One of the most significant areas of scholarly disagreement concerning U.S. neutrality policy during World War I involves Woodrow Wilson's “strategic calculations.” By this I mean Wilson's view of the war's implications for U.S. national security and the way in which he related the balance of power between the belligerents at different points in time to his diplomatic objectives. Historians markedly differ on this topic, with some claiming that Wilson paid little attention to strategic matters and others asserting that he did but diverging over the content and importance of the president's strategic views.Footnote 1
One way to illuminate this topic is to compare Wilson's view of the war from late 1914 to early 1915 with that of his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, and to analyze how those views shaped the response of the two leaders to the sinking of the Lusitania, which killed over 1,000 civilians, including well over 100 Americans. Bryan and Wilson shared some basic ideas about the war. Both wanted the United States to stay out of it, both wanted the United States to mediate an end to it, and both of them saw mediation as a doorway to reforming international politics. Their strategic calculations concerning the war differed, however, and that difference is central to explaining why Wilson chose to pursue a remarkably confrontational policy toward Germany's submarine campaign, one of the most important decisions that Wilson made in the neutrality period.
Bryan's analysis of the war began with his conviction that U.S. national security had nothing to do with who won it or with how it affected neutral rights or international law. Whatever the outcome of the war, the United States would be safe because of its remote geographic location in the world and its great potential military resources. These advantages made it very difficult for any power to threaten American territory or American interests in the Western Hemisphere. To Bryan, this basic reality meant that American security was assured regardless of whatever happened in the war.Footnote 2
It followed from this conception of security that the United States should be neutral in the war and totally impartial in its attitude toward the belligerents. Bryan also believed that America's detachment from the war imposed upon it a duty to try to mediate an end to the conflict and, through mediation, to build a reformed international system based on disarmament and the principle of resolving disputes through peaceful investigations during a “cooling-off” period.Footnote 3
Lastly, after mid-September 1914, Bryan saw the war as stalemated. This meant that the time for mediation was now—the United States should continuously press the belligerents to start peace talks. The belligerents would never start talks themselves, Bryan argued, because they were too caught up in emotions of fear and hate generated by the fighting. Moreover, prospects for international reform would be best advanced by ending the war before one side won, because the winner would try to uphold peace by repressing the loser with superior force, something Bryan believed would lead to another war.Footnote 4
These views all shaped how Bryan responded to the Lusitania attack in May 1915. Given the U.S. position of isolated security, Bryan believed, Germany's intent in its submarine warfare was not to challenge or provoke the United States. Instead, Germany was attacking Britain and Americans unfortunately got in the way. Germany also was not unique in breaking international law that was aimed at protecting civilians since, to Bryan, Britain's maritime blockade against foodstuffs going to Germany amounted to the same thing. At the same time, Bryan perceived that German leaders were angry at the United States because of U.S. munitions sales to the Allies and the administration's failure to strongly protest Britain's blockade.Footnote 5
Bryan concluded from all of this that U.S. policy should aim to de-escalate the crisis and reassert U.S. impartiality toward the belligerents. The point of policy should be to avoid a spiral of anger and recrimination between the United States and Germany that could lead to a war that was completely needless from a U.S. security perspective and that would ruin America's chances for mediation and international reform. He therefore proposed that the administration unilaterally warn off or stop Americans from traveling on belligerent ships and refuse U.S. port clearance to passenger liners carrying munitions. The goal of these steps was to avoid another submarine incident involving Americans on belligerent ships and to signal Germany that the chief U.S. concern with submarine warfare was for Germany not to attack U.S. ships or passenger liners of any nationality that did not carry munitions. Secondly, either at the same time or prior to a note to Germany on the Lusitania, the United States should send a protest to Britain about the food blockade. This would reaffirm America's impartiality and signal to Germany that just as the United States was flexible in dealing with the blockade's infringements on neutral rights, so too would it be flexible in its response to submarine warfare. Third, in the note to Germany, the administration should assert its neutral rights but also state a willingness to investigate factual disputes concerning the Lusitania episode, such as whether or not it was armed, and make it clear that America's chief concern was with the safety of U.S. ships and American citizens traveling only on unarmed belligerent merchant ships and passenger liners. This would convey to Germany a willingness to negotiate and to allow Germany to do a submarine campaign against armed belligerent merchant ships.
