A) The facts of the matter

2. According to the Application, the facts date back to 13 December 1998, when Norbert Zongo, an investigating journalist, and his above-mentioned companions were murdered. The companions, Abdoulaye Nikiema and Blaise Ilboudo, were work colleagues of Mr. Zongo, while Ernest Zongo was his younger brother.

3. The Applicants state that “the investigating journalist and Director of the weekly magazine L'Indépendant, Norbert Zongo and his companions, Abdoulaye Nikiema, Ernest Zongo and Blaise Ilboudo, were found burnt in the car in which they were travelling, on 13 December 1998, seven kilometres from Sapouy, on the way to Leo, in the south of Burkina Faso”.

4. Relying mainly on the report of the Independent Commission of Enquiry set up by the Government to determine the cause of death of the aforementioned persons, the Applicants allege that “the murder of the four persons on 13 December 1998 is connected with investigations that Norbert Zongo was conducting on various political, economic and social scandals in Burkina Faso during that period, notably the investigation of the death of David Ouédraogo, the chauffeur of François Compaoré, brother of the President of Faso and Adviser at the Presidency of the Republic”.

5. The Applicants state that, “as the chauffeur and employee of François Compaoré, David Ouédraogo died on 18 January 1998 at the Health Centre of the Presidency in Burkina Faso, apparently as a result of the brutal treatment inflicted on him by presidential security guards who were investigating a case of money stolen from the wife of François Compaoré.”

6. The Applicants also claim that “Norbert Zongo had written a series of very critical articles on the matter in which he highlighted numerous irregularities, the refusal of the persons “implicated” to appear before justice, and above all the attempt to stifle a very embarrassing matter in which the family of the President's brother is deeply involved”.

B) Alleged violations

7. The Applicants allege concurrent violations of the provisions of various international human rights instruments to which Burkina Faso is a party.

8. With regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter referred to as the “Charter”), they allege that article 1 (the obligation to take appropriate measures to give effect to the rights enshrined in the Charter); article 3 (equality before the law and equal protection of the law); article 4 (the right to life); article 7 (the right to have one's cause heard by competent national courts); and article 9 (the right to express and disseminate his or her opinion) have been violated.

9. Regarding the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as “ICCPR”), they contend that article 2(3) thereof (the right to be heard in case of violation of rights); article 6(1) (the inherent right to life); article 14 (the right to have one's cause heard by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal); and article 19(2) (freedom of expression) have been violated.

10. As regards the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), they allege that article 66.2(c) (the obligation to ensure respect for the rights of journalists) has been violated.

11. With respect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Applicants allege that article 8 thereof (the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law) has been violated.

12. More specifically, the Applicants emphasize that “…. the crucial element in the obligation to protect the right to life and guarantee the existence of effective remedies when the said right is violated is the duty to investigate the perpetrators of the acts of homicide such as that of Norbert Zongo, identify the suspects and bring them to justice…”.

13. They further stress that “instead of fulfilling that obligation, Burkina Faso patently and repeatedly chose to frustrate the efforts of the families of Norbert Zongo and his companions at ensuring that those responsible for the deaths account for their actions”.

14. They also contend that “by failing to initiate an effective inquiry to determine the circumstances surrounding the death of Nobert Zongo and ensuring that those responsible are identified, tried and punished, Burkina Faso violated Norbert Zongo's right to life as guaranteed under article 4 of the Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and article 6(1) of ICCPR, as well as article 3(2) of the Charter on equal protection of the law”.

15. Finally, they submit that “these actions for which Burkina Faso is held liable constitute a violation of article 9(2) of the Charter and article 9(1) and (2) of the ICCPR…” both of which guarantee freedom of expression.

A) Admissibility requirements not canvassed by the parties

53. Requirements in respect of the identity of Applicants, the compatibility of the application with the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Charter, the language used in the application, the nature of evidence and the principle of non bis in idem, (paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 of Rule 40 of the Rules) have not been raised by the parties.

For its part, the Court equally notes that there is no suggestion in the pleadings submitted to it by the parties that any of these conditions has not been met.

Consequently, the Court is of the opinion that the requirements under consideration herein have been fully met in the instant case.

B) Requirements relating to seizure of the Court

54. In its preliminary objections, the Respondent State had raised an objection to the admissibility of the application on the grounds that reasonable time had not been observed in submitting the application to the Court (Rule 40(6).

However, in its Ruling of 21 June 2013, the Court dismissed that objection. ( supra, paragraph 32).

Consequently, the requirement regarding the time for submitting the case to the Court by the Applicants has equally been met.

C) Objection to the admissibility of the application due to failure to exhaust local remedies

55. In its preliminary objections, the Respondent also raised an objection to the admissibility of the application on the grounds of non-exhaustion of local remedies (Rule 40 (5).

However, in its Ruling of 21 June 2013, the Court had declared that this objection was not of an exclusively preliminary nature and had to join it with the merits, pursuant to Rule 52 (3) of the Rules of Court ( supra, paragraph 32).

At this juncture of consideration of the matter, the Court will now rule on the said objection.

56. An examination of the pleadings establishes that there was no dispute over the fact that the individual Applicants had not exhausted all the local remedies available to them under the Burkinabé judicial system. It had been clearly established that they had decided not to go on appeal.

The issue in contention here between the parties is, first, one of determining whether the fact that the individual Applicants did not resort to the Court of Final Appeal (Cour de Cassation) was effective or not. The other issue is one of ascertaining whether litigation of these cases had been unduly prolonged within the meaning of article 56(5) of the Charter.

Moreover, it will be necessary to treat separately the issue as to whether or not the Burkinabé Human and Peoples' Rights Movement (MBDHP) was, for its part, also required to exhaust local remedies.

2) On the issue of the Burkinabé Human and Peoples' Rights Movement

107. In formulating the objection to admissibility on grounds of non-exhaustion of local remedies, the Respondent did not make any distinction between the steps taken by individual Applicants on the one hand, and those taken by the Burkinabé Human and Peoples' Rights Movement, on the other.

108. In response to a question from a member of the Court during the Public Hearing of 8 March 2013, Counsel for the Applicants explained that under Burkinabé law, only victims may bring cases before criminal courts. The Counsel cited, in that regard, article 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Burkina Faso which provides that: “civil action for damages caused by a crime, an offence or a contravention shall be brought by all those who have suffered personally from the damage directly caused”, and explained that the Burkinabé Human and Peoples' Rights Movement was not a direct victim in this matter, and could not therefore bring the case before Burkinabé courts.

