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READING KEYNES AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: THE GREAT DEPRESSION, THE LIQUIDITY TRAP, AND UNCONVENTIONAL POLICY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 June 2018

Richard Sutch*
Affiliation:
Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of California, Riverside; and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. Contact the author at richard.sutch@ucr.edu.
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Abstract

John Maynard Keynes’s analysis of the Great Depression has strong parallels to recent theorizing about the post-2008 Great Recession. There are also remarkable similarities between the two historical episodes: the collapse of demand for new fixed investment, the role of the zero lower bound liquidity trap in hampering conventional monetary policy, the multi-year period of near-zero short-term rates, and the protracted period of subnormal prosperity. A major difference between then and now is that monetary authorities in the recent situation actively pursued an unconventional policy with massive purchases of long-term securities. Keynes couldn’t convince authorities of his era to pursue such a plan, but it was precisely the monetary policy he advocated for a depressed economy stuck at the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates.

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Copyright © The History of Economics Society 2018 
Figure 0

Figure 1.The marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) before and after the spring of 1929 illustrating the collapse of investment demand.

Figure 1

Figure 2.The short-term interest rate over the course of the Great Depression. See the section at the end of this article for the sources of the data.

Figure 2

Figure 3.Long-term interest rates over the course of the Great Depression. The bottom chart graphs the difference, or “spread,” between the corporate bond rate and the government bond rate. The spread is a measure of Keynes’s “lender’s risk.” See the section at the end of this article for the sources of the data.

Figure 3

Figure 4.A schematic of the transmission mechanism of traditional open market operations on the flow of capital investment.

Figure 4

Figure 5.A simulation of the Treasury bond yield required to end the Great Depression suggested by Keynes’s discussion of lender’s risk. See text.

Figure 5

Figure 6.The yield curve for securities issued by the Treasury Department, four dates. Source: Cecchetti (1988, Appendix).

Figure 6

Figure 7.The supply of money (currency held by the public plus demand deposits at commercial banks) over the course of the Great Depression. The impact of the Treasury’s temporarily halt in the monetization of gold inflows is clearly seen. Source: Estimates by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) as reported in Carter et al. (2006, Series Cb64).