indicate otherwise, they supersede al-Zawahiri's reflective account. It is in al-Zawahiri's best interest to impose retrospectively more strategic thinking on al-Qa'ida leadership in his memoirs than actually existed.

Finally, secondary source materials provide a wider context to the al-Qa'ida documents, especially books written by scholars and journalists who have interviewed al-Qa'ida leaders. These sources include the anonymous Through our enemies's eyes,Footnote ⁷The secret history of al-Qa'ida Footnote ⁸ by Abdel Bari Atwan, The Osama bin Laden I know Footnote ⁹ by Peter Bergen, Ghost wars Footnote ¹⁰ by Steve Coll, The far enemy Footnote ¹¹ by Fawaz Gerges, as well as Inside al-Qaeda,Footnote ¹² by Rohan Gunaratna. As one might expect, if discrepancies exist between the primary and secondary source materials, this article gives greater weight to the former.

III

From 1984 through 1987, al-Qa'ida leaders – or those individuals associated with what would become al-Qa'ida – focused primarily on motivating and organizing the Afghan jihad. In 1984, Abdullah Azzam published a fatwa (religious ruling) entitled Defence of Muslim lands, in which he outlined the classical distinction between offensive and defensive jihad.Footnote ¹³ Abdullah Azzam – a Palestinian Arab – was a well-known Islamic activist with ties to the Palestinian resistance movement and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. By the time Defence of Muslim lands was released, Azzam had studied both at Damascus University in Syria and al-Azhar University in Egypt, establishing his credibility as an Islamic scholar. In Defence, Azzam argued that it was both fard kifaya (the responsibility of the entire Muslim community) and fard ayn (an individual duty) for Muslims to help the Afghans fight against Soviet occupation, because the situation that Afghans found themselves in was not of their own doing and they were powerless.Footnote ¹⁴ This revolutionary argument implied that it was a religious duty for all Muslims, regardless of whether or not they lived in Afghanistan, to support the Afghan jihad.

Abdullah Azzam's writings arguably had a significant impact in mobilizing the Afghan jihad. It is difficult, of course, to identify what might have motivated Arabs to travel to Afghanistan to fight against Soviet forces, but some evidence suggests that Azzam's writing did play a certain role. For example, Algerian author Abdullah Anas, an early member of MAK and respected fighter in the Afghan war, recounted in his book Birth of the Afghani Arabs that Azzam's argument influenced his decision to travel to Afghanistan.Footnote ¹⁵ Although only one example, Abdullah Anas's testimony suggests that Azzam's argument was persuasive to individuals in the Arab world. As a result, small numbers of Arab volunteers began to travel to Afghanistan to help fight against the Soviet occupying forces. To support this trickle of Arab fighters into Afghanistan and in demonstration of his own philosophical argument, Abdullah Azzam created Maktab al-Khidamat, arguably the precursor to al-Qa'ida.

MAK was established to help funnel manpower (mostly Arab fighters) and resources into Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet presence. It is well known that Usama bin Laden financed MAK at the time of its creation. But it is difficult to determine how much of a financial burden MAK really was in its early years. In his book, The Osama bin Laden I know, Peter Bergen drew on insight from his interview with the aforementioned Abdullah Anas, who asserted that only thirteen Arab fighters were present in Afghanistan when MAK was established.Footnote ¹⁶ Anas confirmed this limited number in his autobiographical account, Birth of the Afghani Arabs stating

Given the limited size of MAK at the time of its creation, it is unlikely to have posed a significant financial burden on Usama bin Laden. And, despite financial support from Usama bin Laden, evidence suggests that Abdullah Azzam did not want to rely solely on bin Laden's largesse. In this respect, Azzam attempted to garner wider support through the distribution of al-Jihad magazine. First issued in December 1984, al-Jihad magazine initially emphasized recruitment and fundraising for the Afghan jihad. For example, in July 1985 Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, the chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, as well as several other prominent clerics, published a letter in al-Jihad that urged monetary and other support for this conflict.Footnote ¹⁸ Quite an accomplishment, this letter from the chief mufti of Saudi Arabia indicates that Abdullah Azzam and MAK had managed to receive a certain degree of approval from the Saudi religious establishment. In publishing this letter, Abdullah Azzam likely hoped to clear away any hesitation on the part of Arab volunteers and those considering giving money to MAK. Of course, at that time MAK was focused solely on repelling Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia had no way of knowing that some Arab fighters would eventually turn their attention away from Afghanistan and towards overthrowing Arab regimes.