109. According to the afore-cited article 56(5) of the Charter, the Applicant is required to exhaust local remedies only in so far as such remedies “exist” in his case.

110. In the instant case, it would appear, in light of the aforesaid, that the Burkinabé Human and Peoples' Rights Movement is not entitled to bring action in this matter before the courts in Burkina Faso.

111. Consequently, the Respondent cannot object to the admissibility of the application on grounds of non-exhaustion of local remedies because one of the Applicants, the Burkinabé Human and Peoples' Rights Movement did not exhaust the said remedies.

112. In light of all the above considerations, the Court concludes that the Respondent's objection to the admissibility of the application on the grounds of failure to exhaust local remedies should be overruled both in regard to the case of the individual Applicants and in regard to that of the Burkinabé Human and Peoples' Rights Movement.

113. The Court, having considered all the requirements relating to admissibility of the application pursuant to article 56(5) of the Charter and Rule 40(5) of the Rules, concludes that the application is admissible.

A) Allegations of violation of the rights of the Applicants to have their cause heard by competent national courts

114. The right to have one's cause heard by competent national courts is guaranteed under article 7(1) of the Charter and articles 2(3) and 14 of the ICCPR. This right is also enshrined in article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

115. According to article 7 of the Charter:

“1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognised and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force…”.

116. According to article 2(3) of the ICCPR:

“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

1. (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;

2. (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;

3. (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted”.

Article 14 of the Covenant for its part provides that:

“1. …Everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law…” which shall rule either on the validity of any criminal accusation brought against him or on disputes regarding his civil rights and obligations…

117. As for article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it provides that:

“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law”.

118. The Court shall consider the allegation of violation of the right to have one's cause heard by competent national courts, first in light of article 7 of the Charter, and then, if need be, in regard to the provisions of other international instruments invoked by the parties.

119. The right to have one's cause heard by competent national courts has several aspects. In the instant case, the aspects raised and discussed by the parties are as follows: duration of the proceedings in the local courts; the role of the Prosecutor in the judicial system of the Respondent State; the issue of withdrawal of an Investigating Magistrate; the issue of a witness failing to appear; the involvement of parties in the civil suit, and the question of the despatch with which the Respondent guaranteed this right in the instant case.

B) Allegation on the violation of the right to equal protection of the law and to equality before the law

158. The right to equal protection of the law and to equality before the law is guaranteed under article 3 of the Charter, which states that:

“1. Every individual shall be equal before the law.

2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law”.

159. In their application, the Applicants assert that by failing to undertake an effective investigation to prosecute and sentence those responsible for the assassination of Norbert Zongo, “Burkina Faso had violated the right … to equal protection of the law as provided for in paragraph 2, article 3 of the Charter”.

160. In their response on the merits, the Applicants stated in this regard as follows: “Because trial has always been a catalyst for and an expression of justice, the right to fair trial has always been considered as a right ‘crucial to the protection of all other basic rights and freedoms' …because it allows for effective and equal access to justice. In the instant case, neither one nor the other was possible…” (Italics added).

161. Referring to a provision of article 14 of the ICCPR [“All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals”], the Applicants maintained that “Burkinabé tribunals did not, in managing the Norbert Zongo case, as in many other cases with serious political overtones, demonstrate the same diligence as they do in criminal matters”.

162. The Applicants complain in particular that Burkinabé justice did not act expeditiously in its treatment of the case of Zongo and others, whereas it did act and dispose of another contemporary matter - the case of David Ouédraogo - with exemplary swiftness.

After establishing a link on this issue, between the Zongo case and another case where the procedure was equally slow - the case of Thomas Sankara-, the Applicants came to the conclusion that “such practices by Burkinabé courts therefore constituted a violation of the right to equality inherent in article 7 of the African Charter …and article 14 (1) of the ICCPR”.

163. At the Public Hearing of 28 November 2013, the Applicants restated that position.

164. At the Public Hearing of 28 November 2013, the Respondent State argued that the Zongo case was more complex and could not be compared to that of David Ouédraogo because in the latter case, those responsible for the assassination were known and preliminary investigations were not required to identify them.

The Respondent insisted on this point by declaring that: “…what the Court should note is that these are cases that should not be compared. David Ouédraogo was detained and tortured by people who were well known; he was kept for a period of time with individuals who were known and he died in their hands. Therefore, there was nothing complex in that case, unlike that of Norbert Zongo”.

165. In its 21 June 2013 Ruling, the Court declared itself competent to hear the allegations of violation of the right to equal protection of the law and equality before the law “provided these allegations were directly linked to the allegation of violation of the right to have one's cause heard by competent national Courts”.

166. All in all, the Applicants contend that by treating the case of Zongo and others far less expeditiously than other cases particularly that of David Ouédraogo, the Respondent had violated the right to equality of individuals before the law in Burkina Faso. It was in response to that contention that the Respondent indicated that the two cases could not be compared in terms of the complexity of the investigations.

167. The Court is of the opinion that the principle of equality before the law, implicit in the principle of equal protection of the law and equality before the law, does not necessarily mean that all cases will have to be disposed of within the same length of time by judicial institutions. The duration of the treatment of a matter could indeed depend on the specific circumstances of each matter, particularly its relative complexity.

168. In the instant case, the Court notes that in view of the elements contained in the case file, the case of Zongo and others and that of the David Ouédraogo were not of the same complexity and could not have been disposed of within the same length of time.

169. Consequently, as far as the treatment of the Zongo and others case is concerned, the Respondent has not violated the right of Applicants to equality before the law as set forth in article 3 of the Charter.

170. In substance, Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR guarantees in the same manner as article 3 of the Charter the right to equality, especially before Courts and tribunals. The Court having ruled on the alleged violation in relation to article 3 of the Charter, does not deem it necessary to make a ruling on the same allegation in relation to article 14 (1) of the ICCPR.

C) Allegation of violation of the obligation to respect the rights of journalists and the right to freedom of expression

171. The obligation to respect the rights of journalists as far as this matter is concerned, is enshrined in article 66(2)(c) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, which provides that:

“2 [… Member States of ECOWAS] undertake (c) to ensure respect for the rights of journalists”.

Regarding the right to freedom of expression, this right is guaranteed under article 9 of the Charter and article 19(2) of the ICCPR.

