Why have English School approaches to International Relations (IR) been, to paraphrase Hedley Bull, ‘as remote from the [gendered] substance of international politics as the inmates of a Victorian nunnery were from the study of sex’?Footnote 1 In recent years, orthodox IR in the US has faced increasing challenges from the critiques of both feminist scholars and a revived English School, but there has yet been little engagement between these two critical approaches.Footnote 2 While several authors have noted each tradition's separate affinities with constructivist theory, none has connected feminist constructivist efforts with English School theory. However, as a framework for IR, the English School is a way to facilitate conversations between ‘high’ politics (through its study of diplomacy) and international theory (via the philosophical traditions of international theory), and, as such, it offers a promising dialogical scaffold that diverse approaches could use to engage each other as they grapple with problems of knowledge in IR. Indeed, the English School tradition has been appropriated in the past by scholars from all over the IR spectrum, who link the school with social constructivism,Footnote 3 sociology,Footnote 4 post-structuralism,Footnote 5 post-colonialism,Footnote 6 regime theory,Footnote 7 structural realism,Footnote 8 and Gadamerian hermeneutics,Footnote 9 among others. If, as Tim Dunne suggests, the crucial task of the English School's ‘critical international society theory’ is to ‘work toward global consensus’ in the three areas of ‘strengthening states by broadening and deepening the principles of good governance; civilising foreign policy by promoting the concept of international citizenship; and reforming international institutions’Footnote 10 for the common good, then it is clear feminism and gender analysis have important roles to play.
This article critiques the contributions of the English School from a perspective that takes gender seriously. By asking how the English School's construction of IR knowledge is gendered, I take the first step in demonstrating that a conversation between the English School and gender scholars could result in fruitful new research about the role of gender in ‘international society’, but also about areas of key concern to IR theorists including globalisation, diplomacy, and humanitarian intervention. Noting several areas of convergence, I demonstrate how the two approaches are broadly compatible, arguing that to conduct a conversation between English School and feminist approaches to IR, it is necessary to reconstruct the English School's three traditions, as first developed and deployed by Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, so as to allow a greater role for gender as a category of analysis. A third section treats Bull's foundational contribution to English School theory and Barry Buzan's important recent structuralist reformulation. Finally, I argue that IR theorists who have participated in the recent English School revival should integrate gender into its theoretical and research agenda, and then I show several examples of how this might be done.
The English School, which coalesced around the meetings of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics held at Cambridge in the late 1950s and early 1960s, featured the work of IR scholars such as Wight and his protégé Bull, historians like Herbert Butterfield, and policy-makers such as Adam Watson.Footnote 11 The English School's notable contributions include the conceptualisation of ‘international society’ and the sociological history of its expansion, the ‘classical approach’ to methodology, and the notion of international theory as a conversation between three different philosophical traditions of Realism, Revolutionism, and Rationalism (‘the three Rs’).Footnote 12
In the 1990s, scholars such as Barry Buzan and Tim Dunne began to argue for the continuing utility of the English School tradition. Buzan called for a ‘reconvening’ of the English school as a means of reviving ‘grand theory’ in IR, based on the school's historicism, methodological pluralism and its theorisation of the international system, international society, world society continuum.Footnote 13 Despite the increased prominence of feminist IR theory, the new generation of English School theorists has largely ignored gender as a category of analysis outside of an occasional passing mention.Footnote 14 This omission is puzzling in light of the fact that many of this generation of English School scholars explicitly see their project as ‘aligning the “British” contribution to IR with progressivist thinking in contemporary social and political theory’.Footnote 15 Symptomatically, one otherwise valuable attempt to compare English School scholarship with American approaches to IR goes so far as to compare the English School with neo-liberal institutionalist, constructivist, and post-structuralist traditions, but ignores gender, thus marginalising feminist IR.Footnote 16 In trying to understand the neglect of gender in recent English School theory, I argue that the classic English School's conception of international social relations is flawed because the three traditions it is built upon are three gendered ideal types, or configurations of masculinity. The recognition of gender as a category of analysis would make English School theory a more promising framework for a productive conversation about international relations by expanding its empirical grasp and enriching its theoretical debates.
IR feminists meet the English School
Feminists working in IR might be forgiven for initially dismissing the English School as a male preserve with little potential for critical engagement. Indeed, Dunne's influential survey of the history of the English School notes that the British Committee's exclusivity may strike some as an ‘old boys club’ although Dunne does not pursue the consequences of the group's gendered construction.Footnote 17 While this article is concerned principally with an audit of the English School, my assumption is, however, that the intellectual framework of the English School has much to offer gender analysts. Though recent contributions have focused on developing and critiquing its theory of ‘international society’ to the detriment of other facets of English School thought, it is the English School's preference for multi-voiced dialogue over premature synthesis that makes it a viable alternative to the neorealism-neoliberalism that shapes the American mainstream of IR. If feminist hopes of reaching an ‘understanding’ with mainstream American IR are contingent, as Robert Keohane has insisted, on feminists being ‘willing to formulate their hypotheses in ways that are testable – and falsifiable – with evidence’Footnote 18 then feminists may profitably engage the English School alternative: three Rs, rather than two. In other words, Keohane's influential partition of IR scholarship into rationalist and reflectivist campsFootnote 19 and the mainstream demand that international theory conform to what Timothy McKeown has called the ‘statistical worldview’Footnote 20 may be more constraining to feminist theorising than Wight's Realist, Rationalist, Revolutionist rubric.Footnote 21 The multiple perspectives inherent in gender analysis in IR – the tendency to see the world from liberal, standpoint, and post-structural views and utilise research methods in both post-positivist and positivist veins – demand a framework that refuses theoretical foreclosure, making the English School a most appropriate home. This article explores the intuition that both sides have much to gain from rapprochement.