Articles in al-Jihad magazine also provide some indication of other decisions made by MAK leaders in 1984 and 1985, beyond simply providing logistical support to would-be Arab fighters. For example, volume 1, issue 4, discussed the creation of a university, the purpose of which was to teach incoming mujahideen (fighters) key Islamic principles, as well as guerrilla tactics and warfare. This effort seems to indicate that MAK did not function simply as a logistical network, but that its leaders also wanted to shape the direction of future efforts and spark a revolutionary movement in the Muslim world. It seems, based on this document, that al-Qa'ida's ideological vision and strategic roots owe much to Abdullah Azzam and MAK leaders. Al-Qa'ida leaders and operatives in subsequent years continued to stress the importance of ‘converting’ or persuading Muslim fighters in other countries to adopt a series of Islamic principles commonly associated with what is now known as the Salafist-jihadist ideology.

Similarly, in March 1985, Azzam argued in al-Jihad magazine that Afghanistan was not the end in and of itself, but preparatory for Palestine:

Thus, not only did Abdullah Azzam provide future al-Qa'ida leaders with the vision of an Islamic movement, but also a strategic imperative to move beyond Afghanistan. Indeed, beyond Palestine, in the winter of 1985, Azzam took his revolutionary vision one step further and asserted that if Arab regimes did not help the Afghans against the Soviet invasion, they would be next.Footnote ²⁰

Based on these pamphlets, therefore, it seems clear that even as early as 1985 thinking inside MAK had begun to look beyond Afghanistan and towards other parts of the Muslim world. MAK leaders, soon-to-be al-Qa'ida leaders, did not believe that their efforts would stop with repelling Soviet forces from Afghanistan and instead would be part of a revolutionary movement in the Muslim world. This finding fits nicely with observations made by other authors on the history of al-Qa'ida, such as Fawaz Gerges, that MAK-associated training camps emerged in 1984 and 1985.Footnote ²¹ MAK leaders apparently established separate Arab training camps in an effort to remove themselves from the day-to-day squabbles of Afghan fighters. These camps also could be understood as an effort on the part of MAK leaders to shape the worldview of trainees, as well as provide them with guerrilla warfare skills. Despite this revolutionary emphasis in MAK rhetoric and the existence of training camps noted in secondary source materials, however, it should be noted that MAK activities themselves in the mid-1980s remained focused on repelling Soviet ‘invaders’, rather than broader revolutionary objectives such as rescuing the Palestinians from occupation or overthrowing secular Arab regimes. So while it is fair to conclude that MAK leaders viewed their activities in a wider context, they had yet to act on these views and even disagreed amongst themselves as to the importance of other revolutionary activities. This disagreement in the ranks of Arab fighters in Afghanistan was particularly evident between Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Ayman al-Zawahiri (a leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and eventual co-leader of al-Qa'ida) and Usama bin Laden reportedly did not meet until a 1985 function arranged by the Kuwaiti Red Crescent in Jeddah. At that time, al-Zawahiri had already been imprisoned by Egyptian authorities, tortured, and released.Footnote ²² These experiences apparently influenced al-Zawahiri to prioritize overthrowing certain Arab governments, rather than repelling foreign invaders. Al-Zawahiri's argument can be seen in his pamphlet, Bitter harvest, written and released approximately six years later, in 1991,

This statement is significant because it encapsulates a key difference between Abdullah Azzam and al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri argued that it was an individual religious duty for Muslims not only to fight against the occupation of Muslim lands, but also to overthrow corrupt Arab regimes. That is, al-Zawahiri took Abdullah Azzam's philosophical argument one step further in laying out the moral obligations for jihad. In their interactions, al-Zawahiri likely introduced this concept to Usama bin Laden, attempting to persuade bin Laden that secular Arab governments were kufr and therefore should be opposed militarily.Footnote ²⁴

It would be easy to attribute al-Zawahiri's overwhelming anger against secular Arab governments to his prison experience and to understand al-Zawahiri's influence on Usama bin Laden as primarily ideological. Yet, perhaps as important was al-Zawahiri's need for funds to rejuvenate the Egyptian Islamic Jihad; a friendship with the wealthy Usama bin Laden was in al-Zawahiri's best interest. Around this same time, Usama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam reportedly had a falling out. Although multiple sources confirm a split between Azzam and bin Laden in approximately 1986, the actual cause of the split is unclear. In his book entitled, The road to al-Qaeda, Montasser al-Zayyat, a Cairo lawyer and radical who was imprisoned with al-Zawahiri, argued that al-Zawahiri convinced Usama bin Laden that Arab fighters should form their own units, rather than integrate with Afghan fighters.Footnote ²⁵ This approach represented a divergence from Azzam and MAK, which continued to emphasize support for the Afghan jihad. Abdullah Anas similarly recounted internal arguments between bin Laden and Azzam in his own work.Footnote ²⁶ According to Anas, these arguments centred on the practical utility of creating separate Arab units, as advocated by al-Zawahiri.Footnote ²⁷ Anas also observed that in the mid-1980s Arab fighters began to distance themselves from Abdullah Azzam, who subsequently became less and less central to the Afghan jihad. ‘I was shocked when I returned to Peshawar’, Anas recalled,

