Electing Chávez is a focused, serious, and creative case study that helps to reorder priorities for those trying to understand what in the world is happening to one of the significant political currents in Latin America. President Chávez would do well to read Gates, should he wish to better understand how his failed coup of 1992 was transformed into the successful election of 1998, how to understand the political significance of the powerful business elites, and how to avoid the pitfalls of a rentier state. President Chávez has so far failed to achieve many of his cherished goals, and yet a significant percentage of Venezuelans continue to support him in spite of broken promises and obvious failures. This case study of the presidential politics of business elites opens the door to some related questions. Will Chávez avoid the economic failures of his hero Fidel Castro and the populist errors of Juan Perón of Argentina?
Before examining some of the more significant details of this well-researched case study, I propose to place President Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías in his proper historical framework. Lt. Col. Chávez was elected to his first term as president of Venezuela in December 1998, but was detained and briefly deposed by a rebellious military junta in 2002. An interim president, Pedro Carmona, tried to return to a pre-Chávez political structure, but failed. Within four days of the initial coup, Chávez was allowed to return as the legitimately elected president of the country.
The subsequent electoral history of the executive and legislative branches includes a second presidential election in 2000 (Chávez with 59 percent of votes), a failed attempt at a presidential recall in 2004 (59 percent of voters opposed), and a third presidential election in December 2006 with 61 percent of votes cast in his favor.
The latest election (September 2010) has given the Chavistas—now united under the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV)—139 legislative seats out of a total of 165. The previous election for the single-chamber National Assembly (2005) gave the Chavistas—originally designated as the Fifth Republic Movement—116 seats representing nearly 60 percent of the legislative assembly. The September 2010 election was represented by both opponents and supporters of Chávez as a referendum on past policies and a harbinger of Venezuela's future. The election created controversy among neighbors as far as Chile, where a representative group of senators asked to be designated as official observers but (at this writing) were denied entry.
Taken together, these proximate parliamentary elections and the subsequent presidential elections (probably in December 2012) represent a referendum on the populist and authoritarian style used by Chávez to redefine the structure of representative institutions. In light of this significant effort to redefine institutional dynamics by undermining traditional partitocracía and redirecting economic policies, any serious attempt to explain how Chávez gained, and maintains, power will make a useful contribution to Latin American scholarship.
Contemporary Venezuelan politics are complicated as much by a history of corruption and violence as by the substance and style of the authoritarian and charismatic Chávez. The 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International (TI) defines Venezuela as one of the most corrupt countries of Latin America and the world. The TI index defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The 180 countries evaluated by TI range from 10 (very clean) to 0 (very corrupt). Venezuela rates a 2.0 (ranked 167th) along with Bangladesh, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Of all other Latin American countries listed, only Haiti is rated more corrupt than Venezuela, while Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile and Cuba are all rated significantly less corrupt than Venezuela.
A balanced evaluation of Chávez has been complicated by the polarization of supporters and opponents, both inside and outside of Venezuela. He has been demonized in the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal and praised as a savior by film director Oliver Stone. Cardinal Jorge Urosa Savino, primate of Venezuela, has warned that Chávez is leading Venezuela toward a Marxist dictatorship. While some experts have compared Chávez to Cuba's Castro and Libya's al-Qaddafi (and Chávez compares himself to Simón Bolívar), an objective approach is taken by Michael Shifter, who sees both strengths and weaknesses in the person, style, and public policies of Chávez. Shifter compares the politics of Chávez to that of Juan Perón, president of Argentina (1946–1955, 1973–1974). Perón's Third Way was known as Justicialismo and had numerous similarities to Chávez's Bolivarismo with its corresponding demonization of the rich and appeal to the poor masses, so characteristic of Chavistas.
President Chávez has personally intensified the controversies over his political strategies by encouraging anti-neoliberal currents throughout Latin America and forging political and economic alliances with a wide range of countries such as Iran, China, North Korea, and Bolivia. So upcoming elections can usefully be understood within the rich historical examples of past Latin American leaders. We now turn to the insights of author Leslie Gates.
Gates explains her approach to the case study by questioning whether anyone should have been surprised by the election of an anti-neoliberal president in 1998. By the early 1990s, many Venezuelans had already lost confidence in the traditional political establishment with its record of corruption and inefficiency. Gates's research suggests that business elites played a more important role than was previously acknowledged. This research helps to explain two traditional puzzles, one concerning widespread voter support, the other concerning support from the business elites.
The author does not believe that, taken alone, the traditional interpretations of the election of Chávez are sufficient to explain his initial victory. One might also question the usual interpretations of why Chávez has maintained strong popular support in spite of some significant political obstacles and economic failures. The author singles out in careful detail most of the weaknesses and inconsistencies in the traditional explanations for the election of Chávez. There is, on the one hand, the thesis that the traditional political institutions had become alarmingly corrupt and increasingly exclusionary, and, on the other hand, the widespread thesis that polarization of the electorate effectively opened the political doors to this unsophisticated and inexperienced presidential candidate.
The more traditional interpretations for the election of Chávez are acknowledged to have some interpretive force. But they also need to be amended and readjusted with the data that the author has obtained from extensive interviews and from new studies of corruption scandals, with extensive biographical data from cabinet ministers responsible for economic policies, and, finally, from abundant interviews of selected congressional leaders who had relevant business experience. Such data serve to reinforce those related interpretations that explain how and why specific business leaders believed that their chances of maintaining access to state resources would be better served with the candidate Chávez than with the other candidates, both moderate and radical.
Finally, the author effectively argues that her research introduces a new analytical focus on the politics of antibusiness sentiment and the role of state dependence. Voters had become so skeptical of corrupt and ineffectual business elites that they were willing to give a chance to an outspoken, anti-neoliberal candidate such as Chávez. While the average voter may not be guided by a sophisticated theoretical analysis, a significant number of business elites (“elite outliers”) supported Chávez (and perhaps still do so) because they feared that the traditional candidates could not (or would not) guarantee their access to state resources (especially oil), an access that is essential for continued business success.
Within the context of this framework, questions about the future of Venezuelan politics, about political leaders advocating unorthodox economic policies, and about populist politics will depend on the success President Chávez has in maintaining the confidence of a significant percentage of the business elites. He is likely to face growing internal and external opposition in the future. Continued support from the poor is not sufficient. He must maintain the support, however grudgingly, of business elites.