According to Article 9 of the Charter:

“1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information.

2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law”.

For its part, article 19 (2) of the ICCPR provides that:

“2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice”.

172. In their application, the Applicants allege violation of all the aforementioned provisions. They state that “in more specific terms, the murder of Norbert Zongo and his companions is a violation of paragraph 2(c) of article 66 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, according to which Zongo had the right to be protected against unlawful acts of aggression, resulting from, or relating to the free exercise of his profession as a journalist and to benefit from effective remedies in case such rights were violated”.

173. They conclude by maintaining that, “the passive attitude of Burkina Faso in relation to the horrible assassination of which Norbert Zongo, an active journalist, was victim, and the fact that the State had refrained from ensuring, failed and refused to ensure that those responsible were identified and held accountable for their acts, is a source of anguish in exercising the right to freedom of expression in this country and the rights of its citizens to participate effectively in their own governance”.

174. In their reply on the merits of the matter, the Applicants first insist on “the dual nature of freedom of expression which is both the individual right of a person (…) and the right of the public to receive information and ideas…”

They went on to stress that the State is accountable for two types of obligations, namely, the obligation to refrain from any interference which may affect the freedom of speech of journalists, and the positive obligation to protect the free flow of information and ideas.

175. In the instant case, the Applicants argue that Late Norbert Zongo had complained on several occasions in his articles, of being threatened and of attempts to abduct him. The Respondent ought to have protected him by carrying out an effective investigation of the acts of violence about which he was complaining.

176. At the Public Hearing of 28 November 2013, the Applicants again underscored the fact that freedom of speech implied that media professionals could work without fear, apprehension or intimidation, thus enabling the public to access information and the truth.

The Applicants concluded that the State did not only have to prevent attacks against journalists in the exercise of their duties, but had to strive to quickly find those responsible for such attacks whenever they occur; and that in view of the impunity that those responsible for the assassination of Norbert Zongo had employed, the Respondent State had violated his right as a journalist, owner of a media outlet, and as an advocate of the truth, as well as his right to disseminate information and the truth.

177. In its submission on the merits, the Respondent citing various clauses of the Constitution and the Information Code of Burkina Faso, noted that “no journalist has ever been prevented from exercising his profession since the adoption of the Constitution of 2 June 1991, except where they contravened the ethics of the profession as set out in the Information Code”; that Norbert Zongo ‘whose pen was rather sharp against the Government, had never been subjected to any disciplinary or legal action'; and that the Weekly “L‘Indépendant” of which he was Director of Publication, and its newspapers had never been closed down or seized by Government officials”.

178. The Respondent concluded that, in view of the foregoing observations, the allegations, specifically those regarding violations of article 9(1) and (2) of the Charter, article 19(2) of the ICCPR and article 66(2)(c) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, were unfounded.

179. At the Public Hearing of 28 November 2013, Respondent State further argues that since Norbert Zongo had never complained to the courts about the death threats against him, he was not entitled to special protection by the State, given the principle of equality of all citizens before the law.

180. The Court is of the view that in the instant case, article 66(2)(c) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty and article 9 of the Charter on the alleged violation should be read jointly. Whereas the first deals with the rights of journalists in general, the second guarantees their freedom of expression in particular. Against this background, according to the allegations made by the Applicants, the rights of journalists which should be guaranteed by the Respondent State are specifically the right to life and the right to freedom of expression.

181. Regarding the right to life, the Applicants allege that the Respondent had failed in its obligation to prevent and to protect Norbert Zongo against the death threats which he stated he had received.

182. However, the Court had, in its Ruling of 21 June 2013 on the preliminary objections, already recognized that it does not have jurisdiction rationae temporis to hear the allegation of “violation of the right to life based on the assassination on 13 December 1988 of Norbert Zongo, Abdoulaye Nikiema, known as Ablassé, Ernest Zongo and Blaise Ilboudou ( supra, paragraph 32).

Consequently, the Court will not examine the said allegation.

183. Regarding allegation of violation of the right to freedom of expression the Court in its Ruling of 21 June 2013, had declared that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, on condition that it is directly linked “to the allegation of violation of the right (of everyone) to have his cause heard by competent national courts”.

184. In the instant case, the Applicants maintain essentially in that respect, that the very fact that the Respondent failed to expeditiously and efficiently identify, apprehend and try the assassins of the investigative journalist Norbert Zongo, constitutes a violation of the freedom of expression of journalists in general, given that they run the risk of working under fear, apprehension and intimidation. To this, the Respondent State replies that since 1991, no journalist has been disturbed by the authorities in the exercise of his profession.

185. Viewed from this perspective, the Court observes that the allegation relates to the right to freedom of expression of the media in general (and not that of Norbert Zongo in particular), and that it does not concern the specific rights of individual Applicants in this case, who are not journalists. The Court observes, on the contrary, that such allegation could be of interest to the other Applicants in this case, namely, the Burkinabé Human and Peoples' Rights Movement.

186. In the circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that even though the Respondent State's failure to identify and apprehend Norbert Zongo's assassins could potentially cause fear and anxiety in media circles, in the instant case, however, the Applicants have not shown proof that the Burkinabé media had not been able to exercise freedom of expression.

187. In the circumstances, the Respondent State cannot be accused of directly violating the freedom of expression of journalists as guaranteed under article 9 of the Charter, read together with article 66(2)(c) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, merely because it had not acted with diligence and efficiency in identifying and bringing to trial the assassins of Norbert Zongo.

188. The Court, having thus decided on the alleged violation of the freedom of expression on the basis of article 9 of the Charter, it does not find necessary to rule on the same allegation on the basis of article 19(2) of the ICCPR.

D) Allegation of violation of the obligation to guarantee respect for human rights

189. The obligation to guarantee respect for human rights is contained in article 1 of the Charter which provides as follows:

“The Member States of the Organisation of the African Unity, parties to the present Charter shall recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them”.

190. In their application, the Applicants allege that the State had violated its obligation to protect human rights as provided for in article 1 of the Charter.

They thus assert that applied to the instant case, this article would imply that Burkina Faso was bound, under article 7 of the Charter, to guarantee remedies in case of violation of the rights that it guarantees.

The Applicants argue, relying on the jurisprudence of the African Commission, that the obligation set forth in article 1 of the Charter is one of result and that the State had the choice as to the means to deploy, as far as legislative or other measures are concerned.