Alternatively, Mustafa Hamed, another Afghan fighter and the author of Chat from the top of the world, presented yet one more explanation for the fractured relationship between Usama bin Laden and Abdullah Anas. In his autobiographical account, Hamed recalled that bin Laden had begun to express some concern about corruption or a mismanagement of funds in MAK. MAK's annual expenses were reportedly $200,000 at the time (1986) and it was still dependent on support from Usama bin Laden, despite Azzam's wider fundraising efforts.Footnote ²⁹ This observation suggests a somewhat more mundane reason for the split between MAK's two primary advocates and leaders: money. With either explanation, it is probable that al-Zawahiri's influence caused bin Laden to diverge somewhat from Azzam by the end of 1986. Indeed, later on that year, bin Laden would establish Ma'sadat al-Ansaar (Lion's Den of Supporters) outside Jaji as a training camp specifically for Arab fighters as they prepared to expand the fighting to ‘infidel’ Arab governments.

Ma'sadat al-Ansaar appears to have developed somewhat slowly. Two Egyptians acted as bin Laden deputies in the camp, known by the respective noms de guerre of Abu UbaidahFootnote ³⁰ and Abu Hafs,Footnote ³¹ but it is difficult to determine how many fighters actually were based there.Footnote ³² Despite this uncertainty over numbers, accounts indicate that competition existed between different Arab factions in Afghanistan – e.g., between the Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians, and Saudis – for new recruits.Footnote ³³ Usama bin Laden apparently interacted with every faction, although his popularity continued to be based upon access to funds.Footnote ³⁴

In May 1987, Arab fighters based at Ma'sadat al-Ansaar participated in the Battle of Jaji against Soviet forces. Al-Jihad magazine reported how ‘Russia lost many of their well-respected commandos to the mujahideen. The mujahideen were thirsty for death and ready to die.’Footnote ³⁵ Although this battle was not the first engagement for the Afghan Arab fighters, their perceived victory apparently garnered attention throughout the Muslim world. As a result of this victory, moreover, recruitment increased for the nucleus of the group that would eventually become al-Qa'ida.Footnote ³⁶ Again, numbers tend to be uncertain at best. Abdullah Anas asserted that the number of Afghan Arab fighters grew from 100 in 1985 to 5,000 in 1989, following the Battle of Jaji.Footnote ³⁷ Other factors confirm the growing popularity of Usama bin Laden and his fighters. For example, al-Jihad magazine first mentioned bin Laden (or Abu Abdullah, his nom de guerre) in its June 1987 issue.Footnote ³⁸ A subsequent issue discussed Abu Ubaidah's heroics in the Battle of Jaji, recounting that Soviet planes dropped two different bombs on his location that did not explode, so he must be blessed.Footnote ³⁹ Interestingly, these stories of bin Laden and his cadre still appeared in al-Jihad, despite the ongoing tension between Azzam and bin Laden.

IV

By late 1987 or early 1988, MAK had become more engaged in humanitarian activities than fighting in the Afghan war, while Usama bin Laden's deputies had begun to draw together individuals for the formation of al-Qa'ida.Footnote ⁴⁰ Nevertheless, al-Qa'ida by no means represented the majority of Afghan Arab fighters at the time. Published minutes of the first al-Qa'ida meeting in August 1988 indicate that Abu RidaFootnote ⁴¹ claimed that 314 fighters would be trained over the next six months.Footnote ⁴² This number was approximately 15 per cent of the estimated 5,000 Arab fighters in Afghanistan following the Battle of Jaji. Perhaps more important than numbers, however, was the observation in these minutes that recruits would pledge an oath of allegiance to al-Qa'ida and its leaders. The pledge reportedly was as follows,