Shared conversational analytic
Rather than ‘grand theory’ with its dependence on straightforward boundaries between inside/outside, domestic/international, and private/public,Footnote 22 I argue for reconciliation between the English School and gender-analytic scholarship in terms of a conversational approach exemplified in the work of Wight and advocated by several leading feminist IR theorists. By fostering ontological, epistemological, and methodological engagement, such an approach might avoid the detrimental posturing and horse racing of post-third debate IR by providing a loose framework in which powerful arguments from currently estranged theoretical positions can be brought to bear on urgent global problems. A certain dialogical ethos has solid roots in both English School and feminist knowledge traditions. Feminists have sought to employ a conversational logic in their efforts to engage with conventional IR. For example, noting that feminist and other critiques of mainstream IR are ‘expanding the margins without, however, significantly affecting the center’, Spike Peterson views her work as an effort to ‘open new conversational spaces’ between conventional theories and the periphery.Footnote 23 Ann Tickner addresses the ‘gendered estrangement’ that inhibits constructive dialogues and public critical engagement between feminist and IR scholars.Footnote 24 Because there is no one feminist approach, Peterson's apt deployment of the conversational metaphor in order ‘to emphasize the processual, interactive dynamics and fluid boundaries of conversations, as well as the exploratory nature of shifting perspectives and gaining new vistas’ will be adopted here.Footnote 25
The conversation foundational to the English School, seen in Martin Wight's typology of Realist, Revolutionist, and Rationalist international theory, resonates with feminist IR theory, which at its best involves dialogue between standpoint, empiricist, and postmodern epistemologies as well as liberal, radical, socialist, psychoanalytical, and postcolonial theories, among others.Footnote 26 For Wight and later Hedley Bull, no one of these positions exhausted international theory; the dialogue among the three constituted international theory. Highlighting Wight's ‘commitment to theory in dialogical form’, Roger Epp argues that ‘by casting international politics as the realm of persuasion involving a plurality of discourses, and by denying any strict division between participant and observer, Wight offers a way out of the totalizing claims of scientific realism to understand its subject.’Footnote 27
Methodological pluralism and resistance to scientism
Further, there are methodological and epistemological grounds for conversation between feminists and the English School. Recent English School writers have stressed the benefits of a methodologically pluralist approach.Footnote 28 For example, Richard Little has argued that the hallmark of English School theory is ontological and methodological pluralism, claiming that each of the three traditions is best seen as corresponding to a different form of international order, each requiring a particular methodology (the Realist investigation of the international system is linked with positivist methods, Rationalist international society demands interpretivism, and the Revolutionist approach to world society requires critical theory).Footnote 29 At the core of this pluralism is what Hedley Bull called the ‘classical approach’, which utilises philosophy, history, and law to derive ‘general propositions’ about international relations using perception, intuition, and judgment.Footnote 30 In his published work, Bull greatly mistrusted those scientific approaches that required strict verification or relied on mathematics. As Bull flatly stated, ‘[t]heoretical inquiry into International Relations is therefore philosophical in character. It does not lead to cumulative knowledge after the manner of the natural sciences.’Footnote 31
Writers in the feminist tradition also draw upon a legacy of critiques and reformulations of scientism and science. For example, Evelyn Fox Keller argues that science is a ‘rendering of the human fabric’ and ‘a deeply personal as well as a social activity’ the masculinist imperative of which, to ‘bind Nature to man's service and make her his slave’, has been overlooked by students of science.Footnote 32 Feminists and the School also share scepticism towards positivist claims to objectivity and the possibility of value-free research. While Bull did believe in the ‘value of attempting to be detached and disinterested’ in the practice of academic inquiry, he derided the sterility of any study that was able to manage such objectivity, endorsing ‘the raising of political and moral issues as part of inquiry’ and the subjecting of these assumptions to criticism.Footnote 33 Similarly, IR feminists have argued that ‘objectivity, understood as “perspectiveless gaze”, is impossible in a socially constructed world; rationality is not transcendental but an historically specific, learned activity; and methods are necessarily contextual, and therefore shaped by culture and particular values.’Footnote 34 Sandra Harding has argued that a genuine effort at maximising scientific objectivity ‘should require overcoming excessive reliance in distinctly masculine lives and making use of women's lives as origins for scientific problematics, sources of scientific evidence, and checks against the validity of knowledge claims.’Footnote 35
Constructivist assumptions
Against overly positivist notions of science, representatives of both traditions have noted their affinities with social constructivist theories of IR. Tim Dunne has repeatedly made the connection between Alexander Wendt's style of constructivism and the English School.Footnote 36 He argues that the English School shares with constructivism a commitment to the state as primary actor, a ‘belief in the power of inter-subjective structures such as common rules, values, and institutions’, and a focus on questions of culture and identity.Footnote 37 Buzan has argued that Wendtian constructivism and the English School share the basic goal of understanding the social structure of IR; the injunction ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ restates the English School ‘inside-out’ position regarding the construction of international society by its constituent state units.Footnote 38 Taking gender as socially constructed, IR feminists have noted shared ontological commitments between gender theory and constructivism and are optimistic about cooperative research on norms, identities, rules and institutions, though they are less comfortable with constructivism's status as a grand alternative and are critical of constructivist work that ignores gender and power.Footnote 39 Feminist attention to gender constructions highlights both the social nature and the historical mutability of gender in a manner consistent with English School theory.
However, if the two schools of thought can be said to share a common interest in the constructivist perspective, this has not developed into a shared recognition of the importance of gender in international society. Aside from Bull's use of sexual metaphors for levity, there is very little in English School writings to suggest any consideration of the role that gender plays in the culturally sustained international society, the development of Western political philosophy, or the construction of diplomatic relationships.
Foundations without gender: realism, rationalism and revolutionism
An appropriate model for present purposes, Ann Tickner'sFootnote 40 treatment of the IR sub-literature of international political economy (IPE) demonstrates how the theoretical constructions deployed by IR theorists affect our understandings of international politics. Tickner argues that the three ‘models of man’ found in IPE – liberal, mercantilist, and Marxist – rely on gendered notions of the individual, state, and class, respectively. With these ‘models of man’ in mind, it is difficult to read Bull's characterisation of Wight's thought without reflecting on the gendered nature of the English School's ideal types: ‘The Machiavellians he thought of crudely as “the blood and iron and immortality men”, the Grotians as “the law and order and keep your word men”, and the Kantians as “the subversion and liberation and missionary men”.’Footnote 41 Following Tickner's lead, Realism, Rationalism, and Revolutionism can be seen as ‘configurations of masculinity’ to borrow Christine Di Stephano's terms.Footnote 42 Insofar as Wight's triad universalises particular models of masculinity, the three Rs pose serious problems for the entry of women into international society. While space does not permit a comprehensive intellectual history of the three traditions, a brief review demonstrates the value of a feminist rethinking of the school's gendered foundations.
