This narrative history of a century of US policy towards Cuba is impressively researched and splendidly written. It becomes the instant standard on its subject. Its emphasis is on US policy since the late 1950s, its sources are principally US archives, and its sweep is comprehensive. Schoultz has a knack for identifying in the historical record the telling phrase, the apt metaphor, the outrageous statement and the powerful insight, and these serve to enliven a very lengthy book.
The phrase in the main title – ‘that infernal little Cuban Republic’ – is taken from President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906. It captures well how US presidents, and many US elites, have felt about Cuba to the present day. An equally ancient comment from Governor-General Leonard Wood, the chief US colonial official in Cuba in 1901, still applies well to the often ridiculous and consistently counterproductive US policies of the recent past. As Wood put it, ‘It is next to impossible to make [Cubans] believe that we have only their own best interests at heart’ (quoted on p. 13). Wood's sentence is the discursive and policy antecedent of the delirious Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, better known as Helms-Burton, as well as George W. Bush's 2004 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.
The book opens with 50 pages on US–Cuban relations during the first half of the twentieth century and the Truman presidency. It appropriately devotes 100 pages to the Eisenhower administration (before and after the revolutionary victory in 1959). The Kennedy administration, too, receives two chapters, not so much on the 1962 missile crisis that others have covered well, but on the Bay of Pigs and US ‘state-sponsored terrorism’. Subsequent presidencies get one chapter each, with the longest of these (70 pages) being on the Carter presidency, in part because it combined both attempts at reconciliation and serious conflict during a four-year period.
Schoultz wants to tell the story of US policy toward Cuba – that is why the book is organised chronologically and by presidential administration, which enables him to zero in on governmental decision making in the context of time and the times. Schoultz is an artful storyteller for these policy debates and often silly decisions. As a result of these authorial choices, he states the book's analytical argument briefly only in the introduction and conclusion; theorising or hypothesis testing is not his purpose.
The United States, Schoultz avers, had some rational interest-based reasons for its policies toward Cuba both before and after 1959. US officials long ago looked at the map and concluded that Cuba mattered for US strategy and security in the Americas and worldwide. This assessment explains the US response to Germany's incursions into the Caribbean during the world wars and its efforts to counter the Soviet Union in the region during the Cold War. Moreover, the United States had long had significant economic interests in Cuba. In 1959–61, US policy toward Cuba encountered severe threats to these two interests as Cuba expropriated US properties and aligned in every respect with the Soviet Union.
Schoultz argues persuasively, however, that those two considerations, while important, fail to account for the kinds of policies that the United States has adopted toward Cuba, and their duration. Instead, Schoultz devotes the bulk of his empirical effort to demonstrating that US policy toward Cuba persisted in emphasising a ‘civilising mission’ from Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood to the present day, with the slight variant that the contemporary version ‘remains largely hidden, embedded in a human rights context’ (p. 7). This ideology, plus the electoral impact of organised Cuban-American groups in Florida, explains the persistence of hyperventilating US policies towards Cuba beyond 1990, when there was no longer a Soviet Union and economic interests, to the extent they were present, mainly favoured freeing bilateral trade.
Schoultz's most important insight is that the United States and Cuba reached an accommodation. After helping to bring the world close to nuclear war, Cuban leaders never again crossed the line that would provoke the United States into pulverising Cuba into a parking lot. For their part, US policymakers concluded early in Lyndon Johnson's presidency that Cuba was not all that important. As Johnson reassured Senator William Fulbright, ‘I'm not getting into any Bay of Pigs deal’. Instead, the president said to Fulbright, ‘I'm just asking you what we ought to do to pinch their nuts more than we're doing’ (p. 5). Schoultz rightly concludes that nut-pinching has been US policy ever since.
Books of this sweep and quality are rare, but such books, too, deserve criticism. Schoultz's book is undertheorised. It is analytically unclear, for example, how it is that the two governments enter and sustain a path-dependent equilibrium (these are not Schoultz's words, but this is what he seems to mean). This remains, for the most part, unexplained; instead Schoultz supplies us with hundreds of pages of stories that sometimes relate to such an equilibrium (pp. 171, 221), but most times do not.
One explanatory weakness is the question of whether Schoultz believes that Cuban foreign policy helps to explain US policy. Schoultz argues that it did in the 1959–62 period, as noted above, when core US security and economic interests were threatened. There are other examples: Schoultz notes that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger came to believe that Cuba had stopped its subversion of other countries so US policy toward Cuba could become more moderate (pp. 263, 271). For the most part, however, Schoultz is remarkably cavalier in his treatment of Cuban policy as a possible explanation for US government actions. Cuba's tens of thousands of troops in Angola and Ethiopia in the late 1970s are simply labelled ‘annoying to Washington’ (p. 310; also p. 320).
At other times Schoultz omits elements of Cuban behaviour, admitted in public by its own leaders at the time, that serve to explain aspects of the US response, even if Schoultz is right that in many such instances the US response was disproportionate and ill-advised. In 1977 and 1978, former Katanga (Shaba) province gendarmes invaded Shaba from Angola. US officials made ill-informed, extreme accusations about Cuban involvement, which were in most cases false. Schoultz gets this right, but he misses what Cuba admitted to doing. In May–June 1978, in Granma Weekly Review, President Fidel Castro commented on the view attributed to the US government that ‘Cuba could have supplied and reorganised the Katangan force in Angola as early as 1975’, writing, ‘There is some truth to this because, during the war in Angola, the Katangans fought on the side of the MPLA … and they fought alongside us on a few fronts’.
The war in El Salvador presents a second example. Schoultz is quite right in his fundamental assessment of that war and his critique of the Reagan administration's responses. Yet, reading Schoultz, no one would know that Cuba admitted early on that it had helped to train Salvadorean guerrillas, or would be aware of Castro's acknowledgment as early as 1981 that Cuba had supplied weapons and ammunition to the Salvadorean guerrillas in late 1980 and early 1981 for the general offensive, noting only that it had become more difficult for Cuba to do so (see this reviewer's To Make a World Safe for Revolution, p. 136). Cuba's material support for the Salvadorean guerrillas lasted throughout the 1980s. This Cuban behaviour helped to explain aspects of the US response.
The most general question is whether Castro's choice of policies helped to explain why the US government responded as it did. Schoultz quotes Bill Clinton's reminiscences about his policies toward Cuba: ‘And I almost think [Castro] doesn't want us to lift the embargo because it provides him with an excuse for the failures, the economic failures of his administration’ (p. 514). Jimmy Carter could have said the same. Were they wrong? Did Fidel Castro undermine the admittedly few and feeble attempts that could have changed the course of the shared history between the United States and Cuba? Were Cuban actions explanations for US policy? This thoughtful and important book, admirable in so many ways, does not say. Cuba, too, did some nut-pinching.