In February 1989, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan. This withdrawal was by no means peaceful, as Afghan fighters continued to engage Soviet forces, but it accelerated the need for al-Qa'ida to find and engage another enemy. Pamphlets written during this period indicate some debate amongst Afghan Arabs in general on the next stages of the conflict: where do we go next? It appears that some fighters wanted to attempt to free India-controlled Kashmir, while others wanted to fight against ‘infidel’ Arab regimes. Interestingly, little evidence suggests that the Afghan fighters wanted to attack the United States. For example, a magazine written in Urdu and distributed by the Afghan fighters, entitled al-Irshad, published a treatise in late 1988 on the Afghan jihad. In this article, the author discussed three types of struggle: against infidels, against Satan, and against internal desires. Significantly, the article did not mention the United States in this context, nor did it advocate that fighters attempt to challenge other Arab regimes.Footnote ⁴⁴ This article, therefore, suggests that at least some Afghan fighters wanted to re-focus on other Muslim lands under occupation.

Approximately four months later, in April 1989, Soviet forces routed Arab units at the Siege of Jalalabad. Al-Irshad addressed this defeat in its July 1989 issue, by blaming the foreign media for over-publicizing it.Footnote ⁴⁵ Like in previous issues of al-Irshad, this article criticized Russia, India, Iran, and European powers, but did not mention the United States or Arab countries. The article reinforces the finding that in the late 1980s Afghan fighters had yet to focus their attention on the United States. Most Afghan fighters similarly had yet to be persuaded to turn their efforts to overthrowing corrupt Arab regimes, instead the focus continued to be on freeing Muslim lands under occupation. In contrast to this majority opinion, al-Zawahiri not surprisingly wanted Afghan Arabs to fight to overthrow corrupt Arab regimes. To this end, al-Zawahiri issued a bulletin in May 1989 that criticized the Egyptian government and al-Azhar University. Al-Zawahiri argued that

In this regard, it appears that al-Qa'ida fighters, or at least al-Qa'ida leadership, diverged from mainstream Afghan fighters over what to do after the defeat of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

A conference on the potential next steps for jihad was convened in Rahimyar Khan, Pakistan, during the autumn of 1989 in an effort to resolve this dilemma.Footnote ⁴⁷ It appears from reports in al-Irshad magazine that much of the attention had turned to Kashmir, although this apparent emphasis could be the result of al-Irshad's focus, not the conference itself.Footnote ⁴⁸ Sources do not indicate whether or not al-Qa'ida had a presence at this conference. Al-Qa'ida may have been much less likely to participate in a conference that emphasized Kashmir, since evidence suggests that Usama bin Laden was interested primarily in Yemen. Indeed, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia in late 1989 in order to gather fighters to go to Yemen.Footnote ⁴⁹ Around the same time, bin Laden sent Mamdouh Salim to meet with Hassan al-Turabi and discuss the possibility of establishing a base in Sudan. These activities suggest that Usama bin Laden was looking for a logistical headquarters to support his fighters against the communists in Yemen.Footnote ⁵⁰ Yemen, therefore, might have been the next battlefield for al-Qa'ida in the early 1990s, while other Afghan fighters engaged Indian security forces in Kashmir, had not other historical events intervened.

In August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. This invasion, plus the response by Arab regimes and the United States, caused a series of changes in al-Qa'ida. Primarily, Usama bin Laden became disillusioned with the Saudi regime and its religious credibility. This disillusionment centred on the Saudi regime's decision to request military assistance from the United States and allow US forces to be based on the Arabian Peninsula. A number of well-respected Saudi clerics criticized the decision by Saudi Arabia to ask for protection from the United States. These opposing clerics included Sheikhs Salman al-Awdah and Safar al-Hawali, already well known to and well respected by Usama bin Laden.Footnote ⁵¹ It is logical to assume, therefore, that these clerics influenced bin Laden's decision to meet Prince Sultan and offer to replace American troops with Arab fighters from Afghanistan. This offer was refused and instead bin Laden was placed under house arrest.

While before the August 1990 invasion al-Qa'ida appeared to be diverging from other Afghan fighters, documents from the early 1990s indicate that the first Gulf War contributed to a convergence of worldviews once again. For example, an autumn 1990 issue of al-Irshad magazine argued that Russia and the United States represented Islam's most significant enemies, while the United States was barely mentioned beforehand.Footnote ⁵² Similarly, in February 1991, al-Jihad magazine editors asserted that secularism – for example, as promoted by the United States – was worse than Communism. ‘Secularism, spearheaded by America’, the magazine declared, ‘will threaten the future of Afghanistan. It will prevent morals and the laws of God from being a part of governance, and disunity among the mujahideen will serve as the doorway for secularist agenda to enter.’Footnote ⁵³ Another Urdu magazine from Afghanistan, Nusrat ul-Jihad, published a similar article in early 1991. It argued that prior to Operation Desert Storm, the United States wanted to control the supply of oil and that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait gave Americans the excuse they needed to establish a presence on the Arabian Peninsula.Footnote ⁵⁴ In this sense, al-Qa'ida leaders and other Afghan fighters both were concerned with the growth of US influence on the Arabian Peninsula as well as the presence of foreign soldiers in Saudi Arabia.

In fact, interestingly, mainstream Afghan fighters evidenced more animosity towards Western countries than did al-Qa'ida leadership at this time. In April 1991, for example, bin Laden convinced the Saudi government to allow him to travel to Pakistan. Once out of the country, bin Laden returned to al-Qa'ida camps in Afghanistan to meet with operatives and reportedly plan to assassinate the Afghan king in exile. One al-Qa'ida operative who was apparently present at this meeting, Paulo Jose de Almeida Santos, recalled that someone asked bin Laden if attacks against American civilians were permissible. According to an account in Peter Bergen's book entitled, The Osama bin Laden I know, bin Laden replied to this question by stating, ‘No. The American government is one thing, but the majority of Americans do not even vote, they are totally apathetic.’Footnote ⁵⁵ So while Usama bin Laden clearly did not want American soldiers in Saudi Arabia and was disillusioned with the Saudi regime's decision to request US protection, this concern did not equate to animosity towards Americans or Westerners in general.

In the autumn of 1991, the government in Pakistan began to pressure foreign fighters to leave the region. Arab fighters therefore dispersed to a number of different countries, including Yemen, Sudan, and Jordan. At this time, Usama bin Laden established al-Qa'ida headquarters in Sudan, but he still provided direct support to al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad as well as to militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.Footnote ⁵⁶ Indeed, al-Qa'ida apparently expanded its programme significantly in 1991 and 1992, eventually sending support to additional areas of conflict, such as Somalia, Bosnia, Tajikistan, and the Philippines.Footnote ⁵⁷ In each of these areas, al-Qa'ida trainers took on the dual responsibility of providing local fighters with new guerrilla warfare capabilities, as well as teaching a particular religious worldview and form of Islamic principles.

Al-Qa'ida also shifted its attention increasingly towards the United States at this time, following the American intervention in Somalia. In November 1992, President Clinton expressed some concern publicly over the conflict in Somalia. Usama bin Laden allegedly interpreted this concern as another indication of American interest in dominating the Muslim world. According to some sources, bin Laden anticipated Operation Restore Hope and sent al-Qa'ida operatives, Abu Ubaidah and Abu Hafs, to Kenya and Somalia to prepare to confront US forces. The purpose of al-Qa'ida activities in Somalia was to find a substitute for Afghanistan in a country closer to the Arabian Peninsula and to help train local fighters in Somalia and Ogaden.Footnote ⁵⁸ Thus, even as al-Qa'ida sent trainers to help local Somalis repel US forces, leaders still viewed this training as part of a wider effort to gain a foothold and influence on the Arabian Peninsula.

By late 1993, however, al-Qa'ida views on the conflict in Somalia and its importance to the wider jihad had changed. According to internal al-Qa'ida documents, its leadership soon determined that if al-Qa'ida could confront American forces in Somalia successfully, the US government would withdraw from the Muslim world entirely. For example, in September 1993, a letter from an operative in Somalia was sent to Osama bin Laden and al-Qa'ida leadership in Sudan and subsequently recovered by US military forces in Afghanistan. In this letter, the author complained that the Somali fighters did not have a unified objective and were reluctant to adopt al-Qa'ida's Islamic teachings.Footnote ⁵⁹ Al-Qa'ida leaders responded with their own letter, arguing that the United States was leading the largest crusade against the Muslim world in history. Al-Qa'ida leaders went on to argue that al-Qa'ida would have saved Sudan, Yemen, and Bab al Mandab (southern tip of the Red Sea) as well as the Gulf and Nile regions if it repelled US forces from Somalia. ‘When you entered Somalia, the Somali arena was barren and futile’, the letter's author wrote,

In March 1994 the US government withdrew its forces from Somalia. Usama bin Laden gave an interview to ABC News four years later, in which he claimed that this pullout emboldened al-Qa'ida and encouraged him to plan new attacks against the United States.Footnote ⁶¹ This claim has been stressed repeatedly in both academic and popular literatures. It seems logical and at first glance al-Qa'ida documents appear to reinforce this belief. For example, one internal al-Qa'ida memo written at the time of the US withdrawal asserted that al-Qa'ida was equal to the United States.Footnote ⁶² But this logic does not hold up under further scrutiny. Indeed, most al-Qa'ida documents from the early 1990s – including internal al-Qa'ida memos and publicly distributed leaflets – contradict the claim that al-Qa'ida was emboldened by US withdraw from Somalia, at least emboldened to the extent that al-Qa'ida wanted to attack the United States once again. These documents reveal instead that al-Qa'ida returned to its emphasis on confronting ‘infidel’ Arab governments.