Represented by thinkers such as Hobbes and Machiavelli, Realists view international relations as a Hobbesian state of war in a world with no common morality where state behaviour is moderated only by the rules of prudence and expediency.Footnote 43 In Wight's view, the Realists either did not see an international society, or alternatively, saw international society as constituted by the great powers; they ‘made an absolute cleavage between the [international] state of nature and [domestic] civil society.’Footnote 44 While English School theory highlights Realism's dim view of human nature, it ignores the masculine bias at the core of its constitutive Realist thinkers' accounts of politics. Machiavelli's vision of politics is indisputably masculine, from his contemptuous characterisation of women, to his notion of Fortuna as a woman to be forcefully conquered, to the way his armed state excludes women from its militarised citizenship.Footnote 45 In The Discourses, Machiavelli's discussion of ‘How States are Ruined on Account of Women’ posits ‘a sphere of private morality – a place for women – that he felt should be kept separate from the sphere of politics at all costs.’Footnote 46 While for Machiavelli, women have no access to the sphere of the statesman, in Hobbes' influential depiction of the pre-social state of nature, gender is entirely absent. Rebecca Grant argues that women's invisibility in the Hobbesian state of nature as borrowed by IR theorists allows ‘no room for the question of how gender relations affect the transition out of the brutish state of nature and into society.’Footnote 47 Hobbes' denial of the maternal contribution to reproduction results in an ‘atomistic account of human nature, social interaction, and civic life.’Footnote 48 Gender is thus entirely absent from even the minimal interactions that Realists argue characterise the state of nature they find in the international system.
At the other end of Wight's continuum, Revolutionism, identified with the thought of Kant and Rousseau, aims at the ultimate overthrow of the state system and its replacement by an immanent human community. According to Bull, the Revolutionist, or Kantian/Universalist, found the essence of international politics, not in Hobbesian state conflict, but ‘in the transnational social bonds that link the individual human beings who are the subjects or citizens of the states.’Footnote 49 Taking human beings as the constituents of international society, Revolutionists appear best equipped to recognise women and thus the most likely home for IR feminists who have attempted to move beyond statist frameworks to conceive of international security from the ‘bottom up.’Footnote 50
However, despite surface similarities, there are important tensions to be explored in any Revolutionist/feminist hybrid project. Feminists have been generally sceptical of Western universalist claims, and it is not clear upon viewing Revolutionism's masculine philosophical pedigree, or the historical record, that women would be included in the liberating project of a Revolutionist world society. Rousseau harkened back to a ‘golden age’ of the patriarchal nuclear family, while he denied that equality and freedom were relevant to the social roles of women, or ‘the sex that ought to obey’.Footnote 51 According to Jean Elshtain, Kantian rational morality leaves the status of women suspect: ‘As the culturally defined more emotional and less rationally rule-governed being, women fall under a cloud’ when located in a Kantian framework that takes ‘the emotions as a brake to moral reasoning’.Footnote 52 While Wight categorises past revolutionary movementsFootnote 53 as Revolutionist, feminists argue such movements are historically gendered; women have found it difficult to translate their revolutionary activism into meaningful participation after the revolutionary struggle upon the reassertion of the gender order.Footnote 54 In the cases of the seventeenth century English and the eighteenth century American and French revolutions, post-revolutionary regimes did not ‘“remember the ladies” by defining their rights or protecting their interests independent of the interests of their male relations’.Footnote 55
Often identified with Grotius the seventeenth century Dutch jurist, Rationalist masculinity is arguably the dominant position in classical English School thought, as it is the position most thoroughly developed in Bull's work and has garnered the most attention in recent English School scholarship. Conceived as a ‘broad middle road’ the Rationalist position was meant by Wight to serve as a correction to E. H. Carr's idealist/realist construction of the discipline of IR. Reflecting on Bull's statement that the international activity that best typifies the Rationalist position is not war, but trade (economic and social intercourse between countries) a gender perspective might emphasise R.W. Connell's argument that the new ‘hegemonic’ masculinity is spread by the business executive who operates in global markets, spreading a ‘transnational business masculinity’ that eschews bodily force, preferring to manipulate by institutional means.Footnote 56
Besides trade and diplomacy, Rationalists also focus on the institutions of international society and international law. For Bull, the importance of international law, a key international institution, is not found in ‘the willingness of states to abide by its principles to the detriment of their interests, but in the fact that they so often judge it in their interests to conform to it.’Footnote 57 However, Rationalists ignore the relationships of international law and organisations with women's human rights and security. Feminists argue that in the international legal tradition, systematic violence against women is relegated to the domestic sphere and dismissed as cultural, traditional, and a private matter that neither deserves international attention nor authorises intervention.Footnote 58 The state often fails to take the initiative on gender issues in international organisations, and thus many of the positive changes in the area of women's human rights have come from nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) working outside formal government institutions.Footnote 59 This survey of the three traditions suggests a theoretical terrain resistant to the incorporation of gender as an analytic category. In the classical English School troika, the institutions of international society provide order for states, but are inadequate for women's security.
Gender and the anarchical society: from Bull to Buzan
This section demonstrates the benefits of a feminist re-reading of two of the English School's primary texts in its classical and recent vintages with an eye towards identifying the problems and opportunities they present for a gendered English School theory: Hedley Bull's seminal approach to the state in its social context and Barry Buzan's statist, structural constructivist revision of English School theory. In the Anarchical Society, Bull adumbrates a theory of international relations that focuses on the maintenance of international order under anarchic conditions. Taking order as ‘a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary or universal goals of social life’,Footnote 60 Bull begins his inquiry by positing that order in social life is contingent upon three universal, elementary goals of all societies: security against violence, the honouring of agreements, and the stability and mutual recognition of sovereign property rights.Footnote 61 Bull assumed these abstract goals without the benefit of any systematic empirical or anthropological observation; the goals reflected a status quo position.Footnote 62 The starting point of international relations for Bull is the state, which, possessing of territory and population, exerts its sovereignty both internally and externally.