191. At the Public Hearing of 29 November 2013, the Applicants underscored that “when a State ratifies a Treaty, it commits itself to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty are domesticated in its national laws and, by so doing, the State conforms to the prescriptions of the Treaty in question”. The Applicants maintained that the Respondent State had violated this obligation because the legislative measures it had adopted, particularly via the Criminal Procedure Code, were at variance, notably with article 7 of the Charter. The Applicants referred once again to the provisions according to which the Prosecutor could receive instructions from the Minster of Justice, or, according to which the Investigating Magistrate was not bound to conduct adversarial procedure during investigations.

192. In its Response on the merits of the matter, the Respondent State started by observing that the Applicants “had concluded that Burkina Faso had violated article 1 of the African Charter, without stating which “legislative or other measures” had not been adopted by Burkina Faso which made it unable to “guarantee available, effective, accessible and satisfactory remedies”.

The Respondent State rejects the allegation and argues, on the contrary, that it had not only ratified key international human rights conventions, but had also at domestic level adopted the Constitution of 2 June 1991 and a long list of legislative instruments and regulations. The Respondent then concluded that:

“…in claiming that the State of Burkina Faso had violated article 1 of the African Charter, thereby leaving the impression that no internal measures had been taken by the State to ensure protection of the human rights and liberties guaranteed by the said Charter, the Applicants were making a completely baseless and gratuitous assertion”.

193. At the Public Hearing of 28 November 2013, the Respondent State reiterated this position and asked the other party to at least indicate the measures which the Respondent State was yet to take to comply with article 1 of the Charter.

194. In its Ruling of 21 June 2013, the Court recognised its competence to hear the allegation of violation of human rights by the Respondent State, “in as much as the said allegations were directly linked to the allegation of violation of the right of Applicants to have their cause heard by competent national courts”. ( supra, paragraph 32).

195. In that regard, the Applicants allege the violation of article 1 of the Charter in the sense that the Respondent State had not taken the necessary steps to ensure respect for the right to have their cause heard by competent national courts, as guaranteed by article 7 of the Charter, and because some measures it had adopted were at variance with the same article 7. For its part, the constitutional, legislative and regulatory measures required in its judicial system to ensure compliance with the provisions of article 7 of the Charter.

1. The issue of legislative measures

196. On the allegation of violation by the Respondent State of its obligation to take legislative measures, the argument of the parties centred on compliance with the Charter, of the legislative or regulatory measures adopted by the Respondent to guarantee the rights of all persons for their cause to be heard by competent national courts, pursuant to article 7 of the Charter.

197. In that regard, the Court observes, from the records of the case, that the Respondent had adopted a number of legal measures to guarantee the right to have one's cause heard by an independent and impartial judge. As mentioned earlier, the Constitution of Burkina Faso, in its articles 129 and 130, does guarantee the independence of the judiciary ( supra, paragraph 125). Furthermore, article 125 of this same Constitution holds up the judiciary as the custodian of the rights and freedoms which it defines.

It is therefore clear that the Respondent State cannot be blamed for not having taken such measures, and for having violated article 1 of the Charter with respect to legislative measures.

E) The issue of damages

200. In their written submissions, the Applicants prayed the Court to hold the Respondent liable to a series of damages to be quantified by the Court itself ( supra, paragraph 45).

201. In its Response on the merits and during the Public Hearing of 28 and 29 November 2014, the Respondent State, for its part, prayed the Court to reject all the claims for damages filed by the Applicants ( supra, paragraph 45).

202. Before taking a decision on the prayers in respect of damages, the Court had opted, in application of Rule 63 of its Rules, to first rule on the various allegations of violation of the Charter made by the Applicants.

The Court, having now ruled on all said allegations, shall decide on the damages at a later stage in the proceedings, after having heard the parties more extensively.

203. In view of the foregoing,

THE COURT, unanimously

1. 1. Declares that it has jurisdiction to hear the application, except in relation to the allegation of violation of the right to life;

2. 2. Overrules the Respondent's objection to the admissibility of the application on the grounds of failure to exhaust local remedies; and declares the application admissible;

3. 3. Finds that the Respondent State has violated article 7 of the Charter as well as article 1 of the Charter, concerning the obligation to adopt measures, other than legislative measures;

4. 4. Finds that the Respondent has not violated article 3 of the Charter, and that it has not violated article 1 of the Charter concerning the obligation to adopt legislative measures;

By majority of five to four, Judges Gérard NIYUNGEKO, Fatsah OUGUERGOUZ, El Hadji GUISSE and Kimelabalou ABA dissenting:

1. 5. Finds that the Respondent State has violated article 9(2) of the Charter, read together with article 66 (2) (c) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty;

Unanimously:

1. 6. Defers its ruling on the issue of damages;

2. 7. Orders the Applicants to submit to the Court their brief on damages within thirty days from the date of this ruling; and also Orders the Respondent State to submit to the Court its response on the damages within thirty days after receiving the response of the Applicants.

Signed:

Sophia A. B. AKUFFO, President

Bernard M. NGOEPE, Vice- President

Gérard NIYUNGEKO, Judge

Fatsah OUGUERGOUZ, Judge

Duncan TAMBALA, Judge

Elsie N. THOMPSON, Judge

Sylvain ORE, Judge

El Hadji GUISSE, Judge

Kimelabalou ABA, Judge; and

Robert ENO, Registrar

Done at Arusha, this Twenty-Eighth day of the month of March in the year Two Thousand and Fourteen, in English and French, the French text being authoritative.

Pursuant to Article 28(7) of the Protocol and Rule 60(5) of the Rules of Court, the Joint Declaration of Justices Gérard NIYUNGEKO, Fatsah OUGUERGOUZ, El Hadji GUISSÉ and Kimelabalou ABA, is appended to this Judgment.

1. In paragraph 5 of the operative part of this judgment, the Court finds that “the Respondent State has violated Article 9 (2) of the Charter, read together with Article 66 (2) (c) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty”.

2. The Court indeed considered that “the Respondent State's failure to identify and send for trial the assassins of Norbert Zongo has provoked fear and anxiety within the media circles” (paragraph 186), and that for this reason, “the Respondent State has violated the right to freedom of expression of journalists” as guaranteed by the two above-mentioned provisions (paragraph 187 of the judgment).

