Paul Spicker usually has some challenging reflections to offer. For this book he was asked to make a broad non-technical case for ‘the welfare state’. As I am only too aware this is no easy task even when confined to an economic brief. But here Spicker takes on moral and philosophical arguments too. In one chapter he summarises the case he has made before: that individualism, the capacity of individuals to choose and prosper in freedom, requires collective action. Without security, financial as well as physical, choice and freedom disappear.
The book ranges very widely, discussing the nature of accountability in public, private and mutual organisations, their differing patterns of trust and organisational incentives. Those who advocate social welfare solutions are usually seeking to apply a set of values not shared by opponents. But welfare institutions can reflect some very troubling values too. As anyone who has presented first year social policy lectures knows, ‘welfare’ is a slippery eel to catch.
To his credit Spicker does not duck that challenge. He takes moral or ethical debate as central to his argument contrasting what different ethical and religious traditions say or might say about the goals that welfare states seem to embody and using examples from varied welfare traditions. This wide treatment has to be undertaken at an introductory level but it will help students to think about the often implicit moral values to be found in social policy and in its opponents’ positions.
Given his task it is also understandable that the case against the state getting involved in schools or health care – or anything much beyond the safety of the realm – gets fairly short shrift. But why is it that state involvement in health care is anathema to many Americans? To them this is a moral issue. So, too, is the belief that state welfare drives out human compassion limiting the incentive to undertake charitable acts. We may not agree, given that there is good evidence to the contrary, but perhaps we need to understand this revulsion better.
Spicker is surely right to argue that the case for collective action stems in large part from rational self-interest. Insurance markets just do not work well enough to save us from the potentially catastrophic consequences of the risks life can throw at us. People recognise that intuitively, and from personal examples they see around them. Hence the support the NHS garners. Then, there is the social investment case for public services: an older intellectual tradition that is getting more notice. It might have been worth spending more time pressing home these economic hard-headed arguments.
I was prompted to get down my old copy of Furniss and Tilton (Reference Furniss and Tilton1977). Their general case was advanced in an early chapter but most of the content was comparative, using British, Swedish and American histories to illustrate different conceptions of what welfare states might be. How far has the pattern reasoning used by social policy advocates changed over time? With whom is it resonating and failing? Support for ‘welfare’ amongst the young seems to have waned in the UK. Why? That there are more questions raised by the book is a tribute not a criticism.