Bull was cognisant of the limits of state-centrism, emphasising that ‘that there is nothing historically inevitable or morally sacrosanct about the idea of a society of states.’Footnote 63 Bull also considered both alternatives to the state system – potentially transformational arrangements such as disarmament, ideological solidarity, and neo-medievalism – and the possibility of its decline. However, though Bull's state-centrism was hardly unqualified, he ultimately focused his attentions on the achievement of order at the level of the society of states. With some direct or indirect contact, states could be seen to form an international system; with a consciousness of common interests and values, and the establishment of rules, common institutions and cooperation, states could form an international society.Footnote 64 Bull sought to demonstrate how shared rules and norm-governed behaviour became socially effective and provided international order through several historically developed institutions indigenous to international society: the balance of power, international law, diplomatic practices, war, and great power management.
Bull argued against drawing the conclusion that the condition of international ‘anarchy’ (the absence of world government) meant international society is impossible because society required subordination to an ultimate authority, a conceit he traced back to the acceptance of Hobbes in international theory. Bull's entry point into this debate is his criticism of what he called the ‘domestic analogy’.Footnote 65 As Bull put it, the domestic analogy transferred the experiences of ‘individual men’ in domestic society to the state level, and held that ‘the need of individual men to stand in awe of a common power in order to live in peace is a ground for holding that states must do the same.’Footnote 66 Against Hobbes, Bull maintained that anarchy did not in fact dictate that states attend to their security at the expense of industry or agriculture nor be susceptible to sudden death like individuals are. For Bull, the ‘conditions of an orderly social life’ are not the same at the international level as the domestic and therefore do not ‘require that the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale.’Footnote 67
While Bull thought that IR theorists could grasp the potential of international society by overcoming the domestic analogy, it is precisely this international/domestic, anarchy/order dichotomy that IR feminists seek to problematise. For feminists, it is this dichotomy that codes the public and international space as male, at the same time positing a violence-free domestic or private space that de-legitimates women's voices in the public or international sphere while masking the dangers of this private sphere. Instead, feminists would complicate Bull's defence of the state, finding it contradictory to his assumption that the universal goal of society is providing security. Feminists argue that, in addition to its relegation of the threat and practice of sexual violence to the private domestic realm, the state is implicated in the ways that women become ‘the objects of masculinist social control not only through direct violence (murder, rape, battering, incest), but also through ideological constructs, such as “women's work” and the cult of motherhood, that justify structural violence – inadequate health care, sexual harassment, and sex-segregated wages, rights and resources.’Footnote 68
While some feminists hold that the state is a gendered entity that severely compromises women's sense of security by institutionalising the legitimation of structural violence, other feminists argue that the (liberal) state can be and has been utilised to further feminist purposes pointing to the ways the state has historically been able to counteract industrially-based power just as it has been able to force employers to provide welfare. According to Mona Harrington, the state therefore ‘holds the potential, at least, for disrupting the patriarchical/economic oppression of those in the lower reaches of class, sex, and race hierarchies.’Footnote 69 From this perspective, feminism's best hope is to harness state power, along with liberal and pluralist traditions, in order to gain protection against the international dangers of multinational corporate power and other violent states. This second feminist position finds support in English School theory, particularly in Bull's argument that the dangers of a ‘plurality of sovereign states’ must ‘be reckoned against those inherent in the attempt to contain disparate communities within the framework of a single government.’Footnote 70 Bull suspected that movements to supersede the nation state may not promote the values they support; it was ‘possible to see the states system as providing a bulwark against greater political and economic injustice in the world than would otherwise exist.’Footnote 71 Thus, though Bull recognised that the state system could be the best option against injustice, masculinist assumptions still blinded him to the role of the state in the production of women's insecurity and the absence of gender from his picture of social relations.
For Bull, what distinguished an international society from a system was not merely contact such that states took each other into their calculations, but a consciousness of common interests, values, and rules or cooperation seen in their institutionalised practices.Footnote 72 Behaviour in international society is guided by three sets of rules: constitutive rules (identifying fundamental political organisation of mankind, for example, the society of states versus universal empire or cosmopolitan community), coexistence rules (providing minimal conditions of coexistence, for example, controlling the legitimate use of violence), and cooperation rules (facilitating cooperation in political, strategic, social, and economic realms, for example, legal rules).Footnote 73 Bull sought to demonstrate how shared rules and norm-governed behaviour became socially effective, providing international order through five institutions indigenous to the international realm: the balance of power, international law, diplomatic practices, war, and the great power concerts. The institutions of international society, in Bull's sense, are a distinctive English School contribution; ‘evolved more than designed’ they are ‘constitutive of actors and their patterns of legitimate activity in relation to each other.’Footnote 74
Barry Buzan's English School reformulation significantly develops the state-centric and institutional components of Bull's social theory in a structuralist-methodologically pluralist-constructivist direction. Buzan's efforts to clarify conceptually the amorphous body of English School theory also serve as a foil for more normatively focused interpretations. But it is not immediately clear how to formulate gender analysis within Buzan's theory and it is difficult to place gender within Buzan's otherwise nuanced picture of contemporary global (and sub-global) interstate society. Buzan finds one likely location of feminist theorising, ‘world society’, to be an unsystematically developed ‘residual category’ akin to a theoretical ‘dumping ground’, a problem compounded in part by an unwarranted focus on human rights and a normative agenda biased towards liberal international society.Footnote 75