President Wilson rejected all of Bryan's recommendations and the secretary resigned on June 7, 1915. This happened even though, as indicated earlier, Wilson agreed with Bryan that the United States should stay out of the war, strive to mediate an end to it, and use mediation as a springboard for reforming international politics. If anything, Wilson was even more dedicated to the goals of mediation and reform than Bryan because he thought a second general war might engulf the United States. Wilson also agreed with Bryan that a decisive victory by one side or the other would just lay the seeds for another conflict.Footnote 6
Despite these shared views, Wilson adopted a very hard line toward Germany's submarine campaign. In his first two notes to Berlin after the Lusitania attack, he essentially demanded that Germany abandon submarine warfare altogether. In any case, he insisted that American citizens had a right to travel safely not just on American vessels, but on belligerent merchant and passenger ships too. He refused to issue a warning to American citizens not to travel on belligerent ships, would not refuse port clearance to passenger liners carrying munitions, would not indicate any willingness to investigate disputed facts surrounding the Lusitania, and would not send a simultaneous protest note to London against the blockade.Footnote 7
Some historians argue that Wilson did display flexibility toward the submarine campaign because in his third note to Germany, the president conceded that the Germans could conduct submarine warfare according to so-called cruiser rules of visit and search. But this concession did not exactly de-escalate the crisis. Wilson still refused to warn off or stop Americans from traveling on belligerent ships. He also rebuffed Germany's signals that it was willing to refrain from attacks upon American ships and, indeed, all neutral vessels, so long as they did not carry contraband. Rather than negotiate with Germany on such an arrangement, Wilson continued to demand that the Germans practice visit and search on all belligerent merchant ships, including, specifically, armed merchant ships. These were extreme positions given that submarines were obviously vulnerable in any surface confrontation with an armed merchant vessel; that no other neutral nation insisted that their citizens enjoy safety from attack on belligerent ships; and that the administration itself, as Bryan reminded Wilson, had earlier advised American citizens not to travel to another war-torn area, Mexico.Footnote 8
Wilson's strategic calculations lay behind his policy difference with the secretary over the Lusitania. Unlike Bryan, Wilson believed that if Germany won the war, it would pose a potential national security threat to the United States. A victorious Germany, he feared, might attempt to extend its power into the Western Hemisphere. Even if it didn't, Wilson thought the United States would react to a German victory in the war by massively increasing its defense establishment, to the point that America's free way of life would be threatened. As he stated several times soon after the war broke out, if Germany won, “we shall be forced to take such measures of defence here as would be fatal to our form of Government and American ideals.”Footnote 9
Wilson's statements along these lines were not emotional outbursts delivered only while Germany swept into France, as some historians suggest. The president continued to express apprehensions about the consequences of a German victory even after the German advance into France was halted, in mid-September 1914. He did so, specifically, on September 30, November 25, December 3, and December 14. And he did so again in early February 1915 and on June 16, 1915. To be sure, in a conversation with his advisor Colonel Edward M. House on November 4, 1914, Wilson did appear to dismiss the possibility of Germany threatening the United States if it won the war. He made this comment, however, in the context of trying to convince House that it would be politically risky in late 1914 to propose an increase in the army—his remark seemed more like a debating point in this argument than a genuine belief. In any event, Wilson did not repeat it again. In short, the evidence shows that Wilson saw Germany as a potential threat to the United States—a security calculation at odds with Bryan's.Footnote 10
Wilson's assessment of the state of the war in late 1914 and early 1915 also differed from Bryan's. The secretary, as we have seen, viewed the war as a stalemate. He thought it was possible that one side or the other could eventually break the deadlock and win a decisive victory, but he did not give any detailed thought to who might win or when. Wilson, in contrast, had a much more complicated analysis of the balance of power between the belligerents. Once Germany's initial offensive into France failed by mid-September 1914, Wilson thought it was unlikely Germany could defeat the Allies. The Allied coalition was simply stronger than Germany's. Sooner or later, it would roll back Germany's armies and win. This process would probably begin in summer 1915, when the Allies planned to launch their own offensive against the Germans. Even if this offensive failed, Wilson still expected the Allies eventually to win the war, because the longer a stalemate continued, the more the Allied advantage in resources would make itself felt.Footnote 11
