Within the narrow topic of British covert operations, this book makes a useful contribution toward understanding the specific details and political goals of British counterrevolutionary activities in Yemen. If done creatively and critically, this type of work can yield amazing results, such as Ervand Abrahamian's 2001 work on the 1953 coup in Iran. The novelty of Clive Jones's work is that he uses previously unexamined private records of the British operatives involved in the war. The inherent challenge for historians relying on the often impossible to corroborate sources of secret operatives and researching cloak-and-dagger operations such as these is to avoid being too drawn into agreement with the narrative. This seems to be the downfall of Jones, who at the very least is sympathetic to their viewpoint if not woefully negligent in consulting other perspectives.
After the September 1962 republican revolution in Yemen overthrew the Zaydi-based imamate, and policymakers in London debated over the appropriate response (i.e., whether to recognize the new Yemen Arab Republic), a small coterie of Tory officials started both to push policy toward more hostile diplomatic positions and champion covert operations to undermine the revolution. They quickly found key political and material supporters among the Jordanian, Iranian, and Saudi monarchies—and even Israeli policymakers, as Jones claims—who saw the revolution in Yemen as a Nasserist thrust into the Arabian peninsula. For these British officials, the revolution clearly threatened their colonial position in nearby Aden—even more important now that they had lost Suez—and the Federation of South Arabia.
The most important members of this coterie were Minister for Aviation Julian Amery, MP Lt. Colonel Neil “Billy” McLean, and Colonel David Smiley, and they enjoyed excellent connections—for example, Amery was the son-in-law of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Smiley and McLean were former members of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) from World War II. This group, referred to as the “Aden Group,” worked at cross-purposes with the Foreign Office while trying to bolster policy initiatives proposed by the chiefs of staff and Colonial Office. The covert operations designed by these men were not officially British operations, although the Aden Group's operatives were principally former British and French intelligence. Essentially, the operations were “a sustained mercenary involvement in the Yemen Civil War, to be paid for mainly through Saudi largesse” (p. 67). To preempt possible criticism of the protagonists, Jones writes, “It has become fashionable to deride McLean and his associates as little more than right-wing zealots, driven by ‘a nostalgia for lost causes’ and keen to extract revenge against Nasser for the humiliation of Suez . . . . The revanchist nature of the Aden Group was undeniable, but equally a sense of patriotic probity which refused to accept a determinism that posited the inevitable triumph of Arab nationalism in general and Nasserism in particular” (p. 32).
The Cold War framework is all around this story. The existence and scope of the covert operations were affected by London's need for agreement with Washington, now that the latter was the hegemonic power in the region. Yet, London could neither rely on the United States to initiate covert operations nor officially condone the types of covert operations that the White House opposed and felt threatened regional stability (pp. 57–60). Furthermore, as Jones repeatedly argues, the “legacy of Suez imposed severe limitations” on London's usage of covert operations (p. 86), although ironically, as mentioned previously, Suez was one of the driving impetuses of the Aden Group. (Likewise, the involvement of numerous French mercenaries in the covert operations is ascribed to a desire to avenge Algeria and Suez. As Jones includes no French sources or perspectives, we are left guessing [pp. 130–34].) It may be better to rephrase this argument: if the United States had so willingly cooperated with Britain in constructing a counterrevolution in Iran in 1953, what had changed since then? Suez was an intervening event, but the issue was also more that U.S. presidents were connecting Middle Eastern (“Third World”) liberation movements and revolutions to wider issues of the Cold War. This is why U.S. administrations—until Johnson—were more willing to interact with Arab nationalists whereas many of the British figures under consideration here could not countenance, understand, or view the motivation of local actors outside the prism of British imperial interests.
The book's transliteration is both bizarre and inconsistent. Common Islamic and cultural terminology is used in nonsensical ways; for example, sayyids are defined as “Princes” (p. 22 onward). There is a high incidence of word repetition, especially those that tend to leave a negative and facile impression of the actors involved (mainly Arabs). Perhaps the most outstanding is his use of the word “mandarin,” which also graces the cover of the book, and which designates Foreign Office officials. Probably intended in a snide way (as Jones does not outline how or why he is characterizing officials in this way), mandarin suggests that he has adopted the general tenor of covert operatives in this narrative, who saw diplomacy and a reticence for counterrevolution as pusillanimous. His adoption of this perspective is indicative of the final, and perhaps greatest, weakness of the book: Jones is overreliant on these covert sources for his perspectives on both major Yemeni figures (who come off as one dimensional at best in this story) as well as the nature of the war itself.
Smiley and McLean certainly knew covert operations, but their background knowledge did not include anything to help them understand Yemen, as their trite, racist “character observations” of Yemeni and Saudi individuals cited by Jones tend to show. For example, Jones is honest enough to admit that McLean “lack[ed] the linguistic skills of his Foreign Office counterpart” (p. 32) and made only brief jaunts into Yemen. How is it the case then that we can assume, as Jones repeatedly does, that his reports were consistently “erudite” or that he was an “astute observer of tribal politics and personal characteristics of the Princes” (see pp. 32, 114, 124)? Jones does not counterpose any of this information against any other source; he just runs with the Smiley–McLean narrative.
The only “alternative” contemporary perspective on the facts on the ground utilized by Jones comes from New York Times reporter Dana Adams Schmidt. No Arabic sources were consulted, whether Yemeni, Saudi, or Egyptian. At the very least, David M. Witty's “A Regular Army in Counterinsurgency Operations: Egypt in North Yemen, 1962–1967,” published in The Journal of Military History in 2001, which uses the memoirs of the major Egyptian military officials involved in Yemen, could have been used as a means to broaden and verify the factual claims made by Smiley and the other covert operatives upon whom Jones is so dependent.
