René Descartes was not a chemist – so why a book called Descartes et la chimie? Bernard Joly's insightful analysis concedes from the beginning that the French philosopher never wrote a dedicated chemical treatise. Yet, as he convincingly argues, chemistry did play a significant role in the formulation of Descartes's ideas. Thus Joly highlights two important aspects: first, that Descartes dabbled in chemical practice himself, and second, that Cartesian philosophy was developed against the background of the alchemical philosophy of the first half of the seventeenth century.
Descartes criticized alchemy and alchemists openly on several occasions, mocking their ‘ignorant’ and ‘unintelligible’ ideas. This censure should not be understood as an attempt to differentiate between alchemy and chemistry, which was never his intention. Rather, it should be seen as a rejection of the theoretical part of the alchemy of his period. As Joly points out, early modern alchemy represented a complex body of ideas that a new philosopher like Descartes had to reckon with. In other words, we should not interpret Descartes's negative attitude toward alchemical theories as proving their weakness or unintelligibility; instead, we should perceive it as the strategic choice of a new philosopher trying to affirm his own distinctiveness and originality against an older and still effervescent body of thought. The exchange between Descartes and Pierre Gassendi is enlightening in this respect: Gassendi reproaches Descartes for propounding the doctrine of the soul as a separate entity from matter without performing a ‘quasi-chemical’ analysis on his own soul to discover its substance (labore quodam quasi chymico) (p. 154). As Joly rightfully contends, Gassendi here assumed that the chemical analysis constituted the model of all knowledge. Descartes responded ironically and dismissively, without truly addressing the matter that Gassendi had raised. This approach was typical of his tactic of disengaging from alchemical thought. Rather than going into the substance of alchemical philosophy, Descartes preferred to decry the ‘chimaeras’ of alchemists and the unintelligible nature of their language.
At the same time, Descartes's mockery of the alchemists’ ideas did not stop him from taking some of their objects and interests and incorporating them into his own philosophical framework. Thus his proposal of three elements (the luminous matter of the stars, the transparent medium of the skies and the opaque matter of the earth) was subtly opposed to the Paracelsian tria prima. Moreover, Descartes was hoping to use chemical practice as a way of proving the superiority of his own philosophy. He experimented with chemistry on several occasions, as he himself stated to Marin Mersenne, Constantin Huygens, William Cavendish and others, although he remained throughout his life, according to Joly, a ‘mediocre chemist’ (p. 15). Yet Descartes's true ambition was to prove that chemical results could be obtained within his philosophical framework. Hence the French thinker attempted to explain chemical processes such as distillation, gunpowder explosions or fermentation in mechanical terms (pp. 122–129).
Descartes hence intended to reduce chemistry to mechanical physics. There was no room, as Joly points out, for chemistry as an autonomous science: Descartes's view was contoured by the belief that there could only be one science, and that was mechanical physics. Chemical theories had no ontological reality in his world, where everything was reducible to shape, size and movement. If the practical corpus of chemistry could not be denied or dismissed, it could, however, be explained and integrated into Cartesian philosophy.
Another quarrel that Descartes had with chemical theory was related to his rejection of empirical knowledge. True knowledge, he believed, did not come from the senses, but from the pure act of thought. For Descartes, reality was only accessible from within the mind; it alone could understand the underlying geometry of all things. By comparison, chemical knowledge, which dealt with matter as discoverable by the senses, was an illusory science. Neither experiment nor observation could penetrate to the reality of things.
Despite Descartes's rejection of chemistry as a science, there were followers who sought to apply Cartesian ideas to chemistry. Joly's fifth and final chapter seeks to clarify the true reception of Descartes amongst later seventeenth-century and early eighteenth-century chemists. As Joly observes, classical historiography of science has often overvalued Descartes's influence on chemistry, due to its assumption that the latter's corpuscularianism was a sign of Cartesianism or Gassendism (p. 15). In fact, as William Newman has proven, corpuscularianism had solid roots in medieval alchemy. By comparison, the reception of Descartes in chemistry was piecemeal and often contradictory to the Cartesian metaphysical framework. Even the self-entitled ‘Cartesian’ chemists like Jacques Rohault and Pierre-Sylvain Régis picked out those concepts of Descartes that best suited their views. The problem fundamentally lay, Joly suggests, in the empirical tendency of these chemists, in contrast with the theoretical nature of Descartes's own method. In the first half of the eighteenth century, in the context of Malebranche's theories and resistance to Newtonianism, a new attempt was made to create a Cartesian chemistry, but this came to no substantial conclusion.
It is clear, Joly concludes, that under a Cartesian scientific framework, chemistry would have never acquired the status of a science. At most, it would have survived only as a technology, in a perpetuation of the scholastic rejection of alchemy. If chemistry did become accepted as a science, it was in spite of the Cartesian mechanical reduction. Yet the ‘scientific’ status of chemistry was also obtained as a compromise. Chemistry had to abandon its claims to a global concept of nature and accept a diminished position as an explanation of the sensitive realm. By comparison, the new physics, whose language of choice became mathematics, laid a powerful ontological claim to a reality lying beyond the senses. As Joly points out, this demarcation implied that physics would always hold a privileged position in relation to chemistry under the framework of modern science.
