John R. Bowen and his colleagues in European States and Their Muslim Citizens seek to understand the treatment of Muslim citizens in European states. Recognizing that there are important common institutions within each state that might influence and be influenced by national ideology, such as the courts, the army, schools, and hospitals, they inquire whether these institutions “shape a sense of cultural citizenship” (7) and what the difference across states might be.

The editors argue that there may be two ways that such shaping may occur. First, the providers of services in these institutions may “draw on their repertoires of ideas, and emotions concerning others — defined in terms of ethnicity, religion, color, origin, or in other ways” (4) while providing services. In other words, providers bring their endowed attitudes into the institutions they work for, and which shape their behavior. This framework forms the basis for the first part of the book, wherein hospitals, schools, and the army are sites for observation on interactions with Muslim “clients” — patients, schoolchildren, and soldiers.

The second shaping force is that providers draw their ideologies from the institutions themselves. This requires the prior assumption that there is a certain independence of institutions from national models of citizenship or national ideologies. Such independence may arise from the institutions' own histories, regulatory frameworks, and reference points. This aspect is addressed in the second half of the book, wherein a number of institutional rules as they affect Muslims are examined, including judicial framings, civic education and debates on Muslim civic issues (such as the headscarf), and electoral participation.

The first key finding of the book is that institutions are rarely aloof from the influence of national ideologies, sometimes to the extent of the adoption of controversial behavior that is against the rules of the institutions. For instance, in a chapter on French hospitals, the authors found that Muslim immigrants who did not speak French received little language support. Although French law requires that those who do not speak French be given the support of interpreters, and although the hospitals may have interpreters on staff, these are rarely called upon. In considering the case of Muslim women patients from Mali in French maternity hospitals, the authors found that “midwives, who have the most authoritative interaction with maternity patients, rarely call for interpreters in any of the maternity or child health clinics observed. In the two hospitals with interpreters on staff, the African languages interpreter complained that she was rarely asked to translate, in spite of the fact that the majority of Malian women speak little French” (36).

Instead, midwives perform an apparently illegal act, presumably in full awareness of such an act. The authors note that “some midwives give women prescriptions for birth control pills without explanation, often in a stack of prescriptions for the new mother and baby” (36). When asked why they did this, cultural stereotypes readily emerged, such as the “assumption that it is in migrant women's best interests to have fewer children, thus they should be given the pill whether they know/understand its function and usage or not” (36). These stereotypes seem to be derived from popular discourse that describe African (notably, not necessarily Muslim) women's sexual and fertility practices as characterized by “(hyper) sexuality, (excessive) fertility, and (submissive) marital practices, vis-à-vis which the hospital has responsibilities as an institutional agent of the state” (36).

By contrast, in Germany, the authors' study of hospitals did not reveal the adoption of such questionable practices in furtherance of a national ideology. Stereotyping, though, was common. The Muslim women there were usually of Turkish origin and were looked on as un-German in their behaviors, which were assessed as “too loud, emotional and dramatic,” having a large number of visitors during visiting hours, and having “too many children” (43). Somewhat similar to the French case, the women's behavior was seen as “too Turkish” rather than “too Islamic.”

An important finding comes from another set of studies reported, that of religious diversity within European schools, a topic that first came to global attention with the banning of the headscarf in French schools in 2004. Each of the countries studied — Britain, France, Germany, and Holland — have laws that protect individual freedom. This includes, prima facie (no pun intended), the right to wear a headscarf. National ideologues, in order to restrict this freedom for Muslim women, developed a schema based on inclusivism, i.e., that a country has a responsibility to ensure that everyone is integrated and has a national identity. Using this idea, the chapter's authors explore how European nation states have developed a “variety of ways to translate nationalist exclusivism into inclusivist narratives of participation, integration and identification” (54).

The most dramatic outcomes were in France, where campaigners used both the first schema noted above, and a second schema, that of pitting women's rights against Muslim rights. Campaigners against the headscarf argued that the headscarf was “intrinsically anti-women, that it stood for the oppression of Muslim women by Muslim men” (116). The argument was made that even if girls knew the law and still wore scarves, this was because they were being coerced by their families to do so. So powerful was the emerging sense of a national ideology that needed to be protected that, as in the French midwives case described above, persons in positions of power sometimes did not hesitate to utilize apparently suspect methods to further their case.

As the public campaign wore on, the nation's highest judicial body, the State Council, which had initially been against banning headscarves on the grounds of individual freedom (as long as the wearers did not proselytize or cause disorder), chose not to oppose the recommendation of the Stasi Commission, opening the way for the ban on head scarves in schools to be passed into law.

