Global capitalism in the nineteenth century propelled many individuals to leave their native homes in Europe and Asia, many heading to the Americas. Chinese were among the millions who crossed—and re-crossed—oceans and territorial borders to fill the demand for a mobile labor force after 1840. Once in the Americas, Chinese often stayed on the move, “zig-zagging” between countries as they navigated the often-tumultuous economic and political conditions of each country and rising anti-Chinese sentiment. From the beginning, Elliott Young argues, Chinese migrants often found themselves cast as “outsiders both legally and culturally” by host countries. Desired for their labor but rejected as culturally foreign, Chinese became part of an “alien nation,” “those who are not part of a nation while at the same time being inside of it” (11). Chinese migrants in the Americas increasingly encountered beefed-up national borders and exclusionary laws: laws that hampered, but never fully immobilized, Chinese migrants. They “crisscrossed national boundaries outside of sanctioned channels,” aided by transnational Chinese networks and organizations that established clandestine pathways and repeatedly frustrated “state attempts to solidify national borders” (5). Young seeks in his new book to capture this essential tension between the erection of border controls and continued flows of migration, showing how both served to create “illegal aliens” and “alien nations.”
Young builds on a well-established body of literature on transnational migrant networks, the globalization of border controls, and Chinese exclusion as the paradigm for restrictionist regimes of immigration control. He casts his study more broadly than most, both in time and space. He studies Chinese migration from the “coolie” era (beginning in 1847) through World War II, avoiding what he sees as artificial distinctions between the pre-exclusion and the exclusion eras and seeking to show continuities over time and space. He breaks out of the “nation state” frame of analysis, choosing, instead, a “hemispheric” focus on what Young calls “Greater North America”—Mexico, the United States, Canada, Cuba, and Peru—basing the geographical boundaries of his study upon Chinese migration patterns within the region. While many historians analyze how migrants “settle in” to host societies and negotiate homeland and host countries' cultures, Young follows the paths and routes of Chinese migration to capture the “moments of movement” of Chinese in transit and study the “literal and metaphorical spaces in which Chinese moved between nations (3).”
Young divides his study into three parts, organized both chronologically and thematically. Part I takes on a particularly fraught issue in the literature of Chinese migration, focusing on the Chinese “coolie trade” between 1847 and 1874. As Young highlights, “coolie” has often been a pejorative term used to describe cheap, slave-like Chinese workers who threatened free white labor and stood in “contrast to voluntary and plucky European immigrants” (42). Historians have struggled to liberate Asian American history from the “coolie” label and Orientalist mindsets of nineteenth-century Chinese exclusionists. Young argues that the Chinese coolies who shipped off to plantations in Peru and Cuba, some suffering higher mortality rates than African slaves during the Middle Passage, were neither slave nor free labor, but fell somewhere in between—as did most immigrant workers. Emphasizing Chinese coolies' agency, Young argues that Asian migration resembled European migration more than it did the African slave trade; further, Chinese workers arriving in the United States, Mexico, and Canada on “credit-tickets,” indebted for their passage, were not fundamentally different from coolies in Peru and Cuba, any differences being “distinctions of degree and not kind” on a continuum of free and unfree labor. Young's efforts to elide the differences between coolie and credit-ticket migrants may obscure significant realities, recently captured by Mae Ngai's careful reconstruction of the working lives of Chinese miners in California and Victoria, Australia, which looked far different from those of Chinese coolies in Peru.Footnote 1 But his ultimate point, that the Chinese coolie became the symbol of unfree labor, tainting all Chinese migrants as “alien” and deserving of exclusion, remains important.
Part II takes up the exclusionary period, showing how Chinese exclusion gradually became the norm throughout the Americas. Young's hemispheric approach sheds crucial light on how migration policies and anti-immigrant sentiments “migrate” between countries. “Although immigration policies were national,” Young stresses that “they were created in a transnational environment” as governments often cooperated or copied each other's laws (103). With the United States leading the way, Chinese had been excluded and often forcibly and violently expelled, throughout Greater North America by the early 1930s. Mexico initially resisted the United States' pressure to restrict Chinese immigration, standing on its constitutional commitment to freedom of movement and welcoming Chinese labor to help modernize Mexico's infrastructure. But if anti-Chinese sentiments had been slower to develop in Mexico, they arose with a vengeance after the Mexican Revolution of 1911, as Young explores in Part III, resulting in an outpouring of xenophobia and anti-Chinese violence. Ironically, “revolutionary nationalism” and the expansion of democracy proved Chinese immigrants' downfall. “As citizenship was extended more broadly,” Young observes, “the idea of the illegal alien, the outsider on the inside, emerged” (273). The more democratic the nation, Young suggests, the more exclusionary it became in its immigration policies.
Yet, throughout the exclusionary period, Chinese migrants persisted, aided by their own national and kinship organizations and driven by global economic conditions. In the long run, Young suggests from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, “the exclusion era was just a long pause in an ever-growing population of Chinese” in the Americas (275). Economics, not restriction laws, proved most significant in driving Chinese migration. But laws did turn migrants—whether Chinese, during exclusion, or Mexicans, today—into “illegal aliens,” shadow communities in “alien nations.”