At the turn of year 1914–1915, Wilson had some hope that German leaders recognized the futility of their situation, because of reports Col. House received that Berlin might be interested in peace talks based on the status quo ante bellum in the West and disarmament. These reports led Wilson to send House to London and Berlin in early 1915, to see if talks could indeed take place. Once House was in Europe, though, the Germans made it clear that they had no interest in peace talks because they believed they were winning the war. British leaders, on the other hand, seemed grudgingly open to the idea of talks based upon German evacuations in the West and post-war disarmament, at least once they had begun to beat back German forces in France.Footnote 12
By March–April 1915, right before the German sinking of the Lusitania, Wilson concluded that the best approach to the war was to stay on good terms with the British and wait on any mediation effort until the Allies enjoyed more military success against the Germans. This posture was consistent with U.S. security interests, since it in effect aligned the United States with the coalition that posed no threat to America. It also seemed like the best way to advance the goals of mediation and international reform. Allied military success would hopefully get the Germans to recognize the reality that they could not win the war. As Wilson told Bryan on April 27, just a few days before the Lusitania crisis, “reasonableness has not yet been burned into them [the Germans].” Only after a military setback would Germany embrace peace talks. Keeping up good relations with the Allies, meanwhile, would ensure that as they began to prevail over Germany, they would listen to Wilson's argument that the best outcome for a lasting peace was not a crushing victory but an American-mediated settlement based on the status quo ante bellum.Footnote 13
These calculations all structured how Wilson responded to the Lusitania sinking. Seeing Germany as a potential threat to the United States, he interpreted the attack as at least in part a challenge to the United States, as an effort by German leaders to coerce the administration into confronting Britain more forcefully over its blockade. Even more so, Wilson immediately perceived that his standing with London—his “influence in settling the war” as one advisor put it—was at stake in the crisis. A weak response would damage his diplomatic credibility with the British and could lead them to ignore Wilson's views on peace terms once they started to push the Germans back on the battlefield. Conversely, a forceful policy could gain Wilson influence with London and impair Germany's use of the submarine weapon, which could help to alter Germany's perception that it could still win the war—a perception, again, that Wilson thought was blocking peace efforts.Footnote 14
Historians who downplay the significance of Wilson's strategic calculations point to other factors that may have led the president to take such a tough stance against Germany's submarine campaign. Some scholars assert that economic interest lay behind the policy. In this interpretation, Wilson wanted to impair Germany's U-boat campaign because it threatened U.S. trade with Britain. This argument is unconvincing, though, because in early 1915 this trade was not yet very important to the U.S. economy and because there is no evidence of Wilson being concerned about submarines threatening such trade at the time he devised his submarine policy. When Wilson and his advisors did discuss economic matters concerning the war in early 1915, they tended to focus not on Germany's submarines but on British interference with U.S. trade bound for Europe.Footnote 15
Other historians have emphasized that the killing of civilians caused by the attack on the Lusitania shocked Wilson and offended his sense of morality. This reaction, they argue, underlay the president's hard line against Berlin. This argument has some merit. But it ignores that Wilson knew that Germany was not alone in conducting war operations threatening to civilians. He was fully aware that the aim of Britain's blockade was to starve the German people—the “starving of a nation” as Bryan described it in one memo to the president. Indeed, Wilson himself also equated the submarine campaign and Britain's effort to prevent foodstuffs from going into Germany, as he more than once proposed that if Berlin stopped its submarine policy, London should reciprocate by stopping its “hunger blockade.”Footnote 16
It is also significant that Wilson's moral objections to the killing of civilians in the Atlantic war zone appeared to focus only on American passengers on belligerent ships threatened by submarines. He did not make any protests about submarine warfare against vessels with no Americans on them. Most importantly, he failed to protest against Britain's illegal mining of the North Sea, a minefield that threatened the lives of American citizens and the lives of other neutral civilians. It seems unlikely, then, that humanitarian considerations, or even a more specific moral outrage at threats against the lives of Americans, drove Wilson's submarine policy.Footnote 17
Most commonly, historians depict Wilson's submarine policy as a product of Wilson's perception that the American people reacted to the Lusitania attack with a “double wish”: they wanted to avoid war, but they also wanted the administration firmly to uphold America's neutral rights. There is no doubt that this “double wish” existed. But it did not necessarily mean that the president had no room for choice in his submarine policy. Bryan was no less of a politician than Wilson and was certainly aware of the public outrage over the Lusitania attack. The secretary, however, saw that this anger could be channeled into a resolve to defend a narrow definition of American neutral rights, namely the right to travel safely on American vessels and unarmed passenger liners. Bryan thought few Americans really cared about risking war with Germany over their supposed right to travel on an armed belligerent merchant ship in a war zone—and, after all, one part of the “double wish” was to stay out of the war.Footnote 18
