Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa: Preventing Civil War through Institutional Design explores how institutions help states respond to shocks, with a particular focus on whether integrative or accommodative designs better avert conflict. Using case study evidence from seven countries, the authors conclude that the institutions themselves have less impact than the implementation of whatever design is chosen. Thus, factors that influence institutionalization, such as the scope of the change from existing institutions, elite attitudes and behavior, international involvement, and incentives to avoid or foster conflict, all mediate the effects of design.

The main conclusion, that design matters less than its implementation, contributes a nuanced perspective to a debate that has generally been framed in dichotomous terms. This debate over integrative and accommodative approaches is typified by the work of Arend Lijphart (Power Sharing in South Africa, 1985)and Donald Horowitz(A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society, 1991)and has been enriched in recent years by work on post-conflict power-sharing by scholars such as Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie (Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, 2007), Anna Jarstad and Desirée Nilsson(“From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25(3)[2008]: 206–223), and Michaela Mattes and Burcu Savun (“Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design.” International Studies Quarterly 53(3)[2009]: 737–759). Yet implementation has often been absent from the discussion of institutional design, and while this volume’s analysis could be more detailed, its emphasis on that dimension of the question is especially valuable.

Although it is not entirely clear to what degree the seven cases are representative, the project’s design also departs from much of the existing research, which has often employed either large-n statistical methods or single or paired case studies. By using a relatively large number of detailed cases, Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa offers scholars the opportunity to evaluate institutional designs in great detail but across a range of conditions. The careful process-tracing and close analyses in most chapters are among the volume’s strengths and should make it of interest to scholars in diverse areas of the discipline.

Within each case chapter, the author considers how well state institutions buffered the effects of one or more economic, demographic, environmental, or political shocks to the system. This common approach allows for some inherent control over the different circumstances in each state, although the definitions of both institutional design and shocks run the risk of being so broad that they overlook substantive conclusions. For example, “design” includes all formal and informal structures, including election rules, executive powers, minority accommodations, decentralization, the balance of power, transitional justice, perceptions of institutional legitimacy, and how all these provisions can be modified and interpreted (p. 6). All of these dimensions are then combined to designate institutions as either accommodative or integrative. While that aggregation does make the findings more generalizable, it also obscures significant variation between these institutions. The individual cases often focus on specific types of design, such as the centralization of executive power (Senegal), regional devolution of power (Nigeria), or the engineering of multi-ethnic parties (Burundi). The more fine-grained conclusions about these institutions—which are often quite interesting—seem to be primarily isolated in individual chapters. For instance, Filip Reyntjens’ chapter on Burundi addresses questions not only about whether institutions are accommodative or integrative, but about how very specific types of institutions impact parties’ base of support (pp. 41–44). Of course, there is no “one-size-fits-all” design, but the cases are rich enough that it might have been possible to also delve into some closer comparative analysis of these types of institutions, in addition to the more general conclusions. I also would have liked to see some more detailed cross-national analysis examining the types of shocks—for example, do certain institutions handle economic shocks better than political ones? In short, the volume does well demonstrating the effects of institutions and of shocks in general, but the contribution would be greater with an examination of whether the results depend on the type of shock experienced and whether certain types of institutions exert greater influence than others.

The final chapters describe a new database of institutions across the continent and a section on the policy implications of the findings. While the policy implications are, in some cases, uncomfortable, the volume addresses them squarely. The database represents an important innovation for scholars of both African politics and institutional design. The cross-national data was particularly interesting for suggesting a few general patterns and situating the cases in comparative perspective. In the future, these data may also suggest answers to some of the additional questions this volume raises.