3. We do admit that this failure by the Respondent State could have indeed generated a certain degree of fear and anxiety within the media profession in general, and somehow produced an “intimidating effect” on the freedom of expression of journalists (see paragraphs 173 and 176).

4. We are also of the view that when it comes to facts of a “psychological” nature, which are generally difficult to prove, the Court did not have to insist on getting convincing evidence. We are in favour, especially in the area of the protection of human rights, of an adjustment of the standard of proof relating to the establishment of the violation of certain rights guaranteed under the Charter or any other applicable legal instruments, and in particular, regarding evidence of the possible “intimidating effect” of a behavior by a Respondent State which would be contrary to its international obligations.

5. Besides, in international judicial practice, it is generally acknowledged that, when circumstances which are not attributable to a party are such that evidence required from it is difficult or impossible to obtain, the Judge may be inclined to be convinced more easily than in normal circumstances.Footnote ⁷

6. In the instant case, however, the issue is that the Applicants content themselves with making a general allegation, without substantiating it with precise facts which could concretely reflect this fear and anxiety and thus establish prima facie, the merits of the said allegation. While the Respondent State argued that the treatment of the Zongo case at the national level had no negative impact whatsoever on the freedom of expression of journalists (paragraph 177), the Applicants, on their part, did not submit the slightest evidence to move the Court to make a determination on the existence of such an “intimidating effect” which could affect the rights guaranteed under the above-mentioned provisions. They gave no indication on the fact that, since the beginning of the Zongo case, the media in Burkina Faso would no longer have been able to express itself freely. In the absence of precise facts or a minimum of evidence, and considering that the Respondent State challenged the allegation, the Court being a judicial body, ought not to have concluded in favour of such a violation.

7. It is for this reason that we could not subscribe to the decision of the majority of the Court in paragraph 5 of the operative part of this judgment, as quoted above.

Robert Eno,

Registrar

II. SHORT BACKGROUND OF THE MATTERFootnote ¹

3. The facts of the matter date back to the assassination, on 13 December 1998, of Norbert Zongo, an investigative journalist, and his companions. Messsrs Abdoulaye Nikiéma alias Ablassé and Blaise Ilboudo were collaborators of Mr. Zongo, and Ernest Zongo was his younger brother.

4. In their initial application dated 10 December 2011, the Applicants alleged that “the murder of the four persons on 13 December 1998 … [was] connected with investigations that Norbert Zongo was conducting on various political, economic and social scandals in Burkina Faso during that period, notably the investigation of the death of David Ouédraogo, the chauffeur of François Compaoré, brother of the President of Faso and Adviser at the Presidency of the Republic”.

5. After the Police and the Office of the Public Prosecutor in Burkina Faso had carried out investigations into the matter of the quadruple assassination, one of the suspects identified was indicted in February 2001.

6. In July 2006, an Order was issued by the Investigating Magistrate of Ouagadougou District Court dismissing the case in favour of the indicted person for lack of evidence.

7. In August 2006, an appeal filed against the Order by Norbert Zongo's family at the indictment chamber of the Ouagadougou Court of Appeal, was thrown out by that Court, and the dismissal for lack of evidence upheld.

8. Following these developments, the Applicants alleged before this Court the concurrent violation of the provisions of various international human rights instruments to which Burkina Faso is a party, namely:

1. (i) The Charter: Article 1 (obligation to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to the rights enshrined in the Charter); Article 3 (equality before the law and equal protection of the law); Article 4 (the right to life); Article 7 (the right for one's cause to be heard by competent national courts); and Article 9 (the right to express and disseminate one's opinion);

2. (ii) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 2 (3) (the right to effective remedy in case of violation of rights); Article 6 (1) (the inherent right to life); Article 14 (the right to have one's cause heard by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal); and Article 19 (2) (right to freedom of expression);

3. (iii) The Revised ECOWAS Treaty: Article 66.2 (c) (obligation to ensure respect for the rights of journalists);

4. (iv) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 8 (the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals in case of violation of rights).

9. The Respondent State having raised various objections regarding the Court's jurisdiction and admissibility of the Application, the Court first decided on the said objections in its Ruling of 21 June 2013Footnote ² .

10. As earlier indicated, the Court, in the above mentioned Judgment of 28 March 2014, found that the Respondent State violated certain provisions of the Charter (supra, para 1).

A) Preliminary Observations

20. The Court recalls, firstly, that under international law, a country found guilty of an international crime is required to make full reparation for the damage caused.

This obligation was stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in a dictum in The Factory at Chorzów case, in the following words:

“It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself”.Footnote ³

21. This statement was subsequently put in the following words by Article 31 (1) of Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) and submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in 2001:

“1. The responsible State is under the obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act”Footnote ⁴ .

22. In the context of the African human rights protection system, this principle is reflected in Article 27 (1) of the 10 June 1998 Protocol establishing this Court, which provides that:

“If the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples' rights, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation”.

23. In the instant case, the Court having found in its Judgment of 28 March 2014 abovecited that there have been violations of the Charter by the Respondent State. this State is liable to make full reparation for the prejudice caused to the Applicants.

24. The Court would further like to recall that, in accordance with international law, for reparation to accrue, there must be a causal link between the wrongful act that has been established and the alleged prejudice. On that score, Article 31(2) of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States mentioned above indeed refers to a “prejudice … resulting from an internationally wrongful act by a State”Footnote ⁵ .

25. In the instant case, therefore, it is only damages resulting from identified wrongful acts that the Court will take into consideration.

26. The Court would further like to note that, according to international law, both material and moral damages have to be repaired. In terms of Article 31(2) of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States mentioned above: “Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral…”Footnote ⁶

27. According to Dictionnaire de droit international public, material damage is “one that affects economic or material interest, that is, interest which can immediately be assessed in monetary terms”Footnote ⁷ . As for moral damage, it is defined as one that affects the reputation, sentiments or affection of a natural person who enjoys diplomatic protection or who can be sued”Footnote ⁸ . (Registry translation)

28. In the instant case, the Applicants are in fact claiming reparations both for the moral prejudice endured by them, and for the material prejudice suffered by the MBDHP; and so, the Court will naturally examine the two types of damages.