Hospitals entered the discourse with claims by the Stasi Commission that events such as “parallel cafeterias (set up by Muslim patients) to serve traditional foods (cooked under Islamic dietary rules) in disregard of health rules … contradict the bases of public service: principles of equality, continuity of care, and respect for health and sanitation” (117). As the authors note, it is interesting that, in its eagerness to make a point, the Stasi Commission conveniently overlooked the fact that it was the failure of the hospital to accommodate the patients' religious dietary needs that led to the problem of unregulated parallel cafeterias.

Ultimately, these stories were used as arguments by the Stasi Commission on the need to protect Muslim women from their families, as in “refusals by husbands, on religious grounds, to see their wives cared for by male doctors” (117). This was even though “all interviewees insisted that they faced problems very rarely, which stands in sharp contrast to public perceptions” (124). In addition, further, “all patients have [the] right” to choose the gender of their doctors under French law (130).

Interestingly, the study reports a difference in the accommodation afforded by hospitals relative to schools. In schools, following the ban on headscarves, there was no accommodation, whereas in hospitals, where the headscarf was already illegal, there was considerable informal accommodation, such as allowing nurses who wished to wear headscarves to do so (125). The authors argue that the difference arose from the different histories of the institutions. The French school, with a long history of battling Catholic influence, and fewer layers of action, provided a riper area for the battle against Muslim practices than hospitals, which have a “honey-combed quality that supports the implementation of different rules in the inner sanctum of the operating room from those imposed on staff working more in the public eye” (129).

France emerges as unique among the four countries studied. The reason, the authors argue, is that in France entering a French state school is equivalent to entering the republican state. As they note, “the entrance of the school literally marks the boundary between the ‘unorganized’ society and the ‘ordered’ secular republic” (59). The implication is that only the latter is legitimate. By contrast, in Britain, Germany, and Holland, the school is viewed as a bridge between two legitimate players, the state and society.

While this might explain why the outcomes of debates in French society differed from the other countries studied, this is not to imply that there were no differences in how disputes were resolved or in how schools approached Muslims in the other countries studied. German and Dutch schools tend to have an ordered process that brings conflicting parties together and reduces the overtness of disputes, while British schools tend to involve more open dispute. However, none of these processes resulted in the extreme outcomes of France.

In a later chapter, the social exclusion of Muslims in the Netherlands is discussed. The chapter's authors note that, over time, as in France, there has been a reconfiguration of universal values into “national values of cultural distinctiveness” (235). The Dutch thus appear to be joining the French trend toward “exclusivist neocultural” framing of migrants who must either completely assimilate or be actively excluded.

As in France, a schema used by neo-culturalists is to target Muslims “in the name of progress and sexual emancipation” (236). This helps provide support to the neo-culturalists by arguing that they are not conservative (as might otherwise be assumed) since they are using the discourse of sexual progress. In particular, neo-culturalists have used gay rights and gender equality to build normative frameworks to shape the critique of Islam and multiculturalism (242).

As the authors note, the Dutch did not “turn French” merely from observing what was going on in France. They note that the Netherlands “never pursued a multiculturalist policy.” Dutch policy targeted stigmatized ethnic groups in lower-class positions as part of a policy of integration that was designed to prevent minority formation, “routinely conceptualized as the formation of an ethic underclass” (237). Thus, the schema that migration was problematic was well established several years ago, as evidenced by the writings of Frits Bolkestein in 1991, who wrote, “you should never underestimate how deeply Moroccan and Turkish migrants are hated by the Dutch. My political success rests upon the fact that I have listened to these feelings” (240). This schema continues to be developed in modern times, in the writings of commentators like Ayaan Hirsi Ali (237).

Scandinavia has also seen its share of the headscarf debate. The debates play out on the relative importance of public moral order versus individual rights. For instance, Denmark in 2007, accepted that a parliamentarian could wear a headscarf in parliament and speak, while, in 2008, judges were not allowed to wear attire that could be deemed religious (including head scarves), as it might affect “fair and equal treatment of the accused” (224). Denmark and Norway have favored public moral order over individual rights, though Sweden has seen greater variation. While it is not clear what the reasons for the differences between Sweden and the other countries are, one possible cause suggested by the authors is that civil society has been more active in Norway and Denmark than in Sweden.

Turning to the book's study of the army in France, an a priori expectation may be that the army would be, of all institutions, the least influenced by national ideologies, as a soldier should “have no other identity but that of a fighter” (74). One might even expect that the ideology of an army would be similar across countries.

Studies indeed have confirmed that Muslim soldiers in the French army were not susceptible to “communalistic” Islam (78). Instead, they found that the Muslim soldiers' strategy was “explicitly to disappear behind their uniform, and to be perceived exclusively as ‘complete French citizens’ and ‘skilled professional soldiers.’” This may indeed be because they were socialized by the institution; or it could be self-selection: they volunteered because they shared the military's values prior to enlisting (86).

Yet, Muslim-related issues, the authors note, “have gained increasing visibility in the social, institutional, and discursive practices among French soldiers” (78). For instance, one female Muslim interviewee recalled that, at the time of the Madrid bombings in 2004, her non-Muslim fellow soldiers blamed people like her.