Basing his theory on an ontology of states, as opposed to world society's basis in an ontology of individuals,Footnote 76 Buzan consciously attempts to tie English School theory to structural constructivism, for example dropping the ‘international system’ pillar of the English School triad in order to maintain a consistent, Wendtian emphasis on social structure over physical structure.Footnote 77 Buzan's interests lie in what holds societies together to give them ontological status, not the (gendered) processes by which societies are reproduced.Footnote 78 Buzan focuses on societies composed not of individuals, but ‘collectivities with ontological status of their own’ arguing that if these two types of society are fundamentally different then we should expect limits on ‘both the lessons and the problems that can be carried over to the international level from discussions about primary human societies.’Footnote 79 These commitments leave Buzan largely unable to recognise a feminist constructivism as he falls into the trap identified by Reus-Smit, the tendency of English School theorists to identify only with a limited, Wendtian form of constructivism.Footnote 80
Such recognition might allow Buzan to investigate constructions of gender that span the ideal-types – the state, transnational and inter-human realms – which he introduces both as correctives for the classical system, society, world society scheme, and to accommodate non-state actors. Using the idea of ‘primary institution,’ which ‘implies that one deep practice essentially generates or shapes all of the others’Footnote 81 allows Buzan a more explicit theorisation of the institutions that he sees as the main comparative advantage of the English School.Footnote 82 Suggesting a systematic study of the role of such institutions in the expansion and evolution of international society, Buzan argues that we should not expect primary institutions necessarily to harmonise with each other, but instead be aware of the way that tensions between primary institutions such as nationalism and the market prompt dynamic change.Footnote 83
Buzan's refinement of the English School's theory of institutions offers an entry point for feminist theory. When theorising the institutions that constitute and regulate international society, English School theorists might be tempted, along with Buzan, to relegate gender to the realm of ‘first order societies’ (inter-human realm) with ‘basic human functions such as sex, birth and death’ composed of individual humans, in contrast to ‘second order societies’ which are comprised of socially constructed collective actors,Footnote 84 or to house gender in the primary institution identified by Buzan, the ‘(in)equality of people’, and its accompanying complex of derivative institutions, ‘human rights/humanitarian intervention’ or ‘colonialism/dynasticism’, respectively.Footnote 85 Scholars should resist these temptations. In Buzan's terms, the concept of gender as a primary institution can allow us to investigate the impact of gendered first order societies on second order and vice versa. But because of the complex, multi-level effects of the gender system, and the degree to which state practices also depend on the workings of gender and power, it may be better instead to think of gender in terms of the regulative institutions of international society in Bull's sense, working in part through the primary (in Buzan's terms) institution of gender, and its derivative institution, patriarchy, which can be fruitfully seen as interacting with the complex of international institutions Bull describes. The notion of patriarchy, though controversial,Footnote 86 is at least a provisionally adequate description of the wide-spread subordination and frequent oppression of women. The notion of an institution of patriarchy, to be sure, does not exhaust the range of gender as a category of analysis, or deny the importance of recognising multiple femininities and masculinities,Footnote 87 but instead underscores the normative, constructed, and mutable social aspects of the institution.
Assessing the proposition that layered through Bull's anarchical society is a patriarchal society, we can see patriarchy along the same lines as war, a socially produced and reproduced set of norms with often perverse consequences that nonetheless orders international relations. Patriarchy differs from the other five institutions in Bull and Buzan's understandings in that it is not merely emergent at the international society level, but it is constitutive at inter-human, interstate and transnational levels. As the discussion in the next section demonstrates, it remains an open question what relationship Buzan's general principle/master institution, ‘(in)equality of people’ has with the gender/patriarchy institution suggested here, competitive, constitutive or otherwise. However, a hybrid research program that attends to the complex interactions among patriarchy and Bull and Buzan's other international institutions (particularly international law, diplomacy, and war) promises to further our understandings of international society. In the section that follows, I inaugurate such a program, outlining three possible ways to surface gender in English School theory through joint research ventures concerning the expansion of international society, diplomacy, and humanitarian intervention.
Making gender visible in the English School
I have argued that the three visions of international relations are hindered by the masculinist assumptions of Western philosophy, and have traced this neglect of gender through several generations of English School theorising. I now demonstrate how the positing of a social institution of patriarchy as a primary institution of international society bears on several core contemporary English School concerns, including the order/justice binary, the historical evolution of diplomatic practice, and questions relating to pluralism, solidarism and human rights.
International society: expansion, revolt and the gender order
If mainstream American IR implicitly adopts a universalist posture by its adherence to positivist cultural neutrality, the English School's relative sensitivity to non-Western cultures is, by contrast, thematised in its attention to the expansion of international society and the ‘Revolt against the West’. This line of English School theorising traces the expansion of European international society through four stages: the medieval Iberian and Baltic crusades, the three-hundred year phase of maritime exploration, the industrial revolution-era European administration of most of the world, and the continuation of the European world societal model in the face of the decline of European dominance.Footnote 88
English School theories and IR feminism share a reflective attitude toward the non-West, each wrestling in their own way with the situatedness of their theorisations. The School recognises the resistance European expansion provoked, as seen in the phases of this historical struggle against Western dominance that Bull details (for the achievement of sovereign equal rights; the struggle against European colonialism, for racial equality; for economic justice, and for cultural liberation).Footnote 89 While they see the revolt against the West as a challenge to Western interests, what is striking to Bull and Adam Watson is the adaptability of the European international society. While Asian and African states did attempt to remake the existing international institutions in their own interests, they largely accepted elements of European international society, including the sovereign state model and the rules and conventions of international law, diplomacy, and international organisation.Footnote 90 For Bull and Watson, the vital matter was ‘whether the rise of a universal society of states would usher in a new era of estrangement between different cultures and civilizations or produce an unprecedented agreement on transcultural values.’Footnote 91 The preservation and extension of a common cosmopolitan culture at the elite and societal level was thus a key to the future of international society.
Yet Edward Keene and Buzan have pointed to the ethnocentrism inherent in the English School's account of the expansion of international society, as well as its ignorance of the existence of an extra-European pattern of order based on divided sovereignty and institutionalised hierarchy, failure to recognise the difference between imposed and shared values, and neglect of the role of the institutions of imperialism and colonialism.Footnote 92 A gender analysis might proceed by carefully contextualising the expansion of international society, noting both its colonialist, imperialist context,Footnote 93 and how the attendant ‘unprecedented agreement on transcultural values’ to some extent includes the widespread acceptance of patriarchical norms. The problem noted by feminists is that the common culture from which the modern international society has arisen is profoundly gendered. While the English School takes note of the ways in which ‘the rules and principles which maintained international order pertained only to relations between Western societies and were compatible with the domination and exploitation of “backward” peoples’,Footnote 94 it does not recognise the manner in which women's subjugation was similarly aided by the spread of this order. As Jacqui True notes, for all the attention he paid to anti-colonial movements and the revolt against the West, guided by his statist commitments Bull was unable to recognise the near simultaneous struggles of feminist and women's liberation movements. For True, ‘unlike the struggles of non-Westerners, or non white men, women's revolts against male power and knowledge have never taken the form of a quest for statehood’; it was this fact that rendered these struggles invisible in international society.Footnote 95
Despite this blind spot, feminist and English School approaches do share a concern with the transcultural establishment of order, and are attuned to the dangers of ethnocentric analysis. Feminists insist reflexively that the category ‘women’ be understood in concert with race, class, ethnicity and other crisscrossing identities. Writers like Chandra Mohanty remind feminists of the dangers of ‘women as a category of analysis’, arguing that inherent in earlier Western feminist presentations of ‘Third World women’ as a monolithic and uniformly oppressed group of subjects is an ethnocentric universalism that focuses on patriarchy to the exclusion of region, class and ethnicity. Mohanty warns that the assumption of women as an unproblematic, pre-constituted group with homogenous interests ‘regardless of class, ethnic or racial location, or contradictions, implies a notion of gender or sexual difference or even patriarchy which can be applied universally or cross-culturally.’Footnote 96 Assuming such coherence in ‘women’ as a group structures the world in binary terms, leading to a picture ‘where women are always seen in opposition to men, [and] patriarchy is always necessarily male dominance.’Footnote 97
The benefits of considering gender as part of the common culture that supports international society, while still problematising notions of the feminine or masculine that present us with monolithic and unsituated groups, are evident in studies that focus on the consequences of the expansion of international society. Connell points to the important global trend of the export of the ‘European/American gender order’ to the developing world, explaining that: ‘As the world capitalist order becomes more complete, as more local production systems are linked into global markets and local labor brought into wage systems, local versions of Western patriarchal institutions are installed’ including ‘corporations, state bureaucracies, armies and mass education systems.’Footnote 98 An example of this is the assertion of Western gender ideologies and the subsequent loss of state guarantees of gender equality witnessed in the collapse of the Stalinist regimes and establishment of market economies in Eastern Europe after the Cold War.Footnote 99
According to Connell, the substantial growth of Western men's material power and accumulation of wealth accompanies increasing ‘crisis tendencies’ in the gender order, exemplified by Western patriarchy's loss of legitimacy in the face of the feminist challenge.Footnote 100 While Bull was concerned with the revolt of the non-West so far as it undermined the basis for European international society and thus international order, Connell's hypothesis pushes us to consider what role the international (Euro/American) gender order plays in international society, the possibilities of consensus, the question of legitimacy, and the resistance or ‘crisis tendencies’ it provokes. Avoiding the assumption of monolithic categories such as ‘women’ or masculinity, and recognising the struggle of variegated masculinities and femininities against Western hegemonic forms of gender, English School scholars can integrate analysis of the changing gender order into their study of the expansion of, or revolt against, the Western norms that form international society.
Diplomacy and gender
Thanks in particular to Wight, Bull and Watson, diplomatic practice has long been integral to English School theory, though it has been somewhat neglected by third generation writers.Footnote 101 Paul Sharp argues that despite continued disciplinary interest in bargaining and negotiation, IR scholars have largely ignored the study of the core of international relations: diplomats and diplomacy.Footnote 102 Recent efforts to use the English School as a launching pad for renewed study of diplomacy have added potential for integrating the policy/professional with the academic worlds and also have the advantage of promoting engagement between School scholarship and more mainstream American studies of negotiation.Footnote 103
Rationalist prescriptions for international relations depend on diplomacy. For Rationalists, the ‘preservation of the bases of international society”’ is the ‘principal task of statesmanship, and customary behavior allows for the development of sufficient trust for genuinely cooperative approaches to emerge.’Footnote 104 Diplomacy, for Hedley Bull, functions as a symbol of the very existence of international society.Footnote 105 As custodians of international society, diplomats share a ‘diplomatic culture’ which evokes for Bull ‘the remarkable willingness of states of all regions, cultures, persuasions and stages of development to embrace often strange and archaic diplomatic procedures that arose in Europe in another age’Footnote 106 and is indicative of the ‘universal acceptance’ of international society. In his exposition of diplomacy and diplomatic theory, Bull cites Louis XIV-era diplomatic theorist Francois de Callières' foundational notion of the ideal diplomat. For Callières, the diplomat must be a negotiator of ‘widespread understanding and knowledge’ whose art ‘demands all the penetration, all the dexterity, all the suppleness which a man can well possess.’Footnote 107 Bull generally endorses Callières' insistence that, in regards to both the state sovereign and the international society, the professional diplomat's role is to ensure that the ‘interests of rulers triumph over their passions’.Footnote 108 Feminist Christine Sylvester's quotation of scholar and noted diplomat Harold Nicholson illustrates the gendered construction of the diplomat. Knowledge and a firm grasp of interests must rule over the passions:
‘I expect that the historians of our decline and fall will say we were done the moment we gave the women the vote’ because women are prone to qualities of zeal, sympathy and intuition which ‘unless kept under the firmest control, are dangerous qualities in international affairs.’Footnote 109
With the increasing entry of women into the diplomatic field, this gendered description of women and their uncontrolled passions as a danger to international affairs will have to be reconsidered. As Madeleine Albright, upon being welcomed by Henry Kissinger to the fraternity of American Secretary of State office-holders, claims to have informed Kissinger, ‘Henry, I hate to tell you, but it's not a fraternity anymore.’Footnote 110 It is true that women have not traditionally served as diplomats in large numbers, and though that is changing, the make-up of the diplomatic service is still characterised by a profound gender imbalance. According to a 2000 report, only twelve out of 172 international diplomatic corps in Washington are women, while the US State Department reports around twenty-three per cent of the Foreign Service are women.Footnote 111 Still, oral histories and interviews of the women serving in the diplomatic ranks are becoming available, adding to the stories of Eleanor Lansing Dulles and Jeane Kirkpatrick, and perhaps providing an empirical base for future theorising.Footnote 112
