India's interest in the future of Palestine grew in accordance with events in the Middle East throughout and following World War I. Simone Panter-Brick discusses India's policy toward the Arab–Jewish conflict over Palestine through the lenses of Gandhi—the mythological, spiritual, and political mentor of modern India. Gandhi, who undertook his political role in India at the time when the Balfour Declaration was proclaimed, “had to deal at home with problems similar to those of Palestine, a parallel which is really as remarkable as it is unexpected” (p. 2). At the time, Palestine and India faced similar religious, cultural, societal, demographic (majority/minority) and political issues. Both were dominated by the British, and in both cases the possibility of partition, under discussion from the late 1930s, reached fruition in the late 1940s. Nevertheless, the Muslim Indians who founded Pakistan rejected the rights of the Jews to establish their own state in Palestine. In India, the British favored partition and contributed to its realization whereas in Palestine their attitude was variable—from support of partition in 1937 to rejection in the post World War II period.
When the future of the caliphate was at stake during and following World War I, Muslim Indians responded to the declaration of jihad made by the Ottoman sultan by employing nonviolent means and accepting the leadership of Gandhi, a Hindu. For the sake of satisfying and keeping the Indian Muslims, who sympathized with the Arab Muslims, united within the causes and goals of the Indian National Congress, Gandhi made the caliphate and, later on, Arab-Palestinian rights all-Indian causes.
The book is divided chronologically into three periods of analysis. The first covers the all-Indian campaign to preserve the Ottoman caliphate and its jurisdiction over lands including Palestine. For this reason Gandhi led the anti-Mandatory campaign and rejected the division of the Middle East into French and British zones of influence. Gandhi unequivocally rejected the Balfour Declaration and subsequent attempts by the League of Nations to realize its goals. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of secular Turkey marked the collapse of the caliphate movement and the beginning of the second stage, which stretched to the late 1930s. In this period, Gandhi was less involved with foreign affairs, which were increasingly handled by Jawaharlal Nehru, whose policies toward Palestine and the Arab world are unfortunately not given the required prominence in this book. Nehru was indeed the one who shaped and determined India's policy toward the future of Palestine in the 1940s. At this stage Gandhi came up with the idea that the Jews should look “to the Jerusalem above” as a spiritual entity but not as a concrete homeland. He regarded Zionism as a nonmaterial movement that represented “the spiritual aspirations of the Jews” (p. 62). The Palestine of the biblical conception, he declared, “is not a geographical tract. It is their (the Jews) hearts” (p. 113). In Gandhi's view, the protection given to the Jews of Palestine by the shadow of British guns was wholly inconsistent with spirituality. Moreover, he went on: “the Jews should disclaim any intention of realizing their aspirations under the protection of arms and should rely wholly on the goodwill of the Arabs” (p. 63).
From the late 1930s until the mid-1940s, Gandhi scattered contradictory statements regarding Jewish rights over Palestine. In a famous article published in his weekly journal, Harijian, on 26 November 1938, he ruled categorically that Palestine belonged to the Arabs. It was obvious that this statement was intended to please his Muslim rivals. However, Gandhi also had many Jewish friends and referred to himself jokingly as a “half-Jew” (p. 78). Gandhi could not hide his identification with Jewish aspirations and showed sympathy with the Jewish cause, as is revealed from his talks and meetings with Jewish friends and Jewish leaders and political activists. In early 1946 he noted that “the Jews have a good case in Palestine. If the Arabs have a claim in Palestine, the Jews have a prior claim . . . because they were the first” (p. 147). Panter-Brick provides “a simple and satisfactory explanation” to explain Gandhi's contradictory statements: “Gandhi revised his analysis and shifted his position in the light of events. He never felt bound by the logic of earlier pronouncements. Intellectual honesty obliged him to heed the promptings of his inner voice and his astuteness made him sensitive to the strict requirements of circumstances” (p. 8). So what led Gandhi to alter his views in the early 1940s? The author does not provide a satisfactory explanation. Could it be that the massacre of millions of Jews by the Nazis impacted his abrupt acceptance of the “prior claim” of the Jews to Palestine? The author is, however, to be congratulated for presenting a balanced and impartial study that avoids presenting Gandhi as either pro-Jewish or pro-Arab. As revealed in these pages, his attitude toward the solution of the Palestine question followed the line dictated by Nehru and the Indian National Congress, which was consistently pro-Arab. For Nehru, the Arab struggle against imperialism in Palestine was inseparable from India's struggle for freedom. He maintained that only Arab nationalism could put an end to the British Mandate in Palestine because “the Jews were wedded to the Mandate” (p. 78).
