With the Persian Gulf region once more occupying a central place in both British and American external policies and interests, the publication of W. Taylor Fain's new book is especially welcome. Focusing on the period of oil expansion in the early 1950s to formal British withdrawal from the region twenty years later, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region provides a detailed account using official sources from both sides of the Atlantic.
A number of themes emerge from the study. The first relates to the dualistic nature of American policy that favored the British presence as a stabilizing force in the context of the Cold War but conversely sought to distance the United States from Britain for fear of being tainted, in the eyes of local nationalists, with British imperialism. It is not surprising that this ambivalent approach riled the British, who sought American support for their polices and position in the region. Indeed, Britain's attempt to turn American power and resources to its own advantage is another key analytical strand to emerge from the book. British efforts in this regard reached their apogee during the premiership of Harold Macmillan, who, having succeeded Sir Anthony Eden following the 1956 Suez debacle, entered No. 10 Downing Street at a particularly delicate time for Anglo–American relations. Macmillan sought to align British and American policies in the region through his doctrine of “interdependence.” Nevertheless, this proved an inappropriate tool for the management of Anglo–American relations because, as Taylor Fain points out (p. 138),
an examination of Anglo-American policies in the Persian Gulf region during the Kennedy-Macmillan years reveals the very different interests, priorities, and perceptions of threat each nation defined for itself in the area. While the United States worked to integrate the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula into the larger structure of its Cold War architecture of containment, Britain struggled to secure its more immediate interests in the region.
Taking his analysis still further, Taylor Fain remarks that “Britain and America's interests were not identical. They coincided more often than not but were rooted in different interpretations of the Gulf region's ultimate value to their larger foreign polices” (p. 202). The limits of British and American power in the region is another recurring theme. In particular, Taylor Fain is keen to emphasize “the degree to which U.S. and British diplomacy in the Gulf region during these years was hostage, in many ways, to local rivalries and animosities that long antedated the Cold War” (p. 9).
American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf is in many ways an impressive book, being erudite, well written, and extensively researched. However, the relatively light engagement with the historiography, something not helped by the absence of a section for secondary sources in the bibliography, could be seen as a flaw. Although a fairly minor point, Taylor Fain's depiction of Labor Foreign Secretary George Brown's approach to foreign policy is rather ambiguous. At one point he is portrayed as contending “vehemently with his cabinet colleagues that Britain must continue to play an important role in defending Western interests east of Suez” (p. 141), yet at another he is characterized as a leading pro-European (p. 162). Moreover, the claim that the invasion by Iran of the disputed Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs shortly before formal British departure from the region “deeply embarrassed the British” (p. 190) does not take sufficient account of the fact that, even if the move was not exactly a coordinated one, the British were fully aware of Iranian intentions.
These reservations aside, W. Taylor Fain has produced a significant book that will add to the growing literature on Anglo–American relations and the end of empire in the Persian Gulf. His suggestion that “the roots of America's direct, large-scale military involvement in the Gulf, which began in the late 1970s, lay in its inability to establish viable proxies for British power in the area” (p. 2) clearly has considerable relevance to the contemporary situation in the region.
