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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
In 2001 the bank-sponsored Institute for Bank Historical Research, Frankfurt, held a conference on the topic of “The Private Banker: Niche Strategies Past and Present.” The papers are published in this volume, organized around three main questions: How and why did private banks lose business, and were forced to give up or merge? How did the survivors adapt and secure their economic survival? and What lessons are to be learned? There are five papers in all, one by a social historian (Morten Reitmayer), two by economic historians (Dieter Ziegler, Youssef Cassis), and two by economists (Christoph Kaserer/Marlise Berner and Thomas Hartmann-Wendels/Christoph Börner). The historians cover the late nineteenth century to the present, with an emphasis on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The economists focus on post-1945 developments and the 1990s respectively.
In the first paper, “Structural change and its consequences for private banking in Germany until 1914,” Reitmayer draws on his thesis about bankers in the German Empire. He distinguishes five processes that shaped the German banking community. First, private banks lost control over their own foundations, the universal banks, as evident in their declining representation on the supervisory boards of these big joint-stock banks. Second, they lost business with big industry to the universal banks. Third, they became less important in their erstwhile other domain: the issue of foreign securities. Fourth, legislation, above all the Börsengesetz of 1896, favored big banks over smaller banks, especially through the prohibition of futures trading. Fifth, at the turn of the century the universal banks began to branch out and started to compete with small local banks, ruinously for them. Reitmayer puts the story into perspective. He notes that the private banks' decline was relative, not absolute. Until 1914 the whole banking sector expanded. But growth in terms of business volume was slower for private banks than for universal banks.
Ziegler portrays the resulting specialization of the private banks in the interwar period as a “(doomed?) attempt at survival.” He discovers that private banks did not only dominate “their” niche, asset management, a relatively small niche, but were still very active in investment banking. The twenties saw a short heyday of consortiums of a couple of dozen private banks engaged in investment banking proper. This only changed with the 1931 bank legislation in favor of big universal banks, and with “Aryanization.” Ziegler is most detailed, reflecting his latest research interests, in the part about how “Aryanization,” but also denazification, affected private bankers' fate, and has some interesting new insights to offer here.
Cassis's paper on “Private Banking in Twentieth Century Europe” Anachronism or Competitive Edge?” (English in the original) is broad, though shorter. He focuses on the haute banque in Britain, France and Germany, which he follows through three stages: persistence (with a relative decline) up to the 1930s, decline until the 1970s and revival since the 1980s. His paper is more of an overview of his extensive in-depth research, above all on British banking. It offers the necessary comparative perspective to German developments. Kaserer and Berner present an argument well founded in public-choice theory and law. They advance two theses: the first is that there was an absolute decline since the 1970s, but statistics might hide the fact that private banks withdrew from highly regulated areas like credit and deposit banking and went to off-balance-sheet areas like investment banking and private banking. The second is that banking regulation keeps favoring big joint-stock banks over smaller, private banks. Hartmann-Wendels and Börner see all banking groups in Germany at the end of the twentieth century as affected by the globalization of capital markets, a rapid change in information and communication technology, and a changed, more critical customer, shopping around.
This conference volume is, all in all, commendable reading, with good summaries of current lines of thought in financial history and occasional glimpses of interesting new research. Here Reitmayer and Ziegler offer perhaps the best value for the historian's money.