29. The Court also notes that reparation may take several forms. According to Article 34 of the ILC Draft Articles above cited:

“Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.Footnote ⁹

30. Lastly, the Court notes that, in the instant case, the internationally wrongful act generating the international responsibility of the Respondent State is the violation of Article 7 of the Charter because this State “did not act with due diligence in apprehending, prosecuting and putting on trial those responsible for the murder of Norbert Zongo and his three companions”Footnote ¹⁰ . All these claims for reparation must therefore be considered and assessed in relation to the wrongful act, and only in relation to this act.

31. In light of all the foregoing observations, the Court will now examine the different claims for reparation filed by the Applicants.

B) Claims for reparation of moral prejudiceFootnote ¹¹

C. Claims for reparation for material prejudice

68. In their Brief on Reparations and, once again, in regard to MBDHP, the Applicants claimed “reimbursement of the expenses incurred between 1998 and 2013, for organizing demonstrations, particularly the International Day Against Impunity organized on 13 December of each year, both to force the authorities to track down the perpetrators of the assassination of the journalist and his companions and to rally the people of Burkina Faso to support the families of the beneficiaries”, that is, the amount of forty-five million seven hundred and thirty-four thousand seven hundred and five (45,734,705) CFA F.

69. Furthermore, in their letter dated 17 November 2014 submitted in Response, the Applicants rejected the claim according to which “the State of Burkina Faso contributes financially and yearly to the functioning of the MBDHP [Burkinabè Movement on Human and Peoples' Rights] just like other associations”. According to them, since its creation on 19 February 1989, the MBDHP has never received any financial contribution whatsoever from the authorities.

70. In its Brief In Response, the Respondent State argued that the claim for reimbursement of the costs incurred for organising demonstrations has no material or legal grounds, for the following reasons:

1. (i) the MBDHP has been existing well before the matter of Norbert Zongo and has organized demonstrations not related to this matter;

2. (ii) Burkina Faso contributes financially and yearly to the running of the MBDHP, like other associationsFootnote ²⁷ ;

3. (iii) the demonstrations in question were organised in conjunction with other organisations in a forum called “Group of mass organizations and political parties”, and did not therefore constitute actions specific and peculiar to MBDHP;

4. (iv) the said demonstrations had always been directed against impunity in general and not solely in favour of the “Norbert Zongo” case;

5. (v) the MBDHP did not present any document attesting to the costs that it claimed to have incurred to hold demonstrations, and did not even indicate when the said demonstrations took place.

Consequently, the Respondent State prayed the Court, on grounds of the aforesaid, to throw out MBDHP's request for reimbursement of the said costs as “fake and groundless.”

71. The Court recalls that the Burkinabè Movement on Human and Peoples' Rights is, as the name indicates, a human and peoples' rights advocacy organisation in Burkina Faso. It is therefore evident that the organization of human rights advocacy demonstrations in that country, including for the rights of the beneficiaries of Norbert Zongo and his companions, falls within its mandate and the ambit of its normal activities.

72. For this reason, the Court is of the opinion that there is no basis to grant the claim for reimbursement of the costs incurred by MBDHP in organising human rights advocacy demonstrations, including those in favour of the Applicants in the instant case.

A) Lawyers' fees

74. In their Brief on Reparations, the Applicants submit that reimbursement of the expenses incurred at both the national and international levels in the quest for justice is one of the appropriate measures prescribed by Article 27(2) of the Protocol establishing the Court [para 17]. They argue that “these are mostly the charges and fees of Counsel for the beneficiaries and of the MBDHP during the entire juridical procedure in Burkina Faso and in Tanzania” [at the Seat of the Court].

75. According to the Applicants, “the fees include: the total amount owed by the client to the Counsel for services rendered by the latter; the costs and outlay corresponding to the costs indicated by Counsel in accomplishing his mission, and outlay paid on behalf of the client …; emoluments corresponding to taxes and charges received by Counsel for procedural acts, in accordance with tariff fixed by the instruments in force”.

76. The Applicants submit that their Counsel have been working on the case since 1999 “with all political, financial, moral, etc.) toll it has taken on them” and therefore prayed the Court “to arbitrate these fees to the sum of twenty-five (25) million CFA F exclusive of related taxes and emoluments.”

77. In the Corrigendum on the Reparations, the Applicants however indicate that the figures contained in the Brief are inexact because they do not conform to the agreements signed between the two lawyers and the beneficiaries in 2010, based on the Indicative Scale of Costs and Fees of Lawyers of Burkina Faso. Consequently, they pray the Court “to adjudicate these fees at the sum of twenty-five million (25) CFA F per family, subject to the related taxes and emoluments as had been approved by them”…thus bringing “the total sum to a hundred (100) million CFA F”.

78. In its Brief in Response, the Respondent State, after analysing the Indicative Scale of Costs and Fees of Lawyers of Burkina Faso submitted by the Applicants, argued that the Agreements on lawyers' fees referred to by the Applicants, “are complaisant as they do not state the well-known fees”. It further argues that lawyers' fees are part of damages, which in its view, are the only claims made by the Applicants in the instant case; but argues that if, by an unlikely chance, the Court agrees that the Counsel fees for the Applicants are part of damages, then “the sum of twenty-five (25) million claimed by the said Counsel for each victim's family is exorbitant and out of proportion with the socioeconomic realities of Burkina Faso”. The Respondent State “believes that the sum of 20,000,000 CFA F that is, 5,000,000 per family would be a fair remuneration for the lawyers of the victims”.

79. In the opinion of the Court, the reparation paid to victims of human rights violation may also include the reimbursement of lawyers' fees. This was the position held by the Court in the afore-cited case of Rev. Mtkila v. United Republic of Tanzania:

“The Court notes that expenses and costs form part of the concept of ‘reparations'. Therefore, where the international responsibility of a State is established in a declaratory judgment, the Court may order the State to compensate the victim for expenditure and costs incurred in his or her efforts to obtain justice at the national and international levels”Footnote ²⁸

80. This position is consistent with that of other international human rights jurisdictions. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for example, expressed this position in the following terms:

“…costs and expenses are included in the concept of reparations … because the activity deployed by the next-of-kin of the victims or their representatives in order to obtain justice at both the national and the international level entails expenditure that must be compensated when the State's international responsibility is declared in a judgment against it.”Footnote ²⁹

81. In determining the amount to be paid in the matter of Rev . Mtkila mentioned above, the Court has held that in the opinion of the Court, the reparation paid to victims of human rights violation may also include the reimbursement of lawyers' fees.Footnote ³⁰

82. This is also the position of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which, in a matter, declared that:

“… the Court considers that it is not sufficient to remit probative documents; rather the parties must develop the reasoning that relates the evidence to the fact under consideration, and, in the case of alleged financial disbursements, the items and their justification must be described clearly.”Footnote ³¹

83. In the instant case, the Applicants presented an extract of the Indicative Scale of Costs and Fees of Lawyers of Burkina Faso dated 20 December 2003 as well as the fees agreements signed with the lawyers in 2010.

