One may conclude from the lull in publications on the Gāthic Ahuna Vairiia that a satisfactory understanding of the stanza is at hand. This is, however, not the case. The last substantial treatment of the stanza is from Humbach (1991 II) in his 1991 two-volume edition of the Old Avestan texts. Somewhat less extensive is the discussion we find in Kellens’ and Pirart's monumental three-volume edition and study of the Old Avestan texts (1991). In 1975, Insler published a detailed article on the Ahuna Vairiia. The late 1950s saw the appearance of four studies of the stanza by distinguished Avesta scholars: Benveniste, Humbach, Duchesne-Guillemin and Hinz. As for the number of translations there are, it virtually equals the number of scholars in the field. The source of the difficulties is the syntax of the stanza. The disagreements are due for the most part to the scholar's analysis of syntactic units. Thus the variety of translations may be reduced to a few basic types.
Before turning to the stanza, I would like to note that the question of the significance of the stanza has received only the most limited, and in my mind superficial, attention. Benveniste gives it five or six lines at the end of his article: it is not so much a profession of faith, he says, as a protection formula, like a charm, the most effective one, against the forces of druj. It is generally pointed out that Ahura Mazdā recited the stanza before undertaking his cosmogonic work, as stated in Later Avestan commentary on the stanza (Yasna 19), or that Zarathuštra drove the daēvas underground by reciting it (Yašt 19.81), and so on.Footnote 1 In Yašt 11.3 the Ahuna Vairiia is described as the “most victorious of words”. What does this mean, i.e., victory over what? Why such a virtue is attributed to the stanza? In short, what is the significance of the Ahuna Vairiia? The reason for the lack of interest in the question of the significance must be in part due to the fact that perhaps we still do not know what the stanza says.
I think all the translations offered thus far are marred by fundamental flaws that obscure the sense and hence significance of the stanza. It is important to take measure of these problems fully. I shall try to do this below. If our purpose, however, is not merely to find more or less equivalent words and phrases in our own language for the Gāthic ones but also to understand a discourse, then we must take the risk that any attempt at understanding faces – that of interpretation. We have to reconstruct, in reference to alien concepts and images, the ideological intent that animated the discourse and that alone can place us in a position to grasp its meaning. I hope to deal with this aspect of the topic in a subsequent article.
Y 27.13aa’ yaθā ahū vaiiriō, aθā ratuš a
ā
cī
hacā
bb’ vaŋh
uš dazdā manaŋhō, +
iiaoθənan
m aŋh
uš mazdāi
cc’ xšaθrəmcā ahurāi.ā, yim drigubiiō dada
vāstārəm
1. The problem of yaθā. . . aθā. . .
A number of translators have taken the view that the yaθā. . .
aθā. . . construction is a correlative conjunction of the type ‘X
is A, so is Y’, which is an elaborate way of saying “X is A and Y is A”. They
view the verse line 27.13aa’ as an independent sentence comprising two parallel
clauses. This is what Insler does: “Just as the Lord indeed in accord with
truth must be chosen, so also the judgment in accord with truth must be chosen”
(Insler Reference Insler and Duchesne-Guillemin1975: 413). Taking
ahū as the nominative of ahu- ‘lord’, he
produces for each side what he deems it lacks (the adverbial and the verb,
respectively) by drawing on the other side. It is clear that he reads
vairiiō as a gerundive in predicative function and
a
ā
cī
hacā as an adverbial; the conjunctive adverbs
coordinate the two predicative statements. The verse basically says that both
the lord and the judgment must be chosen in accordance with truth. Benveniste,
who also takes ahū as the nominative of ahu-
‘lord’ (referring to Zarathuštra), has the conjunctive adverbs, however, bear
on the verb ‘to be’, which he provides himself: “(il est) tant
l’ahu desirable que le ratu selon Arta”
(Benveniste Reference Benveniste1957: 84). Zarathuštra is
the desirable ahu and ratu in accordance with
Arta. We find the same understanding of the yaθā. . . aθā. . .
structure in Gershevitch (Reference Gershevitch1959: 329):
“As the (or an) ahu is to be chosen (in
accordance with Truth. . .), so the (or a)
ratu (is to be chosen) in accordance with Truth”, etc. Also
in Hinz (1960: 159): “Wie er ersehnter Meister ist, so ist er auch Richtender”,
etc.
Another group of translators has attempted to integrate the verse line into the rest of the stanza by taking ratuš as one of the subjects of dazdā understood as the verb of the main clause. This obliges them to make 27.13a a subordinate clause. But neither in grammar nor in sense does the pāda read like a subordinate clause in their translation; it is like a stump dangling on the supposed main clause.
Duchesne-Guillemin (1957: 67) rejects the previous interpretations of the yaθā. . . aθā. . . structure, which see in it just an elaborate way of asserting one quality about two different things. According to him, the structure expresses a reciprocal relation: “just as the world must choose Ahura Mazdā, so (reciprocally) Ahura Mazdā can judge the world” (68). In his translation the two clauses become: “Just as He is to be chosen by the world, so has judgment, according to Justice itself, of the deeds of the world been given, from Good Mind, to Mazdā”, etc. (70) He obviously takes vairiiō as a gerundive in predicative function and expressing an obligation. But this situation – the world having to choose the god and the god imperiously judging it – hardly constitutes a relation of ‘reciprocity’. This designation seems to be dictated more by what is taken to be the contribution of the formal structure than by the actual content. As it stands in Duchesne-Guillemin's translation the stanza has either of the following two senses, depending on whether the yaθā. . . aθā. . . structure is understood either as coordinating two related statements or as a subordinated conjunction. Under the first alternative, 27.13a-b’ means: “the world has to choose Ahura Mazdā; and the Good Mind has given the power of judgment over worldly actions to Mazdā, in accordance with Justice itself”. Note that “according to Justice itself” qualifies not the judgment but its handover to the god. So two independent events are being reported, and the “just as. . . so. . . (de même que. . . ainsi. . .)” construction has no bearing on the sense of the translated stanza. Under the second alternative, 27.13a-b’ becomes: “insofar as Ahura Mazdā is to be chosen by the world, the Good Mind has given the power of judgment over worldly actions to Mazdā in accordance with Justice itself”. The qualification “in accordance with Justice itself” would then have to be a somewhat malicious irony, since the subordinate clause can only have the sense of an imposition: seeing that the world has no choice but to embrace the unique god, the Good Mind has handed over the power of judgment to him – an investiture that would be rather redundant.Footnote 2
From what Kellens and Pirart say in the commentary to their translation we may
gather they have the same idea of the yaθā. . . aθā. . .
correlation as Insler does, although their actual translation of the phrase is
virtually unreadable: “Harmonieux comme un (maître est harmonieusement) digne
de choix par l'existence (rituelle), le modèle des actes de l'existence de la
divine Pensée et leur emprise sont attribués au Maître Mazdā. . .” (Kellens and
Pirart Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: p.101). It seems the
correlative adverbs qualify the way both the lord and the model are, namely
harmoniously. At least that is how they explain it in their commentary: “Dans
les deux phrases, il y aurait ellipse formulaire. Cette solution s'impose parce
que la correlation yaθā. . . aθā établit clairement une
comparaison entre ratuš et le mot auquel se rapporte
vairiiō: le ratu est
a
ā
cī
hacā . . . comme x est digne de choix parce
que lui aussi est a
ā
cī
hacā . . .” (Kellens and Pirart 1991: p.13).
The “comparison”, they say, is based on the shared attribute of the lord and
the model, but their paraphrase of the verse does not quite reflect this: “the
model is harmonious as the lord is worthy of being chosen because it too is
harmonious”. Obviously this phrase is not the same as “the
model is harmonious as the worthy-to-be-chosen lord is harmonious”, which is
what their explanation of the yaθā. . . aθā. . . structure
requires. It “établit clairement une comparaison” between the “modèle” and the
“maître” underlying the adjective vairiia- “worthy of choice”.
