Joel Migdal has made extremely important contributions to the study of Middle East politics, particularly in the Israeli–Palestinian area, and to comparative politics more generally. Here he takes on the daunting task of not only critiquing seventy years of American policy in the region but also suggesting a new grand strategy to better accomplish American goals. He tells a story of waves of regional change and American policy makers too caught up in Cold War dynamics or too ignorant of regional realities to deal intelligently with those changes. Those with some background on the region will be familiar with this narrative. Students and general readers can benefit from reading so learned a scholar and so skillful a writer's version of this oft-told tale. However, they are likely to be left with a few important questions that Migdal does not answer. It is a brave author who offers policy prescriptions in book form for a region changing as rapidly as is the Middle East. Migdal's recommendations are very sensible, but one wonders if the assumptions upon which he bases them have already been overtaken by events.
Migdal presents the story of the post–World War II Middle East without many curve balls or change-ups. Arab nationalism dominates the regional agenda until 1967, and declines thereafter. Political Islam enters the scene in 1979 and sets the regional agenda thereafter. Popular revolts against authoritarian governments—2009 in Iran, the Arab uprisings since late 2010, even Gezi Park 2013 against an increasingly authoritarian Erdogan—have set the stage for a new phase in regional history. American policy has followed these events more than led them, during the Cold War winning some tactical victories but never being able to organize the region to its liking. Realizing its limitations and fearing a confrontation with the Soviets, Washington largely acted through local allies during this period. The combination of the end of the Cold War and the traumatic attacks of 11 September 2001 led the George W. Bush administration to take a more directly imperial tack, using American military might to try to restructure not only the regional balance of power but also state–society relations within regional states, with the disastrous results all but the most blinkered now acknowledge. He portrays the Obama administration as coming into office knowing that the imperial turn had failed, seeking a new tactical approach but still wedded to many of his predecessor's views of the region. For Migdal, Obama's policy “simply imploded” (p. 290) in the face of the Arab upheavals of 2011, and since then the American approach to the region has been “seat of the pants . . . with policies geared to the past and irrelevant to the future” (p. 291).
One can agree or disagree with the criticisms of specific presidents. But what Migdal's narrative will not help the reader understand is why, after decades of concentration on Arab–Israeli issues and the Levant, the focus of American policy has shifted so dramatically to the Persian Gulf region. That is because the oil factor is substantially absent from his tale. Of course he acknowledges the importance of oil in American Middle East strategy, but he does not weave it in any substantial way into the flow of events. One glaring example, from the early 1970s, will have to suffice. He calls the Black September crisis of 1970 “a key turning point for America's presence in the Middle East” (p. 59) and spends fifteen pages on the event, despite the fact that the American–Israeli strategic relationship predated it and went through all sorts of ups and downs after it, and despite the fact that there was no appreciable change in the American military posture in the region after it. He then spends less than a paragraph on the Arab oil embargo of 1973–74 (p. 98) that quadrupled energy prices, shifted the regional balance of power toward the oil producers, and refocused American strategy on the oil patch.
Migdal's previous work on the region was very focused on the Arab–Israeli area, and his treatment of events in the Gulf suffers in comparison. He places far more importance on Saddam Hussein's meeting with US Ambassador April Glaspie in the days before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (pp. 109–10) than the scholarship on the Gulf War accords it. He has an Iranian mine sinking an American ship during the Iran–Iraq War (p. 107), when American ships struck mines but none were lost, and neglects to mention that an American naval vessel shot down a civilian Iranian airliner in 1988, killing all on board, in an event that soon after led Iran to accept a cease fire in that war. But his treatment of specific Gulf events is less important than the conceptual gap readers will have to negotiate in figuring out just why, after so much American attention has been given to the Arab–Israeli conflict, Washington since the 1980s has been fighting wars in the Gulf.
In his policy recommendations Migdal very sensibly calls for a new American focus on the Arab Peace Initiative as an opportunity to end the Arab–Israeli conflict (p. 349). However, it is harder to see how such a move will change the regional power situation, as he proposes. He argues that Arab–Israeli peace will remove the barrier to what he sees as a natural alignment of Israel and Sunni Arab states, supported by the United States, against Iran. But it is difficult to see how Israel can provide much help against Iran, which is spreading its influence not through conventional war (where the Israelis excel), but rather through the skillful development of clients and allies in the ongoing struggles in weak and collapsing Arab states, something that Israel failed utterly to be able to pull off in Lebanon in the 1980s. He also does not take into account the rightward shift in Israeli politics, confirmed in the Knesset election of 2015, that makes the prospect of real peace with the Palestinians even more remote. His advocacy of an Israeli–American–Sunni Arab alignment against Iran also misses the one real breakthrough in the Obama administration's Middle East policy—a nuclear deal with Iran.
His policy proposals also make no mention of the recrudescence of Salafi jihadist extremism in the form of the so-called Islamic State. This is hardly a criticism of Migdal. Were he writing now, he would certainly have dealt with what American policy on the issue should be. It is simply an acknowledgement that putting policy recommendations between hard covers, where they take many months to reach readers’ hands, runs inherent risks in such a fluid period in the Middle East. While I would have told the story differently and come up with another set of policy recommendations, I admire Migdal's willingness to take these risks—to assay such a large topic and to forthrightly put forward such specific policy recommendations.
