Gathering more or less independent essays and presenting them as a book is not easy to do. Gaps and, above all, overlaps may be a problem, but what may be more annoying is a certain lack of unity that would deprive the collection of its interest as a book. It is especially risky when the chapters were not specifically written to be included in the same book. The internal logic and objective of an essay are not the same as those required for a book. But, fortunately enough, the problem is avoided in Maria Cristina Marcuzzo’s Fighting Market Failure: Collected Essays in the Cambridge Tradition of Economics, even though the fifteen chapters of the book have all previously been published as journal articles or book chapters. A first reason is precisely that each of these chapters was written with the same objective: to present a part of the Cambridge tradition of economics—in that case, not Alfred Marshall’s Cambridge but the one of John M. Keynes, Richard Kahn, Joan Robinson, and Piero Sraffa. No surprise if, put together, these essays also contribute to give a better understanding and a clearer view of the “unconventional” lives these economists lived (part I), of the richness of their collaborations (part II), and of their ideas (part III). Indeed, each chapter provides, especially for a non-specialist like me, a lot of valuable information.
But that is not all. Marcuzzo also claims that this collection of essays should be read as a book because it shows that Keynes, Kahn, Robinson, and Sraffa were a “group of economists” rather than a “school of economics.” Her argument is that a group rests on “both the idea of cohesion and sharing” (p. 1) but does not imply the “adhesion to a common body of doctrine” (p. 1), as is the case in a school (see the introduction and chapter 1, pp. 21–23). And, despite frequent and intense discussions and collaborations, no one loses his or her identity, a lot of variety remains among the theories each member develops, and disagreements never disappear.
The idea was probably added afterwards—it appears only in the most recent of the articles. But, judging from the evidence Marcuzzo gives about the type of collaboration between Keynes and Kahn, the “intellectual partnership” between Kahn and Robinson, or between Sraffa and the others, it nonetheless seems to make sense: they were a group. At least partially, because it does not rule out the possibility that they were also a school. Or, to put it differently, the differences with a school do not seem that important. First, I am tempted to say that the type of interactions they had at Cambridge do not seem to differ from those they have in “schools.” Take the example of the so-called Chicago School of Economics. Maybe the Chicagoans did not live as unconventional lives as did the Cambridgeans, but they also had a lot of discussions and exchanges. And, even if they shared a common body of doctrine, based on the confidence in free markets, there remained many technical differences between them and a certain variance in their theories. Adhesion to a common doctrine does not prevent technical differences.
Reciprocally, and this is the second point I would like to emphasize, when one reads Marcuzzo’s book, it seems that the disagreements between Keynes, Kahn, Robinson, and Sraffa were essentially technical and that they were united by a much more profound bond, their common “‘distrust’ of neo-classical economics and free markets” (p. 6). This is what Marcuzzo shows in certain chapters and emphasizes also in the introduction of the book. Of course, a renowned specialist of Cambridge economics, Marcuzzo could not and does not miss this. But she stresses that such “distrust” was “framed … in the terms of a theory of imperfect competition ” (p. 6), as if it meant that such a theory was more (or even only) analytical or technical than ideological or doctrinal. From my point of view, these theories were only a (technical) means to express a more profound, and ideological, conviction about the instability and flaws of capitalism. I would say that this belief represents a “common body of doctrine.” And this implies a connection with what is said about market failures.
In effect, as the subtitle of the book clearly indicates, Marcuzzo interprets the analyses of “imperfect competition” as analyses of “market failures.” I think this is misleading, not only because there is a form of anachronism to refer to “market failure” before 1958, when Francis Bator used the term for the first time in economics, but also because there is a difference between “market failures” and the “failures” these economists from Cambridge targeted in their writings (see Marciano and Medema, Reference Marciano and Medema2015). Essentially, the economists who adopted “market failures” after Bator believed markets work, are usually efficient, and fail only in certain circumstances. “Bator’s market failures” are narrow, narrower than the failures envisaged by Cambridge economists, who were convinced that failures are the rule in a market economy and not the exception. This has serious implications, in particular in terms of how to correct them. In effect, “market failures,” in Bator’s and the post-Bator sense, can be solved through limited and isolated, occasional, interventions of the state or even without the intervention of the state. By contrast, the “failures” of markets in the more profound sense of the word used at Cambidge in those years requires more radical solutions. This is exactly what Keynes, for instance, had in mind, and who “saw the main task of economic theory as that of ‘transmutating human nature’ rather than managing it” (Keynes 1945, cited by Marcuzzo, p. 209). I would say that using the expression “market failures” tends to deflect our attention from the need for profound and structural solutions.
But, one should not forget that this approach raises a lot of questions. Such as: How and how far can we change human nature or who could we trust to do that? Can we trust the individuals to reform themselves? It is not certain. Of course, these economists rather favored the intervention of the state. But then, another problem should be mentioned: the cure would be better than the disease and governments could also fail. But nothing is said about these problems in the book. To some extent, one could say that there was no need to raise those issues in a book devoted to a tradition of economists who, themselves, did not raise those issues. And, in addition, this does not even limit their analyses of market imperfections. But it certainly limits the possibility to use their conclusions to “fight market failures.” In particular, it may question the possibility to use these analyses to explain the crisis that has affected our societies since 2008, as, in the introduction of the volume, Cristina Marcuzzo suggests it could be done.