Until that time, Cynthia Enloe's seminal insights about ‘diplomatic wives’ are a good place from which to launch feminist ‘interventions’ into the theory of diplomacy.Footnote 113 As part of her project to read women back into international politics, Enloe focuses attention on how women, in this case diplomatic wives, help constitute practices of diplomacy. Far from being ignored by states, women are seen as a ‘strategic resource’, playing an important role in assuring that the often overlooked domestic side of diplomacy runs smoothly. Enloe traces the way the arts of diplomacy and hostessing became intertwined by the end of the nineteenth century, though women's service was not officially recognised any more than the ‘domestic’ is valued in public life or international politics. For Enloe, the informal relationships that diplomats must nurture in order to develop the trust that sustains international interaction necessitate the use of the ambassador's official residence or home with the result that the ‘domestic duties of foreign-service wives include creating an atmosphere where men from different states can get to know one another “man to man”.’Footnote 114
The growing salience of what Geoffrey Wiseman has termed ‘polylateralism’, a new mode of diplomatic communication between states (and state-based organisations) and non-sovereign, non-state actors, underscores the need for novel approaches to the theory of diplomacy.Footnote 115 A gender analysis of diplomacy may provide new research opportunities through the study of ‘public diplomacy’, the increasing ability of technologically enabled, non-state actors to become players on the international stage. Calls for the American diplomatic community to refocus on public diplomacyFootnote 116 have accompanied increasing attention to the way that new actors in Buzan's transnational realm, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Campaign to Ban Land Mines, and trade groups use the Internet as an advocacy network to promote policy alternatives and to influence American foreign policy.Footnote 117 As IR scholars have documented, women's social movements and NGOs have been successful in promoting issues onto the world agenda. For example, international women's advocacy networks, their emergence entwined with the United Nations (UN) system, were able to frame the issue of violence against women (as a human rights issue) in such a way as to promote important changes at the international and national levels.Footnote 118 The prominence of public diplomacy may make interaction with women's advocacy networks an increasingly familiar part of diplomatic practice, and thus is worth further study.
Finally, the process of diplomatic negotiation itself must be subject to critical scrutiny. Erica SvedbergFootnote 119 points the way forward with her analysis of negotiation as a relationship between masculinities in the case of the interactions of Western and former Soviet Union negotiators in their interactions over the privatisation of a Soviet firm in 1991. Svedberg argues that through the course of this negotiation, the men that represented two masculinities, the ‘benevolent leader’ and ‘authoritarian leader’, were able to overcome the norms of their respective masculinities to learn from and adapt to the other's changing strategies. Using gender and masculinities, Svedberg is able to avoid the pitfalls of traditional negotiation theories that assume away gender, often relying on static and sometimes stereotypical arguments about national character or cultural characteristics.
Women as human: reading gender into humanitarian intervention
As Christian Reus-Smit notes, the exploration of ‘the potential for moral action in a world of sovereign states’ has been a prominent feature of English School scholarship from its classical instantiation through its more recent vintages.Footnote 120 It is perhaps the development of normative IR theory that holds the most promise for a gendered English School. Exhibiting sensitivity to the normative aspects of the English School tradition, many contemporary English School writers clearly link justice to an increasing concern with human rights. A significant amount of the recent intellectual output of the English School has developed Bull's insights about the relationship between order and justice as brought out through the pluralist-solidarist debate, and particularly as applied to the humanitarian crises of the post-Cold War era.
Introduced by Bull in his essay ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, the solidarist-pluralist debate is one of the most pursued leads left by the classical English School.Footnote 121 Contemporary interpretations of the pluralist-solidarist debate have shifted from Bull's early focus on the willingness of international society to enforce international law to a concern with the potential for solidarity among states as underwritten by the common values of a universal human community.Footnote 122 Taking something of a normative turn, scholars since Bull have focused on questions of the efficacy of the states system as an organising arrangement for world politics and whether states or human persons have moral priority.Footnote 123 Echoing Realists, Pluralists argue that states, as the primary actor in international relations and international law, are morally primary; international relations is a distinct preserve of states and thus the members of this form of community can only be counted on for minimal agreement; cooperation is curtailed by the reality of international anarchy and the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention. Solidarists, paralleling the Rationalist and Revolutionist positions, point to the progressively evident emergence of the immanent shared cosmopolitan interests of a natural community of mankind.
Some contemporary English School scholars, most notably Nicholas Wheeler, have made the case against the pluralist injunction that the standoff between order and justice is irreconcilable and efforts at unilateral humanitarian intervention necessarily undermine international order.Footnote 124 Buoyed by the apparent trend towards solidarism, seen in the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, solidarists have thus sought to overcome at least two objections to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention: the objection that, even were general principles possible to establish, they would always be subject to selective application by self-interested states, and the conviction that the imposition of any such putative universal principles of human rights would undermine world order.Footnote 125 They do so by arguing that the primacy of individual justice over interstate order is legitimate in cases of gross human rights violation prohibited in the UN Charter. Encouraged by the solidarist quality of the unilateralism exhibited by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) 1999 intervention in Kosovo, writers such as Wheeler identify the novel way allied states justified intervention and the violation of sovereignty on humanitarian grounds. Though it remains to be seen how the post-September 11 terror war and accompanying effects of Bush Administration unilateralism relate to the development of theories of international solidarism, this debate is clearly important going forward in treating cases like Darfur in the Sudan.Footnote 126
However, from a feminist perspective, both pluralists and solidarists miss important aspects of humanitarian intervention. If Bull's original focus, the degree to which potential solidarity in international society is adequate to make international (human rights) law enforceable, is taken to be an empirical question,Footnote 127 it is clear from much feminist work that human rights law is failing women. The systematic harms women are subject to – female sexual slavery, dowry deaths, bride burning, genital mutilation and a myriad of types of structural violence – are over-looked by conventional human rights law.Footnote 128 Even when enforced, the international legal structure upon which solidarists and rationalists generally rely is gendered, in that it generalises an abstraction based on the Western male experience in which systematic violence against women is coded customary, traditional or private, without rising to the level of international condemnation or intervention.