In any case, since they interpret a
ā
cī
hacā as an adnominal, the conjunctive adverbs
do nothing more than signal that the two subjects share a feature. Moreover,
making a
ā
hacā an adnominal and the
basis of comparison forces the supply of a copula on
both sides, which effectively makes Y 27.13aa’ an
independent sentence, something that Kellens and Pirart would not admit. This
is why their translation is impossibly contorted.
Humbach understands the word underlying vairiiō to be
ratuš, which he translates as “judgment”. “Just as (a
judgment) is worthy of being chosen by the world, so the judgment, (which) in
accordance with truth itself, (is to be passed) on the actions of good thought
of the world, is assigned to the Wise one. . .” (Humbach 1991 I: 115).
a
ā
cī
hacā qualifies, it seems, the manner of the
passing of judgment by the divinity. But it is hard to see what the sense of
“just as. . . so. . .” is in this translation, whether it is merely a
comparative construction or something else. His earlier German translation has:
“Weil sie durch ihren Besitz an Lebenskraft begehrenswert ist, deshalb wird der
Wahrhaftigkeit gemäß die gebührende Zuteilung der aus dem guten Gedanken
entspringenden Bewirkungen der Lebenskraft dem Mazda dargebracht. . .” (Humbach
1991 II: 5). It uses “since” instead of “just as”, making the intention to
subordinate ahū vairiiō clear – at least on the formal level.
It also tells us what semantic role yaθā. . . is expected to
play in the stanza. It is supposed to introduce the reason for the action
described in the main clause, namely the investiture of the power of judgment.
We can use the German translation to make the English one clearer in this
respect: “since a judgment is worthy of being chosen by the world, therefore
the judgment of worldly actions is to be assigned to Ahura Mazdā”. When we do
this, however, it becomes senseless: the (power of) judgment is to be assigned
to the supreme (or unique?) god because a judgment (presumably attributable to
a supernatural being) appeals to one. The only sense this could possibly have
is that of favouritism (on behalf of one's god who thus collects credit for
what one esteems). Still, what possible sense could this have when the esteemed
thing is a “judgment”, that is to say, what does a “judgment
worthy of being chosen by the world” mean?
Let us, then, go back once again to the English version. Can we retrieve a meaning there, keeping the yaθā clause in a subordinate role? I can come up only with this: “so that the judgment (passed on worldly actions) would be worthy of being chosen by the world, (the power of) judgment is to be assigned to Ahura Mazdā,” etc. The problem is that this requires the verb of the subordinate clause to be in the subjunctive. In his translation, as it stands, the main clause is basically independent, and the subordinate clause senseless. Incidentally, if Humbach had taken vairiiō as a gerundive with the sense of ‘to be embraced’, as the Gāthic agonistic development of the Indo-Iranian root var ‘choose’ might suggest, he would have had a syntactically coherent translation of the yaθā. . . aθā. . .: “As (i.e., since) the judgment (of worldly actions) is to be embraced by the world, so it. . . is assigned to Mazdā”, etc. Thus, the subordinate clause gives the reason (i.e., so that the world can embrace the judgment) for the action described in the main clause (i.e., the handover of the power of judgment to the god). This would still leave a number of problems, to which I turn below. Also, as far as the sense of the stanza is concerned, it would leave us wondering why should there be any judgment at all. Since we have to submit our actions to the judgment (of a superior being), we may as well hand over such a power to a god that judges in accordance with truth. We have the freedom to choose the judge of our actions, but not that of doing without a judge. Hintze (2007) too seems to subordinate the phrase introduced by yaθā, probably as a causal clause, reading vairiia- as a gerundive in predicative function. But the sense of the subordination is completely obscure. “Just as he is to be chosen by existence, so the judgment according to truth about existence's actions of good thought is attributed to the Wise one” (ibid., 324). Can “existence” play the role of an agent? And, how does the subordinate bear on the main clause?
The yaθā. . . aθā. . . construction does not seem to serve the
purpose of coordinating parallel statements. In Kellens’ and
Pirart's paraphrase of Y 27.13 (“le ratu est
a
ā
cī
hacā . . . comme x est digne de choix parce
que lui aussi est a
ā
hacā . . .”), the “lui aussi” can
not be accounted to the emphatic particle
(cī
). Where does it come from? Now, it seems that when the
yaθā. . . aθā. . . structure is used in the Avesta for
coordinating two statements it has a specific semantic
function and perhaps a particular illocutionary context. It does not compare
two entities in respect of a feature or an action. Comparison, where it occurs,
is not the purpose but the effect of the structure. The statements correlated
by means of the structure seem to be organised in an order of logical
precedence.Footnote
3
The yaθā clause gives grounds for what the
aθā clause urges or declares. We may describe it as a
figure of reasoned speech used in contexts that especially require tact, where
a demand or commitment is made. Reference is made to a truth that vouchsafes
the veracity or efficacy of the declaration(s). We find it in both the Old
Avestan and Later Avestan texts. It occurs two or three times in the Gāthās and
twice in the Yasna Haptaŋhāiti. I also cite a passage from the Later Avesta, as
it happens from texts that have been called “Middle Avestan” (cf. Tremblay
Reference Tremblay, Panaino and Piras2003).
We find the construction in Y 29.4c’ “aθā
n
aŋha
yaθā huuō vasa
: so shall be for us, as he (Ahura
Mazdā) may wish”. Things will happen for us the way they will, because Ahura
Mazdā will have wanted them that way. Notwithstanding the ostensible order of
the two clauses, the logical precedence of the truth articulated in the
subordinate clause is clear. The reverse order is due to the poetic matching of
the preeminent position divine power occupies in the order of things with the
place it takes in the verse structure (see Watkins Reference Watkins1995: 28–49). The verse-final, stanza-final position is
doubly marked as a position of privilege. This attracts the expression of the
power of god to that position and thereby reverses the normal order of our
structure. We might also note that just as the stanza begins with an expression
of the intellectual power of the divinity, so it ends with a terse statement of
the power of his disposition over existence, in a kind of miniature ring
composition, an authoritative unity that totalises in many dimensions,
including time, whether or not pairī.ciθī
and aipī.ciθī
are indeed adverbs of time.Footnote
4
In my opinion, this makes it very likely that this stanza is an
interjection by the poet, an observation by the narrator (more on this in the
following section).
Y 33.1a-b’ “yaθā āiš iθā varəšaitē, yā dātā
aŋh
uš paouruiiehiiā / ratūš
iiaoθanā razištā: as you have wished so will have been
practiced the straightest actions which were established (or: which you
established) as the measures of the primordial existence” invokes the divine
will as the ground of the practice described. The subjunctive mood of the aor.
varəš- makes the consequent nature of the action
clear.Footnote
5
In Y 35.6 “yaθā ā
utā nā vā nāirā vā vaēdā haiθīm aθā
ha
vohū. . .: as, then, a man or a woman knows
(an action to be) true, so (he/she also knows its) being good”, we are told
that the insight that something is ‘true’ or ‘real’ entails the knowledge of
its goodness (for life and afterlife). Having one kind of knowledge puts us in
the possession of the other. Conversely, knowledge of the ‘good thing’ requires
insight into the primordial constitution of reality. Again, the structure
expresses a logical order of precedence.Footnote
6
In Y 39.4 we see, again, an overt reference to an authoritative truth:
“yaθā tū ī ahura mazdā m
ṇghācā vaocascā dåscā varəšcā yā vohū aθā tōi dadəmahī
aθā cīšmahī aθā θβā āiš yazamaidē. . .: As indeed, O Ahura Mazdā,
you have conceived, expressed, established and practiced these which (are)
good, so we institute (them) for you, so we provide (them for you), so through
them we worship you”, etc. The divine actions are expressed by verbs in the
aorist and those of the worshippers by verbs in the indicative present. What
the worshippers do, they do because those actions have already been done in
that way by their (authorising) god. They draw attention of the divinity to the
raison d’être of their ceremony and tactfully ask for its
success and hence their reward. As I mentioned above, comparison may be the
effect but not the purpose of this figure of speech. The two subjects are not
compared and likened in respect of a common action or feature. The worshippers
perform their ritual according to the model established by the divinity, which
is thus justified. This is the sense that the figure of speech conveys, not the
comparability of the actors.
