Johannes Morsink has long been interested in the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), having published The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent in 2000. His new book, in many ways a follow-up to that exceptional work, continues the project of putting political philosophy to work in the service of human rights. That first book concentrates on the philosophical arguments underlying the drafting process of the UDHR. In this new effort, Morsink “addresses the enormous proliferation of human rights interpretations in various disciplinary discussions by offering a unified theory that is openly based on a close study of the intellectual implications of the UDHR for our present-day theorizing about the concept and scope of human rights” (p. 3). Along the way, Morsink takes aim at virtually all the stars in the contemporary philosophical firmament—from Richard Rorty and John Rawls to Michael Ignatieff and Jack Donnelly. Indeed, at the heart of this project is the argument that many contemporary theorists ignore or undermine the philosophical roots of the human rights movement, substantially weakening the universality of those rights. Ultimately, he wants to argue that we should reject “the antimetaphysical claims of many contemporary human rights theorists as not in keeping with their founding document” (p. 145). Like all of Morsink's work, this book is thoughtful and carefully researched; his ability to develop difficult ideas both broadly and deeply is the book's most obvious virtue and one that any reader will appreciate.

Morsink begins by setting out what he calls “the doctrine of inherent human rights” (p. 5), comprising two interrelated theses: the first is “a metaphysical one about the way the world is” while the second “is a matching epistemic or knowledge-focused equivalent” (p. 17). Specifically, he claims that—in looking at the UDHR—it becomes clear that the drafters set out both the inherence of human rights in the human person and the argument that experts are not needed for us to become aware of these inherent rights. With regard to the first, Morsink highlights and embraces the direct connection between the natural rights of the Enlightenment and the Declaration's human rights before taking on the various contemporary theorists who are critical of making such a connection. Morsink pursues a similar strategy as far as the second thesis is concerned, arguing that ordinary human beings are able to access the metaphysical universality of their inherent human rights by virtue of their reason and conscience (as articulated in the UDHR).

Having argued for the importance and accessibility of a metaphysical foundation for the contemporary human rights regime, Morsink turns to a discussion of the capabilities approach put forward by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen to demonstrate the link between inherence and cosmopolitanism. He then explores critics of capabilities-based cosmopolitanism and works to refute their charge of utopianism. To do so—specifically regarding the economic, social, and cultural rights that are often seen as problematic—Morsink suggests that “everyone only has a human right to the minimal level of the substance (be it health care, food or an education) that is mentioned in any given right” (p. 254). Finally, Morsink turns to a discussion of the right to democratic participation, which he regards as worthy of its own chapter by virtue of the controversy that surrounds its seeming ethnocentrism and excessive utopianism. Engaging the work of Jürgen Habermas and then rejecting his “attempt to connect human rights conceptually and without remainder to the right to democratic participation” (p. 268), he ultimately concludes by locating in the UDHR's drafting the right to “a strong substantive kind of democracy that cannot be undermined by its own procedures” (p. 274).

Morsink's argument is one toward which I am very sympathetic, having concluded my own book on the topic of human rights foundationalism with an argument about the justificatory weight of the cross-cultural consensus embodied in the drafting of the UDHR. That said, those who embrace Morsink's universalism and those who oppose it will still find points of contention here. In his discussion of epistemological universality, for example, Morsink relies on moral intuitionism to make the case that human beings generally know about human rights and wrongs. He writes that “[i]n 1989, millions of communist hearts woke up to the transcendent truths of the Declaration when they judged their regimes to fall short of human rights norms that had for the first time been openly allowed behind the Iron Curtain when the Helsinki Agreements were signed in 1975” (p. 75). If the truths are transcendent, why were the Helsinki Agreements—and the passage of more than a decade—needed before those millions of communists woke up to them? Shouldn't they, by virtue of reason or conscience, have had access to those truths all along? Indeed, I wonder whether a more compelling story might be that it wasn't the newfound access to universal truths so much as it was access to tools—the UDHR, the Helsinki Agreements—that allowed protestors to make a case against their governments (not as violators of the transcendent order of the universe, but simply as violators of their own agreements).

Or consider Morsink's defense of the UDHR from charges of utopianism—his argument in favor of thresholds that limit how much of any given right is ultimately owed to human beings. In attempting to avoid the utopian charge, Morsink might run into the complaint that he goes too far in the opposite direction and rejects the promise of economic, social, and cultural rights simply because they are difficult to achieve or because anything approaching egalitarianism doesn't sit well with the West. Unlike the vast majority of his book, this section does not focus on the drafting process of the UDHR, turning instead to subsequent implementation documents for support. Setting “a minimally decent life” (p. 228) as the standard for human rights seems to substitute Morsink's own view of what is required for human beings' inherent dignity in place of the potentially more expansive view of the drafters, something he very rarely does.

Finally, the main focus of Morsink's book is that theorists of human rights need to come to terms with the metaphysical foundations of the UDHR because they impoverish or undercut human rights if they focus only on practical, legal implementation. But Morsink never really explores whether or not those metaphysical foundations are true, and the critics from Rorty to Rawls will point out that he cannot do so in a way that will seem universally compelling. To my mind, the great virtue of the UDHR is not that its drafters arrived at some metaphysical truth but that they arrived at a consensus on human dignity and human rights. This is a foundation, to be sure, but not a metaphysical one; while it might not have the same weight that Morsink's inherent human rights would have if they could be proven, it is one that can serve as a standard of assessment for the nations of the world because it is one to which they have all agreed.