In 1997 the owners of the largest Turkish conglomerates pressed for radical political change in the country by, among other things, publishing a report on democratization through the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD). Even though Turkey was considered an electoral democracy, the report was a review of the constitutional reforms needed in order to make the country fully democratic. It therefore touched on issues that were regarded as highly controversial,Footnote 1 such as civilian control of the military, freedom of speech and increased minority rights.Footnote 2 This was novel because TÜSİAD members, like business in most late-industrializing countries, owed the success and even existence of their firms to state contracts and subsidies that they had managed to obtain through informal access to officials and government.Footnote 3
The importance of preserving privileged access to limited resources had historically affected the economic elite through bringing about the concentration of industry in the hands of a few family-owned multisector conglomerates and by pushing these families to channel most of their energy towards the maintenance of such relationships with the state elite. For instance, most large firms have tended to offer positions to retired civil servants, military officers and politicians. More importantly, this dependence is often shown as part of the explanation behind business's acceptance of Turkey's dominant ideology and geopolitical stance as formulated by the republican political elite.Footnote 4 As such, the report's publication indicated that members of TÜSİAD were apparently willing to jeopardize their proximity to the state.
Given this relationship, there were naturally some disputes around the publication of the original democratization report within the association itself.Footnote 5 However, as an association TÜSİAD has reiterated its commitment to the content of the first report by publishing another one in 2007 for its tenth anniversary.Footnote 6 The original report on democratization published by TÜSİAD presents an interesting case for the comparative literature because it illustrates the conditions necessary for capital to overcome internal conflicts and to embrace a pro-democratic stance at the risk of endangering its ties to the state elite. However, the fact that the association has continued to press for reform further highlights some of the conditions necessary for this stance to become long term.
This continued pressure is significant because authors such as Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens have shown compelling evidence to indicate that, while business can push for political liberalization during specific periods, it still remains in the long term a reactionary force that reverts to authoritarianism when its interests are challenged.Footnote 7 Recent developments, namely the rise of the Muslim Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) and its conflicts with the secular state elite, make the case of Turkish capital even more interesting for the literature. Some have commented that the rise of Islam represents the emergence of a new bourgeoisie from within Anatolia that can potentially challenge the privileged position of the established classes.Footnote 8 Even though its members come from the highly industrialized Istanbul region and are, as noted above, close to the establishment, TÜSİAD has adopted a democratic tone by strongly criticizing any measures taken by the military and the courts to stifle the AKP.Footnote 9 TÜSİAD has done so by avoiding potential internal cracks and has managed to reiterate its initial positions towards democracy. The association has thus situated itself as a moderate voice within the secularist–Muslim conflict.
While the scope of the threat posed by the AKP is not of the exact same nature as the ones envisioned by Rueschemeyer et al., the case nevertheless highlights the mechanisms that work to buffer business's reactionary tendencies. In this article I argue that large business's participation in political life through a strong association is a significant mechanism that keeps it committed to a democracy even in the face of political turmoil. I make this argument based on 41 expert interviews I conducted between 2001 and 2002 to determine why TÜSİAD had become a democratizing force in the first place, and 21 interviews in 2008 where I probed how the association had evolved in light of the political conflict between the AKP and secular establishment represented by such actors as courts, the military and Kemalist middle classes.Footnote 10 Understanding how associations keep entrepreneurs committed to democracy will probably become even more pertinent in the next few years as the financial crisis of 2008 affects global production and brings the importance of capital's relations with the state and other actors to the forefront.
ORGANIZED BUSINESS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
There is strong support for the notion that some institutions founded under democracy, such as the right to private property, are beneficial to capitalism.Footnote 11 However, even though there may be this longer-term affinity, the problem lies in the fact that business has often tended to work as a reactionary force to protect its shorter-term privileges. Such doubts about the economic elite's democratic values and capacity to realize its longer-term benefits exist for several interrelated reasons. On a macro level, authors have pointed to the structural power of business: the threat of disinvestment serves as a powerful mechanism to push governments to adopt positions that are favourable to business.Footnote 12 At a more personal level, individual members of the economic elite can use their structural position to influence state officials directly.Footnote 13 Capital is therefore able to exercise control over policy without having recourse to formal channels of representation and it is therefore, at the very least, perceived as being ambivalent towards democracy.
Additional factors in the case of late-developing nations have also been put forward as causes for business's support for authoritarian regimes. As a result of late-development, the nascent domestic bourgeoisie often finds itself in a vulnerable social and economic position, thus leading it to fear democratization where it might risk losing its privileged access to already scarce state resources.Footnote 14 Furthermore, there exist elements in the industrialization process itself that lead to the rise of authoritarian regimes at higher stages of development. For example, during the transition from light industry to more capital-intensive sectors, industry may support authoritarian regimes to channel resources towards investment in capital equipment and suppress distributional conflicts that may arise out of this transfer.Footnote 15
As noted in the introduction, in Turkey too capital has been described as a class owing much of its existence to subsidies and its ability to maintain close ties with officials.Footnote 16 Increasing the perception that Turkish business has historically been pro-authoritarian is the fact that TÜSİAD is accused by some of contributing to the collapse of a democratically elected government (the Republican People's Party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP, 1977–79) and to a military coup during a period of political turmoil that threatened business interests.Footnote 17
Research on third-wave democratization has been more positive about capital's ability to become a more democratizing actor for two interrelated reasons. First, there have been cases where business did indeed directly contribute to the collapse of authoritarian regimes by withdrawing its support.Footnote 18 Second, it has been argued that states can sometimes become insulated from economic interests, thus undermining the structural power of business or the effectiveness of the personal ties it has with officials.Footnote 19
Combining both approaches, authors such as Eduardo Silva have asserted that the literature should focus on business associations as viable vehicles for voicing business interests and demanding the liberalization of government when authoritarian states do indeed become too autonomous.Footnote 20 This new scholarship on organized business does not refute the claim that capital's structural position can make it a reactionary force. What it presupposes is that by resisting change, business may be forgoing the long-term benefits found in liberal democracy in order to protect its short-term benefits. One way to get around this trade-off (both conceptually and in reality) has been to distinguish between different possible levels of analysis when studying business interests.Footnote 21 The view that business may oppose democracy is true when looking at it as capital from a macro level or from a more micro level as the activities of an individual businessperson. But several mechanisms appear when it is studied by looking at business associations.
First, as pointed out by Streeck and Schmitter, business associations can exercise some influence over their members in order to make certain measures more acceptable.Footnote 22 For instance, distributive policies in Europe have been more acceptable to business partly as a result of the existence of relatively strong associations. Second, as illustrated by Silva and Durand, business organizations can have some influence on the public debate and as such can increase the trust that business leaders may have in democratic institutions.Footnote 23 Third, it has been demonstrated that business associations that represent various sectors can help capital formulate its broader longer-term goals by going beyond the narrow interest of individual members.Footnote 24 Finally, in places where capital has been historically weak, the existence of strong associations can be an efficient channel of interest representation, thus decreasing the pro-authoritarian tendencies of business even when there are threats to its interests.Footnote 25 For all of the above reasons Silva and Durand have hypothesized that well-established business associations will work to strengthen democratic consolidation and can therefore become valuable areas of study.Footnote 26
Indeed, subsequent sections of this article demonstrate that treating business as an organization helps us to understand why large capital has become a moderating force in the AKP–secularist conflict that has affected Turkey from 2006 to 2009.
TURKISH BUSINESS, THE STATE AND DEMOCRACY
Scholars of Turkish business tend to agree that the historical dependence of large capital on the state has created a complex relationship between the two.Footnote 27 Both the literature and some of my informants admit that to this day business has greatly benefited from maintaining close ties to the state. In addition to resources and contracts obtained through direct relations, the complex bureaucratic web that firms must navigate in Turkey tends to favour already-established enterprises. Furthermore, military spending and a conglomerate controlled by the army's pension plan constitute a major source of demand for Turkish manufacturing.Footnote 28 However, these advantages have historically been distributed on the condition that capital supports state and government policy. The founder of the largest corporation lamented in his autobiography the fact that he was forced by the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti – DP) government to abandon his lifelong membership to the CHP in order to continue maintaining access to state resources.Footnote 29 Economic policy has more often than not been used pragmatically to secure support and insulate policy from societal pressure.Footnote 30 The downside from large capital's perspective, as confirmed by my interviewees and the literature, has been the fact that long-term economic policy has tended to be too uncertain. What is important to emphasize is that, despite their generally favourable attitudes towards free enterprise, even right-wing parties have experienced this problem and have never constituted a pro-business party.Footnote 31
TÜSİAD was founded in 1971 with the aim of overcoming a narrow focus on the economic policy situation; twelve leading industrialists signed a Founders' Memorandum and were joined by others, mostly from the Istanbul region.Footnote 32 It was formed as an addition to the already existing semi-formal organizations with mandatory membership, such as the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodities' Exchanges (TOBB) for two connected reasons, which were really symptomatic of the above problem. First, TÜSİAD members sought to increase the legitimacy of private enterprise as an acceptable endeavour and path towards development. Second, there was growing divergence in the interests of large industrial establishments and smaller-scale firms. The 1970s were a period when large business was becoming more capital intensive and therefore needed longer-term planning than most other establishments.Footnote 33 Bianchi further notes that this increased the tension between the interests of large industrialists and the mandate of formal organizations such as TOBB, which represent thousands of firms of diverse sizes and activities. This view was also clearly repeated by all of my informants who discussed TOBB and felt that it was also too much under government influence.Footnote 34
It was in 1979 that TÜSİAD's political influence became noticeable, when it published four full-page newspaper advertisements criticizing the reluctance of the then Prime Minister Ecevit in the full adoption of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) measures. The advertisements stressed that arbitrary state intervention and poor economic policy went against democratic rights and led to increased poverty.Footnote 35 As mentioned earlier, it has been claimed that this measure led to the subsequent military intervention and is therefore believed by some to represent the first major political impact that TÜSİAD had.Footnote 36
Following the coup, the association reverted to predominantly economic issues. Informally, however, TÜSİAD witnessed the rise of a vocal leader Șahap Kocatopçu, who rarely shied from verbal squabbles with the economically liberal government over economic policy.Footnote 37 It was in 1989, under the direction of Cem Boyner – a second-generation business tycoon – that TÜSİAD began to focus on political issues again. Boyner's term was characterized by greater emphasis on reindustrialization and the emergence of background political themes, such as visits to the poorer and Kurdish regions in the south-east.Footnote 38 These issues came to the fore under Bülent Eczacıbaşı and Halis Komili's terms from 1991 to 1996. During that period, TÜSİAD published reports on rights, local government and the optimal state, and in 1993 it was one of the only mainstream organization to press for the acceptance of Kurdish as a language in Turkey.Footnote 39
These issues culminated in the publication of the Perspectives on Democracy report in 1997. While most segments – such as the military and political parties – reacted strongly against it,Footnote 40 voices within TÜSİAD also showed that there were serious splits between conservative and liberal members of the organization. Some influential businesspeople such as Sakıp Sabancı hailed the report as something that TÜSİAD should be proud of, while others such as Rahmi Koç have implied that they would not have permitted its publication had they been aware of its content.
An exhaustive examination of why TÜSİAD pressed for radical political change is beyond the scope of this article.Footnote 41 My interviews revealed that a combination of economic and political factors were behind these demands. One significant reason is obviously Turkey's proximity to the European Union. Trade via integration in the European Community and the prospect of membership of the EU have brought needed political reforms to the forefront. However, several of my informants emphasized that the conditions necessary for joining the Union were not specified clearly in 1996 and that the reforms proposed in the report were therefore TÜSİAD's own interpretation of what was wrong with the Turkish political system. Other informants also emphasized that EU membership was not an end in itself but a means of forcing fundamental change in Turkey's political structure. One has therefore to look at the factors that make democratization intrinsically appealing to Turkish industry.
Economically, members of TÜSİAD were in the 1990s becoming increasingly international and were moving towards more capital-intensive sectors of industry. To become competitive, however, my interviewees felt that they needed to accelerate the adoption of new technologies through foreign direct investment and longer-term planning. They further emphasized the need for an improved distribution of income and education systems in order to create a qualified labour force that could also constitute a large domestic market. The above demands, they felt, required the kinds of institutions found in democracies, such as the rule of law, and also went hand-in-hand with the more social aspects of democracy. As summarized by one of my informants:
[TÜSİAD] realized the absolutely necessary conditions after the transition to a liberal economy: labour rights, civil servant rights and political stability. [TÜSİAD] became conscious of the fact that these could promote foreign investment and expand markets. There is a need for skilled labour now. For these reasons, issues such as education, democracy, Cyprus and human rights have come to the forefront of the agenda. […] There is a private sector that is ready to compete, instead of selling to the state.
These factors become salient when one considers the characteristics of the Turkish state and attitude towards economic policy as described above. Although my informants admitted that they were in a privileged position to gain favours from state officials, they also emphasized that clientelistic relationships were not as appealing, given their evolving needs. Benefits obtained from the state were described as too uncertain to be conducive to long-term planning, while policy areas where TÜSİAD wanted change, such as the freedom of speech, were in fact the policy areas that the state had managed to isolate from societal pressures. The next few paragraphs will determine whether the conflict between the AKP and secular actors has affected this pro-democratic stance. Through this the importance of business organizations will also become apparent.
THE AKP–SECULARIST CONFLICT AND TÜSİAD'S COMMITMENT TO ITS POLITICAL GOALS
One can roughly distinguish between two periods, one from 2002 to 2006 and the other from 2007 to 2008, to understand the AKP's relation to large capital and other actors. The AKP did two things that secured TÜSİAD's support between the initial periods.Footnote 42 The first was to continue more aggressively the reforms needed for ascension to EU candidacy. While there always has been some opposition on the part of political actors to the reforms needed to join the Union because of the fundamental changes they would bring, the AKP pushed strongly for the changes needed for membership talks to resume. The second was to stick to the economic stabilization and privatization package already undertaken by the previous government and recommended by the IMF. All of my commentators, both from within and outside TÜSİAD, point out that these sets of policies, combined with the stability provided by a one-party government and the improved economic performance of the country after 2002, served to secure TÜSİAD's support. Indeed, during the period TÜSİAD did not voice the same type of concerns that some segments in society were voicing against the AKPs motivation to join the EU.Footnote 43 On the contrary, TÜSİAD reinforced its own dedication to reform by increasing the scope of its efforts to lobby for EU membership; the association organized official visits with leaders of various European governments in order to increase Turkey's chances during membership talks.Footnote 44
It is important to note for the business–state relations literature that both Erdoğan and TÜSİAD made conscientious efforts to establish direct contact with each other during the AKP's first years in power. One forum where TÜSİAD and the AKP came together was during the association's lobby efforts abroad. For instance Tayyip Erdoğan was invited to the opening of TÜSİAD's Berlin office, which presented an opportunity for Turkish business to become intermediaries between the governments of both countries. Another forum has been the AKP's visits to TÜSİAD headquarters to strengthen dialogue. These interactions also brought Cüneyd Zapsu to the fore, a member of both TÜSİAD and the AKP, who appeared to work as facilitator during these visits as an economic adviser to Erdoğan.Footnote 45
This period was not without squabbles between TÜSİAD and the AKP. The source of disputes varied from personal comments to more general attacks on capital's role in society made by Erdoğan in characteristically populist tones.Footnote 46 Everyone I spoke to in 2008 played down the importance of this type of incident in defining the association's tone and focused on the general direction of policy. The arguments were perceived as nothing more than personal conflicts that did not affect the association's position and were often followed by conciliatory remarks. This does lend support to the comparative literature that suggests that one factor that helps eliminate business opposition to government policy is officials' willingness to forge relationships with business. Nonetheless, my informants outside the association pointed to the fact that the harsher exchanges between the AKP and TÜSİAD were probably symbolic of a growing conflict between old money and the newer, more pious, eastern bourgeoisie.Footnote 47 It is therefore worth examining the developments of the 2006–8 period to determine how TÜSİAD's position was affected as a result of the conflict between secularists and the AKP.
The first major dispute erupted in May 2007 during the presidential election process when the secularist Sezer's seven-year term was due to end.Footnote 48 The Kemalist establishment organized the first of many mass protests known as the ‘Republic meetings’ and it was widely covered in the international mediaFootnote 49 when talks of a possible Erdoğan presidency surfaced. In response to these reactions, the AKP eventually presented Abdullah Gül as a candidate to the National Assembly that elects the president, because he was perceived as being more mainstream and had managed to become a fairly popular figure as a more ‘Westernized’ foreign minister. His nomination, however, did not end the Republic meetings, which justified the protests by emphasizing issues such as the fact that his wife covered her head. Although the AKP parliamentarians voted for Gül in the National Assembly, the boycott of the session by CHP representatives prevented them from obtaining quorum and Gül's election was eventually annulled by the Constitutional Court.Footnote 50
Following the decision, the AKP decided that it would move towards constitutional reform that would mean that the president was elected through direct popular vote. This step infuriated the secular sectors further and ignited worries about a religious party tinkering with the country's secular constitution. Following these events the military stepped in with its second ‘virtual coup’ in a decade by posting on its website warnings against the AKP and the possible dangers of the AKP's actions.Footnote 51
During this period TÜSİAD had two significant press releases that reflected its official stance. The first one was to congratulate Gül on his nomination, thus highlighting the fact that the association did not feel as uncomfortable about an AKP presidency as other secular segments. The second release was directed at all the actors and had several aims: it strongly protested at the military actions and emphasized that these had no place in a democracy. It also took the more moderate stance and pushed for the AKP to go to the polls, given all the popular mobilization. Finally, it invited everyone involved to remain calm, thus also targeting the Kemalist actors who were organizing the meetings.Footnote 52
Moreover, TÜSİAD attempted to promote its own agenda during the elections by publishing a summary of all of its previous reports and opinions called Güçlü Demokrasi, Güçlü Sosyal Yapı, Güçlü Ekonomi (Strong Democracy, Strong Social Structure and Strong Economy), and emphasized that the debates and party platforms should revolve around these three major issues.Footnote 53 In so doing it took a position that moved away from the conflict by restating the type of political reform it had been pressing for all along.
The AKP won the elections with 47 per cent of the popular vote, compared to 34 per cent in 2002, and managed to maintain control of the Assembly. Two problems that came to the fore after the elections were constitutional reforms and attempts by the chief public prosecutor to close the AKP on the grounds that it wanted to overthrow the secular state. TÜSİAD's attitude during this period became less consistent and was characterized by sending out several different signals.
First, some tensions from within the association surfaced when various prominent members of the association situated themselves at different points along a spectrum in their attitude vis-à-vis the AKP government. While Güler Sabancı from the second largest industrial group in Turkey declared on several occasions that the AKP had now become Turkey's centre-right party, TÜSİAD's chairperson Arzuhan Yalcındağ sent sterner warnings emphasizing that the post of president held by Gül was one that should respect Kemalism and secularism.Footnote 54 My interviewees too reflected different positions about the AKP; some were more favourable while others were more worried. Moreover, some were satisfied with TÜSİAD's stance, while others felt that it could do more to protest the government.
Second, the definition of Turkey as a secular nation gained a more prominent place in TÜSİAD's declarations. However, one difference between TÜSİAD and other secular actors was the fact that it did not revert to Kemalism in its opposition. Rather it adopted, as revealed by my informants, a more liberal democratic notion of secularism where it defined the headscarf and religious symbols, for instance, as issues of individual rights rather than collective rights.
Third, as attested to by the publication of a report during elections, TÜSİAD continued to promote reform. One such revealing development has been the fact that, while most secular actors have been opposed to the idea of constitutional change under an AKP government, TÜSİAD has signalled that it favours replacing the military constitution, on the condition that it is done with the participation of civil society actors.Footnote 55 The following quote is from the press release that TÜSİAD published in response to the Constitutional Court's decision not to ban the AKP and its members and it reflects its position well:
TÜSİAD has consistently emphasized that the closure of a political party will not resolve a country's political problems.…there is still much that must be done to make Turkish democracy stronger and more pluralistic. Firstly, political parties must develop their political agendas, programs, and activities based on the fact that Turkey is a secular, democratic, social and constitutional state. All constitutional and legal barriers that prevent Turkey from strengthening its democracy must be changed. In light of this experience, …and to commence this process of change, we reiterate our call for the establishment of a Constitutional Convention which will include all groups of society as well as civil society organizations. We believe this decision will be regarded as a milestone in the history of Turkish democracy.Footnote 56
During this period TÜSİAD has at times sent somewhat conflicting signals, but overall it has stayed close to its own democratizing mission. The interviews conducted with members have revealed aspects of the organization that help it adopt this position and that are worth further examination.
TÜSİAD AS ORGANIZED BUSINESS AND LONGER-TERM COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY
To understand TÜSİAD it is important to note that although membership increased from 140 in 1975 to around 600 in 2008, it still remains the voice of the few families who own the largest holdings in Turkey. As became apparent during internal debates surrounding the democratization report and underlined by a few of my informants, the influential families within TÜSİAD are also different from each other ideologically. A split between more conservative and liberal members surfaces, as noted above, in the conflicting statements that individual members made about the AKP. However, studying TÜSİAD as an organization, rather than looking at it as capital or through its individual members, helps isolate five mutuallyreinforcing factors that explain why it has been able to go beyond this type of division and sometimes contradictory comments to maintain a pro-democratization discourse despite a highly volatile political climate. These are also important in helping us to understand how the association overcame internal disputes and publish the highly controversial report in 1997.
First, TÜSİAD has been successful in maintaining a consistent discourse as a result of the control that influential families have continued to exercise. Indeed, the organization of TÜSİAD reflects an attempt to safeguard the control of key families and to hide internal debates from the public eye. The association includes two main bodies: while the High Advisory Council determines the broad mission and goals, the Board of Directors (Yönetim Kurulu) – headed by a chairperson – constitutes TÜSİAD's executive wing. Key positions within this structure are typically held by individuals who come from the large families or who are at least ideologically close to them. This is ensured by the fact that election to the board is achieved through consensus over a single list prepared by the most influential members and not through direct elections. As for the Advisory Council, it is made up of previous presidents of the board and honorary members, thus achieving some continuity in ideology and control. Supporting this structure is a professional staff, including the general secretary, four deputy general secretaries, the directors of the Ankara, Brussels and Washington offices and a team of professional experts that coordinate TÜSİAD's activities. These have usually held office longer than the chairperson, who is elected for two years, and therefore help bridge several different administrations.
The problematic nature of such undemocratic practice has been raised by some members and its implications will be discussed in the concluding remarks of this article. However, it can be said that TÜSİAD stays committed to the broader goals it has laid out thanks to the families' control. The chairperson, for instance, usually consults with the members of the board, the Advisory Council and the Secretariat before making statements on current problems. As such, while on some very specific issues or on occasion the tone can change, the position pronounced by the chairperson stays faithful to what TÜSİAD promotes by ensuring that influential members debate it internally and come up with compromises that are acceptable to each.
The second factor that helps consistency in ideology is that TÜSİAD has developed a tradition of backing every report it publishes. Disputes over ‘Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey’ were resolved by restating this tradition. A good example is the summary of all of the previous reports it had published during the 2007 elections. In it TÜSİAD reiterated positions found in previous reports rather than formulating new positions to situate itself in the face of the political crisis affecting the AKP.
