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The Real-Time Impact of the War on Russian Imports: A Synthetic Control Method Approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2024

Michele Mancini*
Affiliation:
Banca d'Italia, Roma 00184, Italy
Francesco Paolo Conteduca
Affiliation:
Banca d'Italia, Roma 00184, Italy
Alessandro Borin
Affiliation:
Banca d'Italia, Roma 00184, Italy
*
Corresponding author: Michele Mancini; Email: michele.mancini@bancaditalia.it
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Abstract

In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the EU and most other advanced economies imposed extensive sanctions on Russia, intending to harm its production capabilities and hinder its economic activities by restricting its access to international trade and financial markets. This paper develops an empirical framework based on the synthetic control method to assess the impact of the war and the following sanctions on bilateral and sectoral exports to Russia almost in real time. The war and the following sanctions reduced aggregate exports to Russia by a third between March and December 2022, with the effects being stronger for sanctioning countries than for non-sanctioning ones, albeit with substantial country-level heterogeneity within each group. Exports to Russia in high-tech sectors – relatively more targeted by trade sanctions – have been disproportionately affected.

Information

Type
Original Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Secretariat of the World Trade Organization
Figure 0

Figure 1. Effects of war and sanctions on exports to RussiaNote: On the vertical axis, we report observed and synthetic exports to Russia in USD bn.

Figure 1

Figure 2. Effects of war and sanctions on exports to Russia, sanctioning vs. non-sanctioning countriesNote: On the vertical axis, we report the percentage difference between the observed and counterfactual exports to Russia for sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries.

Figure 2

Figure 3. Effects of war and sanctions on exports to Russia by origin country (March–April vs. October–December)Note: Differences from the counterfactual are in percentage points.

Figure 3

Figure 4. Effects of war and sanctions on manufacturing exports to Russia (March–April vs. October–December)Note: Differences from the counterfactual are in percentage points.

Figure 4

Figure 5. Effects of war and sanctions on exports to Russia in selected sectorsNote: For sanctioning (right-hand-side axis, inverted scale) and non-sanctioning countries (left-hand-side axis), we report the average monthly difference in the last quarter of 2022 between the observed and synthetic exports to Russia in the given sector.

Figure 5

Figure 6. Effects of war and sanctions in the high-tech sectors, the case of TurkeyNotes: Left panel, exports from Turkey to Russia. Right panel, exports from sanctioning countries to Turkey. On the vertical axis, we report observed and synthetic trade flows in USD bn.

Figure 6

Figure 7. Effects of war and sanctions in the high-tech sectors, the case of TurkeyNotes: Differences from the counterfactual are in percentage points in the left panel and in USD bn in the right panel. Both panels refer to the last quarter of 2022. High-tech sectors correspond to Chapters 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, and 90 of the Harmonized System.

Figure 7

Figure 8. “In-time” placebo effect (shock in June 2021)Notes: Left panel, aggregate Russian imports, observed and synthetic exports to Russia in USD bn. Right panel, sanctioning vs. non-sanctioning countries, percentage difference between the observed and counterfactual exports to Russia for sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries.