We report here on recent developments in Israel on the issue of sex selection for nonmedical reasons by preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Sex selection for medical reasons (such as in cases of sex-linked genetic diseases) is generally viewed as uncontroversial and legal in European and American law. Its use for nonmedical reasons (like “balancing” the gender ratio in a family) is generally illegal in European countries. In the United States, it is not illegal, although in the opinion of the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), it is problematic. This position is undergoing reconsideration, albeit in a limited way.
When sex selection is done for medical reasons—say, preventing the birth of a child with a particular genetic defect that is sex-linked—the procedure is generally viewed as ethical and acceptable. But sex selection for nonmedical reasons has generally not been accepted as an ethical practice in Western countries. One concern is that the sex selection techniques could lead to a wildly skewed number of males and females in society. Another is that sex selection is a form of sexism—that is, that it regards one gender as inherently superior (preferable) to the other. Some others see allowing the use of PGD for sex selection as a slippery slope to nonmedical, nonillness-based eugenics, as the same technique can be used to test for other genetic traits. Once we allow parents the option to choose the sex of their child for nonmedical reasons, they say, will we not be forced to permit choosing among embryos for other traits?
There are currently no legal restrictions on laboratories offering sex selection for nonmedical reasons in the United States, and an Internet search quickly identifies various laboratories that currently offer the service. However, although in 1999 the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine concluded that PGD used for sex selection to prevent the transmission of serious genetic disease is ethically acceptable, it said that the use of PGD for nonmedical reasons was problematic and should be discouraged because it poses a risk of unwarranted gender bias, social harm, and results in the diversion of medical resources from genuine medical need.Footnote 1 In 2001, the Ethics Committee took up the question of preconception (as opposed to preimplantation) sex selection. It concluded that sex selection aimed at increasing gender variety in a family should not be prohibited or condemned as unethical in all cases. If the social, psychological, and demographic effects of such use of preconception sex selection are found to be acceptable, then other nonmedical uses of preconception sex selection might be considered.Footnote 2
Subsequently, J.A. Robinson, the Chair of the ASRM Ethics Committee, reported that the Ethics Committee reaffirmed its previous conclusion that initiating in vitro fertilization (IVF) and PGD solely for nonmedical sex selection “should be discouraged.” The interest in choosing the sex of offspring is not necessarily strong enough to justify the creation and destruction of embryos for that purpose, he explained. (Preconception techniques like “sperm sorting” do not create embryos that are to be discarded if of the “wrong” gender.) Robinson added that there has not been sufficient ethical and social debate as to whether there are circumstances in which embryos (even if none were destroyed) may be created and selected for transfer on nonmedical grounds alone and concluded that these issues deserve close attention in the future.Footnote 3
Writing in the same issue of Fertility and Sterility that contained Robinson's clarification, Gleicher and KarandeFootnote 4 reported the conclusion of the institutional review board (IRB) of The Center for Human Reproduction, arguing that “[g]ender selection for nonmedical reasons either is or is not ethical. If the ASRM maintains its official position that it potentially is ethical (in reference to preconception techniques), then one has to reach the same conclusion for all applicable techniques and leave it up to the patients which to choose.” They conclude that “selected information and limited access to only one procedure option, especially if it is the qualitatively inferior one, appears, though currently the formal ASRM position, of questionable validity.” Indeed, creating embryos that will not be subsequently implanted is commonplace in assisted reproduction. Although ethical guidelines suggest limiting the number of fertilized eggs implanted after IVF to limit the eventual necessity of multifetal pregnancy reduction, no attempt is made to minimize the number of eggs harvested or then fertilized through IVF. In virtually all IVF laboratories, the disposal of fertilized eggs that are not implanted is at the discretion of the couple and can include instructing the laboratory to destroy unused embryos, donate them to other couples or research, or have them cryopreserved.
New Israeli Regulations
In 2005, the Israeli Ministry of HealthFootnote 5 created a legal mechanism for allowing sex selection for nonmedical reasons through PGD. The Health Ministry's decision followed a joint recommendation by the Ministry's Helsinki committee on genetic experimentation in humans and the bioethics committee of the Israeli National Academy of Sciences. It set up a seven-person committee authorized to approve such procedures. The committee consisted of a clinical psychologist, an expert in the field of medical/bioethics, a social worker, a legal expert, a doctor with expertise in genetics, a doctor with expertise in obstetrics and gynecology who is working in the field of fertility, and a clergyman of the faith of the petitioning couple. Four criteria had to be met to consider the possibility of sex selection via PGD.
1. There was, in the absence of such permission, a real and present danger of damage to the mental health or well-being of both parents, one of the parents, or to the child who would be born;
2. The applicants have at least four children of one gender and none of the other, with the exception of rare and idiosyncratic cases;
3. The applicants had received proper and thorough counseling regarding the procedure, any possible danger, and the status of the unused embryos;
4. The applicants understood that if all the embryos created through this procedure were not of the desired sex, a second cycle would not be allowed until these embryos were used for reproductive purposes.