Gandhi and the Indian National Congress rejected the recommendations of the Peel Commission (1937) to partition Palestine on the grounds that such a solution might serve as a role model to Jinnah and the Muslim League. By late 1937, it would appear, India's stand on Palestine was dictated by the pro-Arab resolutions made by the All-India Muslim League, which rejected at a stroke the Peel partition recommendations. It considered them to be in conflict with “their religious sentiments” (p. 105) and called for Muslim rulers to save the holy places in Palestine “from the sacrilege of non-Muslim domination” (p. 106) and for the annulment of the British Mandate unless policy changes were introduced. The Indian National Congress followed suit, making an effort to adapt the radical line dictated by the Muslim League. Speaking on behalf of “the Indian people,” it protested against the reign of terror exercised by British imperialism in Palestine in order to force the Arabs to accept the partition of Palestine. Gandhi called the Jews to amicably settle their problems with the Arabs “and not to seek the shelter of the British Mandatory” (p. 107). He stressed that the Jews were not entitled to sovereign rights in a place that “has been held for centuries by Muslim powers by right of religious conquest” (p. 115). As early as 1946, Gandhi admitted in a meeting with Jewish leaders that India's pro-Arab stand over Palestine was not determined by him but by “the Indian Mussalmans” (p. 146). However, as future events were to demonstrate, the tactics and strategies employed by Gandhi, Nehru, and the Indian National Congress to win the sympathy of Jinnah and his followers proved unsuccessful. Jinnah and his fellow Muslims refused categorically to become an integral part of independent India—the partition of India was just a matter of time.
The book is mainly based on secondary sources, and one may ask why the author failed to utilize the richness of the Indian national archives in Bombay and New Delhi related to Palestine and India's relations with the Arabs, especially with regard to Nehru. The core of the book's interest is the Jewish–Arab/Muslim dispute over Palestine and its relation to the Indian Hindu–Muslim strife over the future of India. However, the Indian stand regarding Palestine was also based on broader political and strategic considerations. The Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in April 1947 a telegram regarding India's interests in the Arab Middle East: “We must not forget that India's relationship with Muslim countries of the Middle East is very close and must become much closer.” India also took into consideration the utmost importance of the Mediterranean to her communications, declaring that “the security of those communications must depend upon the existence of an Arab world which is connected and can rely upon sufficient material support from friendly powers to enable it to retain its independence.” (See Telegram 3172 from Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to Ali Asaf, Washington, 23 April 1947, File No. 46(1) AWT/47. National Archives of India, New Delhi.)
Panter-Brick is wrong to argue that despite the constant support given to the Arabs by India “no thanks were received in return, no reward. Pleasing the Arabs was a thankless task” (p. 153). As Indian archival material reveals, Arab leaders congratulated Nehru for India's pro-Arab stance on Palestine. For instance, on 30 November, shortly after the approval of the partition plan, Shukri al-Quwatli, the Syrian president, dispatched a telegram to Nehru expressing the deepest gratitude of both Syria and the Arabs for “the noble attitude of the Indian government” and its representatives to the United Nations for what he described as “enthusiastic defence of the Arab cause in Palestine.” The Syrian people and the Arabs, concluded the Syrian president, “shall never forget it.” (See Telegram 51 From Shukri Quwatli, president of Syria, Damascus, to Nehru, New Delhi, 30 November 1947, File No. 7(8)-UNO-I. National Archives of India, New Delhi.)
On 3 December, Nehru received another letter, this time from the government of Saudi Arabia, which also expressed its deepest gratitude “for the honourable attitude” of India's delegates to the United Nations who had taken the side of the Arabs “against that unjust and oppressive resolution against Palestine.” The letter concluded by promising that “the Arab nations will keep in memory your country and government this good deed and genuine help in supporting right and justice and will never forget this noble and honourable attitude.” (See Telegram 126 from Foreign Ministry, Jeddah, to Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 3 December 1947, File No. 7(8)-UNO-I. National Archives of India, New Delhi.)
Overall, Panter-Brick's book is a welcome addition to the scant literature on India and the Middle East. It adds an important dimension to the study of the formative years of the modern Middle East as seen through the lens of an emerging Asian power. One may hope that the reading of Gandhi and the Middle East will encourage other graduate students as well as established scholars to follow suit—the study of India and the Middle East is still in its infancy.