There are three other joint occurrences of aθā/iθā and
yaθā (in this order) in the Old Avesta,
which do not belong to our structure. In Y 45.3c-e’ “yōi īm
v
nōi
, iθā m
θrəm varəšəṇtī / yaθā īm, m
nāicā vaocacā / aēibiiō aŋh
uš, auuōi aŋha
ap
məm: (those) of you who will not have practised
this formula the way I conceive and articulate it, ‘woe!’ will be the last
(word)”, and in Y 35.6 “yōi ī
aθā vərəzii
n yaθā ī
astī: (to those) who will execute it the way
it is”, iθā/aθā is without any semantic value. In the former,
it seems to serve the purpose of keeping to the requisite syllable count. In Y
34.6
yezī aθā stā haiθīm, mazdā a
ā vohū manaŋhā
a
ta
mōi daxštəm dātā, ahiiā
aŋh
uš vīspā maēθā
yaθā vå yazəmnascā, uruuāidiiå stauuas aiienī paitī
aθā is a cataphoric adverb and refers to the subordinate clause 6cc’. We may translate 6a + cc’: “If you truly are in such a way. . . that, worshipping, praising and joyful, I may come to you”.
As I mentioned, the figure is also attested in the Later Avestan texts. Two passages in particular make the pragmatic context of the figure quite clear. In Y 58.5 we have an expression of a demand for protection that uses both citation from sources of authority (from Y 34.7, see Kellens 2008: 689) and the yaθā. . . aθā. . . figure of reasoned speech:
Y 58.5 yaθā n
dātā amə
ā spəṇtā aθā nå θrāzdūm. θrāzdūm
n
vaŋhauuō θrāzdūm n
vaŋvhīš θrāzdūm
n
amə
ā spəṇtā huxšaθrā huδåŋhō. naēcim
t
m anii
m yūšmā
vaēdā a
ā aθā nå θrāzdūm.
As you have created (it) for us, O
Amə
a Spəṇta, so protect us! Protect (it) for us, O gods!
Protect (it) for us, O goddesses! Protect (it) for us, O
possessed-of-salutary-power and benevolent
Amə
a Spəṇta! I do not know any other (protector) than
you, so protect us because of aša!
The demand made to the gods is reasonable: the subordinate clause expresses both a truth and an acknowledgment of their creative and protective power, and thus places the gods in a position of responsibility.
There is, then, no reason to take the yaθā. . . aθā. . .
figure as simply implying a comparison. If, as all the translators have
assumed, the yaθā. . . aθā. . . coordinates two
predications, we should rather expect to find in the
subordinate clause a reason for the action described or urged in the main
clause. Further, if no comparison is made in respect of a feature (e.g., being
in accord with aša), another ground must be sought should one
want to have a
ā
hacā on both sides of the caesura. The
emphatic article (cīt
) does not seem to have, in any of
its occurrences in the Gāthās, the sense of ‘too’; it draws attention to the
noun or pronoun to which it is attached, sometimes with the connotation of
‘even’. I come back to this.
2. The problem of ahū
After Humbach (Reference Humbach1957) argued, mostly on linguistic grounds, that this word should be understood as the instrumental case of ahu- ‘existence’, and not as it was traditionally taken, namely as the nominative of ahu- ‘lord’, most scholars took the matter as settled. As far as I know, only Insler and Kuiper still held out for the traditional view. Whatever the linguistic merits of the currently prevailing view may be, it has not just the Avestan exegetical tradition against it.
Aside from the Ahuna Vairria, ahū also occurs
in Y 29.6bb’ (nōi
aēuuā ahū vistō, naēdā ratuš
a
ā
cī
hacā) in an almost identical syntactical
context. Insler (1975b: 31) translates this latter passage: “A master has not
been found by a single one (of us), nor a judgment which indeed befits truth”.
As he points out in his article on the stanza, Y 29.6b-c’ is almost certainly a
reply by the god to a question initially put to aša by the
Fashioner of the Cow in Y 29.2 (Insler Reference Insler and Duchesne-Guillemin1975a). Kellens and Pirart also view Y 29.6b-c’ in the same light,
and provide, as implied, the word ‘lord’, since they think the stated
ahū should be read as the instrumental of
ahu- ‘existence’: “Ni (un maître) ni un modèle harmonieux
ne sont connus par l'existence unique” (Kellens and Pirart Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 109). Apparently they find the
evidence of the context overwhelming in favour of reading the implicit ‘lord’
in the verse. Let us look at these two stanzas.
Y 29.2 adā tašā g
uš pərəsa
, a
əm kaθā tōi gauuōi ratuš
hiia
hīm dātā xšaiiaṇtō, hadā vāstrā gaodāiiā
θβaxšō
k
m hōi uštā ahurəm,
y
drəguuō.dəbīš aēšəməm
vādāiiōi
Then the Fashioner of the Cow asks aša “of what kind (is) your measure for the cow, since you, who have disposition (over such things), created her along with pasture and cattle-caring activity? Which lord do you wish for her, who would be able to destroy the aēšma (perpetrated) by the partisans of druj?”
Y 29.2bb’
(hiia
. . .) gives the reason why one of the gods is
being questioned on the matter: g
uš tašan- approaches them because it was they
who created her and provided for the necessities of bovine life.Footnote
7
The reply by Ahura Mazdā is apparently given in Y 29.6:
Y 29.6 a
vaoca
ahurō, mazdå vīduuå vafūš viiānaiiā
nōi
aēuuā ahū vistō, naēdā ratuš
a
ā
cī
hacā
a
zī θβā fšuiiaṇtaēcā, vāstriiāicā θβōrəštā
tatašā
Then spoke Ahura Mazdā, the knowing one, (these) verses (rhythmically?) “. . . For indeed I, the Sculptor, fashioned you for the cattle-breeder and the pastoralist.”
I have deliberately
left out the translation of Y 29.6bb’. The translations of the passage by
Insler and by Kellens and Pirart are given above. Let us look at the case for
reading the word ‘lord’ in Y 29.6bb’, be it implied, and not worry for the
moment about the purely linguistic argument, which in any case should not be
taken as the be all, end all. The mainstay of the traditional view is textual
and contextual, and not linguistic. In a short article on the Ahuna
Vairiia, Kuiper (Reference Kuiper1985:
287–288) makes the point that “Avestan nōi
. . . naēdā/naēδa. . . ‘non. . . neque’ refer,
with a single exception, always to coordinated nouns”. Thus
one should expect to find a noun (in the nominative) in Y 29.6b since it is
coordinated with a nominative noun in b’. Of course, the noun may well be
implied (elliptical). Kellens and Pirart, as we have seen, take this view. So
what is the case for a ‘lord’, be it implied? The translation Kellens and
Pirart (1988: 108) give of Y 29.2 is: “Alors, le Charpentier de la Vache
demande à l'Harmonie: ‘Ton modèle pour la Vache consiste-t-il en ceci que, vous
qui le pouvez, vous lui avez destiné, avec la pâture, le labeur qui nourrit la
Vache? Quel maître souhaitez-vous pour elle, qui chasse la Rage ainsi que les
partisans de la Tromperie?’” This translation is problematic for four reasons.