84. If we take the Indicative Scale into account, it becomes apparent that the lawyers would be entitled to 150,000 CFA F for opening the case; 150,000 CFA F for legal assistance and representation; 25,000 per session before the Court of First Instance; 350,000 for legal assistance and representation before the Court of Appeal and a percentage of the amount of the reparation which would have been paid to the victims in the civil suit. Considering that in the instant case no civil damages were paid to the victims by the domestic jurisdictions, it would not be possible to set with clarity, any global amount based on the Indicative Scale.

85. Going by the fees agreements, the lawyers would be entitled to 250,000 CFA F for the opening of the case, and 25,000,000 for their legal assistance and representation. This will give 25,250,000 CFA F per family, or a total of 101,000, 000 CFA F which the Applicants have rounded up at 100,000,000 CFA F.

86. In the opinion of the Court, the amount calculated on the basis of the Indicative Scale would be too low if account is taken, inter alia, of the difficulties the lawyers must have faced during the domestic proceedings, especially on account of the length of the proceedings and the highly political sensitivity of the case; and also when we take into consideration the qualitative requirements of the procedure before an international courtFootnote ³² . The Respondent State itself admits that a global amount of nearly twelve times higher, that is, 20,000,000 CFA F would be reasonable. On the other hand, the amount of 100,000,000 CFA F based on the lawyers' fees agreement seems to be too high in the circumstances, particularly if account is taken of the fact that there was only one matter for the four families.

87. In the circumstances, the Court has to determine the amount of lawyer's fees on the basis of equity, going by what it considers reasonable in each caseFootnote ³³ . In its opinion, in the instant case, and considering both the amounts set by the Indicative Scale, the amounts stipulated in the fees agreement and the amounts proposed by the Respondent State itself, a total lump sum comprising expenses and lawyers' fees in the amount of 40 million would be equitable and reasonable.

B) Transport and sojourn expenses at the Seat of the Court

88. In their Brief on Reparations, the Applicants once again argue that reimbursement of transport and sojourn expenses for their Counsel and the representative of MBDHP in Arusha for their participation in the public hearing of the African Court forms part of the appropriate orders of reparation prescribed in Article 27 of the Protocol establishing the Court. The said expenses are in respect of the travels made between March and November 2013 for the purpose of attending the public hearings of the Court, and the Applicants estimate the said expenses at seven million two hundred thousand (7,200,000) CFA F.

89. However, in their Corrigendum to the Brief on Reparations, the Applicants reduced this amount to six million five hundred and forty-two thousand five hundred (6,542,500) CFA F.

90. In its Brief in Response, the Respondent State submits that the transport and sojourn costs in Arusha incurred to follow the proceedings should have been supported by documents issued by the transport companies, hotels and restaurants, and that it leaves the determination of the right amount to the wisdom of the Court, considering that the said costs are not mentioned in the lawyers' fees agreements.

91. The Court is of the opinion that the reparation payable to the victims of human rights violation can also include reimbursement of the transport fares and sojourn expenses incurred for the purposes of the case by their representatives at the Seat of the Court.Footnote ³⁴

92. The Court notes that, in the instant case, the Parties do agree on the principle of reimbursement of transport fares and sojourn expenses in Arusha for the representatives of the Applicants. The Court further notes that the Applicants produced written documents aimed at substantiating the amounts claimed. It however finds that the Applicants did not submit a complete set of the supporting materials (supra, para. 16).

93. The Court is of the opinion that, with regard to reimbursement of the expenses actually incurred, only the expenses supported by proof of payment such as receipts or equivalent documents can be considered for the purposes of reparation.

94. Based on the aforesaid, it is apparent from the records that the travel and sojourn costs to be reimbursed are in the amount of US$1,106 for Mrs. Genevieve Poda Zongo, spouse of Norbert Zongo; US$1,106 for Chrysogne Zougmore, President of MBDHP; US$1,106 for Advocate Benewende Stanislas Sankara, Counsel; US$ 1, 827,37 for Advocate Ibrahima Kane, Counsel; and US$50 for Prosper Farama, Counsel. The Court therefore grants the claim for reimbursement in favour of the Applicants in the total amount of US$5,195,37 equivalent to 3,135,405.80 CFA F at Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) rate.

A) Measure of satisfaction: publication of the Court's decision

95. In their Brief on Reparations, the Applicants prayed the Court to order “the publication of [its] Judgment in the Official Gazette, the national Daily Sidwaya and two of the most read private newspapers in the country, in order that the national public opinion, particularly judicial authorities and security officials [might] be aware of the wrong caused to the State and its human rights protection system by the poor functioning of its public justice and security services”.

96. In its Brief in Response, the Respondent State noted that, in principle, it finds no inconvenience with publishing the Court's decision, but argued that in international human rights law, “measures of satisfaction should not lead to humiliation of the State against which human rights violations had been established”. It submitted further that, in the instant case, the reasons given by the Applicants in support of their request for publication “are motivated more by a desire to humiliate the State of Burkina Faso and tarnish its image, than promoting and protecting human rights”. The Respondent State therefore prays the Court to reject the measure of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition as requested by the indirect victims as inadequate and irrelevant.

97. The Court notes that the principle itself of publication of the Court's decision is not in dispute between the parties.

98. The Court also notes that the publication of decisions of international human rights courts as a measure of satisfaction is of current practice.Footnote ³⁵ Thus, in the case of Rev. Christopher Mtkila v. United Republic of Tanzania, the Court itself decided proprio motu to order the publication of one of its decisions as a measure of satisfaction.Footnote ³⁶

99. The Court further notes that measures regarding the publication of its decision, if couched in reasonable terms, will not in any way amount to humiliation for the Respondent State.

100. Relying on its own jurisprudence afore-mentioned (supra, para. 98), the Court is of the opinion that as a measure of satisfaction, the Respondent State should, within six months from the date of this Judgment, publish: (i) the official summary of this Judgment drafted by the Registry of the Court in French, once in the official gazette, and once in a widely read national Daily; (ii) the same summary on an official internet website of the Respondent State, and maintain the publication for one year.