Where did such views come from? The authors attribute this to the infiltration, in a sense, of biases among soldiers recruited from white populations endowed with nationalist ideologies. A white interviewee summed up, in the authors' assessment, these framings with his quote about fellow soldiers who were Muslim: “They were born here but they're not from here, actually” (93). The authors conclude, “The military appears neither as a site of sociocultural diversity nor of universalism” (93).

The second half of the book deals with how institutions influence national ideologies. Taking up first the case of the legal system and how it deals with Muslim issues, the chapter's authors find that an initial set of challenges arose when considering the applicability of an overseas law in the European country. For instance, if a husband in a polygamous marriage dies, can the second wife receive maintenance from his estate given that polygamy is illegal in all European countries? Under German law, German judges tend to put considerable weight on the rights of individuals, while British and French law puts greater weight on how a judgment will affect public moral order. German courts, therefore, have tended to support the second wife's right to receive maintenance, while English and French law courts have not (145). That the insistence on public moral order prevails in Britain and France is interesting, given that, as colonial masters, the British and French accepted Islamic laws in their colonies.

The second case of institutional framing studied in the book is in the context of civic education courses that must be completed by immigrants seeking citizenship in France and Germany. The chapter's authors examine whether “Muslims are a special target group of integrationist measures and how citizenship is framed for immigrants in different national contexts” (164).

As the authors note, Muslims appear to be the prime targets in France. For instance, the French civic education curriculum states that “the religious marriage has no legal value” (whereas, in Islam, marriage is simultaneously religious and legally valid) and that “the law is superior to religion” (175). Separately, it is also stated that it is prohibited to conceal one's face. An official poster with the bust of Marianne, a symbol of the French Republic, states, “The Republic lives with face uncovered” (175).

By contrast, German civic education, with some exceptions at the provincial level, seems less targeted to Muslims (165). As evidence, the authors note that the study material does not discuss religious views relative to the law. Instead, the discussion is more general. For instance, would-be citizens are urged to engage in open discussions on how citizens perceive others and are perceived by others. They note that one graphic that accompanies the written material shows a woman in a pink burqa exchanging eyeglasses with a blond woman in a green miniskirt. Of course, this might seem to be a form of subtle targeting or it may equally show an effort at integration through dialogue. In either case, the difference from the French case is evident.

The final case of institutional framing studied is that of minority representation in politics. One interesting finding is that the simultaneity of rising civil society action for women's rights and minority rights over the past few decades have led to a crowding out of minority rights' views. Despite their different traditions, different European countries have accommodated reservations for women on different grounds — women's rights in Sweden and Britain, for instance. In France, women's rights have been accommodated by the argument that gender difference is a universal difference. This has led to the socializing of the idea that parity of gender representation was a valid concept. However, these ideas have not been portable to ethnicity (209).

The task addressed by Bowen and his colleagues in European States and Their Muslin Citizens is important but challenging, and compounded by the massive heterogeneity within Islam itself. Addressing it through case studies and drawing key insights, as the authors have done, appears to be the sensible way to approach the topic. While such an approach raises the usual questions about generalization, if one assumes, perhaps reasonably, that the institutions are long established and run under common regulatory frameworks (this assumption is less true for the more federalized countries such as Germany), then there may be a strong case for generalization from a few observations.

There are two main learnings from this important book. The first is that the institutions studied — army, hospital, school, and the courts — appear to be particularly susceptible to ideological confrontation given their dual role of providing universal services and representing the nature of public life in a particular country. Second, that where public moral order has predominated institutional thinking, institutions can disrupt previously accepted liberal national ideologies by encouraging departures from universalistic principles in the name of public moral order. The tools used include calls to cultural distinctiveness in the name of social progress. The cost may be borne long term, for example, the trend toward broader social control of women as evidenced in the debate over headscarves.

Of the three principles used in both public debate and institutions, i.e., individual freedom, public moral order, and family stability, the book shows that the first two have been tested against each other. In some countries, particularly France and Holland, the battle appears to have settled in favor of public moral order, while this is less the case in Britain, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries. However, the issue of family stability has not yet been tested against the imperatives of public moral order. Is it out of the realm of reality that a French court may find, in the near future, that it is necessary to separate a child from its mother on the grounds that the mother wears a burqa, because, as in the case quoted above, “the burqa carries a meaning of the woman's submission which goes beyond its religious significance and could be considered to attack the Republican values that govern these teachings” (155)? It seems unrealistic to think so at this point in time. However, two decades ago, a ban of the headscarf in France would have seemed equally unlikely on the grounds that it was an unacceptable challenge to individual freedom. By helping us understand the origins of the treatment of Muslims in Europe, John R. Bowen and his colleagues in European States and Their Muslim Citizens also help us understand how the future might evolve.