First, the interrogative kaθā does not seem to have the sense
of ‘is it so?’ in the Gāthās but always ‘how?’ (with ah ‘to
be’: ‘of what kind?’). Second, they read hīm in Y 29.2b as a
dative whereas it is clearly an accusative in a regular role with
dā.Footnote
8
Third, their translation of the interrogative phrase (“ton modèle pour
la Vache consiste-t-il en ceci que”) requires a subjunctive in the relative
clause 29.2bb’ instead of the injunctive dātā that in fact it
has.Footnote
9
Fourth, in their translation ratu- (for the cow) seems
to mean the “model” of pastoralist care. This cannot be right. In Y 29.6 Ahura
Mazdā acknowledges that the “cow” has been fashioned for the pastoralist, which
implies that she does receive his care, but still asserts that there is no
ratu- for the cow. So pastoral care cannot be at stake in
the question concerning the ratu-. The cow's “being for the
pastoralist and cattle-breeder” does not contradict the cattle-caring activity
that serves the cow, as asserted in 29.2bb’. The reciprocity between the
pastoralist and the domestic animal is explicitly asserted in Y 39.1. Thus, the
right translation of Y 29.2a’-b’ should be along the lines given above: “ye
gods who created the cow along with pasture and cattle-caring activity, what
kind of ‘measure’ did you have in mind for her?” And to this Ahura Mazdā
replies that, as things stand, there is no “measure” for the cow, while
acknowledging that she has been fashioned for the purpose of serving the
pastoralist, which implies receiving the care that is part and parcel of her
purpose. This of course does not necessarily mean that reading an implied
‘lord’ in Y 29.6b is mistaken. Let us just note, however, that it renders
problematic the meaning Kellens and Pirart give to the Gāthic word
ratu- “modèle”.Footnote
10
Now, the problem is whether “nōi
aēuuā ahū vistō” in fact refers to the
question posed in Y 29.2 concerning the ahura-. Insler (Reference Insler and Duchesne-Guillemin1975a: 415ff.) draws attention to Y
29.8a-b’, which he thinks strengthens the argument that Y 29.6bb’ should be
seen as containing a response to both parts of the question in Y 29.2. In Y
29.8a-b’ “aēm mōi idā vistō, y
n
aēuuō sāsnå gūšatā / zaraθuštrō spitāmō: this
one here I have found, who is the first to have listened to our teachings:
Zarathuštra Spitāma” he sees a corroboration of the nominative value of
ahū in Y 29.6b’. First, there is the question, “which lord”
the gods have in mind for the protection of the cow; then, the reply that “no
lord has been found”; and finally, that “one is found” after all in
Zarathuštra. This sequence, however, is specious. What is stated in Y 29.8a-b’
is clearly a reply to the question posed immediately before it in Y 29.7cc’
where, after introducing the “formula of libation and milk”, it is asked
“kastē vohū manaŋhā, y
ī dāiiā
əāuuā marətaēibiiō: who
do you have that could transfer down by means of good thought the two (formula
and milk) to the mortals?” Furthermore, Zarathuštra could not possibly be
identified as an ahura in any case. We saw that in Y 29.2c’
the one thing specifically mentioned as an attribute of an
ahura is the power to destroy the “(ritual) fury
(perpetrated) by the partisans of druj”. In Y 29.9 Zarathuštra
is precisely described as anaēša- ‘listless’ and
asura- ‘weak’. We can then rule out that Y 29.8 might be
able to provide support for the nominative value of ahū in Y
29.6b.
Yet, the case for reading a ‘lord’ in Y 29.6b, whether implied or explicit,
remains open. Let us assume with Humbach that ahū is an
instrumental of ahu- ‘existence’ and not a nominative of
ahu- ‘lord’, and that the objection raised against it by
Kuiper, namely that nōi
. . . naēdā. . . coordinates nouns of the same
case, can be removed by reading an implied noun in the phrase; we would still
have the problem of what this implied noun in the nominative might be. Is it
ahura-, as Kellens and Pirart think? Their viewing it as
the implied nominative in Y 29.6b seems to be based on the assumption that,
having been raised as a question along with that of ratu- in a
single stanza (Y 29.2), it also has to be resolved along with the latter in a
single stanza (Y 29.6). Now this assumption cannot stand up to the facts of the
text and those of the syntax. As to the former, the question of
ahura- is in fact addressed in Y 29.4, whether one takes it
as the continuation of the Fashioner's discourse as Kellens and Pirart doFootnote
11
, or as the poet's interjection as I believe one should.
Y 29.4 mazdå saxvārə mairištō, yā vāuuərəzōi pairī.ciθī
daēuuāišcā ma
iiāišcā, yācā varəšaitē
aipī.ciθī
huuō vīcirō ahurō, aθā n
aŋha
yaθā huuō vasa
Mazdā best remembers performances, (those) indeed that have been done by the daēvas and men hitherto, and (those) that may be done (by them) henceforth. He, the Ahura, discerns (whatever has been done before and whatever may be done henceforth in respect of aša and druj). As he may wish, so shall it be for us.Footnote 12
The ahura in question in Y 29.2 is found
in Y 29.3cc’. After the poet's vignette characterisation of this
ahura in Y 29.4, in the following stanza we find the Soul
of the Cow along with another character taking their plea to the “strongest of
beings”. The development of the text should dissuade us from wanting to read an
ahura into Y 29.6bb’. One must admit, in any case, that it
would be very strange for the supreme ahura,
“hāt
m. . . aojištō: the strongest of beings” (Y
29.3c), to reply with “no ahura is known” (“Ni (un maître) ni
un modèle harmoneiux ne sont connus par l'existence unique”) to the question
“which ahura do you have in mind?” posed to the gods, while in
the meantime we are told that the ahura is in fact the
all-powerful Ahura Mazdā and that the Soul of the Cow has already turned to
him. What activity is at issue that this most powerful god cannot perform, or
that perhaps does not fall within the sphere of his competence? These questions
cannot be dismissed on the grounds that they belong to exegesis and not to
philology. They point us in the right direction. The interpreter must accept
illumination from the sense and context no less than from the grammar and
syntax.Footnote
13
The syntax also seems to be resistant to Kellens’ and Pirart's translation of the verse: “Ni (un maître) ni un modèle harmonieux ne sont connus par l'existence unique”. The word ahu- ‘existence’, as far as I can tell, only ever has an abstract sense in the Gāthās, and not the concrete meaning like ‘world’, which it seems to have in the Later Avestan texts.Footnote 14 If so, “known or found by existence” must have the sense of “known or found (along) with existence” or “by way of existence”, i.e., no implied agency for ahu-.Footnote 15 The semantics of their translation is further marred by the problematic “unique existence”, a rather obscure conception. Later Kellens (1995: 355) clarifies the conception in his new translation of 29.6bb’: “Jamais celui qui n'a qu'un seul état n'a trouvé ni (un Maître) ni un plan adapté à l'Agencement”. This text reads well but creates new conceptual and linguistic problems. First, the implication of Kellens’ translation is that except for human beings worldly creatures have no ahura. It is hard to reconcile this conception with how the word is otherwise used in the Gāthās. Second, in what sense should the “plan” and the “plan adapté à l'Agencement” be understood, since elsewhere Kellens (1990: 308) translates ratu- as “modèle, prototype”? That the role or place of the cow in the cosmic order has not been envisaged? This cannot be right. Third, Kellens in effect treats aēuuā ahū as a possessive adjective, something like *aēuuā-ahu- “one who has one existence”, whereas if such a compound existed, the sandhi would have made it something like *aēuuåŋhu- and the verse line would have been one syllable short.
It is difficult to see what the role of the emphatic particle
cī
is in their translation. Does
a
ā
cī
hacā apply only to the “model”, or to the implied “lord” as
well? If to both, is this assimilation the contribution of cī
? As far as I can tell, the emphatic
article does not seem to have the sense of ‘too’ (“lui aussi”) in the Old
Avestan texts. The emphatic sense may intensify to mean ‘even’. The particle
can attach to ka- to form indefinite pronouns. Both of these
roles are also attested for the Vedic counterpart cid.Footnote
16
If, then, the particle does not apply to both “model” and “lord”, how
should we understand its role in Kellens’ and Pirart's text of the verse line?
All in all, serious conceptual, syntactical and textual problems beset their
translation.
Humbach's translation of Y 29.6 bb’ is hardly any better: “None (has been) really found by the world, no judgment in accordance with truth itself” (Humbach 1991 I: 121). As it was pointed out the Gāthic word ahu- ‘existence’ (Humbach translates it as “world”) can hardly assume to the role of an agent. Also, the coordinated nominative is missing in 29.6b, where its place is given to the “judgment” of 29.6b’ by way of anticipation, which supposedly reveals a further characteristic about the one and the same “judgment”. But this goes against the rule of coordination by negative adverbs, which, as Kuiper has pointed out (see above), always coordinates different entities (nouns or, in one single case, verbs). Schwartz (Reference Schwartz and Siamak2003: 202) translates 29.6b-c’: “Not one (hope), nor any judge(ment) in accord with Rightness has been found by the world, but for the cattleman and for pasturage has the Fashioner shaped thee”. The elliptical “hope” is taken over from the previous stanza and translates frajiiāti- ‘survival’. The meaning Schwartz gives it is ad hoc. Also in his text, Mazdā's speech is disjunct. The first part presumably addresses 29.5cc’ which Schwartz (ibid.) interprets as a question: “Is there no hope for the right-living person, none for the cattleman surrounded by the wrongful ones?” But the second part is seemingly directed to the concern of the cow (or the Soul of the Cow) for protection. The overall sense of the speech is strange: although the world has no hope and no righteous judge (to set things aright?), the Fashioner has created the cow for the (right-living) cattleman and for pasturageFootnote 17 – as compensation?
Let us now examine Y 29.6bb’ more closely. There syntax of Y 29.6b’
“naēdā ratuš a
ā
cī
hacā” is completely clear: “nor (is there) an
a
ā
hacā (an attribute) ratuš
(nominative)”. Note three points. First, in all of its occurrences in the
Gāthās, a
ā
hacā is used as an attribute (eleven times
adnominally, once by predication in a nominal phrase), although it is obviously
an ablative + hacā. Setting aside Y. 27.13 and Y 29.6, since
we want to reach a conclusion about them, of the remaining ten occurrences,
eight are in stanzas that are transparently eschatological and two in stanzas
(Y 51.5 and 51.22) that seem to be so. Let me be clear: by eschatological I
mean pertaining to ascension to the abode of the gods and there attaining
immortality. We cannot go through all these passages here and have to settle
for just two.
Y 43.14 hiia
nā friiāi,+vaēdəmnō isuuā
daidī
maibiiō mazdā, tauuā rafənō frāxšnənəm
hiia
θβā xšaθrā, a
ā
hacā fr
štā
uzirəidiiāi, az
sarədanå s
ṇghahiiā
ma
tāiš vīspāiš, yōi tōi
m
θrå marəṇtī
To me (give) O Mazdā what a capable man, possessing (it), would
give a friend: your knowledgeable support, which one obtainsFootnote
18
thanks to your a
ā
hacā power, so that I may ascend. . .
along with all those who bear in their memory your
formulas.
The supreme god's power allows one ‘to rise up’
(uzirəidiiāi: us + ərə-
aor. of ar ‘move’).Footnote
19
This power is described as a
ā
hacā.
Y 44.17 ta
θβā pərəsā, ərəš mōi vaocā ahurā
kaθā mazdā, zarəm carānī hacā xšma
āskəitīm xšmāk
m, hiia
cā mōi
iiā
vāxš aēšō
sarōi būždiiāi, hauruuātā amərətātā
auuā m
θrā, y
rāθəmō a
ā
hacā
I ask you this, speak to me straight Ahura! O Mazdā, how should
I make my aspiration to be with you into (being in) your company, and
(make) such that my voice be vigorous in order to effect (my) union with
integrity and immortality by means of that formula that is
a
ā
hacā rāθəma-?Footnote
20
Whatever rāθəma- might be, it is clear, I
think, that the formula by being a “a
ā
hacā X” facilitates or effects for one an
eschatological bliss.Footnote
21
I will not go into the question of what one should understand by this,
since it is not our proposed topic. Suffice it to say that we know very little
about Gāthic a
a-. The usual translation of the phrase
a
ā
hacā as “according to truth” or “harmonious”
is based on what one believes the etymology of the word dictates, and its
ablative form. But as it happens the expression
a
ā
hacā has a determinable significance because
it is consistently used in contexts that may be narrowly defined as
eschatological. Thus, for the sake of convenience, let us provisionally
translate it as soteriological.Footnote
22
We may then translate Y 29.6b’: “nor (is there) a soteriological
ratuš”. Note that the emphatic particle
cī
is attached to the “soteriological” and not to
ratu-. It marks the soteriological ratu-
presumably as opposed to other kinds of ratu-; it sets out
this kind from another kind. There is no X of type A, nor
is there one of the type B. Could this schema be a correct conclusion? Let us
examine more closely the first pāda, Y 29.6b
“nōi
aēuuā ahū vistō”. The second word is an adverb
that has an exact Vedic equivalent, evá, which Mayrhofer
(1992–2001: 270) translates as “so, auf diese Weise, allerdings, wirklich”. It
is derived from the word for “one” in Iranian languages: Old Persian
aiva- and Avestan aēuua-. How should we
understand the other two words?
There is a probable mention of this stanza in the Later Avestan Vr 1.5, where it is called ahumaṇt- ratumaṇt- “(the text) that contains ahu and ratu”. There is no question, as has been emphasized by Gershevitch (Reference Gershevitch1959: 238 and 328–329), that the Later Avestan tradition reads this stanza and especially Y 27.13 as containing fundamental revelations about the ahu and the ratu, both taken as nominative and meaning something like “lord” and “guide” respectively (Y 19.8). They seem to have referred initially to Ahura Mazdā alone but subsequently to both the god and Zarathuštra, in such a way that the first is said to rule over the heavenly or spiritual realm and the second over the terrestrial one (Vr 2.4). If an argument could be made for the artificial nature of the LAv. nominative ahu, it would have to proceed from a thorough examination of the meaning and significance of Y 27.13. Vr 1.5 singles out Y 29.6 for a special mention as one of the texts that constitutes the object of worship there, alongside the Ahunauuaitī Gāthā that contains the stanza. The formation of the speculative nominative ahu is not just a process impacting on matters of doctrine and myth, but it is also a matter of hearing and understanding the sacred words. The fact that over so many centuries virtually every interpretation of the two passages (Y 27.13 and Y 29.6) has in one way or another heard or read the word ahu in them (and here we must also include, for the purpose of this argument, all who read an implied nominative ahura-), demonstrates the extraordinary significance that was attached to Y 27.13 (and, perhaps by association, to Y 29.6) and made it impossible for it not to express in the materiality of the words the meaning that it was understood to carry, namely the twofold appointment of the god as the guide and the protector. This view of its significance comes out clearly, for instance, in the LAv. commentary of Y 19.12–14. I leave the discussion of these issues for another article.
The process of the appearance of the nominative ahū becomes
visible once we restore the word that was its object, and once we see that this
restoration produces a coherent syntax and sense. The transmitted text of Y
29.6b is “nōi
aēuuā ahū vistō”. I suggest that the last two
words are the result of an ancient split. They belong together:
ahū.vista-, a dependent compound and meaning “known with
existence” or “found with existence” (the second term from either the root
vid ‘know’ or the root vid ‘find’). The
adjectival phrase aēuuā
×
ahū.vistō qualifies the nominative ratuš and
can be translated as “indeed a worldly”, so 29.6b becomes: “neither indeed a
worldly ratu-”, that is to say, the measure that has to do
with the worldly existence, e.g., a quotidian schedule of observances. The
adverb aēuuā and the emphatic particle
cī
set apart as distinct from one another the two types of Gāthic
ratu-. Thus the text and translation of Y 29.6bb’ become
“nōi
aēuuā ×ahū.vistō, naēdā ratuš
a
ā
cī
hacā: neither indeed (is there) any worldly
(measure), nor (is there) a soteriological measure”. To the question “what type
of measure (e.g., observance) is there for the cow?”, the supreme god replies
“neither is there a worldly measure, nor a soteriological one”. Before turning
to Y 27.13 once again I would just mention that interestingly there is a third
Gāthic passage where the word ratu- occurs with a compound of
ahu-: Y 44.16c’ “ahūm.biš ratūm ciždī: O
healer of existence give the measure!” The epithet “healer of existence” is
used to refer to Ahura Mazdā. As for what the ‘measure’ might mean, a short
discussion of it is found further below.
Let us go back now to Y 27.13aa’ “yaθā ahū vairiiō, aθā ratuš
a
ā
cī
hacā”. Based on the argument given above we
may make a few short observations. First and foremost, one can no longer rely
on the context and text of Y 29.6 to read an explicit or implicit ‘lord’ into
the verse line. I also tried to show that if one proposes to take the
yaθā. . . aθā. . . figure as coordinating two
statements, then the Old Avestan evidence requires one to
understand it in the specific function set forth above, namely
yaθā should introduce a subordinate clause that would give
the ground for the action or event expressed in the main clause. This way of
understanding the syntax would then demand that vairiiō should
be interpreted as a gerundive in the sense of an ‘ought’, especially given the
semantic field of the verbal employment of var ‘choose’ in the
Gāthās. Since ahura- is no longer available as the subject of
the subordinate clause that role falls to the implicit ratu-.
So the sense of the verse would be something like: “since (it is) to be
embraced with existence, the measure – the soteriological one – of the
actions. . . is assigned to Mazdā”. The emphatic attribute
a
ā
cī
hacā would probably have to be understood in
the sense of a notice. Since the measure that is to prevail in one's existence
is to be chosen (as opposed to, say, being externally imposed or being a matter
of fact), so one should look to Mazdā for the measure, the soteriological one,
of the actions of existence, etc. Presumably, this implies that, as opposed to
the daēvas, Mazdā values (free) commitment, and is the only
god who can provide a worldly measure of observance(s) that ensures salvation.
This rendition is coherent and syntactically derivable from the Gāthic text.
Nonetheless, I believe it is unacceptable. Although vairiia-
is a gerundive in form it is only used in the Gāthās as an adjective. More
generally, none of the few words that are gerundive in form is
ever used in a predicative function in the Gāthās. They are either adjectives
or substantivised adjectives. To this extent, reading an ‘ought’ into Y 27.13a
is arbitrary.Footnote
23
Y 27.13a “yaθā ahū vairiiō” is not an implicit
predication. This conclusion is inescapable if one wants to be faithful to the
Gāthic usage.
Thus Y 27.13 aa’ is a coordination of two modified nominatives that are likewise treated, described by dazdā. Just as A (dazdā), so (dazdā) B. Note that this is very different from what we said scholars had seen in the verse: A is X, so is B. ‘A is X’ does not exist, whether implicit or explicit, and if that does not exist, nor does ‘so is B’: no predication either before or after the caesura. In the translations that do not treat 27.13aa’ as an independent sentence, the pāda after the caesura (‘so is B’) is supposed to perform the logical and grammatical magic of being both a statement in its own right, for the purpose of comparative coordination with ‘A is X’, and not a statement in itself, so it can serve as the subject of the main clause.Footnote 24
What we have in Y 27.13a is a (1) comparative adverb of manner plus (2) an
adjectival attribute of (3) an implicit noun in the nominative. As for the last
element, we have no basis or cause to look for any other than
ratu-. The only real question is what form the second
element has. The words in the pāda we need to account for are “ahū
vairiiō”. The instrumental form of ahu-
‘existence’ cannot be understood as ‘by existence’, i.e., expressing agency, if
only because no action is taking place in the pāda, aside from the semantic
reason described above. This leads us to the one and only possible solution: to
see in the two words the result of a split. We should, then, restore the Y
27.13aa’ to yaθa ×ahū.vairiiō, aθā ratuš
a
ā
cī
hacā. As for the meaning of the masculine
adjective *ahū.vairiiō, it literally means “worthy of being
chosen with existence” or, more prosaically, worthy of being chosen throughout
one's life. The ideological force, in the Gāthās, of the underlying verbal root
var ‘choose’ in the adjective *
ahū.vairiia- should indicate partisan adherence (i.e., to
instructions for the sake of a goal). It is enlightening to set the form and
semantics of this adjective against those of *ahū.vista-. I
translated the latter as worldly but perhaps one should use ‘customary’. Now,
against this, the most appropriate translation of
*ahū.vairiia- would be ‘ethical’, understanding ethics as
regulation of existence in reference to precepts. Insofar as we are dealing
with an active regimentation of daily life in view of a goal (and who could
deny this to Zoroastrianism?) we should not hesitate to use the term. Further
consideration of the issue does not have its place here.
In Y 27.13 two kinds of “measure” are distinguished. One has to do with earthly
existence: a quotidian schedule of observances; and one has its place in the
realm of spirit strictu sensu or perhaps a special kind of
ritual concerned with the destiny of the soul beyond earthly existence. Why
should one be surprised by this distinction, different expressions of which are
discernable throughout the Gāthās (see under 4 below), or by the fact that the
worshipper looks to the supreme god for the “measure” of actions in each of
these fundamental spheres of being? Does not Y 32.5 fault the
daēvas with deceitfully depriving the “mortal” from the
“good life” and “immortality” (hujiiātōiš amərətātascā)? This
must be the wrong committed by the daēvas, a
twofold wrong, explicitly articulated as such. Hence: Y
27.13aa’ “yaθa ×ahā.vairiiō, aθā ratuš
a
ā
cī
hacā: Just as the ethical (measure), so the
soteriological measure”, etc.
3. The problem of the cascade of three genitives: ratuš. . .
vaŊhəūš. . . manaŊhō, +
iiaoθnan
m aŊhəūš. . . xšaθrəmcā
How to allocate the genitive determinants? Let us first quickly consider a few
proposed solutions thus far. Kellens and Pirart translate Y 27.13a’-c’ as “le
modèle (harmonieux) des actes de l'existence de la divine Pensée et leur
emprise sont attribués au Maître Mazdā”. The verb dazdā is the
3rd sing. inj. pres. in middle-passive voice of
dā ‘set or place’. It is used with an object in the dative
(of person), which is the beneficiary of the action. There is a certain
semantic awkwardness in their text because of the way they understand Avestan
xšaθra-: “emprise” (hold). Whatever the appropriateness of
this understanding as far as the Gāthic doctrine is concerned, it creates the
problem that the verb has to be given two opposite senses: on the one hand, the
god is the beneficiary of the worshipper's acknowledgment and thus established
as the authority that provides the “model” of the actions of existence, and on
the other, the same god is to undergo the “hold” that the worshipper places on
him and thus become an object of manipulation. More importantly, setting aside
this stanza, one cannot find a single example of determination by a cascade of
three genitives in the Gāthās. There are seven cases of double genitive
cascade, but not a single triple cascade! The problem is palpable for
Duchesne-Guillemin, who reads vaŋhəūš. . . manaŋhō as an
ablative, which is problematic since this would be the only case of an ablative
governed by dā ‘set’ and having the sense of agency. It also
troubles Insler, who attempts to resolve it by semantic liquidation of one of
the genitive determinants: “poetic elaboration through the employment of
meaningful yet unnecessary terms. . . we should understand vaŋhəūš
manaŋhō
iiaoθana- and vaŋhəūš manaŋhō
iiaoθana- aŋhəūš to be equivalent expressions” (Insler Reference Insler and Duchesne-Guillemin1975a: 416).
Humbach accepts the triple cascade without further ado. “Just as (a judgment) is worthy of being chosen by the world, so the judgment, (which) in accordance with truth itself, (is to be passed) on the actions of good thought of the world, is assigned to the Wise One, and the power (is assigned) to (Him), the Ahura, whom (people) appoint as a shepherd to the poor” (Humbach 1991 I: 115). He takes the two genitives that determine “actions” in the sense of (actions) proceeding from (good thought) and that of (actions) belonging to (the world). It seems difficult to sustain the cascade in the meaning of the phrase. Also, one wonders in what sense one should understand the passing of judgment on actions that proceed from “good thought”, which should have an absolute value. Is it that, no matter how scrupulous people are in their intention to follow the “good thought”, their actions are perverted by some sinister force? So, does the judgment bear on the failure to implement? But, then, would this be a judgment “in accordance with truth itself”, where responsibility is not justly allocated? In the case of Kellens’ and Pirart's translation too, one has to convince oneself that an inherently strange situation is somehow understandable: the god provides the “model” of the actions of “la divine Pensée” to the worshipper, who for his part enacts these same actions of “la divine Pensée” to control the god – presumably for his own benefit. Could not the god give what the worshipper wants in the first place, and in that way at least spare himself the ignominy of manipulation?
But as it happens the triple genitive cascade does not exist. vaŋhəūš manaŋhō determines xšaθrəm o: the ‘power of good thought’.
Y 31.6 ahmāi aŋha
vahištəm, y
mōi vīduuå vaocā
haiθīm
m
nθrəm yim hauruuatātō,
a
ahiiā amərətātascā
mazdāi auua
xšaθrəm, hiia
hōi vohū vaxša
manaŋhā
The best to him, the knowledgeable one, who would tell me the true formula of integrity, of aša, and of immortality! To Mazdā (the best which is) the power that one will have made increase for him by good thought!
This stanza presents no syntax
or semantic problem as far as our point is concerned. It says, with all the
clarity one might desire, that the “power” of the god can be increased by means
of “good thought”. (See also Y 30.8, among others.) But one should not think
that this power is the exclusive possession of the divinity. Y 51.21b'c says
“vohū xšaθrəm manŋhā / mazdå dadā
ahurō: Ahura Mazdā confers power by means (or
because) of good thought”. In Y 33.5bb’ “xšaθrəm vaŋhəūš
manaŋhō: power of good thought” is characterised as
“darəgō.jiiātīm: (giving) long life”. Y 34.11a-b says that
“integrity and immortality” is offered for Mazdā's appropriation
“vaŋhəūš xšaθrā manaŋhō: through the power of good
thought”. In Y 51.18 the poet asks the god for the power of good thought:
“ta
mōi dāidī ahurā hiia
mazdā rap
n tauuā: give me that (power), O Ahura, the
helping (power) of yours, Mazdā!” And finally in Y 46.16dd’ we are told
“yaθrā vaŋhəūš manaŋhō īštā xšaθrəm: power is found in the
ability that good thought makes possible”. Again, I have to leave aside the
question of how to interpret this medium (good thought). On the other hand,
Kellens’ and Pirart's string of “(ritual) hold of the (ritual) acts of. . . the
divine Thought” is not only absent from the entire Gāthic corpus in form but is
also conceptually problematic. There are only two passages where
xšaθra- ‘power’ is in any way associated with
iiaoθəna- ‘act’ (Y 33.14 “power of the (ritual) act” and 33.1
“power through the (ritual) act”). In each case the “ritual act” plays a role
along with other positively marked terms, which together yield “power” for the
divinity, along with other valued spiritual goods. There is no conceptually
significant relationship between
iiaoθəna- ‘act’ and xšaθra- ‘power’. We are
then left with ratuš
+
iiaoθanan
m aŋhəūš on one hand, and vaŋhəūš
manaŋhō xšaθrəmcā on the other: the measure of actions (or
enactments) of existence, on one hand, and the power of good thought, on the
other.
4. The problem of ratu-
But what is ratu-, which I have been translating as “measure”?
In the Later Avestan texts ratu- refers to a number of things:
to cyclic time periods marked by observances and festivals, and their tutelary
divinities (Y 1.3–9); to “chiefs” of living creatures (Vr 1.1)Footnote
25
; to sacred texts that are offered in sacrifice in formal ceremonies (Y
1.10–19); and finally to Ahura Mazdā and Zarathuštra, the supreme authorities
of celestial and earthly domains respectively (Vr 2.4). The essential work on
these first chapters of Yasna and Visprad texts is Kellens’ “Commentaire sur
les premiers chapitres du Yasna”. According to Kellens (Reference Kellens1996: 102–104), the term ratu- has four
different meanings in these texts, two inherited from the Indo-Iranian period,
and two innovative ones. In the inherited usage, like its “équivalent skr.
tú-, ratu- désigne étymologiquement une
période récurrente du temps (ou des fonctions biologiques) et, en virtu du
précieux parallèle védico-avestique RS 1.162.19 – Y 29.6, une parole divine,
qui, dans les Gāthās, est prononcée par Ahura Mazdā et
consiste à définir une régle conforme à l'Agencement
(a
ā
hacā)”. The characterisation of
ratu- as a type of “divine speech” is problematic though,
if the emphasis is placed on ‘speech’. The Ṛgvedic evidence adduced almost
certainly points to ‘rule’ or ‘measure’ as instituted by the gods, which the
sacrificer has to take into account and follow in his immolation.Footnote
26
Kellens also believes that Ahura Mazdā and Zarathuštra are the highest
“prototypes” of living creatures, the “first as the ratu of
the celestial gods, and the second as the ratu of terrestrial
humans”. This development is based, according to him (1996: 103ff.), on
priestly speculations on Y 27.13 and Y 29.6. But the context of Vr 2.4 where
the designation of Mazdā and Zarathuštra as ratu occurs does
not allow Kellens’ interpretation, nor does the supposed “origin” (i.e., Y
27.13, 29.6) warrant such a derivation. From the Later Avestan commentary and
ritual references to Y 27.13 one may conclude that the ratu-
of the Ahuna Vairiia acquired its specific Later Avestan
meaning in the context of priestly speculations about the name of the god. In
other words, if a new sense could have developed by speculation from Y 27.13,
this sense could only have been that of ‘authority’, a certain kind of
authority, and not the prototypes of categories of beings as Kellens asserts.
But let us look the term in the Gāthās.
There is a stanza, Y 33.1, that could shed light on the sense the term has in the Gāthās, but on the condition that it is read in the context of the subsequent stanzas.
Y 33.1 yaθā āiš iθā varəšaitē, yā dātā aŋhəūš paouruiiehiiā
ratūš
iiaoθanā razištā, drəguuataēcā
hiia
cā a
āunē
ye
iiācā h
miiāsaitē, miθahiiā yācā hōi ārəzuuā
As you have wished, so will have been practiced the straightest actions, which were established (or: which you established) as the ratu- of the primordial existence for the partisan of druj as well as for the ašavan, and also for the one whose crooked and upright (actions) balance each other out.
The ratu- (plural) apply to all, it seems, if we take the last category as covering all those who belong neither with the partisans of aša nor with those of druj. This is perhaps the reason why scholars have thought it appropriate to translate ratu- with terms that feed the universality of its application, as it were, back into its semantics. Its divine origin also encourages placing it at beginnings, giving it the sense of ‘inaugurating’, e.g., a series. It must mean ‘model’ or ‘archetype’ (so Kellens and Pirart (1988: 122): “les actes (rituels) les plus directs, dont l'existence fondamentale a fait des modèles pour le partisan de la Tromperie, le partisan de l'Harmonie”, etc.) with the possible connotation that the gods have provided the archetypes of (ritual) actions not only for the ašavan but also for the drugvant. For Insler (1975b: 50) the word means divine “(final) judgment” that has all deeds meet with their just reward. For Humbach (1991 I: 136) ratu- is the “judge” in this context but generally means divine judgment (so his translation of Y 44.16cc’ “Accord (as) a judgment bright (things to be) in my house, O Healer of existence”, which is incomprehensible to me). The term ‘judge’ (or ‘judgment’) seems to be a modern phenomenon, as far as I can tell. In the Later Avestan texts ratu- generally has four related senses: a religiously significant period of time or species; a recited text in sacrifice; or a position of authority. The latter seems to refer to an authority of a special kind, namely one that presides over the implementation of Zoroastrian teachings in the daily life. The rules for observances of mundane life and those for the sacrifice proper belong to the very center of one's existence. How one conducts oneself in the most seemingly banal matter has a consequence not just for one's own possibility of salvation but also for the outcome of the cosmic struggle. Every sphere of social life has its role to play in this affair. We learn from Y 19.16–18 that for each level of social integration there is a ratu. Y 19.16 tells us there are five levels of ratu-ship; Y 19.18 names them. The development of a new form of social authority responded to a need that had its root in religious observance, both a constant occasion for priestly reflection and an object of speculative elaboration.