For example, the Advisory and Reformation Committee issued its second statement in April 1994. The author criticized the Saudi regime and corruption in that country.Footnote ⁶³ Letters written at this time by operatives in Central Asia criticize al-Qa'ida's leadership for focusing too much on the Arabian Peninsula and excluding other countries in the Muslim world,

In these letters, the author then went on to argue that the US presence was growing in Central Asia while al-Qa'ida's was shrinking. Indeed, the letters indicate clear dissent between al-Qa'ida trainers deployed to the outlying non-Arab countries in the Muslim world and the priorities of al-Qa'ida leadership. This evident prioritization by al-Qa'ida leaders of the Arab regimes is particularly interesting, given al-Qa'ida's origins in the Afghan jihad. Yet, at the same time, the priority is not necessarily unanticipated. The original split between Abdullah Azzam and Usama bin Laden, after all, appeared to be the result of a disagreement on how to deploy Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad. So it makes sense that al-Qa'ida leaders would shift their attention once again towards the Arabian Peninsula after US forces withdrew from Somalia.

Reinforcing this conclusion, a fourth leaflet issued by the Advisory and Reformation Committee (May 1994) addressed the situation in Yemen. That is, the leaflet posed the question as to why Western countries chose not to intervene in Yemen's civil war. In answering this question, the leaflet provides further insight into why al-Qa'ida leaders returned to focus predominantly on Arab governments in the early to mid-1990s, ‘One of the greatest lessons learned from the events of Yemen is that Western countries – the first and foremost being America – are not willing to risk intervening to protect corrupt regimes that do not possess any credibility among their people.’Footnote ⁶⁵ Perhaps al-Qa'ida leaders simply did not believe that the US government would compromise their efforts to reform Arab regimes. If true, then it makes sense that al-Qa'ida leaders would feel free to focus on its primary objective, overthrowing secular or ‘apostate’ Arab governments, while planning attacks against US targets and motivating fighters in other parts of the Muslim world in the background.

Admittedly, it is also possible that other events outside al-Qa'ida control forced them to focus primarily on Arab governments in the early to mid-1990s, instead of the United States or other Western countries. For example, in September 1994 the Saudi government arrested Sheikh Salman al-Awdah and Sheikh Safar al-Hawali. The Advisory and Reformation Committee issued several statements in response to these arrests. The first statement argued that the Saudi regime was defective, because it enlisted Christian armies to defend itself in the Gulf War.Footnote ⁶⁶ The second claimed, ‘The time for work and seriousness has arrived. The regime that has perpetrated what contradicts the words of monotheism is floundering.’Footnote ⁶⁷ By arguing that Arab regimes had contradicted the words of monotheism, this leaflet essentially accused Arab governments of ridiculing God – really, the oneness of God or tawhid – by choosing to implement man's laws instead of God's laws. In its third statement, the Advisory and Reformation Committee argued that the Saudi regime had declared war on Islam.Footnote ⁶⁸ Finally, in its fourth statement on this issue, the Advisory and Reformation Committee asked the Saudi security apparatus to pressure the regime to release these clerics. The statement stopped short of urging a coup, but it referred to the regime's behaviour as al-kufr, implying that force could be used against the Saudi regime.Footnote ⁶⁹ Based on these documents, one could conclude that al-Qa'ida leaders were emboldened after the US withdrawal from Somalia to attack US or Western targets, but in the midst of this strategic shift events in Saudi Arabia drew their attention once again.