The very pluralist-solidarist distinction the contemporary English School literature depends on is problematic for feminists, as it posits a distinction between state systems and universal communities, both of which women have partial membership in at best. To the extent that pluralists claim that control of domestic affairs is the right of the statesmen and citizenry of each state, pluralism has failed to understand properly the political consequences of demarcating a ‘domestic’ sphere. Problematic as well, as Andrew Hurrell notes, are the representational claims of many states on the part of their citizens' interests and ‘the use of the universalizing discourse of statism as the political framework for the protection of the particular’, which renders women and other minority groups ‘unable to gain any very secure foothold on the basis of legal categories of an international society still indelibly marked by the statist and western assumptions of its origins.’Footnote 129
To the degree that it takes the community of humankind to be morally prior and worthy of interventionary measures, Wheeler's solidarist position is ostensibly most consonant with feminist concerns. However a gender lens suggests that the problem for women is not so much what states disagree on, the focus of solidarist theories, but what they ‘agree’ upon. Tacit agreement on the part of states in international society to ignore gender-differentiated human rights practices is part of an international, multilevel agreement over the subjugation of women.
The under-theorisation of patriarchy also undermines efforts to legitimise humanitarian intervention. Wheeler's solidarist theory of humanitarian intervention requires certain criteria to be met for an intervention to be considered legitimate: just cause necessitated by an exceptional humanitarian emergency, use of force only as last resort, proportionality, and a highly probable positive humanitarian outcome.Footnote 130 Wheeler's efforts are a laudable first step. Yet it seems counterproductive to theorise grounds for legitimate intervention while implicitly denying women's legitimate political concerns. To achieve legitimacy, such threshold conditions must recognise the pervasive effects of patriarchy on human rights discourse; the conscience of humanity can hardly be shocked by conditions it is blind to. Feminist theory suggests the search for new criteria of legitimacy that recognise both gender-differentiated violence and the impact of humanitarian campaigns on women.
A brief look at the Kosovo intervention illustrates the benefits of adding gender as an analytic category to the solidarist agenda. Wheeler notes that the framing of Bosnian violence as a civil war missed the ways that the violence was directed at civilians.Footnote 131 Feminist analysis crucially adds to this insight by directing attention to the gendered way the Kosovo case was framed, and to the use of women as justification for intervention. As Francine D'Amico contends, US President Bill Clinton justified the intervention by utilising the frame of villains (Milosevic), heroes (US/NATO), and innocents and victims (Kosovars) in a narrative that constructed women as innocent victims. This framing not only helped legitimise intervention but, in constructing women solely as victims or refugees, had the effect of stripping women of agency; women's voices were delegitimised in the post-conflict phase, thus diminishing women's voices in debates over resolution, recovery and reconstruction.Footnote 132 Solidarists should pay closer attention to the ways in which women are constituted as a ‘protected’ category and how this process shapes the justification and implementation of humanitarian intervention.
Wheeler rightly notes that in the case of Kosovo, NATO's humanitarian actions were conducted in a ‘casualty free’ manner so as not to undermine public support; the Allied choice of air power over an invasionary ground force as its instrument showed the weakness of the West's commitment to human rights.Footnote 133 The West avoided the ‘ground option’ leading it to rely on bombing which led to results contradictory to the goals of humanitarian intervention. For example, there were reports that the strategic bombing incited Serbian military and paramilitary revenge raping campaigns.Footnote 134 Though feminists remind us that war-related violence should not obscure women's everyday insecurity under global systems of patriarchy, solidarists must confront rape warfare and grapple with the complex consequences of humanitarian intervention.
By asking ‘how far the society of states has developed a new collective capacity for enforcing minimum standards of humanity’Footnote 135 without including considerations of gender, Wheeler's project fails to live up to its promise of its own normative standards, weakening, not strengthening international societies' commitment to justice. Further, if as Wheeler contends, solidarists have a responsibility to act as guardians of ‘human rights everywhere’Footnote 136 than the extension of human rights into the ‘private sphere’ demands further investigation.
More optimistically, humanitarian intervention represents an opportunity for joint feminist-English School research. State complicity in gender harms suggests a different kind of intervention, perhaps one that goes beyond state remedies to look for answers at the transnational level. Solidarist approaches to humanitarian intervention also seek to carve out a space for adjudicating responses to humanitarian crises outside of state practice. Wheeler's suggestion of the creation of a global public sphere outside the society of states (to ensure non-state actors have a role to play in deliberations over whether any given intervention is justified) resonates with the concrete activities of women's rights movements and the achievements of feminism in the international sphere, such as the 1979 adoption of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), UN Women's Conferences in Nairobi (1985) and Beijing (1995), and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), to name just a few. The study and critique of this global public sphere represents an opening for the development of a collaborative scholarly agenda.
Only by attending to the complex interplay of gender and human rights discourse can academic knowledge offer grounds for legitimate humanitarian intervention. Writing in the 1970s, Bull took as referents the rich industrial states and poor non-industrial states to ground his concern with the clash between order and justice. Attending to gender order and gender justice, feminists and English School scholars can work together to broaden and update order and justice debates and bring their normative concerns to bear on international society.
Conclusion
In this article, I offer a preliminary sketch of the ways in which gender analysis could inform and enrich the English School research agenda. Refusing to identify the school entirely with international society theory and preserving its classical, dialogical approach to complex international realities, I have argued for a fusion of feminist and English School horizons through several normative and empirical paths of joint concern. Since a new generation of English School writers are reconstituting this tradition along both structural and normative lines, the timing is apt for considering gender as a category of analysis. Feminists, for their part, might embrace the conversational and normatively-oriented constructivist framework provided by the School. By facilitating conversations between these two research traditions, we can hope to construct an ontologically and methodologically diverse critical approach to world politics. But this cannot happen without both the theoretical ground-clearing of the sort I have attempted in this article, and the nurturing of dialogue and conversation between these two critical approaches to IR.