Y 33.2–4 refers to the most basic principles of conduct in a few, particularly significant contexts of social life, clearly meant for the ašavan. The person who harms the partisan of druj, and the one who offers hospitality to his guest meet the supreme god's approval (Y 33.2). He who strives to be helpful to the partisan of aša along with his family, community and tribe; and he who dedicates himself to caring for the cow – he will find himself in the “pasture of aša and of good thought” (Y 33.3).Footnote 27 The poet wishes to conjure away by means of ceremonial action (or rites) all malice against the god, and remove the contempt and deceit that he finds in his social circles, and finally cast away the evil intention from the pasture of the cow (Y 33.4). Here we have the social functions of the Gāthic priest. This last stanza prepares the shift to another register. From this point, the context is no longer that of social life but of sacrifice, where the poet imagines himself meeting and speaking with his divine interlocutor (Y 33.6), having indicated his competence for such an audience (Y 33.5). The metaphor of the charioteer's arriving at his destination (auuaŋhāna-) serves as the setting for an articulation of various elements or conditions that are involved in attaining the company of the gods (Y 33.5–6). We see from this context that ratu- pertains to existence, and more exactly, to the ways one should conduct oneself in respect of certain vital matters. And, if I am not mistaken, these matters are placed in two more or less distinct registers, social or worldly and eschatological. So in this context ratu- should perhaps be translated as ‘rule’. If I have preferred the term ‘measure’ it is because this term not only connects with the Vedic and Later Avestan usages – in fact it already contains them in its semantic field – but also it is etymologically most suitable, if in fact it is derived from PIE *h2er ‘join’ (Mayrhofer Reference Mayrhofer1992–2001:p. 257; Rix Reference Rix2001: pp. 269–270). There is a ‘measure’ of everyday life: the day is ‘measured out’ or ‘arranged’ in sections marked by observances; and so are the month and the year (the calendar): a complete life schedule. There is also a sacrificial measure, a measure of the rites of offering to the gods, etc., where the sequence of texts defines the measure of the ceremony, whose very success depends on the proper arrangement of these texts, which thus end up being designated as ‘measures’ themselves.
5. The problem of dada
What is dada
in Y 27.13c’ “yim drigubiiā dada
vāstārəm: (for Ahura) whom
dada
as the pastor for the needy?” Kellens and Pirart understand it as the
3rd sing. pres. of dā ‘set or place’ in the
subjunctive mood. Humbach (1991 I: 115) reads it as the 3rd pl.
injunctive present of the same root: “whom (people) appoint as a shepherd to
the poor”. Insler also interprets it as a plural injunctive but he makes
Amə
a Spəṇtas the subject of the verb, and Zarathuštra the object.
“I have translated dada
as 3pl., since the verbal form again markedly refers back to the 2pl.
in 29.2c k
m hōi uštā ahurəm. The idea is clear: once the
Amə
a Spəṇtas, and particularly Vohū Manō, found Z. to be fit
enough to bear the burden of caring for the cow and the community of the
truthful on earth, they invest him with this office and appoint him prophet of
the lord. These heavenly forces of the Wise Lord are the implied subject of
dada
, and the phrase in question is testimony to the elevation of Z. as
worldly lord following in the footsteps of god” (Insler Reference Insler and Duchesne-Guillemin1975a: 420). None of this is tenable. As we have seen,
there is nothing in the text of reference (Y 29) that supports his
interpretation. Hintze (2007: 324) makes the impersonal “one” the subject: “the
Lord whom one has appointed as a herdsman for the destitute”. Is it a
substitute for the anonymous plural subject, since she does not read the verb
as a subjunctive? In any case, the impersonal construction is rare in the
Gāthās. Kellens and Pirart have xšaθra- of Y 27.13c as the
subject of the relative clause. This seems to be the best option.
The subject and the object of the relative clause are named at the end of the main clause. The object is present in the relative clause as accusative relative pronoun. The subject is projected into the clause by the association just evoked in the previous pāda. Y 27.13c is then a pivot on either side of which something significant is said about the relationship between xšaθra- ‘power’ and ahura. But why is the verb of the relative clause in the subjunctive mood? According to Kellens and Pirart (1990, 83) one of the usages of the present subjunctive in a relative clause is to indicate a consecutive state or action. This means that this latter can take place on the condition that the action described in the main clause is already accomplished. Thus, not only the stanza expresses two significant relationships of ‘power’ and ahura but it also articulates the ‘exchange system’ of sacrifice, where a whole ideology of the relation between mortals and the gods is at stake.
Conclusion
-
Y 27.13aa’ yaθā ×ahū.vaiiriō, aθā ratuš a
ā
cī
hacā
-
bb’ vaŋhəūš dazdā manaŋhō, +
iiaoθənan
m aŋhəūš mazdāi
-
cc’ xšaθrəmcā ahurāi.ā, yim drigubiiō dada
vāstārəm
“Just as the ethical (measure), so the soteriological measure of the actions of existence is assigned to Mazdā, and to Ahura the power of good thought, whom (that power) will make the pastor for the needy”.
The specific translations of Gāthic expressions I have offered are obviously
suggestions. But I believe that any future improvement will have to take into
account the arguments put forward above. In the case of
a
ā
hacā the most likely scenario is that we are
dealing with a fixed expression that designates a definite function. The
orientation with respect to a specific place (or mental notion) expressed in
the ablative form takes on the further sense of a purpose, which turns the
expression into an adnominal characterising the function of the noun that it
modifies. We can have no doubt that Iranian arta (Avestan
aša) has, among others, a spatial sense; it signifies the
divine sphere, a locale which is also a state of fulfilment. In the so-called
Daiva Inscription of Xerxes we come across these lines: “martiya hya
avanā dātā pariyaita tya Auramazdā nīštāya utā Auramazdām yadataiy
×
artā hacā barzmaniya hauv utā jīva šiyāta bavatiy utā marta artāvā
bavatiy: the man who respects these laws which Ahura Mazdā has
established, and worships Ahura Mazdā ×
artā hacā barzmaniya, he will be happy (while) alive and will
be artāvan (when) dead”.Footnote
28
The restoration of artācā to artā
hacā is due to Herrenschmidt (Reference Herrenschmidt1993), which, according to her, modifies barzmaniy.
It would be very interesting if artā hacā turned out to have
the same functional significance as Avestan
a
ā
hacā. However this might be, one thing is
clear: once dead, if one has worshipped Ahura Mazdā as it is required, one
becomes an artāvan, a ‘companion of’ or ‘one in the company
of’ or ‘one associated with arta’. In the Yasna Haptanghāiti
(Y 37.4) a
a- is characterised, among others, as
raocōŋhuua
“possessed of celestial lights”. In earthly life one may achieve the
quality of ašavan, but in the celestial realm one who has
achieved that quality enjoys the bliss of being in (the state of)
aša.Footnote
29
I have argued on syntactic, semantic and textual grounds that in Y 27.13a we have to read ahū.vairiiō, a determinative attribute of an implied nominative, ratu-. I do not think there can be any objection against this reading save one: that the later tradition saw in the pāda an instruction about the ‘lord’, whether it is taken to be the supreme god or his earthly deputy. Did the Zoroastrian priests and scholars misunderstand this most fundamental expression of their faith? Posing the question like this leads only to confusion. The Ahuna Vairiia was from the beginning the vignette articulation of Zoroastrianism (even composed for this purpose?) and hence a teaching about the supreme ‘lord’ and ‘guide’. If we wish to understand the process of the ‘rehearing’ of the words, we have to find out of what this teaching consisted, which at the most basic level is a doctrine about words. There is nothing roguish in this claim: the same speculative process that resulted in expecting to find the ‘guide’ (or ‘judge’) in ratu- also underpinned hearing in the first pāda an instruction about the ‘lord’: ahū vairiiō. What is so natural about the semantic development of ratu- that it should bear virtually nothing more than a notice? And what is so monstrous about the, let us say, syntactic development of ahū that one should not want to consider it? The twofold appointment of Ahura Mazdā as the powerful god who gives measure is seen reflected in the nominative epithets. The occurrence of the two words ahu- and ratu- within the structure (yaθā. . . aθā. . .) that clearly assimilates them as designating the ‘arranger’ (dazdā as understood by the LAv. exegete of Y 19.13) of existence produces the nominative ahū necessary for the comprehensive formula of appointment.