The third factor concerns the fact that large holdings owned by TÜSİAD are very diversified. Diversity leads the association to be more in tune with the broader needs of capital rather than defending specific sectoral needs. One informant paraphrased a statement made by the former chairman, Cem Boyner: ‘We are not an interest group, we are a group with conflicting interests who work for the good of the country’. Even in the case of smaller members found in TÜSİAD, they are usually linked to firms that offer services to large holdings such as consultancy or capital goods. As such, TÜSİAD stays faithful to the broader framework needed for a well-functioning capitalist economy.
Fourthly, business organizations enable a few influential leaders, who see the benefits of democracy for capitalism, to emerge and guide their general direction. Within TÜSİAD this has been facilitated through the existence of workgroups known as commissions, in which active members can participate. Those who wish to do so can work in nine commissions, focusing on varying issues such as political reform, taxation, competition and education. By having this channel, TÜSİAD draws on the know-how of individuals who have a more informed opinion of the complex issues. For example, current work on the rule of law is accomplished thanks to the contribution of one member of the board with a law background. More importantly, the report on democracy, though written based on a decision taken by TÜSİAD, was closely supervised by Can Paker, and to a certain extent Ishak Alaton, who are identified as highly pro-democratic members. Several of my informants made a point of emphasizing that the content of the democratization report would not have been quite the same had Paker not been involved in its preparation; he went to great lengths to get it prepared by Bülent Tanör, who was a left-wing constitutional law professor known for progressive ideas.
Finally, both in 2001–2 and 2008, my informants from TÜSİAD did not feel represented politically because of the contradictory nature of the state. In 2008 especially, they did not see a potential for the rise of a mainstream political movement that could defend business interests. Thus working as an association also provided TÜSİAD members with a formal political voice. What is important to note in 2008 is that most informants felt that it was the consistency of TÜSİAD's message that increased its legitimacy as an organization. Therefore, in a context where a pro-business party is lacking, business associations can work to give members of capital a more legitimate and less reactionary way of participating in debates. In essence TÜSİAD works as the bourgeoisie's ‘party’ and its more informed members help formulate its ideology.
If one looks at these factors and how they interact, the following can be said about TÜSİAD: some reactions do from time-to-time leak to the press, and splits within the association surface. However, for the most part the association has created mechanisms to ensure that only the broader longer-term interests of large capital come to the fore. Moreover, the workgroups that the association has put in place have further contributed to building a clear conceptual link between capitalist interest and democracy by ensuring that members who have the capacity to make this connection do actually contribute to TÜSİAD's position on issues. Once these views are formulated, TÜSİAD has shown great commitment to back them. As such, the association has remained fairly consistent despite the AKP's rise to power, secular protest and potential member dissent.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above discussion showed that working as an association has helped large Turkish business stay committed to the longer-term goals it had formulated. Organized business ensures some consistency in ideology that business-as-capital often lacks. Furthermore, working as an association has enabled a few more pro-democratic members of the business community to contribute to the association's ideology and help large business see a positive link between capitalism and democracy. As such, there is reason to believe that organized business may indeed, as hypothesized by authors such as Silva and Durand, contribute to democratic consolidation by formulating a more liberal democratic agenda and preventing shorter-term reactions. Thus it should be expected that, whenever conflicts arise due to political or economic tensions, capital's position may be mitigated through associations.
However, the example of TÜSİAD also shows a potential tension. While greater participation from diverse members has contributed to its pro-democracy stance, it is the less-democratic measures within the association designed to reduce dissent that have contributed to consistency in the long term. If stability is achieved by concentrating power in the hands of a few influential members, what is to prevent the association from turning pro-authoritarian as soon as the interests of a few are challenged by a threat from below, as envisioned by Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens? To maintain a pro-democratic stance, business associations, or any organization for that matter, have to find a balance between consistency and plurality to ensure some stability in its ideology.