B) “Guarantees of non-repetition”

101. In their Brief on Reparations regarding what they characterize as “guarantees of non repetition”, the Applicants prayed the Court to order “the re-opening of investigations so that the perpetrators of the assassination may be apprehended and brought before national courts”, and “to order Burkinabè authorities to submit [to the Court], all information concerning the initiatives taken to that effect within six (6) months”.

102. In its Brief in Response, still basing its argument on humiliation, the Respondent State indicates that “exacting the immediate resumption of investigations and production within a time limit of six months, of all information on measures taken to that effect, is contemptuous to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of Burkina Faso”, specifically Articles 188 and 189Footnote ³⁷ thereof. It further argues that “it continues to make the commitment that, as soon as new facts or new charges will be discovered in terms of the above mentioned provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, it will reopen investigation as long as the 10 (ten) years prescription provided for crimes would not have elapsed”.

103. On the application for resumption of investigations into the murder of Norbert Zongo and his three companions, the Court notes that this is not really a measure of nonrepetition, but rather one of cessation of a violation already established.

104. Be that as it may, the Court is of the opinion that this is indeed a legitimate measure likely to forestall the continued violation of Article 7 of the Charter in this case.

105. This position is consistent with the jurisprudence of some international courts. For instance, the Human Rights Committee held the view in a case that:

“The State party should investigate the events complained of and bring to justice those held responsible for the author's treatment; it further is under an obligation to take effective measures to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future.”Footnote ³⁸

106. For its part, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights frequently recommends to States to take certain measures to prevent a repetition of the vtolations it has established. In the matter of Gabriel Shumba v. Zimbabwe, for example, it recommends “that an enquiry and investigation be carried out to bring those who perpetrated the violations to justice”.Footnote ³⁹

107. The Court is further of the opinion that such a measure hardly amounts to contempt of Burkinabè legislation, since all it does is to offer the possibility of reopening investigations after the matter had been dismissed by the national court for lack of evidence; and the Respondent State itself is disposed to the reopening of investigations into the matter (supra, para. 102).

108. The Court would also like to emphasize that whereas it may indeed order the State to adopt certain measures, the Court does not however deem it necessary to indicate to the State how it should comply with the Court's decision, that being left to the discretion of the said State.

109. Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court grants the Applicants' request to order the Respondent State to reopen investigations with a view to prosecute and bring to trial the perpetrators of the murder of Norbert Zongo and his three companions, and thus shed light on this matter and do justice to the families of the victims.

110. On the Applicant's request to require the Respondent State to furnish all information concerning the measures taken in this respect within six months, the Court is of the opinion that it is not necessary to set a specific time limit for implementation of the measures in question, considering that it will determine later (infra, para 111) the time limit within which the Respondent State should notify the Court of its execution of all the measures it would have taken in the instant case.

111. For these reasons,

THE COURT:

1. (i) UnanimouslyDecides, with regard to the moral prejudice suffered by the Applicants natural persons in the instant case, that only the spouse, the sons and daughters, and the fathers and mothers of the deceased persons mentioned in paragraph 50 of this Judgment are entitled to reparation;

2. (ii) Unanimously Orders the Respondent State, in consequence, to pay twenty-five (25) million CFA F to each spouse; fifteen (15) million CFA F to each son and daughter; and ten (10) million CFA F to each father and mother concerned;

3. (iii) Unanimously Declares that for the purposes of the payments prescribed in the preceding paragraph, the following documents must be presented by the Applicants to the competent Burkinabè authorities: marriage certificate and life certificate or any other equivalent proof for the spouse: birth certificate and life certificate or any other equivalent proof for the sons and daughters; attestation of paternity or of maternity, and a life certificate or any other equivalent proof for the fathers and mothers;

4. (iv) Unanimously, Declares that the Judgment of 28 March 2014 on this matter represents a form of reparation for the moral prejudice suffered by the Burkinabè Movement on Human and Peoples' Rights (MBDHP); and orders the Respondent State in addition to pay a token sum of one (1) CFA F to the MBDHP, as reparation for the said prejudice;

5. (v) Unanimously, Dismisses the claim made by the MBDHP for compensation for having organized human rights demonstrations regularly, including demonstrations for the Applicants;

6. (vi) Unanimously Orders the Respondent State to pay the Applicants the sum of forty (40) million CFA F being the fees owed to their Counsel;

7. (vii) Unanimously Orders the Respondent State to reimburse the Applicants the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by their Counsel during their stay at the Seat of the Court in Arusha in March and November 2013, in the amount of three million one hundred and thirty-five thousand, four hundred and five CFA F and eighty cents (3,135,405.80);

8. (viii) Unanimously Orders the Respondent State to pay all the amounts mentioned in sub paragraphs (ii), (iv), (vi) and (vii) of this paragraph within six months as of today, failing which interest will accrue for delayed payment, calculated at the rate applicable at the Central Bank of the Community of West African States (BCEAO), for the entire duration of the delay until the full payment of the amounts owed;

9. (ix) Unanimously Orders the Respondent State to publish within six (6) months of the date of this Judgment: (a) the summary of this Judgment in French drafted by the Registry of the Court, once in the Official Gazette of Burkina Faso and once in a widely read national Daily; (b) the same summary on the website of the Respondent State and retain the publication on the said website for one year;

10. (x) By ten votes to one, Judge Tambala dissenting, Orders the Respondent State to reopen investigations with a view to apprehend, prosecute and bring to justice the perpetrators of the assassination of Norbert Zongo and his three companions;

11. (xi) Unanimously Orders the Respondent State to submit to it within six months effective from this day, a report on the status of compliance with all the Orders contained in this Judgment.

Signed:

Augustine S.L. RAMADHANI, President

Elsie N. THOMPSON, Vice-President

Gérard NIYUNGEKO, Judge

Fatsah OUGUERGOUZ, Judge

Duncan TAMBALA, Judge

Sylvain ORE, Judge

El Hadji GUISSE, Judge

Ben KIOKO, Judge

Rafâa BEN ACHOUR, Judge

Solomy B. BOSSA, Judge

Angelo V. MATUSSE, Judge; and

Robert ENO, Registrar.

Done at Arusha, this Fifth Day of the Month of June of the Year Two Thousand and Fifteen in English and French, the French version being authoritative.