The memo does not provide a detailed explication of the bases of these criteria, although some rationale appears clear. The third is good medical practice and the fourth clearly reflects the desire to prevent the creation of embryos as a trivial matter. (Y. Shafran, director of the Jerusalem Rabbinate's Department of Medicine and Halakha [Jewish Law], in a personal communication to D.J. Krieger, 9 April 2006, indicates that he could foresee a couple claiming that donating the embryo for research fulfilled this fourth condition.) The second criteria speaks to limiting the impact of “family balancing” in driving sex selection, and the first reflects the importance of taking note of mental distress in evaluating the ethical nature of a proposed procedure.
Although these regulations were promulgated by a secular Israeli body, they reflect, to a large degree, the position of Halakha (Jewish Law) as articulated by contemporary religious Jewish authorities. This is not surprising, for, as Shapira notes:
In Israel, the bulk of the population leads an essentially secularist, liberal, and permissive individual lifestyle. At the same time, certain cultural–religious values, institutions, practices, and injunctions are formally woven into the Israeli communal fabric. Consequently, the bioethical discourse in Israel has evolved in a socio-cultural context which manifests a unique mix of orthodoxy and secularism, of communal paternalism and assertive individualism, of proscription and permissiveness, of religious norms and liberal ethical values. There can be no denying of the impact of Jewish religious tenets, and the political groups that champion them, on the shaping of Israeli biomedical jurisprudence. Yet it would be wrong to assume that such impact invariably has been prohibitive and restrictive. The insistence of including a clergyman of the couple's faith on the Israeli regulatory committee reflects an awareness that religious values play an important role in addressing such requests.Footnote 6
Halakhic Judaism and Fertility Therapy
There is no single source of authority in contemporary Jewish law. Positions on contemporary issues are developed by circulation of responsa (rabbinic rulings) to questions posed to various rabbinic authorities. Collegial review and community acceptance eventually allow for specific opinions to emerge as dominant. Yet, even when one view surfaces as authoritative, individual rabbis or layman will often defer to their local authority, whose position is considered decisive.
GraziFootnote 7 describes fully the major issues concerning the interface of fertility medicine and religion in the lives of contemporary halakhically observant couples. As a general statement, Halakhic Judaism welcomes with enthusiasm the new opportunities to help couples overcome the pain of infertility. However, it has its own ethical concerns that might limit the applicability or acceptability of various therapies and protocols. Although the position is not universally endorsed, if the gametes of the married couple are used, intrauterine insemination (IUI) and IVF are generally viewed as legitimate procedures to overcome infertility problems. There is, however, vigorous debate among halakhic authorities regarding the use of donor gametes, especially donor sperm. In one view, donor sperm violates the exclusivity of marriage to such an extent that it should be rejected as too akin to adultery. In the other view, the absence of any physical sexual contact leaves the process as ethically acceptable. A minority of halakhists maintains that a child born through artificial insemination or IVF is not legally related to its genetic father and, in fact, has no legal father. The majority view, however, is that child has the same legal relationship to his or her genetic father as if conception had occurred naturally. In both cases the social father is akin to a foster parent.
Halakha sees no intrinsic moral difficulty in wanting a child of a particular sex, and the Talmud even proposes various noninvasive folk suggestions to help realize one's desire. However, the personal desire to have specifically a son or daughter does not in and of itself override the halakhic imperative to maintain natural marital relations. Hence Zilberstein,Footnote 8 who regularly contributes rabbinic responsa to the Israeli Medical Halakha Group, rejects IVF for sex selection (“sperm sorting” not having been developed at that time): “[Normally] God joins with man and wife [in creating a child],” he writes “but here it is the doctor's hand [instead].” Rabbinic general aversion to sex selection for nonmedical purposes was confirmed when the Israeli Ministry of Health issued its guidelines. Rabbinic authorities were quotedFootnote 9 as condemning sex selection for noncompelling personal parental satisfaction as antithetical to traditional Jewish values.
That notwithstanding, Zilberstein continues, “one cannot close the door in the face of despondent people who suffer mental anguish in fear of giving birth to sick children, pressure which can drive the mother mad. Therefore, in the case of a serious genetic disease which affects the couple, it is difficult to forbid the suggestion [for genetic screening through PGD].” It is important to note that it is the mental anguish of the parents that creates a compelling situation that allows for the genetic screening and, in a sense, creates the medical need. It is such an approach that allows many halakhists to allow abortion of a fetus diagnosed with Tay Sachs disease. It is the parents' legitimate distress rather than the child's medical condition that creates the compelling situation necessary to allow the abortion. This is not meant to compare the mental anguish of a parent of a terminally ill child to that of a parent's mental anguish resulting from the birth of a child of “the wrong sex.” These situations are not commensurable. Rather, it establishes mental anguish as a legitimate consideration for considering PGD without implying a threshold case (such as a seriously sick child) as a minimum condition to consider PGD.
