In his latest book, The Color of Citizenship, Diego Von Vacano argues that, in lieu of discarding or rejecting the idea of race, proponents of racial justice ought to reconceptualize their idea of race so “that [it] does not promote either color-blindness or racism” (145). For Von Vacano, these normative prescriptions of color-blindness and racism are insufficient for racial justice and are also unavoidable if we begin from either of the two current paradigms of race, the European (i.e., domination) or US (i.e., dualistic) paradigm of race. Both of these paradigms, Von Vacano suggests, are analytically faulty and constrict our normative possibilities by assuming that races must be “pure.”
In order to reconceptualize “race” in a way that avoids this dilemma, Von Vacano suggests that we adopt a synthetic paradigm of race. This paradigm is derived from the Latin American experience and maintains that “race is indeed a socially constructed phenomenon predominantly driven by political power in the attempt to create specific meanings of citizenship” (153). In other words, race is a political, not metaphysical, category. “Race,” according to Von Vacano, has arisen out of, remains enmeshed in, and can be (and has been) changed through political struggles. “Race,” according to this paradigm, is therefore neither “pure” nor a natural division among humans, but is an unstable differentiation of persons used to determine civic belonging. The reconceptualization that Von Vacano is advocating therefore promises to be more analytically and normatively useful than the concept of race we currently use.
To make his case, Von Vacano traces the political (as opposed to metaphysical) genealogy of race within the work of four Latin American pensadores (i.e., thinkers). According to Von Vacano, a synthetic understanding of race emerges when the work of these four thinkers, who write and represent different historical periods in Latin American political thought, is dialectically considered. Von Vacano begins this dialectical analysis, in chapter 1, by taking the reader through the work of sixteenth-century Dominican friar and “Protector of the Indians” Bartolomé de Las Casas. In this chapter, Von Vacano compares and contrasts the political thought of Las Casas with that of his slightly older contemporary Niccolò Machiavelli. In doing so, Von Vacano makes the case that Las Casas ought to be read as presenting an anti-Prince viewpoint within early modern political theory.
Through this comparison, Von Vacano also shows why Las Casas should “be considered one of the central (if inadvertent) contributors to the intellectual scaffolding that allowed the early-modern construction of racialization” (27). Las Casas, by appealing to a sense of universal humanity, provided a moral and political defense of the Amerindians, arguing that Amerindians are human beings, not beasts of burden. The universalism that Las Casas appealed to, however, was grounded in his Catholicism and support for the imperial Spanish crown. For this reason, Las Casas is only able to provide one strain—the universal strain—of the synthetic paradigm of race. The second strain—the particularist strain—is introduced in the following two chapters.
In chapter 2, Von Vacano explores the political theory of El Libertador, Simón Bolívar. According to Von Vacano, the most faithful way to read Bolívar is to read him as an original republican theorist for whom, unlike other republican theorists of his time, “race [was] a political matter of highest significance” (61). While some might read Bolívar as a Montesquieuan or Rousseauian republican, Von Vacano invites us to read Bolívar as a Machiavellian republican for his emphasis on the citizen-soldier, strong executive, and a focus on protecting the nation from external enemies. This reading highlights how, for Bolívar, focusing on external factors (i.e., a common enemy in Spain) can resolve internal racial tensions. In doing so, Bolívar not only supplements European republicanism, but also moves the quest for racial justice past the imperial limitations of Las Casas's universalism.
Bolívar, however, only provides half of the particularist strain (i.e., that Latin American racial identity is inherently mixed). The second half of this strain (i.e., that all racial identities are inherently mixed) is presented in chapter 3 through an exploration of the work of Venezuelan intellectual Laureano Vallenilla Lanz. Vallenilla is typically overlooked as a result of his support for military dictatorships, but despite this drastic shortcoming, Von Vacano argues that overlooking Vallenilla's contributions will have us miss a key part of “the second stage in the genealogy of the synthetic understanding of race in the Latin American tradition” (84).
To this end, Von Vacano compares and contrasts the views of Vallenilla with his contemporary Carl Schmitt. The projects of both thinkers, he writes, “are similar: to justify ‘sovereign dictatorial powers’ for the executive” (109). The important difference between the two, however, is that Vallenilla is more concerned with the internal problems of consolidating a nation (e.g., addressing racism) than he is with the threat of external enemies, which seemed to preoccupy both Schmitt and Bolívar. So unlike Schmitt's critique of liberalism, Vallenilla's criticisms of liberalism and his concept of “nationality [do] not emerge into militant nationalism” (109), and unlike Bolívar, Vallenilla goes further and suggests that all races—not just the Latin American race—are socially constructed. Vallenilla's nationalism, which supplements Bolívar's republicanism, thereby completes the particularist strain of the synthetic paradigm.
In chapter 4, Von Vacano argues that the cosmopolitanism of José Vasconcelos represents a synthesis of the two strains: the universalism found in Las Casas's Catholic political theology and the particularisms found in Bolívar's republicanism and Vallenilla's nationalism. Vasconcelos's unconventional view of race—that Latin Americans comprises a fifth race (i.e., the cosmic race) that is formed out of a mixture of all the other races (i.e., Black, white, Asian, and Indigenous)—is for Von Vacano a full-fledged instantiation of the synthetic paradigm of race. This is a paradigm that sees race as a hybrid (e.g., as being mixed), as opposed to something pure, and that understands race to be the result of political power, as opposed to a natural differentiation. The synthetic paradigm of race is therefore superior to the other paradigms of race (domination and dualistic) because it offers a better explanation of race and, by exposing it as a political category, it has the normative potential to ameliorate the pernicious hold that racism has over our society.
Von Vacano should be applauded for this work, but it is not without its problems. First, he never adequately defends the claim that all “Western” theorists who work on race fall into one or the other of the two faulty paradigms. In order to substantiate this claim, a more thorough engagement with the work of current political theorists who work on race (e.g., Derrick Darby, Charles Mills, Tommie Shelby, and Ronald Sundstrom) would be necessary. It is also not clear how his normative position, that “race is a thin concept that can be shed if we understand it [especially through early childhood education] as synthetic or artificial” (154), is any different from the racial eliminativism advocated by Anthony Appiah and Naomi Zack. In short, if most of the analytical and normative insights promised by the synthetic paradigm of race are already present in the work of contemporary theorists (who also do not ask us to radically reconceptualize our idea of race), then it is not clear what this quasi-Hegelian exposition is supposed to do for us.