In fact, Wilson seems to have realized that his submarine policy was politically risky. Bryan's resignation caused him “intense anxiety,” he confided to Edith Bolling Galt, who would soon become Wilson's second wife. “The newspapers do not express the real feeling of the country” for Bryan, the president declared, “and he is evidently going to make a determined effort to direct public opinion in this German matter.” Given that the American people clearly did not want to get involved in the war and that the bulk of the Democratic Party almost certainly was as averse to risking war over the Lusitania attack as Bryan was, the easiest course politically for Wilson to have taken was to narrow the issues between Germany and the United States as much as possible while still asserting the principle of American neutral rights. This was essentially the approach Wilson took when confronting Britain's blockade. Instead, Wilson chose to define the American rights at stake in the submarine crisis in the most inflated way possible. He did not have to do so in order to meet the “double wish” of the American people, but he did so anyway. He did it because he wanted to retain influence with the side he thought would win the war—the British—and because he wanted to hasten the day that Germany—the side he wanted to lose—would recognize defeat.Footnote 19
Wilson's submarine policy did not change much over the course of the year after the Lusitania crisis. From late August 1915 to January 1916, the president learned that Britain was arming its merchant fleet and that even lightly, “defensively” armed merchants could easily destroy a submarine. He even observed to Col. House at one point that Germany had a good case in arguing, as it did during the crisis over the sinking of the Arabic in September 1915, that it could not always practice visit and search with belligerent merchants because Britain was arming them. Nevertheless, Wilson again rejected German proposals to clarify which vessels should be covered by visit and search rules and which should not. Instead, seeking to defuse the armed ship issue without one-on-one negotiations with the Germans, the administration proposed in January 1916 that Britain forgo arms on merchant ships in exchange for Germany agreeing to follow the rules of visit and search in its submarine campaign.Footnote 20
When the British angrily rejected this proposal, Wilson immediately backed off. He then reaffirmed to congressional leaders and in public, in strident language, that Britain had a right to put defensive arms on its merchant ships and that the administration would defend the right of Americans to travel on such ships. A few weeks later, after a U-boat torpedoed another passenger vessel, the Sussex, Wilson threatened to break relations with Berlin unless the Germans abandoned their present methods of submarine warfare. He made it clear in a private message to the German government that this demand meant that Germany had to follow visit and search rules even regarding armed British merchant ships.Footnote 21
As during the aftermath of the Lusitania attack, public opinion did not determine Wilson's policy. Wilson knew by fall 1915 that the public and Congress were indifferent to submarine attacks upon armed belligerent merchant ships and, in early 1916, he had had to exert enormous pressure upon Congress to prevent it from passing resolutions warning Americans not to travel on armed ships. The president also continued to relate economic concerns more with American complaints about the British blockade than with the submarine issue, although by August 1915 he was certainly aware that the American economy benefited from trade with the Allies.Footnote 22
Why, then, did Wilson continue to hold to such a hard line against Germany's submarine campaign? Wilson's strategic calculations again provide the best answer. To be sure, those calculations shifted a bit in late 1915 and early 1916, but in ways that reinforced Wilson's existing submarine policy. First, Wilson desired not to see Germany win the war if anything intensified as additional submarine crises occurred and he also discovered evidence of German subversion inside the United States. In fall 1915, some doubts about the ability of the Allies eventually to prevail in the war also began to set in. In early 1916, Wilson again pressed mediation on the British and the Germans and again, as was the case the previous year, London appeared interested in Wilson's ideas but the Germans were not, apparently because they still believed they could win the war. In addition, having staked out his position on submarine warfare after the Lusitania sinking, Wilson realized he could not draw back from it without risking a loss of diplomatic credibility with both Berlin and London. All of these new views reinforced Wilson's impulse not to do anything that might help Germany's war effort, which meant that he would not change his submarine policy. He refused to clarify how the United States would respond to German attacks on armed belligerent merchant ships because he knew that if he gave Germany any leeway on that issue, he would alienate Britain, America's de facto shield against an enemy Wilson feared, and facilitate the Germans’ use of a weapon that could only add to their confidence they could win the war, which, again, appeared to be the chief impediment to American mediation of the conflict.Footnote 23