Finally, a shortage of funds may also have constrained al-Qa'ida plans against the United States and other Western countries. Accounts in Fawaz Gerges's The far enemy and Peter Bergen's The Osama bin Laden that I know indicate that al-Qa'ida suffered a series of financial setbacks in late 1994.Footnote ⁷⁰ These setbacks appeared to be the result of Saudi actions against Usama bin Laden and his personal wealth. Despite these setbacks, al-Qa'ida documents from this time (approximately 1994) indicate that al-Qa'ida was providing support to fighters in the Philippines, Tajikistan, Somalia, and Chechnya, as well as Yemen.Footnote ⁷¹ And so, even if al-Qa'ida fighters disagreed with the leadership's priorities and allocation of resources, al-Qa'ida had not completely abandoned jihadists in other parts of the Muslim world. So the explanation that finances constrained al-Qa'ida's agenda against the United States and other Western countries in the mid-1990s is perhaps less persuasive than others discussed in this article.

Beyond these remote conflicts, in the mid-1990s fighters from associated terrorist groups began to gather and re-group in various al-Qa'ida training camps, located primarily in Sudan and Afghanistan. For example, a large contingent of Egyptian Islamic Jihad fighters, loyal to al-Zawahiri, relocated from Yemen to Sudan. Some of these fighters had attempted to assassinate Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Sidqi in late 1993 and Egyptian counterterrorism activities had, thus, forced them to take refuge in Sudan. In his book, The far enemy, Gerges wrote that al-Zawahiri sent a letter to his followers at this time, informing them that the Egyptian Islamic jihad no longer had the capability of fighting inside Egypt.Footnote ⁷² By comparison, Zayyat wrote that al-Zawahiri rebuked his Egyptian rivals, Gama'at Islamiyya (IG), for issuing a ceasefire with the Hosni Mubarak regime.Footnote ⁷³ These two incidents do not necessarily contradict each other, as it is possible that al-Zawahiri rebuked IG while at the same time noting his own group's shortcomings. Yet the two reports suggest that even as Egyptian fighters joined Osama bin Laden in Sudan and Afghanistan, shifting their attention to a more global agenda throughout the Muslim world, many still retained their own somewhat parochial interests in overthrowing the Egyptian regime.

Beyond al-Zawahiri supporters, other fighters associated with al-Qa'ida had also begun to return from various conflicts to Sudan and Afghanistan. For example, al-Qa'ida relocated its fighters from Bosnia to Sudan after the Dayton Accords in November 1995.Footnote ⁷⁴ Al-Qa'ida camps in Afghanistan also were training fighters from Egypt, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and Palestine. Interestingly, trainees were required to undergo a written examination and sign a contract before they were accepted into these camps.Footnote ⁷⁵ This contract provides insight into the qualities and priorities sought by al-Qa'ida in its fighters:

While this contract illustrates concern by the al-Qa'ida leadership over the moral character of its recruits, it also reveals more practical worries, primarily operational security and financial burdens. It is also worthwhile to note the emphasis placed in this contract on provoking dissent amongst al-Qa'ida adversaries as essential to the furtherance of al-Qa'ida objectives. In fact, the contract equates these activities with spreading the concept of jihad to family and friends in pursuit of al-Qa'ida's revolutionary goals.

This contract goes on to describe various conditions of employment with al-Qa'ida. For example, married al-Qa'ida members are eligible to receive one week vacation every third week, while single al-Qa'ida members are only eligible to receive five days vacation every month. Al-Qa'ida members applying for vacation also were required, according to this contract, to submit their request for travel ten weeks before planned departure.Footnote ⁷⁷ Indeed, the details contained in this particular document are somewhat surprising, suggesting that al-Qa'ida had developed a fairly extensive bureaucracy by the mid-1990s.

At the same time, al-Qa'ida also began to give greater attention to the United States and countering its influence in the Muslim world, particularly on the Arabian Peninsula. In early 1996, the Saudi government pressured Sudan to expel Usama bin Laden and his followers. Most accounts view this pressure as originating at least in part from the United States. Al-Qa'ida documents suggest that its leaders immediately requested, and were granted, safe haven from individuals in Afghanistan.Footnote ⁷⁸ Presumably secure in Afghanistan, Usama bin Laden and his followers subsequently identified US interference and injustice as the primary barrier to revolution in the Muslim world. The core of this thinking can be seen in al-Qa'ida's August 1996 ‘Declaration of jihad’, which accused the United States of imperialism, massacres against the Muslim World, and corruption:

In this ‘Declaration of jihad’, Usama bin Laden then called on all Muslims to unite and fight against Israel and the United States. Two years later, al-Qa'ida members would attack US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 257 people and wounding over 4,000.

