This is a first book that will become an instant classic in Metternich studies. It is extremely well written and based on extensive research in British, Austrian, German, French, Russian, Czech, Polish, Slovenian, Croatian, and Vatican archives. It also relies on the Metternich family archives, as well as published Turkish documents. The study has two aims: first, to demonstrate that Klemens von Metternich was interested in all aspects of the Ottoman Empire—its economy, reforms, social and religious conditions—and that he pursued an active and pragmatic foreign policy towards Turkey based on the rule of law in international affairs, i.e., as opposed to the more aggressive lines that Britain, France, and Russia pursued. The book's second aim is to use Metternich's diplomacy to reevaluate the general history of the Eastern Question from 1821 to 1841, and to refute many of the myths connected with it. Ṥedivý also revises the, in his opinion, much too optimistic views of historians such as Paul W. Schroeder (The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 [1996]) and Matthias Schulz (Normen und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Groβmächte als Sicherheitsrat, 1815–1860 [2009]) concerning the workings of the European Concert and the European states system in the period before 1848.

Among the myths he refutes is the idea that Metternich was mainly interested in German and Italian affairs and, as a result, neglected Turkish ones. In fact, Metternich spent a great deal of time absorbing the latest literature on the Ottoman Empire, reading reams of diplomatic correspondence about it. As a result, the diplomatic world regarded him as an expert on the topic. According to another myth, George Canning saved the day in 1826 with the St. Petersburg Protocol, which forestalled Nicholas I's unilateral intervention in Greece. In fact, the British Foreign Minister opened a Pandora's box needlessly, since Nicholas I had no intention of intervening in Greece. The czar's complaints about Turkey had little to do with the Greek uprising, which he saw as the work of revolutionaries, and the sultan accepted these complaints under strong pressure from Metternich. It was, in fact, Metternich, not Canning, who saved the peace: the czar accepted Canning's offer to Russia of a united approach to the Greek revolt. This was what subsequently opened the door to more extensive Russian interference in Ottoman affairs.

Another myth the book refutes is the claim that Metternich's lack of interest in Middle Eastern affairs led to a quid pro quo in the 1833 Treaty of Münchengrätz, according to which he traded Russian support for Austrian policy in western Europe in return for Austrian support of Russian goals in the Ottoman Empire. This is truly nonsensical, given that Russian and Austrian interests were identical in western Europe and Turkey in 1833. Metternich gave no ground to the czar, in fact, and his support of Russia in the Ottoman Empire supported Austrian interests. According to a further myth, Metternich's policy in the Near East was, first and foremost, anti-Russian. This may have been true in the 1820s, but it was not the case in the 1830s, when Russia, backed by Austria, was supporting the Sultan. The main enemy in the 1830s was France, with whose leaders Metternich clashed on various themes, e.g., during the two Turko-Egyptian wars, in disputes between Damascus Jews and Syrian Christians, on Ottoman reforms and the Algerian Question.

Again, whereas it is often argued that Metternich had no interest in economic affairs, it is here demonstrated that he gave great support to Austrian shipping and trade abroad and that the Ottoman Empire counted among the most important trading partners of the Habsburg Empire. Indeed, during the first Turko-Egyptian War, Metternich's regard for Austrian economic interests is shown to have influenced his policy.

A last important myth demolished in the book is arguably the idea that Metternich was responsible for the political fall of the Ottoman reformer, Mustapha Reshid Pasha, in March 1841. In reality, Metternich did everything possible to save this minister. He was no more opposed to reform in the Ottoman Empire than to reform in the reactionary states of Italy. In short, Ṥedivý's book is a tour de force that demonstrates that the great powers were hardly interested in European cooperation, and that their pointless jealousy and desire for influence in the Eastern Question destabilized not only the Ottoman Empire, but also relations among the great powers themselves.