Only during spring 1916 did Wilson begin to change his posture toward Germany and Britain. By May, whatever concerns Wilson had about the Allied military situation had evaporated. He now saw the conflict as a bloody stalemate. This led him to believe the Germans would be receptive to a mediation effort by the United States. At the same time, Wilson became increasingly anxious that Germany might make a desperate bid for victory by fully unleashing its submarines, which Wilson feared would drive the United States into the war. This perception added to the president's desire to press for mediation. The British, however, refused to implement a plan for mediation worked out with them by Col. House back in early 1916. Britain's position frustrated Wilson. His anger grew when Britain also inflamed American public opinion with new blockade policies, such as intercepting mail between the United States and neutral Europe and blacklisting American firms suspected of trading with the Central powers.Footnote 24
In the fall of 1916, Wilson decided to make a peace bid on his own, without the British, which he implemented in December 1916. He also took steps to signal London that he might retaliate against the blockade and, as Germany's submarine campaign increased in intensity, he indicated to his advisors that he might back off his position that Germany practice visit and search with armed belligerent ships. This shift toward a more genuinely neutral position regarding the war came too late to avert the ultimate crisis in German–American relations, however, which began when Berlin announced a new policy of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917.Footnote 25
Whether or not a different submarine policy on Wilson's part would have affected Germany's submarine decision making is hard to say. The development of those decisions in large part reflected German politics and the deterioration of Germany's military situation in 1916. Still, the anger of Germany's leaders at Wilson's perceived partiality toward the Allies and frustration with having to apply visit and search rules to belligerent merchants played some role in undermining the position of German officials who were wary of fully unleashing the submarine weapon. Certainly, a policy more along the lines promoted by Bryan would have made it at least somewhat less likely that Germany would have opted for unrestricted submarine warfare in early 1917.Footnote 26
The differences between Wilson's and Bryan's strategic calculations concerning the war, then, were both profound and deeply consequential for the course of American policy toward Germany during the neutrality period. The source of those differences is difficult to trace. But it appears to have had much to do with their estimation of how the American people would react to developments overseas. At bottom, Bryan equated U.S. security with safety from invasion, and maybe as well with safety from new European incursions into Central America. He believed that some danger existed that overseas events could stimulate American munitions manufacturers, plutocrats, and imperialists—forces he called “jingoes”—to try to whip up the American people into embarking upon arms races and warfare. But he was confident that the vast majority of the ordinary Americans would resist such militaristic pressures, because they knew that the chance of any power actually trying to attack them or challenge the Monroe Doctrine was remote.Footnote 27
Wilson, on the other hand, believed that if something happened overseas that really surprised and frightened Americans, such as Germany winning the war, they would do almost anything to protect themselves from possible attack, even if the likelihood of attack was low. They would take up defense measures sure to threaten their domestic freedoms—they would, in other words, sacrifice their liberties for their physical security a lot more readily than Bryan believed. Indeed, in mid-March 1917, as Wilson moved toward his decision to go to war with Germany, he observed to journalist Frank Cobb that fighting “required illiberalism at home,” that Americans might try to maintain their political ideals “but it would be too much for us.”Footnote 28 This assessment of the American people's likely response to an abrupt loss of their sense of security made Wilson much more attune to the possible consequences of a German victory than Bryan. And that sensitivity, in turn, made him identify with the Allied view of the war and of mediation, at least up until mid-1916.
The fear that events overseas could undermine America's domestic freedoms did not disappear with the end of World War I. It showed up again in national security debates in the 1930s, as both isolationists and collective security advocates emphasized that involvement in war would ruin American democracy at home. Similarly, Franklin Roosevelt argued in favor of extending American assistance to the Allies after 1939 by insisting that America's free way of life would never survive in a Nazi-dominated world. This argument was revised and used again by Truman administration officials to justify the containment policy against the Soviet Union. Given America's power and its geographic isolation from potential enemies, these leaders, like Wilson, perceived that the most plausible threat to America's way of life came from within, from what a frightened population might do to protect themselves from a hostile world environment. This conceptualization of national security is not usually associated with Wilson, but he pioneered it—and it cast a long shadow over U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century.Footnote 29