V

Not unexpectedly, some perils exist in the use of original source documents to understand a clandestine organization like al-Qa'ida. Interpreting these documents can be frustrating, as they are often undated and anonymous; when names are used, individuals frequently are referred to by their noms de guerre. Drawing on journalistic interviews and autobiographical accounts can alleviate some ambiguity, but the challenges in truth persist. It is tempting always to view the organization as making progress towards some strategic goal – in this case the 11 September 2001 attacks – and discount backward movement or mistakes. Despite these perils, the letters, autobiographical accounts, and pamphlets can provide unique insight into what is perhaps the most notorious organization of our time.

While acknowledging these challenges, this article suggests that al-Qa'ida's early history can be divided into three different stages. In the first stage of its evolution, taking place from early 1984 through 1987, al-Qa'ida leaders, or the individuals associated with what would become al-Qa'ida, placed greatest priority on repelling the Soviet ‘invaders’ from Afghanistan. This first stage and its associated priority are well accepted within the academic and expert community. Yet the splinters within MAK leadership – dissent between Abdullah Azzam and Usama bin Laden as well as the role that Egyptian jihadists played in that dissent – have yet to be fully explored or understood. Based on al-Qa'ida documents, it is clear that MAK suffered from internal fractures like many other clandestine groups. Splinters within MAK derived from very real philosophical differences, somewhat parochial interests advocated by Egyptian jihadists, and even practical issues of fiscal management. Moreover, the relative size of al-Qa'ida in its formative years tends to be over-emphasized in the academic and expert communities. In contrast, the documents explored in this article suggest that al-Qa'ida membership ranged between 50 to 314 fighters in the mid-1980s, representing only 15 per cent of the total number of Arab fighters in Afghanistan.

The second stage of al-Qa'ida's evolution is marked by a shift in emphasis towards confronting ‘corrupt’ or ‘infidel’ Arab governments. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, individuals associated with al-Qa'ida as well as other Afghan fighters were presented with a dilemma: go home or take the fight to another part of the world. While past studies have observed that al-Qa'ida chose to further its agenda in Sudan, very few have acknowledged that in many ways al-Qa'ida's emphasis on corrupt Arab regimes represented a minority view amongst Afghan fighters at that time. This somewhat contentious relationship between al-Qa'ida and other mujahideen has historical significance, of course, but it also holds relevance for scholars today as they attempt to understand the nature and degree of al-Qa'ida's appeal as the vanguard of the jihadist movement worldwide. At the very least, it poses the question of whether it is possible that local parochial interests held by various mujahideen will eventually overcome any appeal to unity presented by al-Qa'ida.

The third and final stage in the early history of al-Qa'ida, taking place from 1992 through 1996, represents an evolution in al-Qa'ida leaders' strategic thinking, towards identifying the United States and other Western countries as their primary adversary. Al-Qa'ida is often viewed as having progressed steadily towards the 11 September 2001 attacks in the mid-1990s. Yet the documents examined in this article actually suggest both forwards and backwards movement. For example, it appears that al-Qa'ida leaders focused on the United States in the early 1990s, as part of its concern over the Gulf War and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Following the withdrawal of US forces, however, al-Qa'ida leaders turned, once again, to its focus on the Muslim world and particularly the Arabian Peninsula. Thus al-Qa'ida clearly did not progress linearly, but rather changed direction back-and-forth during the mid-1990s.

Finally, this present article also calls into question the debate on whether or not the currently understood loosely ‘networked’ al-Qa'ida movement presents a greater challenge that the more hierarchically structured al-Qa'ida that existed prior to 11 September 2001. Indeed, al-Qa'ida often is portrayed as a monolithic entity during the period under examination – that is between 1984 and 1996 – with Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri firmly in control of its actions until after 11 September 2001. In examining internal al-Qa'ida documents, however, this article revealed an organization that, far from monolithic, allowed internal disagreement and debate from its inception. This aspect of al-Qa'ida's nature can be seen in the letters discussed previously between its leaders in Sudan and field operatives in Somalia, as well as the criticism from its operatives in Central Asia. So perhaps it is more useful, in this regard, to ask the question ‘how do we confront the threat posed by al-Qa'ida as an adaptive organization that accepts criticism from both inside and outside its structure?’ regardless of whether that structure is a loose network or hierarchical.

In conclusion, this article also highlights the utility of using historical methodologies to examine terrorism. Some might argue that the topic is better suited to political science or international relations. This article demonstrates that new insight can be gained through the examination of original source materials, including how themes and worldviews presented in these materials evolve over time. This approach presents some challenges, of course, not the least of which is obtaining access to such materials. Yet this article demonstrates that those alternative sources exist for terrorist groups and, when examined, they can deepen our understanding of the terrorist phenomenon.