O. Yosef, former Chief Rabbi of Israel, recently ruled that PGD for sex selection could be used by a couple who had six children of one sex and who would not have any more children unless they were sure that the seventh would be of the opposite sex (personal communication to R.V. Grazi, 27 November 2005). Eliyahu, also a former Chief Rabbi of Israel, similarly permitted sex selection for a couple who had five children of the same sex.Footnote 10 Exactly what circumstances would deserve similar permissive halakhic rulings remains to be explicated. However, the motivation seems to include the traditional halakhic imperative to encourage couples to have many children, together with the realization that families with many children of the same sex would be encouraged to have yet additional children if they could be sure of a child of the opposite sex.
An interesting case of distress was addressed by Israeli authorities some three years before the promulgation of the current regulations. A kohen is a descendant of the biblical High Priest Aaron and has special public duties and rights in the synagogue. Within a religious community, it is obvious who is a kohen and who is not. A male child inherits this status only through his genetic father. A sterile kohen whose wife was undergoing donor insemination was concerned that every member of the community would know that the child was not his genetic son, destroying his privacy in the matter. He therefore requested PGD to guarantee a daughter.
The Israeli Health Ministry's legal adviser, Mira Hivner-Harel, had allowed the procedure at Hadassah Medical Center in Jerusalem on an ad hoc basis, the current regulations having not yet been issued. “In light of the fact that we are concerned with an individual for whom the halakha and religion are his guiding principles … there was room to agree to his request,” she said. “We are dealing with a family that would not have any children had we not allowed them to select the sex of the fetus. Sometimes we have to adapt our decisions to the spirit and traditions of the people.”Footnote 11 In an identical case a decade before, A. Lichtenstein,Footnote 12 Dean of Yeshivat Har Etzion in Israel, had indicated that meeting such a request was in conformity of Halakha.
The distress that led to the request for sex selection to guarantee a boy did not stem from gender bias (in the sense of extending greater worth to one gender over another) but from an idiosyncratic situation in Jewish law. A different case that resulted in the desire for a male child was reported by Grazi and Wolowelsky.Footnote 13 It concerned the halakhic consideration of yichud, which prohibits unrelated men and women from being alone together in a closed room unobserved by a third party. Adopted children are halakhically unrelated to their social parents and siblings, and therefore some halakhists consider the prohibitions of yichud as applicable to them. For this reason, some halakhists discourage adoption in general. Other authorities argue that the deep psychological sexual taboos that exist in normal families are to be found in those families where the child was adopted at birth, and therefore waive yichud considerations in such families.Footnote 14 In the case of donor sperm, the child is halakhically related to the mother but not her husband, the social father. She has no yichud prohibitions with either a male or a female child, because she is the mother. But those who apply yichud prohibitions to adoptive families would impose them on living relationships between the social father and a female child, but not between the social father and a male child (as yichud does not apply to unrelated people of the same sex). The halakhic authority who had allowed the donor sperm also insisted on sex selection for a male child to avoid yichud problems and allow for the regular social interaction common to biological families.
Both cases presented deal with despondent people desirous of children who are suffering mental anguish. In one case there exists the fear of a family situation that will be devoid of the normal interactions of natural families or, in the second case, there exists potential for intense embarrassment and invasion of one's privacy. From the halakhic perspective, these may be considered compelling circumstances allowing treating the cases as those allowed on medical grounds. Indeed, in both of these cases, the rabbinic approval comes against a backdrop of disapproval for sex selection for anything other than medical reasons. The procedure bears limited risk of consequences detrimental to individuals. These represent a use of medical resources for reasons of human mental health. There is little chance of this having any major societal impact, given the idiosyncratic nature of the situation.
Conclusion
A hearing of the Knesset (Israeli parliament) following the promulgation of the regulationsFootnote 15 showed an uneasiness with the promulgation of these guidelines by regulation from the Ministry of Health instead of being anchored in law. It called for the drafting of legislation and Knesset debate relating to its specifics, allowing for a full debate on the issues and an explanation of the rationale behind the specifics of the regulations. This was reaffirmed at a subsequent meeting a year later.Footnote 16 It was reported there that in the year and a half since the promulgation of the Israeli regulations, 124 applications were made to the committee. Three were approved and 39 were rejected because the circumstances were not considered compelling enough to allow the procedure. The rest were still under consideration. Of the three that were approved, two were cases identical to the kohen case above. The third case approved was that of a couple requesting a girl after four boys. Thus all three fell under the rubric of the second criterion of the regulations: “The applicants have at least four children of one gender and none of the other, with the exception of rare and idiosyncratic cases.”
Current regulations remain in effect pending legislative action. Clearly the rationale of the Israeli guidelines includes an assumption that not each and every request for nonmedical sex selection through PGD is inherently unethical, especially when it does not reflect conferring greater worth to one gender over another and is supported by the major religious and ethical traditions that inform its societal secular ethical sensitivities. Respect for the ethical and religious universe of one's patients should be a natural component of any therapeutic protocol, especially in those cases where its concerns reflect the overall attitude of the general medical community.
No doubt policies will continue to evolve in various countries and societies after examining how sex selection for nonmedical purposes via PGD is implemented. The Israeli model provides a contribution to the discussion.
